1. Education
2. Health
3. Water and sanitation
4. Housing
5. Economic infrastructure

PART III - SECTORAL SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS

The previous part explored such aspects of decentralisation as efficiency, equity and participation, supported by evidence drawn from the sectors most relevant to human development. This part seeks to portray a better sense of how decentralisation has tended to proceed in each sector, highlighting the most important characteristics. Thus, for example, the specific issues raised by decentralisation in education include the nature of decision making structures and interested constituencies, political ramifications and financing; whereas in the health context, decentralisation is very much associated with the concept of primary health care. 

1. Education

According to Winkler (1989), a highly centralised education system is perceived to be relatively expensive and inefficient, poor in quality, and unresponsive to the interests and needs of parents and local employers. Much of the evidence pertaining to the education sector was discussed above, under the general headings of Efficiency, Equity, Obstacles, and so on. The discussion in this section is confined to those aspects of decentralisation which are specifically relevant to education, in particular the nature of the decision making structures and issues of financing.

1.1 The degree and type of decentralisation

In practice, there is great diversity in the extent and type of decentralisation of educational functions. Decisions about education are typically made at several levels - national, state, regional, local, school, household and individual. At the same time, the system of education in any country consists of a number of components - ranging across curriculum and supervision, teacher recruitment and remuneration, and school construction. The degree of decentralisation is likely to vary according to each component. The organisation of schooling - minimum requirements and the structure of primary-secondary schooling - is often highly centralised. The chief administrator of a school district may be centrally appointed or subject to the local community; s/he may have substantial decision making authority, or be relatively powerless.

Overall then, in order to assess whether a country's education system is decentralised, it is necessary to look at the distribution of decision making authority with respect to various educational functions. Most significant among these are: (i) The chief administrative officer -who selects the officer, and her/his decision making powers; (ii) Teachers - recruitment, posting, payment, etc; and (iii) Local financial autonomy - the degree to which local authorities are able to finance their own education systems.

• During the Cultural Revolution, the entire education system in China was decentralised, in the sense that national curricula and teaching materials were abandoned, as was the national examination system. Length of schooling, for example, was determined at the lower levels. It is said that the decollectivisation of agriculture and the decline of the communes and brigades since the late 1970s have deprived education of its major support structure. In the mid 1980s it was argued that the Chinese government's education policy was bifurcated - involving a small, centrally financed elite sector based on the "keypoint" concept, which trained first class scientists and engineers; alongside a mass sector providing basic education to the majority, which relied upon local government, collective and individual funding. The result is said to have been a serious neglect of basic education (Rosen, 1985).
• UNICEF (1990) reports that parents and village leaders have been actively involved in establishing and running BRAC schools. The village is responsible for providing the actual classroom (for which BRAC pays a small rent), and for deciding upon school hours. The monthly parents' meetings are well-attended. The teaching staff, drawn mainly from the better educated women in the village, take part in an intensive 12-day training course and receive continuing guidance, support and refresher training. They are only paid a small monthly stipend.
• In Nicaragua after 1979, each school had an Advisory Council - involving students, parents and teachers - which were reported to be "committed to discuss educational policies in order to diversify curriculum, programme content and methodologies" (Cassusus 1990 p.10). There was, however, a tension between people deciding their own goals and course of action, as against the role of 'the vanguard', who were supposed to guide the process. Often the mass organisations, which were supposed to be mobilising the population around the tasks of the revolution - like the mass literacy crusade - were seen as little more than political forums for transmitting the political line being propounded by the FSLN (Arngrove and Drewes 1991 p. 102).

The national government may both finance and directly provide all inputs into the school system, or the local community may fulfil part or all of this role. The system of financing recurrent local expenditure may be mixed - as in India, where the midday meal programme is provided by the local community but partly financed by central grants. The degree of local financing of education varies widely. In Brazil, for example, one fourth of all primary school funding is provided by the municipal governments, which is much higher than either Nigeria, where the local authorities run schools but provide little of the finance, or India where the central and state governments provide the vast majority of funds for education, and the zilla parishads relatively little (table 16) (Hinchcliffe 1989).

In practice, school construction and financing tends to be among the most decentralised aspects of the education system, especially in Africa and Asia (Winkler 1989). In many countries the national government offers a matching grant, whereby the school constructed by the local community is staffed through central funds (as in Eastern Nigeria, Kenya, Zimbabwe and India).

• The central government finances 64% of total education costs in China, while local governments, brigades, enterprises and so forth contribute 28% and "the masses" 8%. Over 90% of central funding goes to recurrent costs. At the basic levels education in China is not compulsory, nor is it free. In the countryside, primary schools and teaching staff are largely financed by the local population. In the mid-1980s, 80% of the funds used to build and repair middle and primary schools in rural areas were raised locally. Teachers are expected to raise funds through commercial activities (Rosen, 1985).
• The Indian government has played an increasingly active role in education, through (i) its own regional colleges, national scholarships, University Grants Commission etc; (ii) the centrally sponsored sector, where the states may undertake responsibility for implementation (e.g. promotion of Hindi in non-Hindi speaking states); and (iii) the centrally assisted sector, where central interest is embodied in state plans, and its financial contribution ranges between 25-100% of total cost. Direct federal education expenditures are limited however - there is a reliance upon intermediaries such as state governments and the UGS. In 1976, the reality was constitutionally formalised when education was put onto the concurrent list (it had previously been a state function). Still education represents a much larger proportion of state expenditure (about 20%) compared to the central budget - where education has declined from 2.3% (1976-7), to 1.5% (1985-6) total expenditure. Table * shows the centre-state shares in educational finances, by level of education (Tilak p.466). There have been calls to reform intergovernmental relations in education - Tilak (1989) recommends less physical concurrency (intervention in policy formulation, planning and administration), and more financial concurrency (devolution of larger resources to the states, or the centre helping the states to widen their own revenue bases).

1.3 Political Aspects

Decentralisation in education can be viewed in terms of the political implications and obstacles, especially vis-à-vis different groups within the bureaucracy, and national teacher unions and the State. In the Latin American context, for example, McGinn and Street (1986) stress that decentralisation is primarily a question of the distribution of power among various groups in the society.

• Decentralisation in Mexico has been seen as a battle between the bureaucrats and the technocrats, both of whom had been incorporated into the ruling PRI. The latter were described as 'intellectuals with links with the private sector' - this faction was given a new Vice Ministry of Educational Planning in the Secretariat of Public Education, and the position of Education Minister under the Portillo government (1976-82), and sought to replace patronage in appointments with technical criteria. Part of the technocrats' campaign was said to lie in the decentralisation of decision making to delegates of the Minister, with authority to act in his name; followed by the creation of formal offices that transferred responsibility for all levels of education (except tertiary) to delegates, undermining the power of the bureaucrats in Mexico City. The National Director General of Education lost a major source of power when administrative control over teaching positions was transferred. The reforms were also intended to weaken the national teachers' union (an ally of the bureaucrats), by forcing it to negotiate separately with the 31 states. Ultimately however a dissident teachers' group which became a mass movement opposed to the union's central authority and antagonistic to both factions, eventually pushed the technocrats 'back into the arms of the bureaucrats', at least temporarily. This led to renegotiation of the decentralisation plan. The authors conclude from this and other case studies that centralisation-decentralisation are chosen not only on their technical merits, but also as part of a strategy where political effectiveness is an important consideration (McGinn and Street 1986).
• Cassusus (1990) also emphasises the 'tensional power relationships' generated by the process of decentralisation in reference to Bolivian education. The teachers' union regarded decentralisation initiatives as an attempt to break their own hegemony, which prevented implementation of the project, at least during the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) government.
• In Thailand, non-formal education (NFE) has been deconcentrated following the recognition that the NFE curriculum ought not be urban-oriented in a largely (80%) rural country, and that there was a need for research and curriculum development outside the centre in order to overcome excessive standardisation. Regional centres of the Adult Education Division (AED) were established to conduct research into the educational needs, and produce NFE curricula and learning materials relevant to the ethnic and occupational structure of the region. The changes only affected the control of research and development activities - since operations had always been a provincial responsibility. Armstrong (1984) found that implementation of these reforms was facilitated by the following factors: (i) Senior officials in Bangkok did not view NFE as a high priority activity (compared to, say, secondary education) and therefore did not interfere in the process. (ii) National policy had endorsed decentralisation as a (rhetorical) goal, whilst the relevant policy documents and guidelines were extremely vague, which facilitated a flexible approach at the local level. (iii) Decentralisation policy was formulated within AED, and key officials were enthusiastic about the project. In several cases regional directors were able to mobilise local resources and recruit highly qualified staff.

2. Health

A number of international organisations and academic writings have endorsed the decentralisation of health services. Centralisation is associated with an emphasis on high cost curative medicine, highly trained medical personnel and technologically advanced facilities largely confined to urban centres and the better off. Decentralisation is seen as a means of achieving greater responsiveness to local needs through the delegation of authority and resources to the local community and to intermediate levels (WHO 1980). It has been praised as a means promoting local participation in health care (Mills et al. 1987). Community participation, in turn, has been "almost universally accepted as the cornerstone of primary health care in developing countries" (Asthana 1989).

Access to basic health services is available to fewer than three in ten people living in the rural areas in a number of developing countries. The argument for decentralisation rests partly on the need to increase access to health care, particularly in rural areas. Evidence suggests, for example, that the spatial deconcentration of maternity care could significantly improve the serious rates of maternity mortality presently suffered in many developing countries.

• One longitudinal study from Cote d'Ivoire found that the presence of an obstetrician in the district greatly reduced the incidence of complications (which had formerly necessitated transfers to hospital). The maternal mortality rate for rural women was 2013 per 100 000, compared to 33 per 100 00 in the town where the medical facilities were located.

Others are more wary of attempts to promote decentralisation in the health sector, suspecting an association with the "contemporary international pressures on developing countries (which) militate strongly against a positive central government role in health", and seeing it as "a discrete way of the state abandoning its functions" (Collins 1989 p.169). There is a concern that "over-decentralisation" could break up the consistency and coherence of national health policy and constitute a major obstacle to improved equity (ibid p.170).

• In what has been described as "the most radical decentralisation policy to date" (Winkler 1989), responsibility for the provision of basic social services in Chile was transferred from the State to local entities. The health care reforms mirrored the approach adopted throughout the social sectors, as: (i) responsibility for primary health care, infrastructure and personnel, was transferred to the municipalities; (ii) the role of the central Ministry of Health was limited to policy-making and supervision; and (iii) providers of health service, both public and private, were paid directly on a fee-for-service basis.

• It is also interesting to note that in Europe, where it is "correct to say that the provision of health care has been decentralised, through the development of primary health care services ... there is still a large gap between the health-for-all strategy and what goes on in PHC services" (Godhino 1990). For instance, communication and collaboration between communities and hospitals, health centres and local PHC programmes "remains weak" (ibid p.47).

A survey of the literature on health policy suggests that the district is increasingly regarded as "the backbone" of primary health care since, under the guise of various names, it is "the most peripheral fully organised unit of government" (Tarimo and Fowkes 1989). Certain advantages have been put forth: that it is administratively capable of supporting a specialised technical and managerial staff and exercising substantial decision making power, yet geographically and demographically compact enough to facilitate efficient management. Integration is put forward as an important principle to be pursued at the district level - e.g. collaboration and sharing of facilities between programmes for maternal and child health and immunisation. Also inter-sectoral concerns can be encompassed - e.g. the improvement of local water supplies. Yet while considerable decentralisation of authority is called for, it is often stressed that "overall national guidance and monitoring have to be provided by the government" (ibid p.79).

• Some of the problems which can arise in the course of attempts to decentralise the control of health services were evidenced in Papua New Guinea in the early 1980s (Thomason 1984). The central Department of Health decentralised the management of health services concurrently with the commencement of a major rural health development project in several provinces. The main components of the project (e.g. constructing and equipping new primary health facilities) included the activities whose control had ostensibly been decentralised to the provinces. A special central government unit was responsible for overall management of project implementation, including day-to-day operations. Throughout the planning and development of the project, there was only limited involvement of the provincial divisions of health, and even less of the respective provincial governments. This was despite the fact that the project was affecting purely provincial functions towards which the provincial governments would be required to provide a substantial financial contribution. These arrangements lead to frequent misunderstandings and conflict between the relevant institutions, which was reflected in long delays in implementation.
• A more recent study of Papua New Guinea, concluded that the provinces are now effectively responsible for the day-to-day operations of primary health care facilities and programmes. Provincial governments are provided with central grants, to be spent at their own discretion to organise and administer health programmes. Many provinces have decentralised even further by creating district offices designed to co-ordinate the local activities of the specialised agencies. In some cases district health officers are appointed, who are responsible for the supervision of health workers, submission of the district health budget, and making such policy decisions as where to locate new facilities. Generally, however, the district structures did not significantly further decentralisation - budgets were determined by the province and the district input was basically advisory. The study concluded that the provincial level was the most appropriate for responsibility for health care, combining support and supervision with local flexibility.
• In Mozambique, there was a shift in emphasis from hospital- based curative care to preventive medicine, combined with a broader infrastructure of basic curative care administered by intermediate health workers. The government reduced the list of essential imported drugs to 300, purchased on a competitive tender basis - so that the proportion of the health budget spent on drugs was maintained within a range of 10-20% (compared to 30-40% for most developing countries). These shifts met considerable opposition from health workers on the grounds of quality. Attempts to introduce courses on public health in the universities met with equally strong opposition from medical doctors and students alike. There was also local demand for basic curative care (see above).

• A USAID-assisted project in Indonesia was partially effective in promoting decentralisation of health management, planning and implementation (Bossert et al. 1991). The capability of lower units was enhanced vis-à-vis the highly centralised Ministry of Health, particularly in the collection and analysis of better data (in terms of quality and quantity) than was available at the national level. Provincial and local health officials could convince central officials that national policies should be modified in order to take account of provincial realities. They were able to challenge national targets (especially those for specific diseases), initiate specific drug proposals that were accepted by the centre, and implement changes in national policies that were innovative or more appropriate to local needs (such as a TB programme in a Kabupaten in West Sumatra). Lower level units were able to persuade Jakarta officials that their decisions about priorities and interventions were more appropriate for the province than those set nationally. Another dimension of the project lay in innovative training of nurses, which encouraged greater community involvement and longer periods in the field. The result was not, however, thoroughgoing devolution of decision-making in the health sector. Often local initiatives were modified by the centre, rendering them 'less effective'. Local responsiveness to the decentralisation project was not always positive - many local and provincial officials were not willing to support additional health efforts, and those who were seldom committed significant resources to support project initiatives. The study concludes that control of information is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for effective decentralisation of decision making.

3. Water and sanitation

Here, perhaps more than any other sector, in schemes for the provision of water and sanitation, the literature emphasises the importance of community involvement. This involvement should encompass all stages, from project initiation and design to construction, operation and maintenance.

3.1 Decision making processes

It is generally held that centrally directed engineers, with little reference to local needs, are unlikely to realise the full potential of schemes for the provision of water and sanitation. The lessons which have emerged from experience emphasise the deficiencies of a top-down strategies. Local people should take a leading role in planning, constructing, financing and managing rural water supply and sanitation projects (IBRD 1987, 1988; Narayan-Parker 1988; Douglas 1990; U Tin U 1988).

• It is reported from Adayaw in Burma that the network of basic health services staff and volunteers plays a vital role in encouraging community participation in development projects. Under the supervision and guidance of the local party and council, the town launched a major water supply effort, resulting in 97% of the population having access to safe water (U Tin U 1988).

Nonetheless, government - local or central - has an important supporting role in this context.

• The Malawi Self Help Water Scheme, which is rightly regarded as the outstanding water project in rural Africa' (IBRD 1988), reflects the success of community collaboration with the national government. (The scheme was described on p.16 above.) Community participation has been successfully "institutionalised" in water committees (Cox and Annis 1982). The committee can seek technical assistance, channel requests for water, organise and take responsibility for the mobilisation of local resources, draw up work schedules, and promote community awareness about health education and hygiene.

4. Housing

A general lack of data on housing availability, quality, tenure and so on makes any assessment of housing conditions in developing countries difficult, if not 'conjectural' (UN 1989). Nonetheless it is clear that the housing available to most households in developing countries - especially to the poor - is grossly inadequate (Struyk 1988). This problem is especially acute in rapidly growing urban areas - squatter settlements, shanty towns, and low-income neighbourhoods (Annis 1987). Publicly supported contractor-built units, hitherto the norm, have not been able to meet this deficit - especially in cities growing at an annual rate of 3-5%. Since the mid 1970s(?), there has been a shift in public policy. The role of the state in housing policy is increasingly seen as that of an enabler, rather than as a provider. The focus has shifted to sites and services, slum upgrading, security of tenure and the provision of basic infrastructure.

The issue here revolves around the extent to which decentralisation can help alleviate the problem of providing decent housing, especially for the poor. There is a considerable body of literature which appraises the role of community groups and self-help here. We also need to compare the role of local, to that of the national government, especially in the sense of its activities as an enabling institution.

4.1 Role of the government

The activities of governments, national and local, have a bearing upon the housing sector in the following senses. Various public policies may facilitate or deter informal housing investments, such as credit policies, building regulations, the nature and security of land tenure, and the regulations which affect the use of residential plots for income generating activities. The provision of basic infrastructure - water, sewerage, roads, electricity - also affects private housing decisions and the quality of housing.

Some activities are likely to fall largely into the central domain - including real property legislation, credit policies and the provision of, say, electricity. In the remaining areas, there may be important steps open to local authorities to contribute to an 'enabling environment' to facilitate housing development. Local government is arguably in a good position to pursue such strategies. It can engage in consultations with local people, better appraise local conditions and needs, and frame policies and regulations appropriately in that light.

There are however cases where municipalities have acted in ways which have not enhanced the availability of decent housing for the poor. Throughout Latin America, there have been numerous land invasions, with groups of low income families occupying undeveloped plots of private or public land and erecting makeshift shelters. Ironically in Colombia, much of that land was purchased by municipalities for use as sites as low-income housing, which had yet to be built (Sorock 1984). In some instances the municipal regulations that were designed to protect homebuyers by requiring private developers to build adequate infrastructures have aggravated housing shortages (e.g. in Colombia).

• In Iloilo City in the Philippines, the city government is said to have failed to respond to housing needs, which is one of the most serious problems facing the city. This was partly due to a lack of funds, and also to a "generally negative attitude towards squatters on the part of decision makers" (Ruland and Sajo 1988). When asked about the most effective strategy to approach the squatter problem, almost half the councillors opted for 'resettlement to prepared lots in periphery areas', although many of them were well aware of the adverse effects of resettlement on the living conditions of the families (ibid p.273).
• In Colombia, self-help housing movements (groups) receive technical assistance from SENA (the national institute for vocational training), and municipal planning authorities assist groups in designing site and infrastructure plans. Municipal officials also provide technical assistance to help upgrade local homes and communities. Municipal public utilities assist the groups by drawing up plans and budgets for the water, sewerage, and electricity systems and by supervising the community workers on the site (Solock 1984).
• Self help housing groups in Argentina joined together to pool expertise in architectural, financial and social services, and also to increase overall bargaining power. In the 1983 election campaign, the confederation urged the legalisation of land ownership where necessary, and support to self-help housing programmes through government credit subsidies, better technical assistance and less red tape (e.g. simpler building codes). They called on the state to provide basic infrastructure and public services. Nonetheless it was accepted that the national economic situation prohibited the construction of large public housing projects or increased housing subsidies, and that improvements must be sought primarily through legal and policy changes to facilitate self-help programmes (Page 1984).

5. Economic infrastructure

An array of economic infrastructure - including roads, irrigation, agricultural extension services, basic communications and electricity - facilitate local economic and employment growth. There is a growing body of opinion which regards the efforts of the central government in this regard as manifestly deficient (see Wunsch 1990). Attention has thus focused upon the role of the community and local government in the creation and maintenance of economic infrastructure, particularly in rural areas. At the same time it is recognised that national macro-economic policies, regarding fiscal and monetary matters, pricing and sectoral policies etc., will generally have a crucial impact upon economic activity throughout the country.

• One detailed micro-level study of a cluster of villages in West Bengal focusing on ways to promote employment expansion, emphasised the role of the 'panchayats' - the local unit of self government. The sectors covered included agriculture, animal husbandry, food processing, cottage industries, transport, and the building and maintenance of rural infrastructure. It was noted that "these works will involve a considerable amount of micro-level design, planning and organisation of human-power and materials, which cannot be achieved by the traditional bureaucratic methods of administration". The author concludes that local popular institutions of self-government, with appropriate leadership, can be expected to be much more useful in promoting employment expansion (Maitra 1982).
• Sanwal (1987) reports from Uttar Pradesh, India that decentralisation increased the commitment of local officials to promoting local development. Block Development Officers took bank managers out with them to the villages, the banks fixed dates for groups of villages in order to expedite loan procedures, and villagers were taken in groups to markets to select the best stock, carts and implements.

The responsibility for making decisions about the provision of economic infrastructure can be decentralised in a variety of ways. The following paragraphs present some country experiences in point.

• In the Indian state of Karnataka, legislative reforms in 1987 brought the planning and management of a number of important development activities within the jurisdiction of the zilla parishad (district). The zilla parishad is responsible for extension and training, the operation of commercial and seed farms, the development of irrigation, and the promotion of small scale industry through the establishment of training, production centres and marketing facilities. The most novel aspect of these arrangements lies in the legislative intention to give the zilla parishad effective control over the line departments. In the past, local authorities had exercised only limited control over the spending departments within their jurisdiction. According to Slater and Watson (1989) however, it seems likely that what public investment is planned will remain subject to national or state level policy decisions translated into targets, whilst how much investment is planned depends upon financial allocation procedures - decisions which are generally made in the state capital. The authors concluded that the main scope for manoeuvre lies in where investment is planned - which arguably had always been subject to local control.
• The operations of local government in Zimbabwe's Communal Lands in economic infrastructure are very restricted in scope - district councils spend very little on capital investment, as much of the investment on infrastructure (roads, water etc.) is made by the central government through the District Development Fund (Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1990).