



Confronting movements for cultural domination

This Report argues that people should be free to be who they are, to choose their identities and to live accordingly. It further argues that the recognition of multiple and complementary identities—with individuals identifying themselves as citizens of a state as well as members of ethnic, religious and other cultural groups—is the cornerstone of cultural liberty. But movements hostile to these principles seek to eliminate diversity in the name of cultural superiority. Such movements, and their underlying sources of support, must be confronted. The question is: How?

This chapter is about coercive movements for cultural domination—those that are motivated by an ideology of cultural supremacy and domination and that use coercion to suppress the cultural identities of others. These movements are a familiar part of the political landscape in many countries and may even be growing in strength.

It is important to clarify what is distinctive about this sort of movement. Many types of movements use coercive strategies of violence or intimidation, but not all such movements are movements for cultural domination. Many historically disadvantaged or subordinated groups feel compelled to use coercive strategies, particularly if they are excluded from or marginalized within the normal political process. Their tactics may involve coercion, but their goal is the pursuit of equal rights, power sharing, autonomy and a more inclusive society (for example, the Zapatistas in Mexico). Insofar as the recommendations discussed in chapters 3 and 5 are adopted, the use of coercive strategies by such groups would no longer be necessary or justified.


This chapter, by contrast, focuses on movements that typically seek to create ethnically or religiously “pure” states by expelling, coercively assimilating or even killing anyone viewed as “other”. For such movements the sorts of

multiculturalist policies defended in this Report are anathema. It is the intolerance or hatred of other ways—and organizing to spread that intolerance while denying people choice over their identities—that makes a movement coercive (figure 4.1). The target: freedom and diversity.

Such movements are often misleadingly described as religious “fundamentalist” movements. But it is important to emphasize that the focus in this chapter is both broader and narrower than the phenomenon of religious fundamentalism. On the one hand, many forms of religious fundamentalism do not believe in the use of violence to achieve their aims. Nor do they necessarily seek to coercively impose their ideology on others. They may work solely within the democratic system. Tibetan or Trappist monks have strong religious beliefs but do not impinge on the religious freedom of others. On the other hand, there are cases of coercive movements for cultural domination that are not based primarily on religion, but rather on appeals to racial or ethnic purity. Thus, religious fundamentalism is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to qualify as a coercive movement for cultural domination.

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Figure 4.1 Movements for cultural domination—**not the same as all fundamentalist or all violent movements**



Source: Human Development Report Office.

The absence of democracy often creates conditions for the rise of such movements, while political accommodation can often moderate the sources of conflict and strengthen liberal democracy

How can states respond to such movements without compromising their democratic principles? States have two options: to repress such movements or to undermine their bases of support by democratically accommodating their underlying concerns and grievances. States have a legitimate right, and responsibility, to prosecute criminal acts. At times, the use of force is necessary. But states have to ensure that measures to restrict movements for cultural domination do not repress fundamental rights and freedoms. This chapter argues that repression seldom works. The absence of democracy often creates conditions for the rise of such movements, while political accommodation can often moderate the sources of conflict and strengthen liberal democracy.

MOVEMENTS FOR CULTURAL DOMINATION—TODAY'S CHALLENGES

Coercive and intolerant movements are not new, but they have been on the rise. In many countries movements for cultural domination are becoming a prominent force in national politics. Among the disturbing indications:


- In Europe extreme right parties have had election successes in several countries, obtaining as much as 26.9% of the vote in Austria in 1999 (figure 4.2).
- In North America and Europe hate crimes and xenophobic violence—motivated by

racist, ethnic or religious bias—remain widespread. In 2002 there were 12,933 such crimes in Germany and 2,391 in Sweden, 3,597 prosecutions in the United Kingdom and 7,314 offences in the United States.¹ These countries are not unique in experiencing extreme intolerance; they are among the few, however, that collect such data.

- In 2003, 13 of 65 (one in five) groups engaging in terrorism could be identified as seeking religious domination or ethnic cleansing.²
- In Africa the Lord's Resistance Army, which aims to establish a government based on the Ten Commandments, has inflicted brutal violence in northern Uganda since 1988, including kidnapping, torture and rape. The Interahamwe Hutu rebels, perpetrators of the 1994 genocide, continue to pose a threat in Rwanda.
- In South Asia organized violent attacks on Christian churches and missions have increased. India, despite its long secular tradition, has experienced considerable communal violence, with rising intensity: 36.2% of casualties due to communal violence since 1954 occurred in 1990–2002.³ In Pakistan certain organizations (the Sipah-e-Sahaba, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Tehreek-i-Jafariya) have stoked brutal sectarian violence between Sunnis and Shiites since 1989 (table 4.1).⁴
- In South-East Asia the militant Jemaah Islamiyah, with networks in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore, seeks to establish an Asian Islamic state. Some of its members were convicted for the Bali bombing in October 2002.
- Such movements are often found on the fringes, but they can also be segments of a political party or even a state. In seeking to impose a particular notion of national identity and ideology, while suppressing other cultural identities, coercive states have committed some of the worst brutalities of recent history—the genocide of non-communists by the Khmer Rouge and the ethnic cleansing of Muslims by Serbian forces in Kosovo.

Political activism for cultural domination exists in all major religions. In the United States Christian extremists bomb abortion clinics. In

Figure 4.2 Some European extreme right parties have won steadily increasing vote shares



a. The AN party in Italy was in the electoral alliance Casa Delle Libertà, which included Forza Italia, Lega Nord and the New Italian Socialist Party (the alliance received 45.4% of the vote.) The vote percentage shown refers to the proportional part of the election, in which 155 of the 630 deputies are elected.

Source: Electionworld.org 2004; Ignazi 2003; Jackman and Volpert 1996; Widfeldt 2004.

TABLE 4.1

Casualties resulting from sectarian violence in Pakistan, 1989–2003

Year	Number killed	Number injured
1989	18	102
1990	32	328
1991	47	263
1992	58	261
1993	39	247
1994	73	326
1995	59	189
1996	86	168
1997	193	219
1998	157	231
1999	86	189
2000	149	..
2001	261	495
2002	121	257
2003	102	103

.. Not available.

Note: Data for 2000 are for terrorist attacks using explosives only. Data on casualties and incidents of other terrorist activity are not available.

Source: SATP 2004.

India Hindu extremists have fomented anti-Muslim violence in Gujarat even as Muslim extremists have targeted Hindus. The Jewish Gush Emunim, a militant settler group, aims to recreate Biblical Israel and has used violence to expel Palestinians. The Armed Islamic Group in Algeria threatens to kill those who do not pray or women who choose not to wear a headscarf. In Japan the Aum Shinrikyo cult, which claimed to be associated with Buddhism, poisoned commuters on the Tokyo subway system in 1995.

Nor is religion the only wellspring of extremism. Brutalities on the basis of ethnicity or race include the attempted extermination of Jews by the Nazis in Germany and the massacre of Tutsis by Hutus in Rwanda.

IDENTIFYING MOVEMENTS FOR CULTURAL DOMINATION

Movements for cultural domination share some key elements. They distinguish themselves by their cultural identity—whether ethnic, racial or religious—and they attempt to impose their ideology by coercion, even extermination. They:

- Believe in the superiority of their culture and reject all others.
- Act on this belief to impose their ideology on others and create a “pure” society.
- Often, though not always, resort to violence to achieve their aims.

Movements for cultural domination are supremacist and often predatory. They espouse an ideology that demonizes other identities to justify the creation of a “pure”, sacred and homogeneous homeland. They view anyone who does not belong to the core community as inferior, unwanted and unworthy of respect. The Jemaah Islamiyah blames Indonesia’s problems on “Kaffir Chinese and Christians”⁵— this is its justification for seeking to create an Islamic state at the cost of Indonesian secularism. The National Alliance—the largest neo-Nazi organization in the United States—wants to create a new government “answerable to white people only”.⁶

Movements for cultural domination are exclusionary and seek to impose their ideology on others. They build support by engendering a sense of fear that their own values and identity are under threat (chapter 1). A study of extreme right parties in Europe revealed common characteristics: they foment xenophobia, leading to demands to create mono-cultural societies, to exclude “outsiders” from welfare policies and to mould a strong state that can protect the nation from “evil forces”.⁷ Movements of cultural domination also target members of their own community by denigrating and suppressing dissenting opinions and questioning integrity and loyalty (purity of faith or patriotism).

Other motives may be at work. Many ethnic conflicts are also about political or economic power (chapter 2), and ethnic identity is a way to mobilize allies. The Rwandan genocide, for example, was a manifestation of the struggle for political and economic power between the Tutsi, excluded under the Hutu-dominated government, and the Hutu, excluded under colonial rule. What distinguishes these movements is that they pursue cultural domination in the name of identity. Inciting an ideology of hatred against the Tutsis, the Hutu militants redefined Hutu identity in racial terms, claiming that Hutus were the original inhabitants and deriding Tutsis as “foreigners” from Ethiopia.

Not all movements for cultural domination are overtly violent. Threats, harassment and electoral politics are also common tactics. Moreover, the same organization might use a range of strategies—propaganda, electoral politics, soliciting of external support, forcible demands

Movements for cultural domination are exclusionary and seek to impose their ideology on others

When the state fails, coercive movements may step in to offer education, insurance or law and order

for local support, and guerrilla or terrorist campaigns. Electoral politics is not always an alternative to coercion—many parties instil fear and insecurity to gain votes and to threaten members of other communities. While violence is not a universal characteristic of coercive movements, it is a common one. Coercive ideologies spread intolerance, which can inspire acts of random violence. The Christian Identity movement in the United States inspired racist shootings and murders by members of the Aryan Nations in 1998.

WHY DO THESE MOVEMENTS EXIST—AND WHY IS THEIR INFLUENCE GROWING?

Ideology. Discrimination. Poverty and inequality. Manipulative leadership. A weak or ineffectual state. Outside political interventions. Linkages with alienated diaspora. All are among the reasons for the rise and staying power of coercive movements for cultural domination. Failures of development and governance can leave a vacuum that coercive movements are only too eager to fill. A consistent characteristic of such movements is that they offer a simple (often distorted) explanation for the world's failings—and a simple agenda to correct them (expelling immigrants, killing members of other communities).

Identity politics often has underlying economic explanations of grievance or greed. In Western Europe extreme right parties have gained votes when there has been a significant loss of trust in mainstream parties over issues ranging from corruption to globalization.⁸ Religious movements offer doctrinal salvation to people who see modernization as alien and repressive in contexts where neither democratization nor economic development has succeeded. So, even a threatened middle class and professionally frustrated intelligentsia might join the ranks of the economically and socially marginalized in coercive movements. This was evident in the role of the “oppositional lay intelligentsia” in the rise of many coercive Islamist movements until the 1970s. In recent years clerics have played the dominant role.⁹

When the state fails, coercive movements may step in to offer education, insurance or law and order. The Taliban initially helped secure

trading routes. The Gush Emunim briefly provided security to its members' settlements in the West Bank and Gaza. The Adolat brigades in Uzbekistan gained popularity when they took the law into their own hands to reduce crime and lower food prices.

The lack of resources to send children to secular (government or private) schools is one reason individuals rely on religious schools that provide free education. In principle, this is unobjectionable. Islamic schools, for example, can provide cultural and economic benefits to students who might otherwise not get an education. But in some communities such schools have also promoted coercive cultural ideologies and encouraged students to engage in coercive activities. While 2–3% of Pakistan's Islamic schools are said to be recruiting children into coercive movements, only about half the estimated 15,000–20,000 religious schools are officially registered.¹⁰ It becomes difficult for the state to oversee and regulate such unregistered schools. In Thailand 300 of the 550 Islamic schools offer no secular education (the state is investigating their involvement in recruiting and training militants).¹¹

But even state schools can preach intolerance. Nazism was propagated in state schools. Ideologies of white supremacy were part of the curriculum in South Africa under the apartheid regime. Control over education resources permits states to revise textbooks to distort history, target particular communities and encourage racist stereotypes.

Leaders define the ideology of a movement. One of their main functions is to interpret religious doctrine to persuade members of the “divine” rightness of their acts. Because militias have a high risk of defection, leaders might demand that members prove their loyalty by studying religious texts for years or by committing acts of destruction. They also change the organization's ideology or target, depending on the circumstances. And leaders convert wanton acts of coercion into a corporate effort. They recruit, indoctrinate and train their cadres (sometimes children). They plan terrorist acts and prepare publicity materials. And they secure funds to compensate family members of cadres who die in action and are then glorified as heroes (box 4.1).

Long-term immigrant communities abroad can contribute to the rise of coercive movements in their countries of origin. As members of the diaspora they struggle between retaining their original identity and cultural traditions and adapting to their new environment. When they feel insecure or unappreciated, they may separate themselves from mainstream society. There is evidence of such dissatisfaction among Muslim populations in Germany and the Netherlands.¹² Coercive movements can exploit such sentiments to tap the diaspora for financial and political support. In the early 1990s “weekend fighters” came from Germany to fight for their ethnic groups in Bosnia.¹³

Many of these underlying factors in the rise of movements of cultural domination also inspire nationalist movements. Many of these factors are the reasons why discriminated-against groups struggle for political rights. But many movements for autonomy can be liberal and recognize the importance of accommodating diversity within an autonomous region. By contrast, movements for cultural domination can arise even within the majority and politically dominant group. Racists do not seek territorial autonomy; instead, they target all who are viewed as “other” or inferior. Movements for cultural domination are adept at using people’s genuine grievances to gain supporters. What distinguishes them is their agenda of cultural superiority and elimination of diversity and tolerance.

DILEMMAS FOR DEMOCRACIES—RESTRICTIVE OR ACCOMMODATIVE MEASURES?

Coercive movements can be a powerfully destabilizing force. A challenge for all states, they present a particular dilemma for democratic ones. If movements for cultural domination use violent means, threaten law and order or deny the human rights of their members, governments have every right to take forceful action against them. But the problem is much broader than crime and punishment. In states that respect the right of free speech, movements for cultural domination use the freedoms of democratic societies to try to undermine them. It is possible—indeed, common—to advocate exclusion, discrimination and the

denial of civil and political liberties without ever breaking the law.

The dilemma is that democratic states, which hold their values of freedom dear, do not want to stand accused of improperly restricting free speech and rights of assembly. Nor do they want to ignore threats to communal peace or intimidation of minority groups. If the rights of some groups are restricted, while the rest of society enjoys them, there is a danger of provoking extreme, even violent reactions. The challenge is to protect freedom while discouraging coercive movements.

Coercive movements tend to be more powerful, and threatening, in non-democratic states. They make themselves heard through violence and extremism because the public sphere is otherwise closed to them. By definition, non-democratic states embody little or no allegiance to such values as free speech or the right to organize politically. For non-democratic regimes the trade-off between liberty and repression is less acute because there is less liberty to start with.

For non-democratic governments, moving towards more liberal politics can be an effective

Coercive movements can be a powerfully destabilizing force

BOX 4.1

Leadership, ideological manipulation and recruiting supporters

Leaders of movements for cultural domination build group identities and mobilize their followers to adopt coercive methods against others. Leaders use their organizational skills to gain supporters, modify ideologies to suit their needs, arrange finances at home and abroad and give weapons and training to militant cadres. Such leaders pursue two core aims: creating an ideology of intolerance and altering the balance of political power.

The easiest way to breed intolerance is to use self-serving interpretations of history to describe and vilify other groups. By doing so, leaders emphasize the quest for justice and focus on the losses their group allegedly suffered. The focus is not on solving real grievances but on using ostensible grievances as rallying cries. The Web site of the Bajrang Dal, a Hindu extremist group, accuses the Indian state of appeasing “anti-national elements (muslims)” and demands that Indian Muslims “prove that

they are not the heirs and followers” of past invaders who destroyed Hindu temples. In the United States after the 1993 Waco tragedy involving Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents and the Branch Davidian cult, leaders of religious cults and white supremacist organizations tried to rally support by attacking the federal government for perpetrating what they claimed was an injustice.

Leaders also seek to change the structure of governance, such as substituting theological law for secular rules, repudiating electoral processes or restricting the constitutional rights of others. All these measures serve to impose one group’s authority and superiority over others. Notwithstanding the violent activities of the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, in the past Buddhist monks have regularly opposed any moves towards granting autonomy to Tamils in the northeast.

Source: ADL 2003; *The Economist* 2000; Grove and Carter 1999; HinduUnity.org 2004; IRR 2003; Stern 2003.

strategy (box 4.2). Democratic societies, better suited to dealing with movements of cultural domination, have more options.

RESTRICTIVE MEASURES

Restricting the activities of coercive movements is the first step. When these movements threaten, intimidate and violently target other groups, states need to restrain them, even if that requires the use of force. Common measures to restrict (and eventually eliminate) the activities of coercive movements include:

- Erecting institutional barriers against coercive political parties.
- Enacting legislation and using judicial intervention.
- Applying force.

Erecting barriers against coercive political parties. Institutional barriers that exclude certain types of organizations from participating freely in electoral politics or civil society are a common way for democratic societies to keep cultural extremism from infecting the larger society. Barriers include requiring a minimum share of votes to enter the legislature, controlling campaign funds, restricting access to broadcast services and

banning certain types of political parties through constitutional provisions. Non-democratic governments use similar measures to suppress opposition, compromising their ability to deal with coercive movements when a specific threat arises because there are no lines of communication.

In Germany a political party must get 5% of the national vote to take a seat in the legislature. This threshold has helped to exclude from power all major extreme right parties since the end of the Second World War—the National Democratic Party (NPD), Republican Party (REP) and the German People's Union (DVU). Israel's threshold of 1.5%, by contrast, was not high enough to keep Rabbi Kahane of the racist Kach Party from winning a seat in the Knesset in 1984. In response, parliament adopted section 7A of the Basic Law, which blocks a slate of candidates from participating in elections if its purposes include, among others, "denial of the democratic character of the state" or "incitement to racism". The government banned Kach in 1988 for inciting racism and declared it a terrorist organization in 1994. In both Germany and Israel coercive groups, even if permitted to contest elections, found their freedoms constrained when authorities identified them as hostile to the constitution.

Restricting the activities of coercive movements is only the first step

BOX 4.2

Central Asia—the danger in restricting political and cultural liberties

By the end of Soviet rule in Central Asia Islam was polarized and new Islamist movements had emerged. There was official Islam, as regulated (and suppressed) by the Soviet state; traditional Islam, as organized around unofficial clergy; and reformist Islam, as espoused by the ahl al-Quran—"people of the Book"—who wanted to establish "pure Islam" and believed in strict adherence to Sharia law. With the repression of movements expressing popular aspirations, each successive religious movement became more ideologically extreme and coercive.

Repression seldom works ...

In the early 1990s the pan-Central Asian Islamic Revival Party (IRP) sought to purify Islam but lacked a coherent structure. Despite being generally moderate, the IRP was banned in Uzbekistan in 1991. Around the same time the Adolat (justice) movement became a force, demanding that Uzbekistan become an Islamic state. It gained popularity as bands of volunteers

patrolled the Ferghana Valley to reduce crime and demand lower food prices. Fearing alleged links with the IRP, authorities prosecuted Adolat leaders. This only boosted their popular appeal and forced the movement underground. In 1999–2000 the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), headed by former Adolat leaders, sought to depose the Uzbek government and establish an Islamic state.

Another Islamist group, the Hizb-ut Tahrir (HT), has gained supporters throughout the Ferghana Valley region of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. It wants to establish an Islamic caliphate in Central Asia. But it strongly criticizes the violence of the IMU, relying instead on grass-roots campaigns, distribution of leaflets and similar tactics. However, the HT also espouses radical ideas, rejecting democracy, imposing Sharia and threatening the possible use of force in future. The HT has been banned in all three states, but its popularity has not waned.

... but democratic accommodation can

Tajikistan's civil war (1992–97) was largely a power struggle between different ethnic groups. After the United Tajik Opposition had been expelled from its strongholds, religious activists took over its leadership and renamed the group the Movement for the Islamic Revival of Tajikistan (MIRT), trying to reshape it as a religious force. In areas under its control the MIRT threatened to punish people who did not pray and demanded that women wear veils. Many moderate opposition leaders left the MIRT. After a peace agreement in 1997 former opposition members (including those from the relegalized Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan) received government positions. More moderate leaders joined the party. The IRPT has kept its commitment—surrendering weapons, upholding the constitution, supporting a secular democratic state. The IRPT continues to advocate inclusion of religious values in the legal system, though it has limited political influence.

Source: Cornell and Spector 2002; *The Economist* 2003b; Rotar' 2002; Rubin 2004; Zelkina 1999.

Such bans on political participation may be legitimate if a party has been implicated in criminal behaviour. But restrictions on political parties only because they adhere to a particular ideology might not work for two reasons. First, a movement that expresses a genuine public concern seldom withers away. Second, opposition against the regime can increase, and take more extreme forms, if the public considers such bans illegitimate. Morocco's experience shows that wider political participation can increase moderation. After constitutional changes expanded the electoral playing field, the Islamist Justice and Development Party became the main opposition party in 2002. Within a year its leaders were arguing less about imposing Islamic law and more about advancing development.

Enacting legislation and using judicial intervention. Laws restricting coercive groups differ in scope and implementation. Despite strong anti-racism laws in Sweden the Parliament rejected a ban on extreme right groups. But at times stringent laws against terrorism become necessary. In the United Kingdom the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act of 2001 extended its scope to include both racially and religiously aggravated crimes. This law and India's Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2002 extend the period of detention of suspects without trial. Malaysia and Singapore have used similar provisions for decades.

But there are lively debates about anti-terror legislation almost everywhere—Germany, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States—because there is also a danger that anti-terror laws, enacted to deal with a crisis, will be abused or will remain in use in perpetuity. It is important to regularly review these laws for their need and effectiveness to justify their continuing application. The Indian government allowed its earlier anti-terror law to lapse in 1995 after accusations of human rights abuses. The UK anti-terror law was introduced as a temporary measure in 1974 (in the wake of Northern Ireland-related terrorism) and amended in 1976, 1984, 1989 and 1996. When made permanent, such laws compromise guarantees of civil liberties in democratic societies. The UK legislation has no expiry date.

The effectiveness of laws that seek to cut the ground out from under movements for cultural domination depends not on how much they restrict civil liberties but on how much they protect them. The role of a functioning civilian justice system is critical for prosecuting coercive movements and individuals but also to serve as a check on government actions.

Courts have come to different conclusions about the proper balance between protecting liberty and permitting the spread of hatred. In 1996 the Swedish Supreme Court interpreted a 1948 law that prohibited agitation against other ethnic groups (*hets mot folkgrupp*) to allow the banning of any display of emblems, symbols or clothing connected with racial hatred. The Dutch are also working through such complexities. In early 2001 the mayor of the municipality of Kerkrade invoked the Law on Public Events to forbid a march by the Netherlands People's Union, an extreme right party with a racist ideology. A court in Maastricht overturned the order, and the march took place. The legitimacy of actions rests on acceptance of internationally recognized laws and norms. Coercive movements often develop international networks. If due process of law is not followed in one country, then a movement might gain sympathy and support in other countries as well.

Applying force. All states, democratic or not, have a right to use force when faced with violent movements. What matters is how they use it. The use of force loses much or all of its legitimacy when the state restricts political rights, avoids civilian jurisdiction or uses torture.

There is a practical argument against the use of force as the first option: it often does not work. Repression of the generally moderate Islamic Revival Party in Uzbekistan in the early 1990s led to the growth of extremist groups like the Adolat movement, and by 1999 the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan was attempting to overthrow the government and engaging in terrorism (see box 4.2).

Ensuring that force is used legitimately is not always easy. Force should be used only against groups that are coercive, not against groups demanding rights for political participation. It is sometimes difficult to make that distinction, however. Members of the same movement might

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States should go beyond restrictive measures to contain intolerant ideologies and coercive movements

espouse different ideologies and objectives, some coercive, others not. States become wary that giving freedom to a coercive movement could encourage more intolerance. Egypt shows just how difficult it has been to identify coercive movements—and yet how important it is to choose the right policy response (box 4.3).

But certain strategies should be avoided. States have resorted to torture, arguing that it is justified under certain circumstances. No matter how infrequent or moderate the use, there is always the danger of abuse when the law condones such actions. In 1987 an Israeli judicial commission recommended allowing “moderate physical pressure” in interrogations.¹⁴ But the abuse of Palestinian prisoners by Shin Bet, the security service, became widespread. Recognizing this reality, the Israeli Supreme Court declared all such methods illegal in 1999. As of March 2004, 58 of 191 United Nations member states had not ratified the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (indicator table 30).

Most democratic states, and even some non-democratic ones, apply five basic principles in their judicial processes: no arbitrary detention,

no torture, habeas corpus, access to trial by civilian magistrate and access to a defence lawyer. Confronting coercive movements does not mean that these principles have to be compromised. Doing so makes restrictive measures repressive—and even ineffective.

DEMOCRATIC ACCOMMODATION

States should avoid using only restrictive measures to contain intolerant ideologies and coercive movements. Why? Because the measures can undermine democratic principles—and are frequently ineffective. There is no evidence, for example, that banning political parties and movements with a racist agenda ends racism. Movements for cultural domination exploit real grievances; if banned, they simply go underground. Restriction, especially repression, provokes resistance not only from the movements—it can also turn popular opinion against the state.

Coercive movements are sustainable at least in part because they give expression to people’s concerns and sentiments. Such concerns can be addressed only if they can be expressed and understood.

BOX 4.3

Egypt—distinguishing between moderates and extremists

Islamist groups are not all alike. At the same time, distinguishing between groups and their ideologies is not always easy. This can be seen clearly in Egypt.

The law governing the establishment of political parties in Egypt prohibits the formation of political parties that “are based on class, confessional, sectarian, geographical grounds or on discrimination because of sex, origin, religion or conviction.” The aim of these stipulations is to avoid divisions on social, religious or ethnic lines and to preserve social peace.

For the better part of a century Egypt has contended with Islamist movements. The Muslim Brotherhood (founded in 1928), al-Jama’ a al-Islamiyya and al-Jihad are the most prominent. From the 1940s to the 1960s the Muslim Brotherhood had a violent element involving high-profile assassinations and armed plots against the government. But in the past two decades some of its leaders have rejected revolutionary and violent methods (they claim completely), even suggest-

ing that violence contradicts Islamic Sharia.

The Muslim Brotherhood’s stated objectives now are the establishment of an Islamic democracy based on freedom, and the creation of a society with social justice and security for all citizens. It seeks an Egypt governed by Sharia law, while emphasizing the need to work within the institutions of democracy.

The Egyptian state allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to run for election, in alliance with other parties, in 1984 and 1987, without officially recognizing it. The Brotherhood contested in alliance with other parties (Wafd in 1984, Liberal and Socialist Labour in 1987) and scored impressive gains—initially 8 seats, then 36. However, partly due to internal conflicts, the Brotherhood was equivocal in condemning violent acts committed by other groups in the early 1990s. Such ambiguity about its ideology has undercut the Brotherhood’s attempts to position itself as a moderate political alternative. In the 1990s the government arrested hundreds of Brotherhood members on the

grounds that they were supporting terrorism.

Deciding how to deal with the Muslim Brotherhood is difficult.

Al-Jama’ a al-Islamiyya and al-Jihad, which originated in the 1970s, have relied on violent tactics to secure their objective of imposing Sharia. The most gruesome attack was the massacre of 68 foreigners and Egyptians at a temple in Luxor in 1997 (the Muslim Brotherhood denounced the attack). Since then these groups have suffered ideological divisions. Some leaders now reject violence, while others defend it. The attacks on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 (both groups allegedly contributed to them) highlighted the threats extremist elements pose. Alleged links to al-Qaeda have further eroded their claims to political participation. They are not allowed to enter elections.

As the world seeks solutions to the threats posed by international terrorism, the Egyptian experience shows how difficult it is to distinguish between moderate and extremist groups.

Source: Abed-Kotob 1995; Campagna 1996; Fahmy 1998; Gerges 2000.

Allowing political parties that espouse coercive ideologies to participate in elections might provide a democratic channel for expressing resentment, thereby reducing violence. The risk is that such parties, on gaining power, might then try to suppress cultural freedoms. Should the state ban parties that want to coercively impose Islamic Sharia law? Should a white-power group in Sweden be allowed to operate freely?

This Report has already argued that universal values of human rights and individual freedoms must not be sacrificed to claims of tradition or customary law. But repressing a party for its ideology risks undermining democratic processes and might encourage the excluded to turn to violence. The experience of several countries suggests four strategies to guide the actions of democratic states—strategies that non-democracies can learn from:

- Allowing normal democratic processes to function.
- Prosecuting hate crimes.
- Paying attention to school curricula.
- Helping communities come to terms with past hatred and violence.

Allowing normal democratic processes to function. Suppression of political rights on grounds of ideology seldom succeeds. In Algeria a military intervention in 1992 annulled the election of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) party. This led to the emergence of a more militant group, the Armed Islamist Group (GIA). The result: more than a decade of deadly violence and nearly 100,000 lives lost.¹⁵ Political accommodation can split coercive movements between those prepared to participate in elections or government and those not (box 4.4).

Mainstream parties in Europe tend to avoid links with racist, anti-immigrant parties, but political realities have at times coaxed them into bringing extreme right parties into a coalition. Austria's extreme right Freedom Party (FPÖ) has been part of regional coalition governments since the 1970s. After winning 26.9% of the vote in 1999, it became a partner in the national coalition government. But this was on the condition that its leader, Jörg Haider, not be part of the government; he even stepped down as party chairman in 2000. Government policy remained moderate: Austrian immigration policy

Democratic accommodation can shed the hard light of reality on the fringe appeal of extremism

BOX 4.4

Algeria—discontent, democratization and violence

The Algerian civil war is often portrayed as a conflict between Islamic fundamentalists and the state. But the rise of intolerant and violent groups resulted from failed democratization. Accommodative strategies in recent years have yielded some initial positive results even as several other challenges remain.

After an economic collapse in the 1980s pressure for greater democratization increased. The National Liberation Front (FLN) government, which had ruled Algeria since independence, introduced constitutional changes in 1989 to legalize political parties and curtail the role of the military. It had also encouraged an Islamist movement by significantly increasing religious spending from 1982 to 1987. Beginning in 1988 the country prepared for its first multiparty election, and the government dramatically cut religious spending to dampen the Islamist movement's growing appeal. In the December 1991 elections the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), which wanted to establish an Islamic state, won 47% of the vote in the first round. With the election outcome almost certain, the government halted

the electoral process in early 1992. Democracy had failed in Algeria.

While the failure had little to do with Islam, Islam was a major factor in the crisis. An armed Islamist movement had begun organizing in Algeria in 1990. Many groups, believing that democracy was not the route to an Islamic state, stayed out of the FIS. The FIS, arguing for democratic processes, at first marginalized violent groups. But it started losing credibility in the aftermath of the 1992 coup. By 1994, when armed groups opposing dialogue with the "apostate regime" (Hafez 2000, p. 577) united as the Armed Islamist Group (GIA), the FIS formed its own military wing—the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS).

The differences in ideology were substantial. The GIA targeted civilians; the AIS declared such methods un-Islamic and focused on military targets. The GIA considered violent *jihad* an Islamic imperative; the AIS viewed it as only one of many means to build an Islamic state. The GIA portrayed an uncompromising struggle against infidels and apostates; the AIS and FIS appealed to the president to restore democracy and political rights.

These varying interpretations of Islam and its role indicate why generalizations about Islam and Islamist movements in Algeria are unhelpful.

Since 1997, when the AIS negotiated a ceasefire with the military in return for a general amnesty, Algeria has made some moves towards reconciliation and democracy. In 1999 the government released political prisoners and passed a Law of Civil Reconciliation to extend amnesty to rebels who had not killed civilians, placed bombs in public places or committed rape. In elections in 2002 two Islamist-oriented parties earned seats in the National Assembly.

Algeria has a long road ahead. The FIS continues to be disqualified from elections. The GIA and the recently established Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat continue to threaten violence. Demands for cultural recognition by the Berbers are another source of tension. Algeria's experience exemplifies the argument presented throughout this Report: religion and ethnicity are not intrinsically causes of conflict, and democracy is a necessary but not sufficient condition for guaranteeing cultural freedoms.

Source: Hafez 2000; Middle East Institute 2003; Testas 2002; Tremlett 2002.

SPECIAL CONTRIBUTION

Difference is not a threat but a source of strength

Most societies in the world today include more than one culture, one community or one tradition. All too often in such a situation one element may seek to dominate the society as a whole. That approach can generate tension and conflict. It is in the interests of all to work together to build a society beneficial to all its members.

Northern Ireland and the European Union are particularly strong examples of how the existence of more than one culture can prove to be positive in the building and development of society through a process of conflict resolution.

It is now almost four decades since the beginnings of the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland, which has sought by peaceful means the same rights and opportunities for all the people living in Northern Ireland, irrespective of their background or religion. Throughout those years I have maintained that, when you have a divided people, violence has absolutely no role to play in healing the division or in solving the problems—it only deepens the division. The problem can be resolved only through peace, stability, agreement, consensus and partnership. There cannot be victory for one side or the other.

So long as the legitimate rights of each community in Northern Ireland were not accommodated together in a new political framework acceptable to all, the situation would continue to give rise to conflict and instability. There needed to be agreement.


That is the purpose of the 1998 Belfast Agreement. It represents an accommodation that protects and promotes the identities and rights of all political traditions, groups and individuals. No one is asked to yield cherished convictions or beliefs. Everyone is asked to respect the views and rights of others as equal to his or her own.

I also believe that the European Union is the best example of conflict prevention and conflict resolution in international history. It is important that we maintain and build on that record. European visionaries demonstrated that difference—whether of race, religion or nationality—is not a threat, but is natural, positive and a source of strength. It should never be the source of hatred or conflict. A fundamental principle of peace is respect for diversity.

I entered the European Parliament in 1979 on the occasion of the first direct election to the

parliament by the voters of its then nine member states. I will soon be stepping down from elected public life, delighted in the knowledge that in those 25 years the European Union has progressed to the point that it will by then have expanded to include 25 member states. This will end the artificial division of our continent created after the Second World War and reunite our European family.

The European Parliament's location is in Strasbourg, on the River Rhine, on the border between France and Germany. When I first visited Strasbourg I walked across the bridge from Strasbourg in France to Kehl in Germany and reflected on the tens of millions of people who had been killed in the numerous wars waged for control of territory. The European Union has replaced those conflicts with co-operation between its people. It has transformed its wide range of traditions from a source of conflict into a source of unifying strength.



John Hume, MP MEP
1998 Nobel Peace Prize Winner

did not become dramatically harsher, as had been feared. And in 2002 the FPÖ won only 10% of the vote, suffering from internal party divisions (see figure 4.2).


Democratic accommodation can shed the hard light of reality on the fringe appeal of extremism. Extreme right parties might initially show populism-driven electoral success, but it is not always easy to maintain the momentum. Many European extreme right parties, like the Denmark Progress Party (FRPd) or the German Republican Party (REP), openly contested elections but were rendered irrelevant when they received minuscule proportions of the vote. Others like the Social Movement Tricolour Flame (MS-FT) in Italy got barely any support (figure 4.3).

Non-democratic countries, by definition, have a narrow public space for political contests. This can encourage the growth of coercive movements, but it also limits the state's ability to confront them in a way that the public deems legitimate.

Prosecuting hate crimes. Failure to prosecute hate crimes only encourages coercive movements to advance their agenda through threats

and violence. Legislation that specifically targets hate crimes is controversial. Critics ask why bigotry should be considered more reprehensible

Figure 4.3 Democratic participation can expose the fringe appeal of extreme right parties



Source: Electionworld.org 2004; Ignazi 2003; Jackman and Volpert 1996; Widfeldt 2004; Susning.nu 2004; Swedish Election Authority 2002.

than, say, greed, and claim that such laws come close to prosecuting thoughts not deeds, perilous territory for democracies.

The case for hate crime legislation rests on two premises. First, hate crimes have symbolic relevance—they are intended to send a message to an entire community and therefore, in a sense, threaten all its members. The crime is greater than the physical or verbal assault involved. Second, a potential victim can do little to prevent attack. Since it is religious or ethnic identity that motivates such crimes—often immutable characteristics—the threat is constant. Cultural liberty is about allowing individuals to make choices; hate crime is about coercing them into a straitjacket of someone else’s design.

Having hate crime laws on the books is not enough. To identify potential threats countries need to collect data on hate crimes or xenophobic violence. The European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, which assists EU countries with standard procedures for collecting such data, undertakes comparative analysis for the region. States must also have the political will to take a stand against intolerance. Of the 191 member states of the United Nations, 56 states (29%) have not ratified

the International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (indicator table 30).

Paying attention to school curricula. States should ensure that religious schools are not exempt from state regulation and that their students receive a broad-based education. Some countries have made encouraging efforts in this direction. Pakistan recently sanctioned a \$100 million programme for including secular subjects in the curricula of religious schools.¹⁶ In Malaysia the government is introducing the J-QAF project to incorporate a comprehensive Islamic studies syllabus in the national education system; students will thus get both religious and secular education. In Indonesia since the early 20th century the Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama movements have run schools that have the same syllabus as public schools in addition to their religious curriculum. The State University of Islamic Studies also promotes humanities and social sciences within Islamic education systems.

The curriculum of state schools also deserves attention. UNESCO has been engaged in several projects in Central America, western and southern Africa and southeastern Europe for the promotion of human rights in teacher

States must have the political will to take a stand against intolerance

BOX 4.5

United States—targeting intolerance and hatred

The United States has used a mix of strategies to respond to cultural extremism. These strategies have targeted intolerance, but they have not compromised fundamental rights and freedoms.

Protecting freedom of speech and expression

The United States targeted the Ku Klux Klan in the 1920s and American Nazis in the 1930s. But since then the evolution of the US legal system has been towards strongly defending the First Amendment to the Constitution, which guarantees freedom of speech and the right to assemble peaceably. A famous case during the 1970s involved the neo-Nazi National Socialist Party (NSPA), which demanded the right to march in Skokie, Illinois, a town with a large Jewish population. In 1978 the Illinois Supreme Court permitted the NSPA to march, arguing that “[s]peech can be restricted only when it interferes in a physical way with other legitimate activities” (Pehdazur 2001, p. 349).

Recording hate crimes

Yet the United States also has been recording hate crimes for a longer time than many other countries. In 1990 Congress enacted the Hate Crimes Statistics Act and amended it in 1994. Hate crimes are categorized according to the bias-motivation for a criminal act—race, religion, ethnicity, disability and sexual orientation. Law enforcement agencies have several guidelines to objectively determine whether a crime was motivated by a bias—clothing, drawings and symbols, oral and written comments, acts on religious holidays and so forth. Lately, debate has begun on extending the scope of biases considered as hate crimes. A bill was introduced in the Oregon State Senate to extend the law to eco-terrorist and anti-capitalist actions.

Prosecuting militants

In the United States criminal prosecutions and civil law suits have been pursued with vigour against

violent racist groups, with long jail sentences handed down to their leaders. Consequently, several groups have become bankrupt and fallen into disarray in recent years—Aryan Nations, the Creativity Movement, Greater Ministries International. Others, like the Hammerskin Nation, have also suffered but continue to pose a threat.

Helping communities

Finally, the Department of Justice has tried to resolve hate crimes at the community level. It established the Community Relations Service in 1964 to provide several services targeted at reducing hate crime activity: mediation to resolve communitywide tensions; technical assistance and training for local officials, police officers and residents on how to recognize hate crimes and share information; public awareness programmes and planning for contingencies such as marches and demonstrations that might exacerbate tensions.

Source: ADL 2003; De Kadt 2004; DoJ 2001; FBI 1999; Levin 2001; Pehdazur 2001.

To choke off coercive movements for cultural domination, states need to respond constructively, openly and legitimately to the forces that animate them

training programmes. The Asia-Pacific Centre of Education for International Understanding, in the Republic of Korea, develops education curricula to promote understanding of diverse cultures in the region. Cameroon's teacher training programmes include courses on tolerance and international understanding. Subjects like ethics and civics have become compulsory in primary and secondary education. Croatia has begun producing textbooks incorporating human rights education in both national (nursery, primary and secondary) and non-formal education programmes.

Helping communities come to terms with past hatred and violence. Coercive movements, often the product of entrenched historical antagonisms, cannot be wiped out unless these antagonisms are dealt with. South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission set in motion successful efforts in this direction. The use of community institutions (like the Gacaca Courts in Rwanda) appears to have had some success in healing wounds in the community. Communities in Angola and Mozambique are using traditional purification rituals to help traumatized child soldiers re-establish relations with their

families and larger communities. In Sweden joint projects between police and schools and youth centres have reduced ethnic tensions and provide alternative activities for youth.¹⁷

As countries like Afghanistan emerge from violent conflict, efforts to keep coercive movements at bay require strong state institutions (inclusive constitutions, fair legislative processes and independent judiciaries) and sound strategies for reintegration. Over several decades the United States has used such a mix of policies to effectively target racist groups and individuals. Criminal acts are met with force, but fundamental rights have also been protected (box 4.5).

* * *

Movements for cultural domination exist because they tap into people's real grievances and concerns. Wishing them away, pretending they do not exist or simply outlawing them only gives them more legitimacy to grow. To choke off coercive movements for cultural domination, states need to respond constructively, openly and legitimately to the forces that animate them.