Participation facilitates in the political realm
the pre-eminence of human development and self-determination, both committed
to the ideals of freedom and equality.
(Borter, quoted in Frenkel 1986).
At the outset, the 1991 Human Development Report emphasises "Development by the people -through appropriate structures of decision making, people must participate fully in the planning and implementation of development strategies". Participation can be defined briefly, for present purposes, as 'taking part in the formulation, passage or implementation of public policies' (Parry 1972). It is necessary, however, to be more specific as to the nature of participation in a particular context, and identify who takes part in what, when and how, and with what results. This is the task of the present section.
A distinction can be drawn between participation viewed in terms of active, broad-based local participation in political decision making, as an end in itself; and participation as a means to affect the appropriateness of decisions and enhance the impact of public expenditures upon efficiency, equity, private initiative and so on. These aspects can be referred to, respectively, as the developmental and instrumental values of participation (Parry 1972). Although this distinction is not always clear-cut, it does usefully reflect two approaches to thinking about participation. The former is clearly important, and much of the relevant literature is concerned with participation in the developmental sense. However our ultimate interest in the present survey lies in the instrumental aspect - the impact of local participation, be it broad based or not, upon decisions about the allocation of expenditures for human development. Even where local participation is characterised as being "subject to elite domination", it is still possible that there would be a positive impact upon decisions about human development. This ties into the discussion of comparative priorities below.
These issues are addressed in turn, under a number of headings; the mode, the intensity and the quality of participation, and then the impact of decentralisation and participation upon the nature of decisions made. First, as to whether decentralisation improves the modes of participation - we see that decentralisation typically involves the creation of additional formal structures, ostensibly aiming to increase local participation. Second, the question as to who effectively makes decisions at the local level is addressed - it is found that national officials and/or local elites often tend to dominate the process. Finally, and most importantly from our present point of view, the impact of local participation upon decision making and priorities is explored. Even in the absence of broad based participation, the actual decision makers may be responsive to interests other than their own, so that the quality of decision making is enhanced.
Developmental - Does Decentralisation Enhance Political Participation?
"Like a well-established and well-loved music hall
act, participation and local government are words often found in partnership"
(Bulpitt 1972).
Participation is an important theme of many writings on decentralisation. The emphasis tends to be upon its political dimension, exploring the extent to which decentralisation effectively involves people in decisions about, inter alia, local development. Managing one's own affairs is held to be an integral element of human development, the objective being to maximise the opportunities for individuals to participate in the decisions which affect their lives.
Decentralization and participation are often positively linked. The underlying belief is that local decision making structures will facilitate the genuine involvement of all the people, in issues of direct concern to their needs and interests. This in turn assumes both the desire of individuals to take part in local government, and the existence of appropriate forums which allow and encourage the free expression of their interests. Local government is sometimes presented as a form of direct democracy, or at least as essential to the workings of the modern democratic state.
Yet there is no necessary correlation between broad based local participation and decentralisation. The relationship depends basically upon the social, economic and political setting, and the type of decentralisation enacted. In some cases, 'true' devolution and increased participation were clearly not part of the national government's agenda; the objective was no more than a limited degree of deconcentration. A number of authors (e.g. Conyers, 1984; McGinn and Street, 1986; Collins 1989; Cassasus 1990; Samoff, 1990) have emphasised that decentralisation should be seen basically in terms of rearrangements of power, and tend to conclude that such policies often result in deconcentration, and primarily strengthen central power. Ideally we would want to examine participation (or the lack thereof) on the basis of concrete evidence, such as the holding, fairness, and competitiveness of elections, voter turnout, lobbying of representatives, etc... In practice one must resort to more secondary sources of information.
The mode of taking part in local decision making will differ according to the opportunities - institutional and informal - available, the interests and political resources of the potential participants, and the attitudes prevalent in the society (Parry 1972). It is generally inaccurate to describe a political decision in terms of a once-and-for-all act; rather there are typically a number of stages, ranging from putting an item on the agenda, through technical advice, discussion of favoured proposals, to enforcement of the final decision. For example, local participants may be more effective in putting matters of local concern on the agenda, and much less involved in the technical aspects of decision making.
The focus here is upon the institutional arrangements which have been created under the auspices of decentralisation. In several of the cases, there has been a negative relationship between 'decentralisation' and participation, and a tightening of central, often authoritarian, control. These examples typically, although not invariably, fall at the deconcentration end of the spectrum.
The foregoing proposition is supported by the above-mentioned country cases, as well as the experience of particular countries over time.
The Intensity and Quality of Participation : Who Makes Local Decisions
Who participates and with what frequency? The intensity of participation refers to the proportion of the population that takes part in political activity (Parry 1972). A related question lies in the quality of participation, or its effectiveness - whether the policy outcomes are those intended by the participants and the direct result of their actions. Voting, for example, is sometimes regarded as qualitatively inferior because it is distant from the legislative outcome, and the average voter takes no further part in the decision making process, abdicating her will to the electoral representative. In any case it is doubtful whether voting in an election where there is only one party amounts to 'real' participation. Even where an electoral system is formally open, the outcome may be as predictable as in one-party states because the opposition lacks the necessary resources (wealth, skill and organisation) for success. Alternatively the policies and platforms of the 'opposing' parties may be so similar that there is not, in reality, any real degree of choice exercised in the act of voting. On the other hand, going to the polls may be the most which can be expected of the average participant, in developing and industrial countries.
It has been argued that decentralisation, by multiplying the available modes of participation and by establishing institutional arrangements by which votes will be more closely linked with political consequences, improves the effectiveness of participation. Local knowledge of, and a commitment to, the community is said promote a desire to participate in local government. However there are numerous examples of formal attempts at decentralisation which have failed to engage the effective participation of local people in decisions about local development. Sometimes this is apparently because the national government never actually intended such a result to follow (as in the examples above). In other cases it may be in spite of the creation of structures ostensibly designed to facilitate local participation, often because of the dominance of decision making by official bureaucrats. In the following paragraphs, some of these are recounted.
National Officials
This survey has emphasised the likelihood that local government will be regarded simply as a technical and administrative arrangement within the national government machinery, which relieves the central authorities of direct responsibility of providing certain public services. The civil servants who staff the various central field agencies at the local level play a number of roles, including the provision of technical advice, the administration and co-ordination of services, and regulatory functions. It has been observed that they may also dominate local decision making, for reasons ranging from superior expertise to ulterior motives on the part of central authorities.
Critics argue that the community structure of committees does not encourage the articulation of interests which diverge from the official mass line. And correspondingly, some surveys have found that half the people saw the resident committees as 'nasty and meddling', another quarter viewed them neutrally, and only a quarter of the sample regarded them as helpful (ibid p. 204). The importance of the structure as a mechanism of political control was allegedly demonstrated in the aftermath of Tiennamen Square in 1989. The street offices and residents' committees were immediately mobilised to support the government, through organising political study groups, putting up pro-government banners and assisting the police in tracking down dissidents (Leung, 1990).
Local Elites
It is sometimes argued that community attachment and knowledge will lead to increased rates of participation in local affairs. But even where there is a substantial measure of devolution, participation on the part of those people previously excluded from decision making structures need not follow. Empirical studies have emphasised the importance of high social status (income, occupation and education), characteristics not necessarily confined to those with a high degree of community attachment, as indicators of high political participation rates in local government. The studies available suggest that power structures in small communities are often oligarchic in character, and that political activity is typically the preserve of the few and the more important the decisions are, the fewer the number of people involved (Bulpitt 1972). This contradicts the developmental objective of broad-based participation. Popular election does not always circumvent this problem. Given the distribution of assets (land), income, education, and client-patron relations, local elections tend to favour the rich and "well-born", especially in highly stratified societies.
The phenomenon of elite domination is not unique to local governments, nor to developing countries. The role of elites is one of the basic problems for direct, as well as indirect (representative) democracy. According to the U.S. political scientist Ostrom, the existence of an elite is unavoidable for any political system, be it democratic or not. It might be added that the postulate of participation in the sense of an equal influence of everyone is unrealistic inasmuch as it presupposes everybody having such an interest, in the face of a multitude of 'private' endeavours which might be much more effective, at least from the individual's point of view (e.g. meeting basic consumption needs).
Although we do not know how governmental structures affect political attitudes and behaviour, it seems reasonable to believe that the characteristics of local representative democracy will resemble, to a certain extent, democracy at the national level (Bulpitt 1972). Local systems of organisation are power systems, quite as much as national power structures. It has been argued that new local organisations are quickly taken over by those holding control in the existing structures (Ralston et al 1983).
Quotas are one possible means by which the observed tendency for elite domination can be redressed. They can ensure a minimum representation of deprived and minority groups.
The Instrumental Value of Participation - The Impact of Decentralisation on Local Decision Making
Instrumental theories portray participation as a means by which individuals can ensure that their interests are defended and promoted, and as a way to facilitate better information and communication, and therefore more effective government. Participation is also expected to induce enterprise, initiative and imagination which will benefit the whole community. Unfortunately the relationship between decentralisation and the degree of participation facilitated thereunder on the one hand, and the impact upon other objectives of human development on the other, is not clear-cut.
There is mixed evidence as to the instrumental aspects of participation in a decentralised system. McGinn and Street (1986) conclude their discussion of (educational) decentralisation in the following terms: "non-democratic governments will not use decentralisation to broaden democratic participation (no matter what their rhetoric), and whatever benefits result from increased efficiency will be distributed inequitably in an inequitable society" (p.490, italics added). Yet we will see evidence which contradicts this thesis. Indonesia, under a manifestly authoritarian regime, has achieved through the substantial decentralisation of expenditures on basic social and economic infrastructure, impressive strides in human development over the corresponding period. Such advances were equitably distributed across the archipelago, especially so in favour of the impoverished eastern islands. And in Taiwan, measures of decentralisation adopted in a state which was far from democratic have contributed to relatively equitable patterns of growth and infrastructure development.
It has already been observed that even where there is a thoroughgoing devolution of decision making power to local government, the poor may still be effectively excluded. Beyond simply labelling situations as being "subject to elite domination" however, it is necessary to pursue the issue further. Are local spokespersons, albeit members of the local elite, more appropriate and/or beneficial than the alternative of central control? Elite groups may act solely out of self interest, or be regarded as more capable representatives of local communities. Similarly, where civil servants and nominated individuals dominate local decision making they are not, automatically, less responsive to local demands. Local constituents may prefer to contact field agency officials rather than their locally elected representatives. Finally it is noted that the fact that most important decisions are made in the national capital does not automatically mean that local interests and demands will automatically be ignored or slighted.
These are largely empirical questions. It is necessary to look at the priorities and behaviour of those who occupy local positions of power, and compare this to the revealed preferences of central authorities in the capital. In some cases, the outcomes will be better, in others worse, and sometimes perhaps no different than that which would have resulted under a centralised system.
The available studies suggest that power structures in small communities are conservative in their policy attitudes (Bulpitt 1972). The notion of 'community' which often underlies discussions of local government has been criticised; community harmony may be the result of repression and community integration the result of conflict. It has been argued that the dominant value of small community life and local government is fraternity, which emphasises consensus and stability rather than conflict and change (Wood, cited in Bulpitt 1972), to the disadvantage of the poorer members of the community. The following paragraphs reflect instances where the decisions of local government have favoured the better-off groups in the community.
Some argue that centrally-sponsored institutions are inherently likely to 'co-opt' popular action. This implies that local decision making will not alter the distribution of the benefits of public expenditure, insofar as official decision making structures operate so as to modify perceptions about local needs.
Obviously the foregoing evidence about the impact of local decision making forums upon actual distribution of the benefits of public expenditures is rather scattered and anecdotal. More comprehensive evidence and analysis is presented below in Part IV, under the discussion of the comparative priorities of local and central government.
5. The Impact Upon Economic Activity
The expansion of income earning opportunities is a crucial dimension of human development. Yet the impact of governmental structure upon economic activity is difficult to pinpoint, especially given the multitude of associated variables such as macro economic policy, development strategies and ideology. Ideally we would like to be specific, and obtain evidence as to whether the decentralised provision of economic infrastructure has actually promoted local economic activity. Unfortunately there is little direct evidence either way.
In principle, decentralisation may promote local economic activity through several means, including an increased infusion of capital and other resources, the more extensive provision of infrastructure, and a more effective 'enabling environment' than would have been the case under a centralised system. In this light it has been claimed that countries with effective local government systems have been much more dynamic and successful economically than those under centralised control. It is further argued that there exists a causal correlation between decentralisation and increased economic activity (Allen 1987). Indeed the general assumption in much of the literature on decentralisation appears to be that decentralisation promotes economic development (Olowu, 1987; Olowu and Wunsch 1990). According to Tocqueville, in his criticisms of the nineteenth century European administrative system, the necessary creativity and popular enthusiasm to sustain the development process might be lacking in the absence of effective basic local government systems (Tocqueville, Democracy in America, cited in Oluwu, 1987).
As suggested above, the potentially positive implications of decentralisation for private sector activity are various. First, where decentralisation is accompanied by increased public resource availability and capital inflows, this will have direct and secondary stimulative multiplier effects. For example, the construction and maintenance of local infrastructure, such as roads, water supply and electricity, is likely to involve local contractors and wage labour. Second, as we saw above (p.*) in the discussion of economic infrastructure, decentralisation is likely to lead to more appropriate selection of the type and location of facilities, and better long term maintenance. Thus decentralisation can contribute to improved physical conditions (transportation, energy sources, communications etc.) which reduces rural isolation and improves the profitability of local enterprises, and thereby stimulates local economic activity. Third, local governments may be more supportive of "endogenous entrepreneurial development". The latter is defined by the OECD (1986) as development built on local assets, expanding existing enterprises and creating new ones, which is initiated and managed locally. Governments at the local level may be better able to formulate policies which are appropriate to local conditions. Entrepreneurial energies may be unleashed from the burden of central bureaucratic regulation (assuming, of course, that these are not replaced by local red-tape). Thus it has been observed that "because they need support that is individualised to local conditions, entrepreneurial initiatives appear to survive and flourish best in settings that permit flexible and localised public management (OECD 1986,p.33).
Finally less immediate benefits might also be forecast, such as those flowing from a labour force whose skills better meet the needs of local employers. Devolution of decision making power to the local level may also benefit local entrepreneurship by helping to overcome structural constraints. The rural economic environment is characterised by large distances from the urban centres where both public and private decision making tends to be conducted and financial resources and management information concentrated. Dispersed rural enterprises have tended to be relatively isolated and have poorer knowledge of the economic activities in their immediate environment and beyond. Local governments may be well positioned to formulate and implement policies which are supportive of local business including such services as management assistance and market information. It is said that the physical and social distances which separate central officials from rural entrepreneurs, and that the indiscriminate character of regional policies have inhibited the development of fruitful policies by the national administration (OECD 1986).
Caputo (1988) is enthusiastic about the potential for local governments in "enabling local economic growth". This is to follow from their ability to adopt a management approach "based on the active participation and promotion of many small businesses" (p.111). Access to public contracts - through local government calls for tender for the construction and equipment of decentralised public facilities - is presented as a significant factor in the dynamic growth of small businesses. The other "main lines of action" for local government lie in the establishment of systems to gather and analyse information on the dynamism and constraints of local small businesses, support for small business associations, and involvement in the creation of effective permanent channels for consultation and participation (p.115). The author argues that programmes for supporting small businesses are best promoted at the local level.
At the same time the influence of national macroeconomic policies must be borne in mind - where central economic managers are seeking to stabilise or contract the economy, any local stimulatory measures may well be overwhelmed in the larger context. Moreover national development policies - industrial, agricultural, trade etc. - will generally have a substantial impact. A national system of direct communications, highways and railways is also important, especially for local 'export' industries.
Practice
There are a number of cases where decentralisation has stimulated local economic activity. Sometimes this has followed the construction of economic infrastructure; in other places it has been attributed to the capital injected through transfers to impoverished localities under a decentralised system.
Positive economic consequences do not flow automatically however. There are instances where decentralised governmental structures have not provided a positive link promoting local economic activity. Sometimes this can be attributed to an allocation of government responsibilities between different levels of government in a manner which limits any positive local impact; in other cases, there are continuing inadequacies in infrastructure at the local level.
There has been a considerable research and debate on the nature of industrial decentralisation, and the role of the government therein (see e.g. Bell 1987; Wellings 1988; World Bank Spatial Policies Programme). Decentralisation here refers to the relocation of industry from the metropolitan areas to the periphery. The dominant opinion is that it is primarily a result of government intervention in the provision of incentives and development of infrastructure. An alternative view is that industrial decentralisation is largely a spontaneous response to market forces.