

Mobility & Development in South Africa: Demographics, Dynamics & Policy Challenges

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www.migration.org.za





The Forced Migration Studies Programme at Wits

An internationally engaged; Africa-oriented; and African-based research and teaching centre dedicated to shaping academic and policy debates on migration, development and social transformation

- Graduate degree programme with students from across Africa, North America, and Europe;
- Research in 12 African countries on related to migration, human rights, development, governance, and social change;
- Partnerships on 4 continents;
- Growing record of academic publications, consulting, and outreach: provides key support to NGOs and advocates;
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Why migration is on the South African policy agenda





Why it should be:

- Enormous skills gap due to emigration and apartheid requiring a generation to address
- Migration lowest cost way to promote regional economic development
- Current policy and practice makes the worst of migration
- Failure to address human mobility poses risks to economic and physical security of all



Mozambicans en route

Issues for today:

- South Africa as critical case
- Dynamics: who, what and where
- Migration and development practice
- Recommendations and the possibility of capability-based reform


Approached through lens of
'politico-demography'




Who, What and Where

- Poor data quality worsened by legal and bureaucratic apparatus, proprietary data collection, and limited scholarly research
- Estimates ranging from 400,000 to 10 million non-nationals out of app. 45 million residents
- Probably close to 1.5m or 3% of total population
- Vast majority of migrants from SADC neighbours and Africa. Growing numbers from S. Asia and China.
- 'Mixed flows': Three D's and three P's: profit, protection & passage
- Estimated loss of 1 million skilled South Africans since 1994
- Deportations of 300 000 in 2007
- Highly spatialised and inseparable from rapid urbanisation

Distribution of Non-Nationals in RSA (Census 2001)



Distribution of Recent Immigrants



- 5.6% of Gauteng foreign born; Parts of Joburg >50% non-nationals;
- Many cities growing rapidly through migration and natural increase: 30% of inner city Joburg >10 yrs in city
- Some municipalities have lost 8.5% of population in last decade

Provincial Matrix of Internal Migration

Destination Province	Percent from Province of Origin									All Regions
	WC	EC	NC	FS	KZN	NW	GP	MP	LP	
Western Cape (WC)	0	54	5	3	7	1	25	2	3	100 (N=197,212)
Eastern Cape (EC)	29	0	5	8	19	2	31	3	3	100 (N=85,392)
Northern Cape (NC)	20	6	0	10	3	43	17	1	1	100 (N=46,054)
Free State (FS)	6	18	10	0	8	14	34	4	4	100 (N=67,832)
KwaZulu-Natal (KZN)	6	45	2	4	0	3	29	8	3	100 (N=124,276)
Northwest (NW)	3	16	4	15	4	0	40	6	12	100 (N=152,933)
Gauteng (GP)	6	11	2	7	17	16	0	15	27	100 (N=609,169)
Mpumalanga (MP)	2	7	1	6	13	5	27	0	39	100 (N=128,903)
Limpopo (LP)	3	5	1	5	3	11	45	26	0	100 (N=7,1269)

- Sub-national migration systems
- Gauteng province centre of most heterogenous urbanisation patterns
- Largest movements to peri-urban areas

Migration Figures for Selected Cities

Municipality	In-Migration as Percentage of Total Population (2006)
Metsweding (Gauteng)	10.13
Overberg (KwaZulu-Natal)	8.18
Tshwane (Pretoria)	7.15
West Coast (Western Cape)	6.71
Ekurhuleni (Johannesburg Suburb)	5.88
West Rand (Johannesburg Suburb)	5.82
Johannesburg (Gauteng)	4.38
Cape Town (Western Cape)	4.38
eThekweni (KwaZulu-Natal)	0.92
Nelson Mandela (Eastern Cape)	0.63

Source: Data from StatsSA. Table Reproduced from South African Cities Network



Unstable and Transitory Population: Expected Location in 2 Years

	DRC	Mozambique	Somalia	South Africa
Where I am now	36.4	51.7	54.8	46.3
In another part of South Africa	7.5	7.9	12.9	31.1
In my community of origin	12.3	20.2	6.5	3.7
Another part of home country	0.4	0.0	1.6	0.0
In a third country	29.2	4.4	11.3	3.2
Other	0.8	0.0	0.0	2.1
DK/RA	13.4	15.8	12.9	13.7
n	253	203	186	190

Who are they and what do they do?

- Generally better educated and entrepreneurial – can help address brain drain and skills gap
- Twice the employment rate of South Africans
- Little evidence of aggregate ‘replacement’ or wage suppression
- Increasing numbers of women, children (including unaccompanied minors) and less skilled migrants



Migrant Street Traders

Who are they: a few details

Levels of Education

	Percent Nationals	Percent Non-Nationals
No schooling	15.9	16.0
Some primary	30.0	18.9
Complete primary	7.0	7.0
Some secondary	28.0	26.1
Grade 10/ Std 10	13.9	16.9
Tertiary	5.3	15.2
Total	100	100

Employment Status

	Percent Nationals	Percent Non-Nationals
Employed	33.4	60.1
Unemployed	24.1	14.9
Not economically active	42.5	25.0

Remittances? What we know

Regional Remittance Flows

Receiving Country (ZAR Million)								
Sending country	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Moz.	RSA	Swaziland	Other SADC	Total
Botswana	—	2.59	3.65		29.64	0.55	51.42	87.87
Lesotho	0.61	—						0.61
Malawi	0.18		—					0.18
Mozambique				—				
RSA	133.28	1,675.84	57.19	2,241.71	—	432.29	1,531.85	6,072.15
Swaziland	0.39					—		0.39
Total	134.46	1,678.43	60.84	2,241.71	29.64	432.84	1,583.27	

Source: Genesis Calculations from Various Sources. Table Reproduced from Pendelton, et al, 2006.

- South Africa centre of regional economy and remittance out flows
- Many migrants receive money from abroad suggesting complex web of flows
- Controlled currency and banking make money difficult to send and track

Policy and its effects?

- Policies neither prevent migration nor protect migrants
- Skills shortage demands migration but few means of legal movement and bureaucratic inefficiency
- Migration not part of regional integration agenda; Zimbabwe undermines SADC-wide initiatives
- Local government not interested and unsupported in addressing migration and immigration despite legislative mandate
- Insecure migration and immigration status & hostility limits investment, promoting social and financial investment elsewhere



Institutional effects

- Poor data and engagement mean poor planning
- Poor access to banking, health, education and housing for migrants result in loss productivity and investment
- Predatory and ineffective policing
- Social fragmentation, and widespread violence hostility fostered by opportunistic local leadership
- Lack of integration and political engagement. Instead, scapegoating, exclusion and reduced accountability



“The more they come to South Africa to do business, the more the locals will continue to kill them”



Newly Registered Displaced Non-National, Johannesburg, 2008

Recommendations: Capabilities all the way

- Admit that current policy frameworks exacerbate negative outcomes and undermine regional integration agenda
- Need for more and better data: re-spatialised, re-categorised, and regularly collected
- Enhance local and regional dimensions of policy making and implementation
- Need for multi-sectoral, multi-level 'migration mainstreaming'
- Develop inclusive mechanisms for promoting political and social participation
- Pragmatic adjustment for limited implementation capacity

Will it happen? Probably not

- Political structures do not promote regional or local involvement
- Migrants and South Africans show little interest in participation and institutions remain fragmented. Issue not on civil society agenda
- Nationalist, populist turn in South African politics
- Paucity of analytical skills and creativity in local, national, and regional bodies
- Strong influence of security agenda from IOM, EU, and US and misplaced faith in ability to regulate mobility
- Spatial development strategy promotes investment in already productive areas. Promotes restrictions on 'new poor'
- Little control over police, private security, and non-state actors
- Migration will remain a critical regional dynamic but with unintended developmental consequences

General analytical lessons

- Institutions and politics matter as cause and consequence. Development is more than money and remittances
- Inseparability of domestic and international migration; displacement and voluntary migration
- Disaggregate impact of different migrant trajectories
- Spatialise development effects and actors. Where states are weak, local authorities matter: cities, chiefs, councilors, and gangsters



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