Governance
Acknowledgements

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Poverty Reduction Forum Secretariat

Muriel Mafico: Coordinator
Charles Mutasa: Researcher/Documentalist Stabile
Masawi: Administrative Assistant
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Preface

The theme of the Zimbabwe Human Development Report 2000 is Governance. This theme is as pertinent globally as it is for Zimbabwe. Furthermore, Governance issues are relevant at all levels within the corporate, public and civic sectors. The report discusses key requisites for good governance in Zimbabwe tracing developments from the post independence period to date. These issues are looked at from the view point of independent analysts, as well as other development practitioners.

The report analyses Governance issues in Zimbabwe from the perspectives of various researchers, who draw their information from credible and accepted sources. It emphasises the link between Governance and the promotion and sustenance of human development. One of the important observations made in the report is the role of the State in creating an enabling environment for development to take place, with the participation of all its citizens. The report also seeks to analyse governance issues from a gender perspective as well as incorporating the views of the youth. In the indices section, the report provides updated data on levels of poverty at the national, provincial and district level.

Following on the past Human Development Reports, the 2000 version should continue to stimulate debate, provide a good basis for researchers and infuse the global perspective in the national debate.

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UNDP Resident Representative

Donald P. Chimanikire
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The Setting

Governance is a term we often hear discussed in the media, in different forums and elsewhere. Politicians and civil society leaders discuss governance, and often have different visions of what it should consist of in a particular society. Donors and international financial institutions are equally interested in the nature of governance in the countries to which they provide assistance and loans. In official and popular discourses, governance has become resonating term. Like democracy, it has become a rallying idea or concept. However, there are no unanimous visions of governance nor a single recipe of good governance for every country or society. Thus few concepts have stimulated more profound interest and debate, as well as controversy, than that of governance.

As developing countries seek to consolidate their independence and democracy, it is appropriate that governance is a central issue. It is proper that it is at the centre of discussions on political arrangements, economic and social policy and institutional capacity. It is useful that governance is assessed in relation to whether it enhances or impedes democratisation in a particular society. The theme of the Zimbabwe Human Development Report (ZHDR) for 2000 is therefore appropriately on governance. In particular, the Report explores how governance can contribute to improvement in conditions for human development. Political, social and economic rights constitute a core issue in governance. These rights are indispensable to sustainable human development. As it was observed:

“Governance and human development - the two are indivisible. Human development cannot be sustained without good governance. Governance cannot be sound unless it sustains human development.” (UNDP, 1997). This Report assesses the symbiotic relationship between the current governance system and the human development process in Zimbabwe. The topicality and timeliness of this assessment are reasonably clear. The beginning of a new century provides a good vantage point to reflect on past and present experiences of governance, and to begin to map out an agenda for better governance. There is also a sense in which Zimbabwe, 20 years after independence, is at an important cross-roads as it contemplates its economic and political future. The twin challenges of building foundations for stronger democratic governance and sustainable human development have never been more daunting since independence in 1980.

1.2 What Is Governance?

Governance is a concept as well as a process. As a concept, it became more widely popularised in the 1980s when it gained currency in the international development discourse. Although it is widely used in the writings and reports of the World Bank and other multilateral donor institutions, the concept was extensively discussed in African institutions even earlier. For instance, the Khartoum Declaration of 1988 defined governance priorities as:

- the promotion of human development,
- restoration of basic freedoms and human rights,
- overcoming political instability and intolerance, and
- curtailing of over-centralisation of power

The Addis Ababa Declaration of the OAU Heads of State in 1990 also defined governance in similar terms. Its constituent elements were accountability of leadership, consolidation of democratic institutions and popular participation, and a development model that was self-reliant, human-centred, sustainable and based on social justice. This official discourse was complemented by the African Charter for Popular Participation and Transformation drawn at Arusha also in 1990. According to the Charter, the elements which made up governance included the following:

- freedom of association
- press freedom
- rule of law
- accountability of leadership
- decentralisation in decision-making and
- economic justice.
It will be observed that these official and popular definitions identify aspects which constitute governance and also those which contribute to “good governance” from their perspective.

It has been the task of academics and international development agencies to summarise and refine the meaning of governance. Simply put, governance is the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority of a country’s affairs at all levels (UNDP, 1997). Governance therefore consists of the mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, mediate their differences and exercise their legal rights and obligations. Thus it is not only the state and its institutions which are involved in governance, civil society and its organisations play an equally important role.

1.3 Good Governance

In general, there has been little disagreement over what constitutes the core elements of governance. The institutional, political and economic elements are key ones in any system of governance. Where controversy has sometimes arisen it has been on what constitutes “good” and “bad” governance, and over the linking of governance to democracy. The Zimbabwean discourse on governance has not escaped this controversy, as various sections of the Report will show. One survey in Zimbabwe discussed “good governance” in terms of attaining a “good society” characterised by: positive relationships at all levels based on equity, understanding, cooperation and mutual respect, respect for citizens’ political, economic and social rights, fair distribution of resources, maximum development of individuals and communities, a strong and committed leadership as well as peace and democracy (ACPDT and Commonwealth Foundation, 2000).

This is a sufficiently flexible definition of good governance in a developing society. To these elements can be added freedom of association and participation, a fair and effective legal framework, accountability and transparency in the public services and private sector, availability of reliable information, effective and efficient public sector management and cooperation between state and civil society organisations (UNDP, 1995). In sum, good governance should be participatory, transparent and accountable; it should also be equitable.

“Good governance ensures that political, social and economic priorities are based on broad consensus in society and that the voices of the poorest and the most vulnerable are heard in decision-making over the allocation of development resources.” (UNDP 1997).

For its part, as one of the leading lenders to developing countries, the World Bank has linked good governance to issues of institutional capacity and management of economic resources and policies. Hence it incorporates issues of improvement of public sector management, economic and financial accountability, rule of law and predictability and transparency into its definition (World Bank, 1992).

Finally, the notion of “good governance” belongs to a specific era. It is the current post-Cold war era in which there has been a notable shift in perception and attitude amongst the rich developed countries and international financial institutions regarding the necessary institutional framework for economic development in developing countries. Countries with authoritarian and neo-patrimonial systems of rule would be penalised while those which embraced democracy would be rewarded with development assistance and loans. There is therefore a sense in which there is an implicit political conditionality to loans, investment and aid. This is at least in so far as governments are required to meet certain conditions of good governance such as observance of rule of law, accountability, transparency and political pluralism.

1.4 The Global Context of Governance

Although the main focus of this report is the national context and experiences of governance, this is not to underestimate nor marginalize the significance of the wider global context. Indeed, from the I 990s onwards, governance became a prominent issue in the relationship between developed countries and donor institutions on the one hand, and developing countries on the other. As we have observed above, the release of loans and aid have been tied to performance in governance in the recipient developing country. This has implications for national sovereignty. It is therefore scarcely surprising
that strong exchanges have sometimes occurred between government leaders in developing countries and institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It was perhaps inevitable that broadening economic conditionality to political conditionality would spark a new round of controversy.

Broadly speaking, there are two positions on the impact of globalisation on the capacity and autonomy of a state. The first position argues that state autonomy has been substantially eroded. International financial markets together with structural adjustment programmes have steadily eroded national autonomy. As it has been argued:

“National borders previously corresponded fairly closely with the limits of political authority and economic activity - with international trade serving as the principal link between autonomous nations. Now we have a more integral global economy in which not only exchange but also production and finance are organized and articulated on a planetary scale. This has not only reshaped global capitalism, but also helped restructure the state. In an uneven but cumulative manner, nation states have become attuned to, and in many cases subordinated by, international economic forces.” (UNRISD, 1995). In the realm of both economic policy and governance, the autonomy of individual states has been reduced. In countries amidst economic crises, the autonomy is even more circumscribed. In particular, multi-lateralism in economic policymaking has been typified by the Bretton Woods institutions, the IMF and the WB. This economic multi-lateralism has particularly exerted a great deal of influence and pressure especially in developing countries undertaking economic reforms. In sum, this position argues that the globalisation of trade, investment and communications has steadily robbed the state of much of its capacity for independent initiative - to fix exchange rates or to determine budget deficits, for example. Under such circumstances, neither national parliaments nor governments “could claim to be fully in charge of their countries’ destinies or responsible only to their electorates” (UNRISD, 1995). This explains the frustration of government leaders at their loss of decisive power in making policies especially key economic and social policies. The challenge to adjust to this new structure of international power relations needs to be faced squarely. In the last analysis, it is not only states in developing countries which must address this challenge. States in developed countries also face the challenge (albeit on a different scale) to adjust to this global context.

The second position is skeptical towards the position that the global context diminishes a country’s autonomy in making its own policies and organizing its own programmes. It argues that proponents of globalisation “seriously underrate the variety and adaptability of state capacities which build on historically framed national institutions” (Weiss, 1997). Rather than counter-posing the nation-state and global market as antinomies, globalisation is often the by product of states promoting the internationalization strategies of their corporations, and in the process ‘internationalising’ their capacity. Due to the fact that state capacities differ, the ability to exploit opportunities of globalisation - rather than simply to succumb to its pressures - appears much more marked in some countries than in others (Weiss, 1997). Examples of such countries which have successfully adjusted to the global context include the industrializing countries in East Asia - South Korea, Taiwan and Malaysia. In sub-Saharan Africa, examples of such successful adjustment to globalisation are sparse. Even so, countries such as Botswana and Mauritius have been able to develop and sustain policies which have resulted in rapid growth and democratic governance.

Thus while the global context can affect a country’s autonomy in the spheres of development and governance, the impact is not the same in all instances. Although they are now much more restricted than before, states still possess some modicum of autonomy and therefore responsibility in choosing their development strategies and governance systems. This is a position which does not view states as hapless ‘victims” of the globalisation process. However, this means that there will sometimes be tension between certain national strategies and globally-orchestrated strategies in the areas of development and governance policies.

1.5 The Concept of Human Development

The concept of human development stresses that human beings should be put at the centre of the development process. They should not be marginalized nor made mere cogs in the development process. In essence human development relates to the process of widening people’s choices as well as their level of well-being. Three essential choices for people are to lead a long and healthy life, to acquire knowledge and to have access to the resources needed for a decent standard of living (UNDP,
In addition, these choices should include access to income and employment opportunities, education and health, and a clean and safe physical environment. Equally importantly, each individual should have the opportunity to participate fully in community decisions, enjoy human rights, economic and political freedoms (UNDP, 1991). If these basic necessities are inaccessible, and capabilities not achieved, many choices are simply not available and many opportunities remain out of reach.

In short, human beings must be the centre of attention - with development woven around people, and not people around development (UNDP, 1991). Development should therefore be participatory: people should have the opportunity to invest in the development of their capabilities in relation to education, training and creativity. Such a development process needs to create unfettered opportunities for people to be productive and creative, and to enjoy selfrespect, empowerment and a sense of belonging to a community. To that extent, human development represents a process as well as an end (UNDP, 1998). In the final analysis, human development should be “development of the people, for the people by the people”.

Previous Human Development Reports have rightly identified crucial factors which enhance human development. These are:

- improved social well-being,
- strengthening productive sectors and expanding employment,
- exploiting and regenerating natural resources in a sustainable manner,
- providing for current and future needs,
- transferring knowledge, technology and skills while also enhancing the use of traditional wisdom and culture and building local capacities,
- empowering people to participate in decisions that affect their lives,
- enhancing gender equity, and providing social protection and safety nets (UNDP, 1993; ZHDR, 1999).

Growth is a necessary but insufficient condition for human development. Specific further policy measures are required to translate economic growth into sustainable process in human development and poverty reduction (ZHDR, 1999). In a developing country such as Zimbabwe, the issue of poverty reduction is central to any viable human development strategy. Conscious efforts and measures to reduce poverty need to be incorporated into the human development process. This is because poverty remains a principal economic and social challenge in contemporary Zimbabwe.

Of course, human development should be sustainable. Sustainable development relates to development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (WCED, 1987; Singh and Titi, 1995). It should give priority to the poor rather than marginalize them, sustain the environment rather than degrade it, advance women rather than discriminate against them (Speth, 1997). Sustainable human development should promote job-led growth rather than job-less growth, and it should ensure equity and empowerment. There exists a synergy between the ingredients of good governance and those of sustainable human development. Sound governance seeks to eliminate poverty, sustain livelihoods, attain gender equity and protect the environment. Good governance itself can only be consolidated in conditions where there is satisfactory human development. It is not possible to attain high levels of participation and empowerment in the political and development processes where illiteracy and unemployment are high, where education is lacking and gender inequalities glaring (SADC RHDR, 1998). The consolidation of good governance should simultaneously contribute to stronger foundations for sustainable human development.

1.6 Highlights from HDI, HPI and GDI data in Zimbabwe

1.6.1 HDI and HPI Indices

As previous Zimbabwe Human Development reports have done, this report carries both the Human Development and Human Poverty Endices. The methodologies used in the computation of the HDI and HPI indices are specified in the Technical Note in Appendix I at the end of this report. The indices for the 2000 ZHDR have not changed substantially from those contained in the 1999 ZHDR. As Table 1.1
and Figures 1.1 and 1.2 show, there has been no change in the HPI indices by province, urban and rural location, and by gender.

In terms of HDI ranking, Harare and Bulawayo, the two largest cities still rank the highest, while Mashonaland Central and Manicaland provinces rank the lowest. The same trend is reflected in provincial HDI comparisons by gender. Not surprisingly, the provinces with higher levels of HPI are Mashonaland Central, Manicaland and Masvingo, while those with the lowest HPI are the better endowed cities of Harare and Bulawayo. Interestingly, Bulawayo (as in 1999) continues to have the lowest ranking. As in 1999, Mashonaland Central, Manicaland, Masvingo and Mashonaland West continue to rank high in terms of probability of dying before reaching the age of 40. They also continue to rank high in relation to illiteracy, while the lowest illiteracy is in the urban centres particularly Harare and Bulawayo.

1.6.2 GDI and GEM Rankings

The major addition to the ZHDR 2000 Report is the new material included on a Gender-related Development Index (GDI) and the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM). The methodology used in the computation of GDI and GEM is explained in Appendix 1. In short, the GDI measures achievement in the same basic capabilities as the HDI does, but takes note of inequality achievement between women and men (UNDP, 1995). The greater the gender disparity in basic capabilities, the lower a province’s or district’s GDI compared with its HDI. In sum, the GDI is simply the HDI discounted, or adjusted downwards, for gender inequality.

The Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) examines whether women and men are able to actively participate in economic and political life and take part in decision-making (UNDP, 1995). Thus while the GDI focuses on expansion of capabilities, the GEM is concerned with the use of those capabilities to take advantage of the opportunities of life (Ibid). In the Zimbabwean case, there appears to be a strong link between HDI and GDI rankings. Harare and Bulawayo top the GDI chart followed by Matabeleland South and Midlands. Low GDI rankings are in Mashonaland Central, Manicaland and Mashonaland West.

However, the rankings on GEM are more interesting as they do not automatically depend on GDI ranking. While it may not be surprising that Harare tops the ranking, and both Mashonaland West and Mashonaland Central occupy second and third slots respectively. Bulawayo and Matabeleland are ranked in fifth and sixth positions. The provincial GEM rankings are significant because they are based on (a) percentage of seats occupied by women in Parliament (b) the proportion of women amongst administrators and managers and the proportion of women amongst professional and technical workers.

Table 1.1: Regional Human Poverty Comparisons in Zimbabwe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Non-survival 40 Years %</th>
<th>Illiteracy %</th>
<th>Under-weight Children %</th>
<th>No Access to Clean Water%</th>
<th>No Access to Health Care%</th>
<th>Living Standard Deprivation %</th>
<th>HPI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mash Central</td>
<td>20.65</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>28.38</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>25.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manicaland</td>
<td>21.95</td>
<td>24.78</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>29.98</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masvingo</td>
<td>19.37</td>
<td>24.15</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>31.77</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>21.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mash West</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>24.58</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>22.64</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>17.14</td>
<td>20.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mash East</td>
<td>16.85</td>
<td>20.12</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>41.42</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>21.57</td>
<td>19.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mat North</td>
<td>11.96</td>
<td>26.28</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>23.88</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>13.93</td>
<td>19.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlands</td>
<td>16.85</td>
<td>18.48</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>31.42</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>17.44</td>
<td>17.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mat South</td>
<td>10.78</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>28.76</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>13.97</td>
<td>16.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harare</td>
<td>13.16</td>
<td>5.96</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>9.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulawayo</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>6.35</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6.02</td>
<td>7.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>16.85</td>
<td>19.62</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>23.39</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>15.16</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Human Poverty comparisons in Zimbabwe by Province

Provincial HPI comparisons by Rural/Urban
Provincial GDI in Zimbabwe
1.7 Outline of Salient Issues Addressed by the Report

For analytical purposes, governance may be broken down into a number of related components. These are economic governance, political and institutional dimensions of governance, gender dimensions of governance, as well as corporate, local and global governance. All these aspects are present in Zimbabwe and the Report addresses them in relation to their impact on human development. Each of the aspects of governance is related to each other, as the Report will clearly demonstrate. Let us begin by highlighting the salient issues relating to economic governance.

1.8 Economic Governance and Human Development

Economic governance provides an important pillar for human development. By economic governance, we refer to processes of decision-making and participation which directly or indirectly affect a country’s economic activities and its relations with other economies. Economic governance is largely conducted through those particular structures and institutions which are involved in decision-making, and implementation of economic policies and development programmes. But it is not only state institutions which are engaged in economic governance.

Other important players are chambers of commerce, industrial associations, financial institutions such as the Reserve Bank, farmers unions and trade unions. Although their impact on policies vary, they have the potential, if not capacity, to influence economic governance. International financial institutions, especially the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMP) intervene prominently in economic governance through the structural adjustment programmes which they sponsor. How economic governance impacts on equity, poverty and quality of life is the immediate concern of this Report. Is economic governance, for instance, ensuring that people’s choices and opportunities are enlarged in the social and development spheres? Do economic and social policies and programmes ensure access to basic needs of food security, education, health and welfare?

The Report observes that Zimbabwe’s economy is in crisis after a first decade of slow growth, and a second decade of painful, if intermittent, economic adjustment reforms. It explains how the present economic system still reflects the colonial legacy of socio-economic imbalances. The earlier optimism
which underpinned the preparation of several National Development Plans in the 1980s has given way to growing anxiety about the present economic conditions.

The various phases of economic governance are then given detailed elaboration. The weaknesses in the formulation and implementation of economic policy are identified. Some of the shortfalls relate to the gap between policy planning and implementation, limited capacity and inadequate consultation of stakeholders on economic policy issues. Others relate to weak management of government expenditure, high budget deficits and huge domestic and external debt which have far-reaching implications for the wider economy. The immediate challenges therefore include consensus-building on economic policy, providing a more favourable investment climate, creation of expanded employment opportunities, and a revised innovative approach to economic reform.

In particular, there is need to avoid policies and programmes which undermined human development gains in the 1990s. There is an emerging consensus that it was a mistake to cut back drastically on investment in the social sectors of health and education in the 1990s. The privatisation issue is also highlighted as an important economic governance issue. It will require nothing less than maximum transparency, accountability and consultation with all the concerned parties including employees in enterprises to be privatised.

1.9 Political and Institutional Dimensions of Governance

As we have already observed, political and institutional structures and processes constitute the core of governance. Indeed, most literature tends to equate these structures and processes with governance. This indicates the crucial role of the political system and institutional environment in determining and conditioning the quality of governance in any society. Equally importantly, the political and institutional components have a direct bearing on the human development process. For example, human rights in their various forms - civil and political rights, economic and social rights - are at the heart of human development, and they are shaped by the political and institutional environment.

This Report therefore assesses the major issues pertaining to political and institutional governance, and how they relate to the challenge of human development. The strengths and weaknesses of the political system and institutional structures are spelt out, and possible ways to improve their effectiveness and transparency are outlined. An overview of the political system highlights major turning-points during the last 20 years. The attainment of independence itself in 1980 was a significant milestone in the country’s history. Stability was a major achievement following the end of the civil conflict in Matabeleland in the early 1980s. That conflict witnessed human rights violations such as killings and torture and the country is still trying to come to terms with the consequences of that conflict. By the 1990s, it was clear that there were shortfalls in the political party system and in the electoral system. For instance, voter apathy was a pronounced characteristic until the 2000 election. Opposition parties have therefore sought a more “level playing field” in party funding and access to the state-controlled public media, and a more independent and transparent electoral structure. Another shortfall which was conspicuous was the weak role of Parliament which was, until the 2000 election, overwhelmingly dominated by Zanu-PE A Parliamentary Reform Committee in 1998 confirmed this. It acknowledged that for an effective system of checks and balances, a more robust rather than a docile Parliament was imperative. The Report observes other shortfalls including those in the realm of media freedom.

The issue of institutional capacity is addressed at length by the Report. The limitations experienced in the public sector bureaucracy are spelt out, and measures introduced to overcome those limitations are examined. For instance, the recommendations made by the Kavran Commission of 1989 are reviewed and their continuing relevance considered. A worrying development is the growth of the number of instances of corruption in the public sector, although the private sector itself is not clean. The more prominent of such cases are highlighted to show the scale and effects of corruption on the economy and society. Corruption results in wastage of resources and their misuse for self-enrichment and thereby undermines human development. The Report submits suggestions as to how the cancer of corruption may be systematically tackled.
Finally, the issue of constitutional reform is central to the prospects of governance in this country. The Report explains why the first phase of the reform process encountered difficulties leading to the “no” referendum result in February 2000. It is a source of encouragement that some of stakeholders are proposing that there should be a resumption of consultations on the process.

1.10 Local Governance and Participation

Governance is not only about the political system and institutional structures and processes at the national level. Yet most discussion of governance and its major ingredient - participation - is often confined to the national level. It is understandable why the national or central level is the main focus of interest and analysis. Not only is most power located and exercised at this level but most of the resources are concentrated there as well.

Yet the most immediate level of governance for most citizens relates to their experiences at the community, village, ward and district level. It is at this level where they encounter the effects of economic and social policies, and the various laws and programmes. This is the level where their rights are enjoyed or frustrated, where their basic rights are attained or denied. This is where their participation in the running of local or community affairs can be meaningful and productive or frustrated. In short, local governance is a level which affects the daily lives of citizens.

This Report therefore complements and reinforces the discussion on governance at the central level with attention to local governance, and the various forms of participation in that governance. By the term local governance, we refer to a variety of institutions and processes (both government and non-governmental) which collectively determine the way in which political, administrative and development decisions are made and implemented in a locality. Good local governance would entail meaningful devolution of power and responsibilities to local levels and ensuring broad participation as well as openness and accountability in the management of public resources.

Broad and active participation in local governance is an indispensable building-block of democracy in society. The Report provides a broad overview of both rural and urban local governance highlighting their current strengths and weaknesses, and the ways in which those weaknesses may be addressed. It draws from extensive field findings in several districts in a number of provinces, and presents voices of some of the communities involved in local governance. Some of the pressing challenges considered by the Report include problems experienced in financial administration in local institutions especially rural and urban councils, and the management of the environment and natural resources.

One response to shortfalls in local governance is institutional capacity-building. The Report highlights one capacity-building programme which promises to yield positive results in rural local governance. As in the public sector at the central level, corruption is also a worrying development at local institutional levels. It needs to be addressed urgently before it gets out of hand. Finally, the Report refers to various constitutional reform proposals for local governance. Some of the proposed provisions are fresh and practical and should be seriously considered in the next stage of the reform process.

1.11 Gender, Youth and Social Dimensions of Governance

An equitable society places value and worth on each human being’s contribution to the development and wellbeing of society at all levels. However, issues of gender equity and youth development have tended to be sidelined in discussions and strategies relating to governance and human development. Yet in Zimbabwe these social groups of women and youth form a greater proportion of the population. While women make up an estimated 51 per cent of the population, it is notable that about 75 per cent of the population is under the age of 35. The youth are the hope of the future as well as leaders of tomorrow. Their interests and needs, like those of women, have traditionally been marginalised in governance structures and development programmes. This Report argues for a change in the conventional thinking and approaches to issues concerning gender and youth. Women, youth and the disabled ought to be placed at the centre of any strategies or programmes of governance and sustainable human development. Because these groups continue to be disadvantaged and marginalised in development and governance processes, the toll on society is considerable. The toll or cost is delayed and skewed development.
The Report examines the current conditions in Zimbabwe relating to gender, youth and the social services sector, and then suggests possible options to improve the status of these groups. In particular, it provides a detailed elaboration of the legal and constitutional framework in which progress in gender equity has been made since 1980. Even so, there are, however, still gaps and constraints on women’s advancement which this framework has not adequately addressed. The co-existence of customary and modern law continues to be a source of confusion and polarisation of views on how best to facilitate gender equity.

In the realm of politics and decision-making structures, progress in gender equity has been slow. For instance, the 2000 election results clearly showed a decrease in women representation in Parliament. Furthermore, their representation in Cabinet and in upper echelons of the public service bureaucracy as well as in the private sector remains low. There should be a renewed commitment to the goal of gender equity. Such mechanisms as affirmative action and proportional representation (PR) are some of the possible avenues for a conscious strategy to increase the role of women in the governance and development processes.

Similarly, the Report argues for more serious attention to the interests and development of youth. There is clearly need to revamp the education and skills training systems to prepare the youth more adequately for the world of work. The youth should be integrated more systematically into the governance and development processes.

1.12 Civil Society, Human Development and Governance

Civil society is an important player in both human development and governance. By civil society, we refer to organisations through which citizens participate and exert influence over public life and especially on state institutions. Civil society complements the pivotal role of state institutions in the development process. In developing societies, such as Zimbabwe, civil society organisations (CSOs) in their various forms (including as NGOs), fill considerable gaps in the provision of development and social assistance. In governance, CSOs constitute a vital source of pressure for greater democratisation. These are currently difficult times for Zimbabwe’s economic and social sectors. The government alone cannot bear the burden and responsibility of ensuring sustainable development and of safeguarding conditions for good governance. Government’s capacity has certain limits. This is where the CSOs come in. This Report considers the CSOs to be a key pillar in the human development process. An assessment of their current and potential contributions to this development process is necessary and overdue. At community and local levels, CSOs play a critical role in mobilising and representing citizens on social issues such as housing, education, health and welfare. They are also central in facilitating access to credit, agricultural and small business extension services, and to marketing outlets amongst other activities. In addition, CSOs are active in mobilising communities in such key areas as conservation and management of natural resources as well as facilitating participation in decision-making structures at community and local levels. This Report provides evidence of the specific sectors and activities in which CSOs are engaged in Zimbabwe.

Particular attention is paid to the specific interventions of CSOs in income-generating projects, grassroots development projects, provision of micro-credit facilities and food security. CSOs are also active in the HIV-AIDS awareness campaigns, and in supporting those who suffer from the disease as well as orphans.

CSOs complement their role in promoting human development with active participation in the governance process. For instance, there is a growing number of NGOs involved in promoting human rights, civic education, gender rights, social equity as well as constitutional reform. The combined impact of these campaigns is considerable. The Report shows that the impact has been positive in deepening the process of democratisation especially in the 1990s. This was a period in which the proliferation of CSOs was notable and in which their self-confidence and self-assertion grew. State institutions can no longer, for example, ignore the profile and pressure of CSOs in the sphere of civil and political rights. Several case-studies are provided in the Report to illustrate this increased clout of CSOs. The case-studies include those of indigenous business associations, the labour movement (the ZCTU) and the constitutional reform movement (the NCA). A major challenge for the CSOs is to
develop a more fruitful working relationship with the state. This will necessarily entail a process of negotiation and accommodation of their autonomy.

1.13 Corporate and Global Governance and Human Development

The principal focus of this Report is on the national-level and local-level experiences and challenges in governance and human development. It goes into considerable detail about the economic, political and social dimensions of governance in Zimbabwe, and how these shape the human development process. The roles of state institutions, CSOs, and local communities are central in these processes. However, the larger global environment in which these institutions and forces operate should not be ignored. It is an environment which has become increasingly significant in the context of globalisation (which appropriately was the focus of the 1999 ZHDR Report).

While national institutions retain responsibility for their policies and programmes, they now have to negotiate with various international institutions for several reasons with just one being access to loans, development aid and investment flows. This makes policy-making and implementation, and indeed governance, more complex and constrained and sometimes leads to a gradual erosion of national autonomy, as we saw above. This Report explores the role of corporate and global interests in national governance and human development. How do these interests shape or constrain these processes in the Zimbabwean context? We seek to provide a more complete picture of the factors which shape, facilitate or limit choices in governance and development strategies at the national level.

In particular, the Report reflects on trends in corporate governance. It argues for greater social responsibility on the part of corporate firms, both domestic and transnational corporations. It observes shortfalls in corporate governance in both national and TNC firms. As in the public sector, corruption also rears its ugly head in these corporate sectors. Corporate corruption is symbiotically linked to public sector corruption. It results in wastage and misuse of resources, and seriously retards development. The Report suggests ways in which the scourge of corruption may be addressed.

Although international institutions are often in the forefront of prescribing good governance to developing countries, they themselves fall short on transparency and accountability in their operations. They lack democratically representative structures, and are controlled by the rich and powerful countries. The Report argues for a more humane global governance which places human development at the centre of its concerns, and at the top of its priorities. Examples of burning issues which should be concretely addressed by global governance are poverty, debt and skewed trade relations.
2.0. ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

2.1 Introduction

The manner in which economic governance is conducted has a direct bearing on human development. Indeed, one of the criteria of judging the effectiveness and soundness of economic governance is whether it promotes human development in a broad sense, or benefits just a few in a particular society. By economic governance we refer to processes of decision-making which directly or indirectly affect a country’s economic activities, and its relationships with other economies. Economic governance is conducted through those particular structures which are involved in decision-making as well as those which implement economic policies and programmes. Those who design, implement, monitor and evaluate development policies and programmes are engaged in economic governance. Of course, the principal local players in this sector of governance are government and related state institutions including the Reserve Bank. Major industrial, commercial and financial organizations are also involved, in one way or another, in economic governance. This may be directly through their inputs into the economic policy-making process, or through their implementation of specific policies or measures.

Furthermore, through their lobbying activities, they seek to influence public and government opinion on economic governance issues. In a similar vein, the labour movement also makes interventions relating to economic governance. It does so through a critique of particular policies, or through submissions on what the national budget should contain, and much more commonly, negotiates and lobbies on what the salary and wage conditions should be. Other domestic groups which have a direct interest in economic governance issues are the various organized consumer interest groups including rate-payers. Finally, international players with an interest in our economic governance are creditors, donors and development partners. It would come as no surprise that amongst these players are the Bretton Woods institutions (the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund), the European Union, SADC, and the various United Nations agencies.

In a world in which globalization is deepening, there are therefore many interests competing to determine and influence the manner in which economic governance is conducted. As we have observed, these include domestic players and international actors. Their interests do not always coincide, and sometimes they diverge. Economic governance in Zimbabwe has not been immune to the vagaries of these competing interests and their accompanying ideologies.

In the last analysis, however, it is how economic governance impacts on poverty, equity and quality of life which is of immediate interest to us. To that extent, economic governance is not simply a matter of academic or policy interest. Nor should it be reduced to polemics although this is often the stuff of politics. A fruitful assessment of economic governance should link it to the human development question. Is economic governance, for instance, ensuring that peoples choices are enlarged, or that people are leading long, healthy and creative lives? It is vital that growth be one of the priorities of economic governance. However, growth should be a means rather than an end in itself. While a country may achieve high levels of growth, this does not automatically translate into high levels of human development. Growth is a necessary but ultimately insufficient condition for balanced human development. Economic governance should facilitate increased access to health and education but also stimulate wider participation by citizens in the development process. In other words the priorities of economic governance ought to include empowerment, equity and sustainability. Empowerment relates to the expansion of people’s capabilities, equity to the broadening of opportunities and not confined to income issues, while sustainability ensures the meeting of the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.

Box 2.1: Economic Governance in Zimbabwe

Introduction

“Economic governance” as a concept refers to the management of economic policy according to a predetermined set of values, norms and standards reflecting public interest and aspirations and as expressed in a national constitution. As such, economic governance therefore becomes a central function and responsibility of the state. It describes a process whereby the economic needs of the population are addressed and fulfilled in a manner that is efficient and is also consistent with the laws of the land. The economic crisis that Zimbabwe presently faces is
traceable to the failure of the system of economic governance. The implication here is that there has been failure of the state to guarantee or create adequate space for the operation of fundamental economic laws essential for the economy to reproduce and sustain itself and for society to progress towards its ideals. This failure, as reflected in the rise in unemployment and the gradual impoverishment of society, points to the existence of powerful influences constraining the functions of the state.

Historical Factors

The Zimbabwe economic crisis is rooted in an interplay of historical factors and discriminatory policies of colonial administrations which spawned the skewed economic fundamentals. Following colonial occupation, productive land and mineral resources were compulsorily acquired as the African people were crowded into the infertile, low rainfall marginal Tribal Trust lands. Presently land, industrial and other productive assets are unequally distributed among the population, with the majority in the rural areas living in impoverished, marginally productive low-rainfall areas. Uneven - regional and sectoral distributions of national income have contributed to a lopsided economy which caters largely to the needs of the urban formal economy. Rural-urban income inequalities are deep and rural unemployment is high. The urban based banking and financial industry services the investment needs of a limited section of the population. The annual GDP is growing at less than the rate of population growth. Financial and economic policies have not only failed to concretely address population demands for equitable growth and development, they have also accentuated these problems through lack of effective and transparent leadership in the administration of financial and economic policies. Persistent declines in the economy over the past two decades, economic instability, low savings and investment and the deepening debt crisis continue to undermine prospects for recovery.

Evidence of Economic Misgovernance

There was failure to institute an all inclusive economic consultative process until it became evident in the mid-1990s that the economic crisis was far from dissipating. Government was not serious about consulting the population in the determination of economic policies. While the birth of the National Economic Consultative Forum in 1997 created some space for national dialogue on economic policy, it still lacked the powers to effect binding decisions, to the extent that economic policy making and planning remained centralized. The determination of national development priorities has thus remained the monopoly of the ruling party.

Source Zimbabwe Economic Society, 2000

The link between economic governance and human development takes on particular resonance in view of Zimbabwe’s mediocre performance on certain development indicators. For instance, Zimbabwe slipped from ill in 1990 to 130 in 1998 in the Global HDI index. Levels of poverty have increased rather than decreased during the past 10 years as latter chapters will illustrate. Life expectancy at birth has declined to 43.5 years. Compared to some of its neighbours, Zimbabwe does not perform well in the human poverty index. Its ranking in 1998 was 52 which compared unfavourably with Botswana at 48, Namibia at 44, South Africa at 33 and Mauritius at 14. It was also estimated that 21 per cent of Zimbabwe’s population has no access to safe water, 29 per cent difficulties in has accessing health services, and that 48 per cent face constraints in accessing sanitation (UNDP, 2000). Furthermore, an estimated 15 per cent of the children under 15 years are underweight. These are worrying indicators by any standards. A principal concern of those engaged in economic governance should be how to arrest the trend towards deepening poverty and decline in key social services especially health. One way of testing the success of economic governance should be whether it contributes to improving the material livelihoods of the majority of people, particularly access to decent nutrition, housing and incomes.

2.2 Major Phases in Zimbabwe’s Economic Development

Let us briefly review the main phases through which the Zimbabwean economy has developed over the past 20 years. At independence in 1980, Zimbabwe inherited an economy which exhibited extreme characteristics. At one extreme was a relatively developed sector, at another there was economic under-development and neglect of the majority of the people, especially in the rural areas. This dualism had been the direct consequence of white colonial policies. The dual and enclave nature of development ensured that the most dynamic part of the economy accounted for the greater part of the GDP of the formal sector. However, up to the present, the relatively more developed modem sector only accounts for about 20 per cent of the labour force. The majority of the labour force constitutes
the remaining 80 per cent who are either underemployed in the informal or communal sectors, or openly unemployed.

Table 2.1: Structure of Gross Domestic Product and Employment by Sector for Selected Years

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Similarly, the communal sector has historically been related to the formal sector in a manner which marginalized it. Although it produces some of the food requirements for the formal sector, it still acts as a reservoir of cheap labour as well as a repository of spent labour from the formal and informal sectors. The communal sector is, to some degree, still insulated from the formal sector to the extent that the majority of households primarily rely on subsistence production and consumption. Like the informal sector, the communal areas are also trapped in a circle of low productivity, profitability and incomes. It is therefore worth looking at the issues raised at the Africa Region Micro-Credit Summit held in Harare on October 2000. The summit emphasized the need for investing in the informal sector through micro-credit systems and strengthening the institutional capacity of micro-finance institutions.

Source: CSO (various issues)
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<td>Banking Service</td>
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| GOP at Factor Cost | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

Source: CSO (various issues)
Similarly, the communal sector has historically been related to the formal sector in a manner which marginalized it. Although it produces some of the food requirements for the formal sector, it still acts as a reservoir of cheap labour as well as a repository of spent labour from the formal and informal sectors. The communal sector is, to some degree, still insulated from the formal sector to the extent that the majority of households primarily rely on subsistence production and consumption. Like the informal sector, the communal areas are also trapped in a circle of low productivity, profitability and incomes. It is therefore worth looking at the issues raised at the Africa Region Micro-Credit Summit held in Harare on October 2000. The summit emphasized the need for investing in the informal sector through micro-credit systems and strengthening the institutional capacity of micro-finance institutions.

**Box 2.2: THE LAND QUESTION AND GOVERNANCE IN ZIMBABWE**

No discussion of economic conditions, and indeed of poverty reduction, would be complete without taking into account the land question. Economic governance should address the land question. Because previous ZHDR reports have extensively dealt with the economics and politics of land, here we will merely highlight the continued political resonance and centrality of the land question in the current discussion on governance.

Simply put, the present inequitable distribution of landownership between large-scale commercial farmers, the communal small farmers and the landless forms the core of the land question. At independence, the land question had three components namely:

- unequal and inequitable land distribution,
- insecurity of land tenure,
- unsustainable and sub-optimal land use.

A racial elite of about 4 000 farmers owned millions of black and lived in abject poverty.
At independence, the Zimbabwe Government was therefore faced with the enormous question and challenge of land redistribution. However, the Lancaster House Constitution made it virtually impossible to redistribute land in any comprehensive manner. Such land acquisition for redistribution as there was reached a high in the first few years of independence, and then slowed down considerably during the next ten years. By 1997, the government had acquired 3.4 million hectares of land on which it resettled about 71,000 families mainly from communal areas.

A major initiative was undertaken in 1997 to acquire land from large-scale commercial farming sector through the process of designation’. About 1471 farms were listed under this process with the objective of acquiring 5 million ha for redistribution amongst 150,000 families. After a de-listing of 400 farms, the number of designated farms dropped to 841. However, this phase of land reform promised to be very expensive since it would require Z$42 billion. Owing to a growing fiscal crisis, the government was unable to raise this enormous amount.

This is the background against which developments in the land sector between 1998 and up to the present may be assessed. Clearly, land hunger had become more pronounced by 1998 in a context of growing impoverishment especially in rural areas. In several provinces, communal farmers “occupied” a number of adjacent commercial farms, and the case of Svosve people was widely reported. However, they were successfully persuaded by politicians to return to communal areas while the land issue would be sorted out. An international land conference in 1998 endorsed a systematic and orderly process of land reform which would receive backing from donors.

However, the land reform issue became highly politicised in 2000 particularly in the run-up to the June 2000 elections. There were observations that the land question was being exploited for political expediency. Unlike the moderating role played by politicians in 1998, there was a more orchestrated approach in “farm occupations”. War veterans were prominent in leading those occupations which attracted a great deal of domestic and international publicity. Unfortunately, there was considerable intimidation, violence if not chaos surrounding the 2000 farm occupations before the fast-track resettlement programme began towards the end of the year.

Notably, several issues pertaining to governance emerge from the manner in which he land question has been addressed. First, there was clearly lethargy in grappling with the question in the 19 years following independence. A more systematic and consistent approach which included ‘carrot and stick’ for large-scale farmers, and constant engagement with donors might have produced more positive results. In this respect, although belated, the dialogue with both commercial farmers and donors which led to the adoption of the 1998 Inception Phase Framework Plan ought to have been sustained.

Second, the polarisation of positions between government, commercial farmers and donors on how land reform should proceed was not conducive to an orderly and co-ordinated approach. This polarisation became of major concern to the judiciary which was called upon to make judgement on land cases brought to it by farmers and government. It was observed, for example, that the land issue had become “a minefield” for the judiciary. The government’s position that the land question was a political and not a legal issue stirred up a great deal of controversy. It was viewed as a position which undermined the “rule of law”. Arguing that the initial High Court order which declared the occupations by war veterans and land-hungry villagers illegal was done according to law, it was maintained that “to have ruled any other way would have amounted to a violation of the law. The rule of law means to me that everyone must be subject to a shared set of rules that are applied universally and which are independently challenged.“ (Chief Justice Gubbay, as quoted in The Herald, 9 January 2001).

At the same time, it had also become clear that:

“It is no longer possible to give judgements on certain issues that are acceptable to both sides of the divide. In some instances, judgements of the judiciary (on land issues) that are highly praised by one side are gravely criticised by the other side of the divide...” (Justice Chidyausiku, as quoted in The Herald, 9 January 2001). Judicial opinion on the land question is not therefore monolithic. Finally, the land question remains a politically volatile one. It can only be hoped that in the calmer post-election atmosphere, there will prevail a more rational and measured approach to the land question. There still exists a case for an internationally-supported land reform process which would result in a well-established community of newly-resettled communal farmers, minimum disruption to the agricultural sector and the broader economy, payment of fair compensation to commercial farmers and material support for displaced farm-workers.

**Box 2.3: Women and Land**

Land underpins the economic, social and political lives of the majority of people in Zimbabwe (Moyo 1995). This is particularly true of women as most have no form of income except that derived from their efforts in tilling the land. Although women constitute 51% of the population, about 70% live in the rural areas and are dependent on land for survival, they cannot claim an equivalent percentage of land as being under their control it is a well-known fact that women have for a long time been subjected to discriminatory practices especially with regards to
land and property rights.

This is more so because the constitution of Zimbabwe, which is the supreme body of law still allows for discrimination against women on the basis of customary law and sex. With a legal framework as patriarchal as that of Zimbabwe, good governance encounters constraints. Recent critics of Zimbabwean land studies argue that there is a 'neglect of the land rights and related interests of women (Roos and Spiemberg, 1994). In response to this, the Women and Land Lobby Group, was set up in 1998 to spearhead the advocacy and lobbying campaign for women's access to, and control of, land. The group has since then faced many challenges in ensuring that women enjoy the same rights to land as their male counterparts.

Gaidzanwa (1995) notes, "land is one of the major topics that has preoccupied development in Africa after colonization'. Whilst it has been a topic of major concern, the main agenda has bordered on discussions around the racial issue at the expense of the equity and equality issue. This is evidenced by a recent analysis carried out by Women and Land Lobby Group of articles collected over a period of 10 months (January - October 20(XXJ) from various newspapers.

The analysis highlighted that there was little mention of women in the land question. The analysis also revealed that of 178 articles reviewed, only 8 made reference to women (WLLG 2000). Also disappointing, some leaders believe that "women who wish to venture into farming, can do so in their own right They will have to compete equally with men" (Herald, 17 August 2000).

At national, regional and international for the land debate has been dominated by the voice of males. Where them have been delegations to discuss the land issue women have been conspicuous by their absence.

1kw example, a recent delegation to London for discussions with the British Government consisted of men only. There has thus emerged another form of inequality around the land issue, which is that of women and men as opposed to the black and white inequality. Black women are known to enjoy land rights through the male relative.

These rights are only guaranteed in as far as women are connected to a male relative. It is time that Zimbabwe embarked on a sustainable development process that takes into account women’s role in the various sectors. As a way of addressing some of the mentioned anomalies. Women and Land Lobby Group advocates the following:

- amendment of sections of the constitution,
- enactment of a gender sensitive Land Act,
- finalisation of the Draft National Land Policy and inclusion of the 20 per cent allocation committed by government as being land which will be allocated to women.

It is the organizations belief that once the above issues have been addressed, them will be a positive legal framework which serves the interests of all Zimbabweans, especially women, in terms of land and property rights. It is only when Zimbabwe is a society that truly regards citizens as equals through the enactment of the requisite laws that true democracy, good governance and equality shall prevail. Women and Land Lobby Group, 2000.

Table 22: Land Tenure 1980 – 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LAND CATEGORY</th>
<th>1980 Ha in millions</th>
<th>% of total ha.</th>
<th>1997 Ha in millions</th>
<th>% of total ha.</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Large-scale Commercial Farming</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>30.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Small-scale Commercial Farming</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communal Areas</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>41.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resettlement Areas</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>National Parks &amp; Urban Settlements</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Farms</td>
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<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>39.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>39.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The inherited economy therefore contained serious built-in disparities and inequalities. Compounding these inequalities were the patterns of asset-ownership particularly that of land. Colonial land legislation deprived Africans of equal access to amble and productive land. For instance, under the Land Tenure Act of 1969,18 million hectares of land was allocated to blacks, and a similar amount of land given to whites who numbered 250 (fl). To aggravate matters, Africans were relegated to agro-ecological zones with poor soils and unreliable rain while whites occupied prime land.
**Source:** Zimbabwe Government, 1998

**Table 2.3: Distribution of Land According to Natural Regions, at Independence %**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Natural Region</th>
<th>Large-scale Commercial Land</th>
<th>Communal Areas</th>
<th>Small-scale Commercial Land</th>
<th>Other Land</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>18</td>
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<td>II</td>
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<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>49</td>
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<td>35</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>40</strong></td>
<td><strong>42</strong></td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** GoZ, 1982: Transitional National Development Plan, Table 11.2: 67

Graph for Tables 2.2 and 2.3

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LSCL = Large Scale Commercial Land  
SSCL = Small Scale Commercial Land

**Table 2.4: The Distribution of Income by Race**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Proportion of population</th>
<th>Share of Wages &amp; Salaries</th>
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<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>97.6</td>
<td>60.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Europeans</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>37.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>0.3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asians</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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</table>

**The Distribution of income by Race at Independence**
Even within the formal sector, there were clear disparities in income distribution along racial lines. For example, at independence, black incomes were, on average, 10 percent of that of whites, with wage differentials being as high as 24 times in some instances (World Bank, 1987). The challenge of economic governance has been to address these complex historically-rooted legacies. Social and economic policies should have been designed in such a manner that the dualism and marginalisation would be tackled head-on. The issue of medium and long-term economic and social planning was therefore a priority to the new government. Let us consider how this task was addressed.

2.3 Growth with Equity and National Development Plans

Independence gave Zimbabwe an opportunity to redress the unjust economic governance of the past. The new government sought to enlist the participation and active support of its citizens in the development process (Zimbabwe Government, Growth with Equity 1981). It even espoused the importance of “popular democratic participation in the ownership and management of national resources”. The need to redress the inequities of the past, and in particular land redistribution, was given priority in government policy.

As a result of the opening up of Zimbabwe in 1980, the economy experienced a major boom in the first two years of independence. This was largely due to access to international assistance and lending, favourable terms of trade, good weather conditions, and increased aggregate demand stemming from rising agricultural and wage incomes. This post-independence boom resulted in increased capacity-utilization firm 75 per cent at independence to 95 per cent by 1981 (Kadhan and Green, 1986). A particularly encouraging development was the rise in the share of gross fixed capital formation in GDP from 15 per cent in 1980 to 19 percent in 1981.
To assess and make recommendations on incomes policy with a view to correcting inherited anomalies, a Commission was appointed under Roger Riddell in 1980. The Commission recommended that there was need for a policy shift towards “growth with equity through planned change”. This would arrest the situation of “growth with widening inequalities”. Furthermore, it called for poverty alleviating policies. The Commission recommended an incomes policy which took into consideration a Poverty Datum Line (PDL) calculated on the basis of the maintenance of a family of six. However, the sustainability of such an income distribution policy lay in the restructuring of the economy along competitive lines. Although it was not possible for the government to implement the main recommendations of the Commission, their value and relevance remain up to the present era. The challenge of addressing social inequalities remains as manifested in deepening poverty.

The boom of the first two years of independence created a false sense of optimism and security. This resulted in the introduction of liberal policies of foreign exchange allocation, remittance of dividends and profits, and an expansionary incomes policy. This contributed to macro-economic instability in a subsequent period. Liberal economic policies resulted in the deepening of the current account deficit from 7$ 157 million in 1980 to 7$ 440 million in 1981.

This was the background against which the Zimbabwe Government introduced the first of a series of national development plans. This was the Transitional National Development Plan which spanned the period 1982 to 1985. In terms of economic governance, the Plan sought to provide “a firm foundation for a new society based on equality of opportunity and prosperity for all Zimbabweans” (Zimbabwe Government Transitional National Development Plan, 1982). The Plan addressed an important governance issue in a section entitled “The People, the Motive Force for Change”. It was imperative that the people who had constituted the forte for liberation and independence should be fully emancipated to chart the course of their economic development. The Plan therefore sought to provide “a solid framework and basis for participation by popular mass organizations and to create new socioeconomic institutions capable of harnessing and utilizing the resources of the people”.

However, the rhetoric about wider participation tended to fall short of the intended objective. For instance, the Growth with Equity policy of 1981 was not translated into a concrete mobilization of the people so that they could actively participate in development programmes. From a governance point of view, it was unfortunate that the people, through their organizations were not involved in the design of policies and plans. It was observed that government then was suspicious of organized business and paternalistic towards mass organizations such as trade unions. The process of plan and policy design remained largely a technocratic exercise in the bureaucratic realm. This trend continued when the national developments for 1985-1990, and for 1990-1995 were designed.

2.4 Economic Governance during the first Independence Decade, 1980-90

During this decade, Zimbabwe experienced mixed fortunes in its economic performance. The average annual growth rate was 4.1 per cent between 1980 and 1985, and 4.6 per cent between 1985 and 1990. With population growth at about 3 per cent per annum, this was not impressive growth. At the same time, however, there were tremendous strides achieved in the social development sector. Access to education at all levels expanded phenomenally. The health service sector grew significantly. In addition, there was considerable investment in the land resettlement programme, road and dam construction.

In terms of economic governance, however, early attempts at redressing the anomalies and inequities were abandoned following a major drought in 1982-84. The drought coincided with a world recession and contributed to balance of payments problems. Thereafter, the economy tended to be managed on a reactive “management-by-crisis” basis (Kanyenze, 2000). In spite of the existence of the above-mentioned development plans, no comprehensive development strategy was pursued. Policy measures that were adopted treated the symptoms and not the real problems which of a structural nature.

There was a certain amount of ambiguity in economic and social policies. On the one hand, the government pronounced a desire to introduce socialism, and on the other sought to preserve and consolidate the inherited capitalist system. Mixed signals were therefore sent to both domestic and
foreign investors during the decade. Clear limitation in economic governance during this period the lack of rigour and realism in the development plans. It turned out that the plans were “more matters of elucidating the desired pleasant ends than setting out the means for getting to them (Stoneman, 1988). There was no conscious attempt to synchronise particular development plan and the national budget, as the main instrument of its implementation. The budget preparation itself was often shrouded in secrecy. Parliament was ineffective and largely reduced to rubber stamping. Even some of the line government Ministries were marginalized in the budget-preparation process. Although the private sector institutions were ‘consulted’ through pit-budget meetings with Ministry of Finance officials, their inputs often not taken seriously. The absence of a vigorous dialogue between the major stakeholders on the budget, and on economic policy more generally, limited the opportunities for more constructive inputs. This did not strengthen the economic governance process. Some analysts have observed that within this limited framework the government adopted a conservative economic programme. This ensured continuing with the inherited structures while adding on more state-owned corporations. At the same time, were apparent contradictions in economic policy. While government was suspicious towards foreign investment, it nevertheless sought to attract it.

Meanwhile, the WB and IMF exerted pressure on the government adopt economic reforms particularly trade liberalization. For instance, in 1987, the WB refused to sign an agreement for the extension of an export revolving fund until measures were taken to liberalize trade. Other liberalization measures followed in 1989 the adoption of investment guidelines. In a bid to reassure investors, the government signed the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) convention, and the Overseas Private Investment Cooperation (OPIC) agreement a year later.

By the late 1980s, it had become clear that the economy was not perform well and therefore required revamping. The sluggish growth of that decade was a symptom of underlying structural weaknesses. At least amongst organized business and in government, there was a growing realization that reforms were required. Such reforms would boost depressed investment, streamline labour regulations, create employment and stimulate export growth.

There was no disagreement about the diagnosis of the economic malaise. The differences centred on the content of the intended reform package.

2.5 Economic Governance during the Reform Period, 1990-2000

The second broad phase of economic governance covers the period between 1990 right up to the present. During this period, economic reforms were designed and implemented to address the above-mentioned malaise. A significant factor in the drawing up of these reform packages was the increased role of the Bretton Woods institutions. Conditionalities attached to the financing of these packages resulted in the erosion of the erstwhile dominant role played by the government in economic and social policy-making. Mom generally, the global context had changed with the collapse of socialist governments in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. The ideological climate had also undergone change with neo-liberalism in ascendancy in major Western economic powers. A new discourse emerged which drew a connection between what was termed “good governance” and access to international lending and donor aid (Baylies, 1995). This was the changed international environment in which economic reform was forged in the 1990s.

The major reform programmes adopted during this decade were the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), the Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST), and the Millennium Economic Recovery Programme (MERP). The ESAP programme ran from 1990 to 1995, ZIMPREST was launched in 1998, while MERP was inaugurated in 2000. For practical purposes, the most substantive of these reforms was indeed the first one in the series namely ESAP. Let us briefly review the highlights of these reform programmes.

**Box 2.4 The Economic Structural Adjustment Programme**

ESAP was an orthodox structural adjustment programme, which sought a fundamental shift from a pervasive state intervention system in the economy to one largely driven by market forces. The key
targets of ESAP were to:

- achieve annual GDP growth of 5 per cent during 1991-95;
- raise savings to 25 per cent of GDP;
- achieve export growth of 9 per cent per annum during 1999-95;
- reduce the budget deficit from over 10 per cent of GDP to 5 per cent by 1995; and
- reduce inflation from over 17 per cent to 10 per cent by 1995

In order to achieve these objectives, ESAP had, as its main components, competition-enhancing measures. These included trade and exchange rate liberalisation, domestic de-regulation, financial sector reform and related institutional reforms. Fiscal reforms sought to reduce the huge parastatal deficit and to implement the commercialisation and privatisation of public enterprises. The ESAP programme also included measures to mitigate the social costs of adjustment through the Social Dimension of Adjustment programme.


Did the ESAP programme attain its objectives? By and large, it failed to do so for a variety of reasons. Overall growth during the reform period was erratic, attaining an average annual growth rate of less than 1 per cent. The budget deficit remained stubbornly high during this period; it increased to 13 per cent of GDP in 1994/95. The deficit problem was compounded by a decline in tax revenues. The tax ratio declined from 39 per cent of GDP in 1990 to 28 per cent in 1995. Inflation rose substantially during this period, peaking at 42 per cent in 1992 before declining to 22 per cent in 1995 and then rising much higher in subsequent years. High levels of inflation contributed to excessively high interest rates. A major drought in 1992 compounded the economic situation. Parastatal losses mounted rather than declined. Public sector reforms were slow. This was the context in which the government acknowledged the limitations of ESAF and proceeded to design another reform programme namely ZIMPREST.

ZIMPREST was belatedly launched in April 1998. It began by drawing lessons from the weaknesses and shortcomings of ESAP. One of such lessons was the lack of fiscal discipline which resulted in excessive borrowings which in turn fuelled inflation and exacerbated poverty. The resultant macro-economic environment made it difficult for enterprises to invest and expand. In this regard, parastatal reform, public service reform and financial sector reform were identified as major elements of unfinished business under ESAP. A related lesson was that for comprehensive reforms to succeed, they needed to be embedded in the aspirations of the people. Reforms should empower people to participate in the economy. In addition, whatever sacrifices were required for the successful implementation of the reforms ought to be shared. ZIMPREST argued that reform programmes ought to make provision for droughts rather than react to them as happened under ESAP. Noting that about 61 per cent of Zimbabweans (in 1998) lived in poverty, poverty reduction was identified as a major challenge under ZIMPREST. In the strategy to eradicate poverty, employment creation was given top priority. There was need to foster an entrepreneurial culture and invest in human resource development, and build partnerships with other stakeholders.

Box 2.5: The Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation

ZIMPREST sought:

(i) urgent restoration of macro-economic stability (low inflation and interest rates, and a stable exchange rate);
(ii) facilitating of public and private savings and investment needed to attain growth;
(iii) and pursuing economic empowerment and poverty alleviation by generating opportunities for employment and encouraging entrepreneurial initiative (Zimbabwe Government 1998).

ZIMPREST then specified what it termed ‘a minimum target growth scenario’. Specifically, it sought:

(i) a consistent reduction in the budget deficit (from 10 per cent to under 5 percent of GDP) with a corresponding fall in inflation (from over 20 per cent to a single digit level by 2000);
However, ZIMPREST contained some fundamental weaknesses which cast doubt on its chances of success. To start with, the programme covered the period 1996-2000, and yet it was only launched in April 1998. Clearly, the programme was two years behind schedule. Second, it was inaugurated at a time when resources had already been allocated through the 3-year rolling budget system. Unfortunately, as was the case with the development plans of the 1980s, the national budget did not allocate resources according to priorities set out in the medium-term plan.

Third, one major criticism of ZIMPREST was that “it was about everything’, namely poverty reduction, land reform, employment creation, institutional reforms, decentralisation, etc. without spelling out clearly the budgetary implications of these policy objectives. For instance, it was difficult to see how most of these objectives would be met when the budget deficit was in excess of 10 per cent of GDP? Fourth, judging from past experience, it was unlikely that the projected 6 per cent annual growth rate would be achieved. Real GDP growth decelerated from 8.5 percent in 1996 to a negative 2 per cent in 1999 and a projected negative 4 per cent in 2000. Two years into ZIMPREST, the budget deficit was still above 10 per cent with inflation well above 50 per cent. Unemployment loosely defined hovers between 40 and 50 per cent.

Finally, savings and investment as a proportion of GDP declined markedly from about 18 per cent in 1996 to 9 per cent and 13 per cent respectively in 1999. The export sector performed poorly. Export growth in USS terms collapsed from about 12 per cent in 1996 to -20 per cent in 1999. During the period 1996-99, exports declined at an annual average rate of 2.7 per cent compared with the growth target of 9 per cent per year. There was a mismatch between the supply and demand for foreign currency Forex reserves deteriorated from 4.2 months cover in 1995 to only 1.6 months in 1999; and the situation worsened in 2000.

The final set of reform measures are contained in the Millennium Economic Recovery Programme (MERP). Launched in 2000, the programme intended to mobilise all the stakeholders - government business, labour and civil society - to implement a set of reform measures designed to restore macro-economic stability. The prime objective of MERP is to restore vibrant economic growth and remove the fundamental causes of inflation. The burden of adjustment would be on fiscal policy measures to reduce expenditure and enhance revenues. This was to be accompanied by appropriate monetary policy aimed at price stability, while debt would be restructured and the productive sector revived.

It is unclear whether MERP will succeed where previous reform programmes failed. In its appraisal of ESAP and ZIMPREST, the MERP document concludes that ‘implementation lacked both co-ordination and commitment at all institutional levels resulting in the missing of targets by a wide margin’. The issue is not merely one of implementation. A profound issue relates to the very design of these programmes. The targets which are set are quantitative and not qualitative. It is necessary to focus on qualitative, human- centred indicators which reflect the ultimate goal of human development. Economic growth is a necessary condition but, on its own, it does not automatically translate into sustainable human development.

MERP is an 18-month programme that will ran concurrently with the millennium budget. However, it is unclear where the funding for MERP will come from. The MERP is likely to be over-shadowed by the millennium budget as it would be running concurrently. A better approach would have been to revise the millennium budget itself The policy measures designed to deal with fiscal reform are not new. They were contained in the ESAP and ZIMPREST programmes and yet they were not fully implemented. The key to success in fiscal reform is the practical implementation process itself. Scepticism therefore remains on whether the government will succeed in implementing the reform measures this time around.
Box 2.6 The Millennium Economic Recovery Programme (MERP)

The restoration of macro-economic stability would be achieved through the following set of measures:
- consolidation of the fiscus;
- price stabilisation;
- exchange rate stabilisation and resolution of the forex crisis;
- deepening of financial sector reforms;
- lowering interest rates;
- acceleration of public enterprise reform
- protection of the vulnerable groups;
- establishment of implementation, accountability and monitoring institutions;
- and building confidence.

With regard to the central issue of consolidating the fiscus, MERP intended to achieve that by improving the credibility and ownership of the budget, rationalisation and reduction of government expenditure, improving budget management performance, and implementing revenue-enhancing measures. The medium-term plan of MEEP would focus on (a) sustainable macro-economic stability and growth (b) land reform and agricultural development (c) infrastructure development and (d) human resource development (including health).

Zimbabwe Government, Millennium Economic Recovery Programme, 20(X)

The MERP target of reducing the budget deficit to 3.8 per cent

| TABLE 2.5: INDICES OF REAL AVERAGE EARNINGS BY SECTOR, 1980-99 (1980=100) |
|-----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| Agriculture     | 100            | 164            | 143            | 137            | 130            | 130            | 70             | 75             | 85             | 79             |
| Mining          | 100            | 130            | 113            | 116            | 113            | 116            | 97             | 90             | 113            | 110            |
| Manufng         | 100            | 117            | 101            | 103            | 101            | 103            | 83             | 74             | 89             | 80             |
| Electicity      | 100            | 110            | 90             | 93             | 96             | 94             | 79             | 85             | 129            | 133            |
| Construction    | 100            | 120            | 107            | 98             | 85             | 78             | 57             | 46             | 66             | 68             |
| Finance         | 100            | 103            | 85             | 87             | 89             | 93             | 89             | 78             | 99             | 76             |
| Distrihution    | 100            | 115            | 92             | 94             | 88             | 85             | 70             | 58             | 75             | 69             |
| Trans & Comms   | 100            | 108            | 79             | 82             | 80             | 90             | 66             | 61             | 68             | 62             |
| Public Admn     | 100            | 89             | 66             | 63             | 62             | 61             | 41             | 35             | 50             | 74             |
| Education       | 100            | 59             | 69             | 73             | 77             | 82             | 64             | 49             | 75             | 82             |
| Health          | 100            | 102            | 79             | 85             | 81             | 90             | 68             | 56             | 80             | 105            |
| Domnicstic      | 100            | 115            | 82             | 100            | 92             | 82             | 48             | 31             | 25             | 18             |
| Other           | 100            | 107            | 85             | 81             | 76             | 80             | 61             | 55             | 70             | 66             |
| Total           | 100            | 122            | 100            | 102            | 101            | 103            | 78             | 67             | 88             | 88             |

GDP in 2000 is not achievable given that it had already risen above 14 per cent of GDP by mid-2000. It was expected to rise to 23 per cent by the end of 2000. Similarly, the target of allocating at least 25 per cent of total expenditure to capital projects is unattainable. This is because in the millennium budget, the capital budget was allocated 8 per cent of total expenditures down from 11 per cent in the previous budget. In the 2001 budget, the allocation for capital expenditure went down to 6 per cent of total expenditure. The target of domestic debt reduction from the current level of 31 percent to 7 per cent by the end of the reform programme does not appear to be realistic. Source: CSO (various issues)
Indices by Sector (1900-1999)

Indices by Sector (1980-1999)
Indices by Sector (1980-1999)
This brief overview of the economic reform programmes between 1990 and 2(D) has shown close similarities between them, and that successful attainment of targets has been elusive for the most part. Have certain ingredients been missing in the various development plans and reform programmes? How can the limitations of these various programmes be overcome? What are the pie-conditions of sustainable economic reform? Let us now turn to a discussion of these issues.

2.6 Addressing Weaknesses in Economic Policy and Implementation

One of the principal factors behind the shortfalls in development plans and economic reforms relates to the matter in which they are formulated and implemented. There has been little consultation and consensus amongst the stake-holders on what the plans or reforms should contain and aim towards. The design process has tended to be top-down. Broad national ownership of economic plans and reforms is imperative. It is an issue which lies at the heart of governance. Indeed, a number of institutions have emphasized the necessity for such consensus and national ownership. The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), for example, has argued that:

‘A truly national compromise can only be arrived at when all interest groups and stakeholders participate in policy formulation, decision-making and implementation Participation and decision-making by all levels of society has to be guaranteed through a broad participatory and decentralised approach’ (ZCTU, 19%).
The Zimbabwe Government, for its part, has affirmed that economic reform programmes should be embedded in the aspirations of the whole community (Zimbabwe Government, Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation, 1998). Where such reforms entailed sacrifices, “these must be seen to be shared, and the rationale and expected benefits communicated to the community at large”. Equally significantly, the government pledged itself to the “the pursuit of good governance” under the auspices of the ZIMPREST programme (Zimbabwe Government, Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation, 1998). Even the Bretton Woods institutions themselves have talked about the importance of national ownership of reform programmes as a vital ingredient for their success. The challenge for governments is to forge an institutional framework and process through which such “a consensus and ownership” process may be achieved. One possible institution through which national ownership of programmes may be forged is the National Economic Consultative Forum (NECF) founded in 1997. It was founded in the aftermath of the criticism that government had marginalised most interest groups in the drafting of the ESAP programme. Although it draws its membership from organised business and labour as well as from government, the NECF has been viewed as weak because its members have no institutional mandate. Nor are they necessarily accountable to their institutions. To some, the NECF is more of “a talk shop” and therefore it is necessary to strengthen it (Kanyenze, 2(f)). This could be accomplished through reviving the original idea of a forum in which government, organised business and labour and other civil society groups have equal representation and institutional mandate.

The second set of challenges relates to the gap between the designed plans and their implementation. That yawning gap is evident when the texts of the plan or reform documents are compared with the implementation outcomes. A common element in the plans are their optimistic projections in terms of targets; a general issue is whether this target setting is realistic or over-ambitious. However, a common factor in failure to implement policies or programmes is lack of capacity. The challenge of institutional capacity has been acknowledged by government:

“Under ZIMPREST the government is in the process of strengthening management at inter-ministerial and ministerial levels and establishing stronger linkages between policy formulation, implementation and financial management. It will also be necessary to strengthen information management systems” (Zimbabwe Government, Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation, 1998).

The issue of capacity in the public service relates to two broad aspects. These are reducing the size of the bureaucracy and streamlining what remains. In the early phase of economic reform, the emphasis was on the former. A more problematic area is the question of improving the quality of service and capacity (UNDP and UNCTAD, 1999). One of the conclusions of a study on economic policy in Zimbabwe was that:

“The area of capacity in the public sector is constrained by political interference. This political influence is such that in certain cases, when the bureaucrats have formulated policy guided by economic implications thereof the politicians have put aside such policy changes simply on the basis of political expediency... Whilst in broad terms there is capacity in policy formulation in the public sector the policy implementation area still needs a lot of improvement... (Zwizwai a. aL 2000).

Mother study has recommended the need to develop capacity for trade policy research and implementation as well as better data on foreign direct investment and a better understanding of the measures required to attract it (UNDP and UNCTAD,1999). There remains, therefore, a considerable scope for improvement in capacity-building and utilization, especially in those institutions responsible for policy implementation and co-ordination.

Mother set of issues relating to the administration of economic programmes relates to accountability and transparency. This is a vital area and essential for the credibility of these programmes. The credibility and image of previous programmes suffered because the process through which they were implemented was not sufficiently transparent. This speaks to the necessity of appropriate mechanisms through which accountability and transparency can be fostered. The concern with the need to “build confidence” reflects the importance of an economic governance which inspires transparency, and a legal framework which ensures predictability. As we will discuss in a later chapter, there have been
lapses in this zone of accountability and transparency in the past [and hence the objective of addressing the issue of corruption (Zimbabwe Government, Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation 1998).

Finally, an assessment of weaknesses in economic reform would be incomplete without a consideration of the role of international lending institutions. They have increasingly become influential players in economic governance in sub-Saharan Africa, especially in the past 20 years. The design and implementation of its adjustment programmes, Zimbabwe has sought the cooperation and assistance of both the WB and IMP. The specific role of these institutions, and particularly the conditions which they attach to their loans have been extensively debated elsewhere (Gibbon, 1995; ZC1'U, 1996; Sachikonye, 1999; ZHDR, 1999). There has grown a critique which questions standard prescriptions for different countries addressing economic and social problems of different magnitude and complexity. Such standard prescriptions have invariably included the following:

- currency devaluation;
- trade liberalisation;
- de-regulation of price and labour controls;
- retrenchments in the public sector; and
- substantial cuts in social sector expenditure.

These policy prescriptions are often added to those we mentioned above on budget deficit reduction, public enterprise reform and fiscal reforms. While some of these structural reforms may be unavoidable, questions have been raised about the timing, sequencing and funding of various aspects of these programmes. Structural adjustment programmes which have lacked a more nuanced approach have been less than successful or proved deeply unpopular domestically. While governments may not be absolved from mistakes which engender economic crises, neither should lending institutions which insist on flawed cocktails of reform measures. In a rare and candid acknowledgement of the factors contributing to the failure of ESAP in Zimbabwe, a WB resident representative observed the following:

“Growth needs to be inclusive. Partial tie-regulation without restructuring of the dual economy creates social tensions and not enough jobs.

Social sector expenditure needs to be prvtecte4 and targeted measures to deal with poverty should not be ‘add ons’ but made an integral part of the reforms.

State intervention is necessary. Getting prices right and making markets work is important, but these need to be complemented with measures to ensure that the ‘unequal’ balance of power of those who can readily engage in the market and those who cannot, does not lead to dangerous levels of social tensions” (Allen, 1999).

It is significant that some international lending institutions are owning up to previous flaws in programmes in which they had played a role in designing. There is an element of “Ma! and error” in economic policy-making as in other spheres, and mistakes are not a monopoly of host governments. The private sector and international institutions are not always correct in their prescriptions.

2.7 The Issue of Privatisation

Privatisation is one of the major challenges to be dealt with under the rubric of economic governance. Why has it become such an important item on the governance agenda? For the past ten years, the matter has been raised and all the reform programme documents devote some attention to it.

The matter of privatisation was discussed at length in the ESAP reform document (Zimbabwe Government, 1991). It was posed as one of the solutions to the poor performance of most public enterprises. Indeed, the immediate objective of the government was to reduce its massive subsidies to the parastatals from Z$ 629 million in 1990/91 to Z$ 40 million by 1994/95. 1kw purposes of the reforms, public enterprises were classified according to the action to be taken. For instance, public sector monopolies would remain under government control but rehabilitated to be run as commercially
viable enterprises. Viable commercial entities would be operated on a commercial basis while non-viable commercial entities were targeted for liquidation. Those entities with a social role which duplicated that of another entity would be closed or merged. However, entities with a valid social role were to be retained by the government with any remaining subsidy made transparent.

However, these reform objectives, as with others, proved elusive for the government to achieve. In 1997/98, for instance, the eight largest parastatals had a combined deficit of Z$ 11 billion. The major loss-makers were NOCZIIVI (Z$5,5 billion), ZESA (Z$ 2,2 billion), CSC (Z$ 9(X) million), NEZ (Z$703 million) and ZISCO (ZS688 million). The reasons for the poor performance were management inefficiencies, exchange rate depreciation, inadequate pricing policies, inappropriate investments, and more generally the unfavourable macro-economic environment (Zimbabwe Government, 1998). By the end of 1999, total parastatal debt amounted to over Z$ 45 billion of which over 50 percent was foreign debt.

In 1998, ZIMPREST recommended the establishment of a high-powered institutional framework to pursue privatisation and commercialisation urgently. However, the privatisation and commercialisation process itself has been slow. According to some analysts, the absence of an enabling legal framework has imposed serious constraints on the privatisation process (Kingdom Research Institute, 2000). In the absence of such a body, the privatisation process was driven by multiple bodies which ranged from the public enterprises themselves to the President’s Office. Experience showed that some of these bodies lacked the necessary specialised expertise or skills for successful privatisation in critical areas such as financial and investment analysis, valuation and selection of strategic partners. It has been argued that the set-up was defective in that the interested parties (the line ministries and the parastatals) were responsible for the formulation of proposals for the reform of the public enterprises (Kingdom Research Institute, 2000). To that extent, the process lacked objectivity and transparency.

Nevertheless, the government has netted over Z$ 2 billion through the privatisation of the following parastatals: Dairibord Zimbabwe, Cotton Company of Zimbabwe, Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwe Reinsurance Corporation and the Rainbow Tourism Group. An additional Z$1, 4 billion was released through sale of shares in some corporations including Delta Corporation.

It was, however, not until September 1999 that the Zimbabwe Privatisation Agency was set up. The Agency still appears to need to earn sufficient credibility and clout. There is need for it to have adequate support from various interested stakeholders. Representatives from organised groups in civil society, such as organised business and labour, should be appointed to the Agency. A stakeholder-driven Agency would ensure accountability and transparency. To ensure that privatisation is also an effective vehicle for indigenising the economy, the National Investment Trust should be adequately funded.

**Box 2.7 Recommendations on Privatisation**

Other recommendations relating to privatisation are that:

- a conducive legal environment is vital; the Privatisation Agency should have a proper legal structure;
- the present arrangement in which the Director operates without a Board is defective; privatisation proceeds should not finance recurrent expenditure; employees and their unions should be consulted and involved in the privatisation process; employee ownership plans (ESOPS) should be incorporated in privatisation plans; social safety nets to cushion workers affected by privatisation should be designed; there should be a public awareness campaign on the privatisation process. (Kanyenze, 2000, Kingdom Research Institute).

It cannot, therefore, be over-emphasized that as a significant matter of economic governance, privatisation should be a transparent process. It should not be monopolised by a few corporations and individuals or be seen as enriching a small elite at the expense of the majority. This is all the more compelling given the corruption tainted record and profile of some of the parastatals which are slated to undergo privatisation. The experience of ‘good practices’ of those enterprises which have been successfully privatised in the past few years should be productively drawn upon.
2.8 Impact of Economic Governance on Human Development

We have seen that economic policy measures implemented between 1980 and 2(D) have not ensured impressive growth. There have been more shortfalls than great strides in our economic development. Most of the factors which contributed to the lack-lustre growth have already been mentioned. However, it is still important to emphasize a number of key factors which impinge directly on human development. These include the wider implications of large budget deficits, debt and more generally a difficult macro-economic environment. In some instances, some of the gains made in human development have been undermined, indeed reversed, as a result of economic down-turn especially in the late 1990s. The issues of spiralling deficits and debt and unemployment require urgent addressing. The high budget deficit throughout the 1990s has exerted pressure on the government to borrow to finance it. Whereas interest payments accounted for 12 per cent of government expenditure in 1990/91, its share had increased to 22 per cent in 1995/96. This had the effect of constraining government’s discretionary expenditure resulting in real declines in social expenditure especially in education and health. The debt service ratio had risen to 28 per cent by 1998.

2.8: Suggested Solutions to the Debt Crisis

A number of options have been offered to deal with the debt issue. These are consolidated in the Parliament, ZCTU, ZNCC, ZCC and Friederich-Ebert Stiftung workshop report “Zimbabwe’s Debt Crisis and Its Impact on Development,” May 1999. The significance of this workshop is in that it brought together civil society groups, academics, Parliamentarians, development partners and government (notably, the Ministry of Finance). The Ministry of Finance suggested the need to put in place the following:

- development of debt securities markets;
- improvement in the co-ordination between debt management and monetary management;
- provision of accurate and reliable debt data preferably through the use of a computerised debt management system;
- adoption of an effective borrowing strategy;
- restructuring of the existing debt portfolio and recourse to debt instruments such as debt buybacks, debt swaps, debt conversion, debt write-offs and debt refinancing.

As pointed out at the workshop, the market-based instruments such as debt-buy backs, debt swaps, debt conversion may not resolve the problem. These may compound the crisis. Take for instance the offer by the World Bank to buy Zimbabwe’s domestic debt and convert it into foreign debt. While this will provide relief in the short-term, in the longer term, exchange rate depreciation will raise the debt stock to the disadvantage of the debtor (Zimbabwe). Options such as debt write-off may require that relations with donors are restored first. Thereafter, negotiations can be opened on the restructuring of debt and possibilities for debt write off can then be explored. Using the proceeds from privatisation to retire pail of the domestic debt is another option.

On 3 August 20(X), the new Minister of Finance and Economic Development, Simba Makoni announced measures to resuscitate the economy. Among these measures was the announcement that government will restructure short-term debt into medium and long term debt. In addition, government guarantees will only be given on the basis of the viability of projects and that of the borrowing enterprise. The performance of parastatals will be monitored closely. To boost revenues, he indicated that the National Revenue Authority will become operational from January 2001.

Clearly, therefore, any measures to deal with the debt crisis require a prudent fiscal policy, prudent debt management, restructuring of the debt and negotiations with donors. Kanyenze, 20(X)

As a result of extensive borrowing, Zimbabwe entered a debt trap. By the end of 1998, the external debt stood at Z$90 billion while domestic debt amounted to Z$43 billion. The domestic debt had soared even higher by the end of 2000 when it amounted to ZS140 billion. Debt repayments are a major drain on the government. Furthermore, this heavy government borrowing crowds out the private sector and feeds into high interests (which soared to over 60 per cent in early 20(X)). Total
government debt has grown from Z$37 billion in 1995 to Z$207 billion as at November 2000. GDP to 37 per cent during the same period. High levels of indebtedness undermine future growth.

There is a direct relationship between the difficult deficit and debt situation and significant decline outlays for the human development sector. For instance, in aggregate terms, real per capita expenditure on health fell from about Z$14 in 1990 to approximately Z$ 9 in 1994. Per capita expenditure in education declined from about Z$37 to Z$30 during the same period with recurrent public- sector expenditure on primary and secondary education declining by more than 30 per cent Shrinking by almost a third was the expenditure on Social Welfare. The quality of the education and health services could not fail to be adversely affected as a consequence, as will be explained in more detail in the section on the social sector conditions. The pledge to increase the health budget from the average allocation of 2 per cent of the budget during ESAP to at least 2,5 per cent (in line with the world average standards) has not been possible to implement For its pan, the WB has admitted that its earlier emphasis on cutting social sector spending was mistaken (Men, 1999). Countries which underwent sustained economic development have devoted sufficient resources to education and health; this was a major priority for those rapidly- industrialising countries in East Asia. As the Minister of Finance and Economic Development points out his Budget Statement in November 2000, Government support for these important sectors in Zimbabwe has also been hamstrung in the face of a large defence budget especially from 1998 onwards owing to the intervention in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).To that extent, the consequences for human development programmes have been adverse.

What has been the impact on employment and incomes during this period? As a consequence of sluggish growth, employment creation has been very slow. It is estimated that only about 200W new jobs have been created annually since 1980. Currently, the formal sector has a work-force of an estimated 1,5 million. The proportion of able-bodied job-seekers is high as evidenced by the high level of unemployment of between 40 and 50 per cent (Levine and Magundhla, 2000). The rate of employment growth actually declined from an annual average rate of 2,4 per cent in 1985-1990 to 0,8 per cent during 1991-95. The rate of 0,8 per cent during the ESAP period is far below the 3 per cent growth rate of the labour force. In addition, each year more than a 100 000 school-leavers swell the saturated labour market Clearly, new jobs are not being created fast enough to absorb new entrants into the labour market (Kanyenze, 20W; Knight, 1996). Significantly, one of the findings of the Poverty Assessment Study Survey, carded out in 1995 was

Table 2.6: Functional Distribution of Gross Domestic Income, 1987-97 (%)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Wages</th>
<th>Rent</th>
<th>Profit</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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<td>1988</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
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<td>1997</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated From Quarterly Digest of Statistics, December 1998
Note: Percentage shares do not add to 100 due to omission of imputed bank charges.
Furthermore, the share of wages and salaries in gross domestic income has declined from an average of about 49 per cent during the pre-reform period of 1986-1990 to an average of 41 per cent during the ESAP era. Meanwhile, the share of profits rose an average of about 50 per cent during 1986-1990 to nearly 56 per cent in the ESAP period. This would therefore suggest that the burden of adjustment had largely fallen on workers relative to owners of capital. As tables 2.5 and 2.7 illustrate, real wages have collapsed in most sectors of the economy. For example, the average minimum wage in the private sector (excluding parastatals and domestic service) is approximately Z$2 500 per month. This amounts to 30 per cent of the estimated Poverty Datum Line of Z$8 310 at June 20(X) prices. This
clearly shows that the current minimum wages have been so seriously eroded that they cannot meet the basic needs of a family of six.

There is now an acute problem of the "working poor? (Gibbon, 1995; Kanyenze, 20(X)). Low wages have been linked to poor morale and shirking amongst workers, moonlighting and low productivity, high turn-over and susceptibility to corruption, all which undermine human development. There is a strong case for an employment policy and an integrated set of measures for employment creation particularly in the small and medium enterprise (SME) sector.

2.9 Civil Society and Economic Governance

Apart from the government and international financial institutions, there are many other interested parties in economic governance. In particular, business organisations and labour unions have a direct stake in how economic policies and reforms are shaped and implemented. Of course, organised business tends to have a differential and better access to the economic "corridors of power than the unions. This was the case in the consultations relating to the design of both the ESAP and ZIMPREST programmes. The labour unions have tended to be marginalised from these consultations, and eventually feel alienated from the reforms. The absence of consultation and consensus-building in the design of economic programmes undermines their credibility, and makes their “national ownership” difficult.

Even the Bretton Woods institutions themselves see value in economic governance based on a broad national consensus. For instance, they recommend that their newly-established Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) be “country-driven with the broad participation of civil society, elected institutions and key donors”. An important related initiative is the structural Adjustment

Participatory Review Initiative (SAPRI) established in 1997. Zimbabwe is one of the 10 countries participating in SAPRI. To the extent that the initiative involves consultations on the effects of adjustment with grassroots organizations throughout the country, it is an innovative programme in participatory evaluation. The purpose of the project would have been served if the data and opinions gathered would be fruitfully integrated in the design of future economic programmes.
Budget comparison for two sectors between 2000 and 2001 ($million)

Source: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
Reference has already been made to the role of the National Economic Consultative Forum (NECF) as an institutional framework through which consensus-building on economic and social policy issues may be pursued in a constructive environment. The potential fill role has not yet been achieved largely due to the atmosphere of mistrust which existed between the government and the labour movement in 1997-1999. In this calmer post-election period, the chances for a more serious and constructive dialogue between the tripartite partners appear to have improved. Although labour later reversed its decision, a declaration of intent to negotiate a social contract had been signed by the tripartite partners in January 2001.

The participation of labour together with representatives of business and farmers should strengthen the credibility of the NECE However, the representatives on the Forum should be lent more clout; they should have an institutional mandate to negotiate and reach binding decisions. It would be worthwhile to compare the NECF structure and experience to date with that of South Africa’s NEDLAC. Finally, there will be need to guard against a duplication of efforts at consensus-building in economic and social policy. For instance, in early 2000, a National Economic Recovery Council (NERC) was set up ostensibly to spearhead the implementation of the Millennium Economic Reform Programme (MERP). The Council would include ministers as well as some members of the NECE It would have been worthwhile to explore whether the present NECF could not have undertaken the functions of the new NERC.

**Source:** Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, Budget Statement, 2000
Here it also needs to be mentioned that there have been serious attempts at dialogue over economic and social policy between organized business, labour and government. This was an unchartered territory. However, the principle appears to have been accepted that such dialogue is imperative, and that it should result in some framework of cooperation or an agreement. The Tripartite Negotiating Forum (TNF) of the NECF has played a key role in this dialogue. Although the initial discussions on a social contract began in 1998, it was not until January 2001 that a draft declaration of intent to negotiate the terms of the contract was released.

The objectives of the declaration were to:

- create a conducive and tolerant environment for the negotiation and conclusion of a social contract;
- overcome stakeholder differences and work towards a common goal guided by a common vision for national development; and
- promote confidence among social partners and generate commitment towards the sustainability of social dialogue in the spirit of social partnership and tripartism.

The discussions on the draft declaration have, however, remained inconclusive. The political atmosphere has, to date, not been particularly conducive to a satisfactory conclusion of the negotiation of a social contract.

There are other arenas through which issues of economic governance have been explored by organisations in civil society. Such organisations include the Zimbabwe Council of Churches, the Zimbabwe Economic Society, the Affirmative Action Group, the Indigenous Business Development Centre, the Zimbabwe Farmers’ Union and the Consumer Council of Zimbabwe amongst others. These groups have periodically brought to the national attention pressing economic and social issues which should be accorded priority from their own point of view. The design and content of the national budget has increasingly become a central issue for some civil society organisations. For instance, women’s organisations have pressed for inclusion in the budget of a bundle of needs relating to women’s welfare and advancement. These have made vital contributions to the national budgeting process.

3. THE POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS OF GOVERNANCE

3.1 Introduction

The political and institutional components of governance are important pillars of any governance system. Indeed, in most of the current literature, governance is often equated with political and institutional structures and processes. This indicates how crucial the political system and institutional environment are in determining and conditioning the nature and quality of governance in a particular society. Equally importantly, the political and institutional components of governance have a direct bearing on conditions of human development. Human rights in their various forms - civil rights, political rights, economic and social rights - are at the heart of human development, and they are shaped by the political and institutional environment. However, governance cannot simply be reduced to the political and institutional components.

There are other equally significant dimensions such as the economic dimension which we explored in Chapter 2 and the gender and social dimensions which we examine in Chapter 5. In this chapter, we nevertheless acknowledge the centrality of the political and institutional aspects of governance, and give them their due weight. This is all the more appropriate and timely given the nature of intense political debate and path-breaking developments in Zimbabwe stemming from the 2000 election results, and the constitutional reform process which has yet to be concluded. One such path-breaking development was the significant electoral performance of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Different positions are held (sometimes very passionately) by different parties and individuals with regard to what type of political and institutional governance should be nurtured in Zimbabwe. This is inevitable and healthy. What is necessary is a broad consensus on the framework in which such competing ideas and paradigms can be expressed fully and contested peacefully. This is the essence of democracy.
In this chapter, we assess the major issues pertaining to political and institutional governance and how they relate to the challenge of human development. We identify the strengths and weaknesses of the political system and of the institutional structures, and consider possible ways in which both be improved in their effectiveness and transparency. It was out of an awareness of existing shortcomings and anomalies that there grew a consensus that a new constitution should be drawn up to serve as a framework for far-reaching changes in political and institutional governance. The first phase of the constitution-making exercise may have floundered due to differences over the process and content. However, it is encouraging that some of the stakeholders in the exercise see the need to resume and conclude the process on a consensual basis.

3.2 An Overview of Issues in Political and Institutional Governance

We have already observed that the political component looms large in the discourse of governance, and that discussions about it are often fraught with controversy. However, it is generally agreed that the political component of governance consists of:

- basic political rights (such as rights to join and vote for a party of one’s choice);
- freedom of expression;
- competitive and free and fair elections;
- supremacy of the rule of law;
- existence of an independent judiciary, and
- broad participation in local governance and community forums, to name a few.

But for This checklist has often been used to assess the degree to which “good governance” practices exist in a particular country. As has been observed above, one of the preconditions of the attainment of these aspects is a national constitution which spells out these rights and conditions in unambiguous terms. The legitimacy and democratic credentials of a political system rest on whether the above-mentioned rights and conditions exist in a particular country.

While the right to vote is universally accepted and guaranteed in most countries, there remain impediments in some. Unfettered rights to political party membership, and the freedom of parties to organise freely are not fully guaranteed and respected in some countries. Furthermore, the degree of political tolerance varies widely between countries even though most countries have, at least in principle, embraced the multi-party system. An effective multi-party system is a necessary but insufficient condition for democracy. Other conditions should also be met. For instance, the system would require a strong opposition to continuously keep the incumbent government on its toes through exposure of maladministration and corruption when they occur. Even so, structural impediments to opposition parties include limited and unequal access to the media, and to the funding of their activities. Furthermore, the level of public participation in the political process - beyond voting in national elections once in every five years - is still uneven and limited in most countries in SSA. For example, the Zimbabwe Human Development Report for 1998 observed that there was need for more space for broader participation, democratic debate and popular empowerment in Zimbabwe.

Elections themselves are an important barometer of public opinion towards a government and political parties. The nature of a national electoral system is therefore of primary significance to political governance. The system should be sufficiently transparent and fair in order to provide “a level playing field” to all contesting players (ESC, 1996; 1997). A major criterion for democracy are “free and fair elections”, and it is scarcely surprising that the international community devotes a great deal of attention to this component of governance.

The institutional component of governance relates to the administrative structures and processes through which policy design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation are undertaken. In order to have an effective system of governance, these institutions should have clear objectives and be effectively managed. The role of these institutions in sub-Saharan Africa has been varied but often uninspiring. In the post-colonial phase, the state has been involved in a broader range of policy agendas and activities, and made more amenable to societal pressures and clientelistic relationships. The need to reform African institutional structures to enhance efficiency and reduce the likelihood of corruption is obvious (Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999).
That there are problems relating to weak institutional capacity and mechanisms to ensure
effectiveness, transparency and accountability in SSA is generally accepted although the degree of
these problems would vary from country to country. Some of the principal factors which have
contributed to this state of affairs include the following:

- policy-making has tended to be very state-centred with small closed elites making decisions with
  little or no wider consultation;
- the public service has tended to lack independence, influence and skills to make the political
  leadership conscious of the need for alternative policies;
- the centralized power of autocratic political leaders and their adherence to certain approaches has
  often limited freed-back of what was going wrong with existing policies, and hence slowed the
  process of modifying or reversing economic strategies;
- the weakness in the organization, resources and effective lobbying of civil society groups in most
  SSA countries means that there were no strong pressures from outside, or from below, on
  policymaking elites (Healey and Robinson, 1993).

These shortfalls in institutional capacity in policy-making and implementation have also been
experienced in Zimbabwe (Agere, 1998). As we will observe below, the principal challenges which face
developing countries are to build effective institutional capacity as well as to eradicate corruption in
their state institutions.

3.3 The Zimbabwe Political System: Strengths and Weaknesses

There has been significant political transformation in Zimbabwe since the demise of white minority rule
in 1980. For some Zimbabweans, especially the younger ones, it may be hard to remember that
political rights - such as the right to vote - were not universal until 1980. Africans were denied
universal franchise under colonial rule. Political parties which espoused nationalism and independence
were often banned, and their leaders placed under detention or restriction for long periods. Many
Zimbabweans possessed and exercised the right to vote for a party of their choice for the first time in
1980. Majority rule and political rights and freedom are recent developments in Zimbabwe; they have
scarcely been more than twenty years in existence. They were won at considerable cost through the
liberation struggle. It was a broadly popular nationalist movement which successfully mobilized and
executed that struggle. It can be stated therefore that there was a qualitative change in the political
status of Zimbabweans as a result of independence in 1980. This is why the attainment of
independence should be viewed as a significant landmark in laying foundations for improved
governance in the country.

There have been major tests and hurdles to that new governance system based on majority rule. No
sooner had the new state begun to consolidate that independence than conflict broke out in the
Matabeleland and Midlands provinces. The conflict dragged from 1982 until a cease-fire was negotiated
in 1987. There were considerable casualties especially of civilians. However, since the Unity Accord of
1987, there has prevailed relative peace and stability in the country. Political freedoms have, by and
large, been allowed. A state of emergency was scrapped in 1990. With a few exceptions, freedoms of
association and expression have been respected. As witnessed by the proliferation of political parties,
civic organizations and independent newspapers and magazines especially in the 1990s.

It is also worth remembering that Zimbabwe has remained a de jure multi-party state during the
entire post-independence period. This has been the case despite a strong lobby within Zanu-PF party
which had an overwhelming parliamentary majority in the 1990 and 1995 elections. With more than 95
per cent of parliamentary seats, Zimbabwe was nevertheless a de facto one-party state. From the late
1980s to the mid-1990s, Zimbabwe was viewed as an oasis of stability and calm in a largely turbulent
region.

A notable feature of the political system is that it has sought to accommodate the principle of
"separation of process' through "checks and balances. The record has, however, been a mixed one.
According to one perspective, the judiciary has upheld its authority and autonomy and thereby
ensured an effective check on executive excesses [Masunungure, 2000]. In general, the judiciary has
sought to maintain its independence from influence from other branches of the state namely the
Executive and Parliament. The judiciary has insisted that the Courts have the power and duty to ensure that the provisions of the Constitution are “observed by all the instrumentalities of Government and to strike down as invalid any Act of Parliament, presidential or ministerial regulations or excess of power which transgresses one of the prohibitions contained in the constitution” [Gubbay, 1991]. This self-assertion is linked to the fact that the Constitution contains a justifiable Declaration of Rights that specifies a number of fundamental rights and freedoms that are not to be violated.

It was significant that some of the judgments made in the late 1990s and much more recently were viewed as controversial. These judgments related to rights to organize demonstrations, rights to freedom of expression and to political party funding, right of access to broadcasting licences and to land occupations. The overall environment in which cases were brought to the High and Supreme Courts and judgments handed down was one in which the political temperature was high. The issue of the impartiality and independence of the judiciary became one for public debate especially in 1999 and 2000. In particular, there was palpable tension between the Judiciary and the Executive, as we saw in Chapter 2 pertaining to judgments on land redistribution. There have allegedly been physical threats made to judges by war veterans. In this heightened political atmosphere, the Judiciary has sought to reassure the Executive, Legislature and the public that:

“When courts declare administrative actions or legislation to be unconstitutional, they do so, not to frustrate the Executive or Parliament, but because of the conviction that the Constitution obliges them to do so. There is no hidden agenda behind such rulings or partiality for one party above another “ [Chief Justice Gubbay as quoted in The Herald, 9 January 2001].

The tension is not likely to subside soon as long as the political temperature remains particularly high in the run-up to the 2002 election. While politicians may disagree with particular court judgments, they should accept and defend the principle of judicial independence. An independent and incorruptible judiciary is an indispensable pillar for sound governance. For its part, the Judiciary has indicated that it was not opposed to criticism directed towards it in good faith.

Let us now consider the weaknesses of the political system. A conspicuous weakness of the political system, especially after the mid-1980s to the 1990s was the limited role of Parliament in playing its “watchdog role” especially visa-a-vis the executive branch. This vitiated the “separation of powers” doctrine. As it has been observed:

“The essence of the doctrine is to provide good governance through power sharing and a system of checks and balances... The system is meant to work like a partnership; each organ carrying out its function in harmony with, but not encroaching upon, the others... ” (Muchechetere, 1998 quoting Gubbay, 1991).

To a large degree, the Executive increasingly encroached upon the Legislature during this period. However, Parliament later bemoaned this usurpation of its role. A report of a Parliamentary Reform Committee attempted to re-assert this role in these terms:

“The role of Parliament is to legislate; to scrutinize the policies and activities of the Executive; to hold the Executive to account for its actions, and to act as a forum for democratic participation by all members of society. It should thus play a significant role in the system of checks and balances common to all parliamentary democracies. Under the principle of separation of powers, Parliament - and its members, institutions and staff - should ideally be independent of the Executive so that the House can perform this role properly and effectively.” (Parliament of Zimbabwe, 1998).

In a moment of self-scrutiny and candour, the Committee conceded that Parliament had not “effectively carried out its functions. The weakness of Parliament, in this respect, was ironically due to the overwhelming dominance of the ruling Zanu-PF which (between 1990 and 1999) held more than 95 per cent of the seats. Its reputation grew that it was a weak and mainly “a rubber stamping” institution.

In 2000, the composition, role and assertiveness of Parliament underwent a radical shift. This was due to the good showing of the (MDC) Movement for Democratic Change which won 57 of the 120 directly-
elected seats. The debates in post-2000 election period have been both substantive and lively. The prospects have tremendously improved for ensuring more transparency and accountability on the part of the Executive, and a healthier balance of power between these two branches of the state. This would augur well for good governance.

The other outstanding feature in the current political system is identified as the excessive centralization of power. It was scarcely surprising that the extent of presidential powers was one of the most widely debated topics during the public hearings of the Constitutional Commission.

Indeed, some analysts argue that the most far-reaching political development in the late 1980s was the establishment of a powerful Executive Presidency (Masunungure, 2000). Amendment No. 7 to the Constitution fused the two roles of Head of State and Head of Government by creating the Executive President. Very extensive powers were accorded this office and person: they included the appointment of 30 MPs, members of various Commissions, judges, executive heads of ministries, ambassadors amongst other powers. The President also has power, under certain circumstances, to declare a state of emergency, dissolve the cabinet and parliament, and rule the country by decree for a while (Sithole, 1998). The provisions of the Amendment granted exceptional powers which could be exercised arbitrarily, it was argued by some constitutional experts (Ncube, 1994). It was scarcely surprising that the extent of presidential powers was one of the most widely debated topics during the public hearings of the Constitutional Commission in 1999. Excessive powers and the temptation to exercise them arbitrarily were viewed as a potential impediment to a system of good governance. The debate on the range of Presidential powers is likely to continue in the follow-up phase of the constitutional reform process. From the point of view of nurturing democracy, it is a healthy debate.

Other notable limitations of the political system relate to constraints on the freedom of expression, and on human rights. There is still some ground to cover before it can be conclusively stated that there is uninhibited freedom of expression in Zimbabwe. Although there is no formal censorship of the media, it is common knowledge that the diversity of views which is reflected in the publicly-owned media is much narrower than should be the case. This is the case with radio and television, and the state-controlled newspapers. Charges of political partisanship are often exchanged on occasions such as election campaigns when opposition parties complain of inequitable access to this media. The growth of a vibrant independent media has partly redressed this weakness and partisanship in the publicly-owned media. But it is an independent media which has its own partisan tendencies. The challenge is for the publicly-owned media to reflect the diverse perspectives represented by the different shades of political opinion. Furthermore, the cool relations between the state and the independent media should improve. The present atmosphere of mutual suspicion, recrimination and sourness should change. Things came to a head in 1999 in the stand-off between the state and The Standard newspaper, resulting in the detention and torture of two journalists. That episode considerably tarnished Zimbabwe's international reputation. The media has an important role and responsibility to play in the dissemination of information, and mechanisms should be put in place to facilitate that role. However, it also has responsibility to ensure accurate and balanced reporting rather than sensational and partisan reporting. Freedoms need to be balanced with responsibility. The challenges of responsibility and balance will come into sharper focus when the de-regulation of broadcasting gets underway. The rules and regulations and criteria which prospective broadcasters will be required to adhere to should be formulated and applied in a transparent and consistent manner. There is understandably anxiety about whether stakeholders will be allowed an opportunity to make inputs into the design of those criteria, rules and regulations. For purposes of good governance, there is need of such a rapprochement between the media, both public and private on the one hand, and the state and civil society on the other.

These steps are necessary for national healing or catharsis. More recently, concerns have expressed on how the draconian handling of peaceful demonstrations and marches has infringed on human rights (ACPD, 2000). The respect of human rights is an intrinsic part of good governance.

### 3.4 Political Parties and the Electoral System

Many parties have continued to exist in various guises (there were no less than twelve such parties in 1995). For the 2000 parliamentary elections, 15 political parties registered to contest. Indeed, it has
been said that forming a political party in Zimbabwe is easier than forming a burial society! However political parties were tolerated to the extent that they did not pose a real threat to the dominant party in power. Their existence, albeit in a feeble and frail state, in fact served to legitimize the democratic credentials of the dominant party system.

In short, throughout the post-Unity Accord period up to the year 1999, ZANU (PF) was “the only game in town.” In accounting for the weak state of the opposition in the country, it is the legal framework which is asphyxiating. Apart from the juridical framework that may not be conducive, or perhaps because of it, the opposition was characterized by was harassed and intimidated (the 1990 elections are a case in point). Combined with the certainty or predictability of a ruling party victory in elections, this bred widespread apathy in the electorate. Elections became a ritual, and not an exciting ritual at that. The apathy expressed itself on two levels; first in terms of an unwillingness or resistance to register as voters, whether for the local, national parliamentary or presidential elections (see Table 3.1). On numerous occasions, voter registration deadlines in preparation for elections had to be extended to allow more potential voters to register.

### Box 3.2: Voter Apathy in Zimbabwe

Voter apathy became tellingly evident in terms of actual voting. There has been a depressingly consistent decline since the independence elections of 1980. Table 3.1 below again graphically tells the story. As is incontestable from the Table, voter turnout as a percentage of potential voters progressively declined reaching its nadir of 25% in 1995 from an all-time high of 93% in 1980. The same trend is apparent if we consider the percentage of registered voters who actually turned out to vote which declined from 93% in 1980 to 47% ten years later and rose marginally to 50% in 2000. The 57% recorded for 1995 is deceptive in that it is calculated from a very low base of registered voters - only 43% of the potential voters had bothered to register. As such, it is the voter registration apathy that is more significant than the actual voter turnout.

(Masunungure, 2000)

### Table 3.1: Voter Turnout in Post Independence Elections: 1980 - 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Potential voting population</th>
<th>Registered voters</th>
<th>Voter turnout</th>
<th>% of potential voters</th>
<th>% of registered voters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>2900000</td>
<td>2900000</td>
<td>2702275</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>4000000</td>
<td>3500000</td>
<td>2972146</td>
<td>74 -</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>5300000</td>
<td>4800000</td>
<td>2237524</td>
<td>42 -</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>6000000</td>
<td>2600000</td>
<td>1482660</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>5500000</td>
<td>5049815</td>
<td>2552 844</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995 Presidential</td>
<td>6000000</td>
<td>4902244</td>
<td>1557651</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The elections for the highest office in the land, the Executive President, was even more disturbing with only 32% of registered voters actually registering their preferences, a drop from the 51% recorded in the 1990 presidential election. So, it is more than evident that voter disengagement from the electoral process had become deeply embedded until recently. It was observed:

“75% of the adult population did not vote in the 1995 parliamentary election. This, in turn means that the 1995-2000 parliament was elected by a minority of the electorate, and is, therefore, a minority parliament... We cannot clown around and simply say “even if one person turns out to vote, that government is duly elected and therefore legitimate. That is a flippant, irresponsible attitude to adopt” (Sithole, 1999).

Reasons for the apathy and indifference are many and varied. Political scientists have identified various factors ranging from voter ignorance to suspicion of manipulation of the electoral process which renders it more or less meaningless as an expression of the voters’ verdict and preferences. Other reasons were biased and unequal media coverage, the certainty of the electoral outcome which is allied to the unevenness of the political playing field and the lack of genuine political competition. Table 3.1 illustrates the trend in voter turnout since 1980.
The 2000 parliamentary elections should be considered as a turning point in terms of voter turnout. For instance, while actual voter turnout declined by as much as 50% from almost 3 million 1985 to just 1.5 million 1995, it jumped by 72% in the 2000 elections to 2.6 million. It is essential to note some of the critical variables that intervened in between.

The issue of participation in the electoral process at various levels lies at the heart of democracy. The institutional framework of the electoral system matters a great deal. It has a direct bearing on the electoral process and outcome. Some attention should therefore be paid to its capacity, transparency and accountability. Presently, the institutional framework consists of the following bodies:

- the Delimitation Commission (which defines boundaries of constituencies),
- the Electoral Supervisory Commission (which is the nominal supervisory body),
- the Registrar of Elections (which is based in the Registrar-General’s Office),
- the Election Directorate (which is made up of officials from various government ministries).

However, the balance of power and authority has tended to rest with the Registrar of Elections and the Election Directorate, both based in government ministries. The role of the Electoral Supervisory Commission itself has been circumscribed in several ways. It has a very limited staff: it has five Commissioners and no supportive staff of its own. It has no independent budget. Its lack of resources in comparison with the Registrar of Elections (based in the Registrar-General’s Office) and the Election Directorate makes it difficult for it to play a meaningful ‘supervisory’ role.


This has contributed to a sense of frustration amongst members of the Commission and prompted this recommendation:
“The machinery delivering elections in Zimbabwe needs to be reviewed with a view to coming up with recommendations for the improvement of the whole electoral system with special reference to empower selection, authority and funding in the light of problems and lessons derived from the elections which have been held since 1980. Consideration should be given to turning the ESC into an Election Commission which conducts all aspects of election administration.” (ESC, 1996).

The recommendation of the ESC takes on particular resonance in the context of the current debate on constitutional reform in the country. An intrinsic part of that constitutional reform should be the reform of the electoral system.

There are provisions in the Constitutional Commission draft (rejected in the February 2000 election) which relate to constitutional reform. To some extent, they take on board some of the ESC proposals. For example, the provisions include the establishment of an Independent Electoral Commission which would have authority and responsibility for:

- organizing, conducting and supervising elections;
- registering voters and ensuring the proper maintenance of voters’ rolls;
- determining the boundaries of constituencies;
- considering and advising on all proposals to alter the boundaries of wards or other electoral divisions of provincial council or local authority areas, and U formulating and implementing civic educational programmes relating to elections (Constitutional Commission, 1999).

There would still remain a few contentious areas including the manner of appointment of the independent electoral commissioners but broadly speaking these provisions would be generally reasonable. They would constitute an improvement of the institutional framework of the electoral system.

Electoral reform along the lines envisaged above would restore public confidence in the electoral system. The present system has been viewed by some, rightly or wrongly, as inefficient and partisan. Inefficiencies and irregularities have been reported in the voter registration exercises. On another level, the limitations of “first past the post” electoral system have been identified in arguments for a proportional representation (PR) system. It has been observed, for example, that the “first past the post” or “winner takes all” system is insensitive to the diversity of interests and population which aspire for representation in parliament (SADC RHDR,1998). It is a system which has resulted in weak opposition on the one hand and what have sometimes been termed dominant-party systems on the other.

The gap between the votes and the number of seats which opposition parties get in the legislature under current electoral systems in some countries in Southern Africa is somewhat wide and unfair to them. The substantial vote for the opposition has not been translated into a proportionate number of parliamentary seats under the “first past the post” system. However, countries such as Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa have instituted reasonably successful PR electoral systems. It is against this background that there has also been a Zimbabwean version of the debate on the virtues of the PR system. Opposition parties have been in the forefront of the advocacy for a PR system. Even the Constitutio1 Commission’s draft constitution envisaged some portion of seats being placed under the PR system. It is vital that the debate on the merits and demerits of the various electoral systems continue and some compromise system devised. An electoral system serves as one of the principal pillars of governance, and it is appropriate that sufficient attention is paid to devising an appropriate, fair and transparent system.

A discussion of the significance of the electoral system for governance in Zimbabwe cannot overlook the difficult experiences experienced in the 2000 election campaign. It proved to be one of the more violent campaigns since independence. Inter-party intimidation and violence were rife. Over thirty people were killed during the campaign. Several thousands of rural residents were displaced as a result of intimidation and attacks. The general atmosphere of the campaign was one of heated rhetoric, threats and intolerance. Peaceful and fair election campaigns are vital for credibility and stability. They are indispensable for good governance.
An agenda for electoral reform ought to include provisions for the funding of contesting political parties. A equitable funding formula will be necessary to ensure that some parties do not have undue advantage. Access to the media during election campaigns should be facilitated for the contesting parties. This suggestion by the ESC should be translated into a concrete framework:

“Consideration should be given to the preparation of comprehensive guidelines to the media on election coverage. An impartial body should be tasked to work jointly with the media institutions in coming up with the guidelines which should become the code of ethics in election coverage (ESC, 1995).

The disadvantages of partisan and unbalanced media coverage include a less well-informed public and electorate. There is a compelling case in the ESC suggestion if the problems and charges encountered in the 2000 election campaign are not to be repeated in future elections.

3.5 The Constitutional Reform Process

It was out of the acknowledgement that a constitution is central to a governance system that the matter of constitutional reform became a leading national issue in the late 1990s. There was a general agreement that the Lancaster House independence constitution negotiated in 1979 had now outlived its usefulness. Initially, a greater amount of the impetus for reform originated from within civil society organizations in the mid-1990s. Through the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) launched in 1998 as the umbrella body for such organizations pressing for reform, the momentum gathered steam especially in 1998 and 1999. Meanwhile, the ruling Zanu-PF party debated the constitutional reform issue at its 1998 congress and endorsed that reform should be carried out.

However, despite the consensus that the reform process should begin, there arose serious differences over how the process should be conducted. The differences proved irreconcilable between Zanu-PF and the NCA resulting in two parallel constitution-making processes in 1999. Both organizations undertook outreach programmes to gather views of the public, in both urban and rural areas, on what should be included in a new constitution. The more extensive programme was that conducted by the Constitutional Commission which held 4,321 public meetings attended by 556,000 people, and 700 special ad hoc meetings by about 150,000 people (Chidyausiku, 1999). In addition, it received about 4,000 written submissions from individual Zimbabweans and organizations. The resultant constitutional draft was rejected in the February 2000 referendum in a vote both against the draft content and prevailing conditions of economic and social hardships. But the rejection was not a vote for the Lancaster House constitution either.

This is why constitutional reform currently remains an unfinished agenda. Politicians in both ruling Zanu-PF and the main opposition party, the MDC, are broadly agreed that it should be re-visited. A motion tabled in Parliament in 2000 argued for the need to revive the constitutional reform process. The principal constitutional pressure group, the NCA, concurs but emphasizes that the process be resumed as soon as possible. There will need to be negotiations about the process as well as its timing, and on the content of the draft. It remains to be seen what the agreed process will turn out to be. However, the process should build on the extensive process carried out in 1999, and the content could be selectively drawn from the two existing drafts of the CC and the NCA. There is now broad agreement between the different sides that the cultivation of trust and credibility in the constitution-making process is of paramount importance. There should be no credibility gap such as existed in the previous exercise. Confidence-building measures will, therefore, be necessary in the next round of constitution making. There should be transparency at every stage of the process. A broadly accepted and popular constitution is a very important instrument for sound governance.

3.6 Zimbabwe’s Public Bureaucracy: Issues of Capacity

By ‘public bureaucracy’ we mean “the system of authority, people, offices, and methods that government uses to achieve its objectives” (Kernaghan and Siegel 1987, 4). The UNDP Discussion
Paper 2 defines administrative governance as a “system of policy implementation carried out through an efficient, independent, accountable and open public sector” (1997, 10). The Zimbabwe Institute of Public Administration (ZIPAM) provides a Zimbabwean perspective to the meaning of capacity:

“By capacity we mean, in many respects, the ability to conceptualize, formulate, manage and evaluate policies, programmes of action and resources. in essence we are talking about the capacity of the human and financial resources to execute the development process and above all the infrastructural capability and sustainability of the process.” (ZIPAM, 10).

The Zimbabwe public service is a product of its history; the history of colonial administration that had three major imperatives vis, resource extraction or revenue collection, maintaining law and order and subjugation of the indigenous population. It was not oriented toward developmental functions for the whole community, except on a very limited scale. As the main clientele of the colonial public service were the minority whites, its size was consequently small such that at independence there were about 46,000 civil servants. Before independence, and as a matter of policy, very few Africans were adequately trained to occupy medium and senior level posts - in 1980, out of the 10,000 or so established officers only 3,000 were blacks.

At independence, therefore, the new black government faced multiple problems whose intervention could hardly be spearheaded by a public service that itself was afflicted with a syndrome of problems. The public bureaucracy was too small to be able to shoulder the developmental functions of a much larger clientele with a myriad of urgent needs like education, health, reconstruction of infrastructure destroyed in the liberation war. The public service burden was worsened by the otherwise noble policy of free education and free health services. Very few Africans had the requisite skills and experience to satisfactorily perform their tasks.

The new black government endeavoured to radically change this orientation and the most important instrument for facilitating this was what became known as the ‘Presidential Directive’ (PD). Derived from the Constitution, the PD empowered the President to suspend the normal public service rules and regulations governing recruitment, advancement and promotion in order to redress the acute colonially- inherited racial imbalances. The then State President invoked this constitutional provision in May 1980 by issuing the following policy directives:

1. To recruit staff to all grades of the Public Service in such a manner as will bring about the balanced representation of the various elements which make up the population of Zimbabwe;
2. To give more rapid advancement to suitably qualified Africans in appointments and promotions to senior posts in the Public Sector;
3. In carrying out these directions, to have due regard to the maintenance of a high state of efficiency within the Public Service and the need to satisfy the career aspirations of existing Public Servants; and
4. To make an annual report on progress.

The results, in quantitative terms, were dramatic. The Service rapidly expanded from 46,000 posts in 1980 to 79,000 in 1983, rising to 190,000 by 1990. Thus, in just one decade, the Public Service had tripled in size. While at independence only 30% of the established officers were Africans, three years later 86% of these were black. Similarly, in 1980, all 30 permanent secretaries were white, but just two years later, all but four ministries and the Public Service Commission (PSC) had black permanent secretaries. All these senior positions were mainly filled by blacks, who, though highly educated, lacked adequate administrative and technical experience. Moreover, sometimes ‘square pegs’ were put in ‘round holes’ resulting in job-skills mismatch. For any public service or organization, all these developments could not but dislocate its operations and compromise on efficiency and effectiveness. In addressing the above questions and issues, the most authoritative anatomy of the public service (here used interchangeably with public bureaucracy) in Zimbabwe still remains the Report of the Public Service Review Commission of Zimbabwe of 1989 (otherwise known as the Kavran Report after its Chairman, Prof D. Kavran). This study was a comprehensive review of virtually all facets of the structure and functioning of the Zimbabwe Public Service. Other more modest studies have followed notably the Public Service Commissions Service Delivery in the Public Service of Zimbabwe (1998).
Box 3.3: Findings of Kavran Commission Report, 1989

According to the Kavran study, the government and people of Zimbabwe should be able to rely upon a Public Service that is:

(i) Honest, with a high degree of integrity, and averse to corruption;
(ii) Impartial and non-discriminatory in dealing with the public at all levels;
(iii) Motivated to give good service to Parliament, Ministers and public alike, with scrupulous adherence to the rule of law: the foundation for this will be a code of conduct and discipline designed to instill and maintain high standards of performance, i.e. accuracy and speed in the dispatch of business, and a positive and courteous attitude to the public;
(iv) Competent in a wide-range of skills, many of them new to government, and managed by methods designed to achieve results, and give good value-for-money;
(v) Professionally and whole-heartedly committed to respond to the governments’ requirements in fulfilling its national and development objectives (Kavran Report 1989, vol. 1, 8).

These ideals, the Kavran study found, were not being met “to an acceptable standard overall” (Ibid). It catalogued a number of problem areas chief among them: an oversized public service, weak management practices, excessive centralization resulting in slow decision-making, waste due to an overlap and duplication of functions between and within ministries, low morale, delays due to cumbersome bureaucratic procedures and lack of skilled personnel to carry out specialized functions.

These individually and cumulatively represent the chief sources of public service inefficiency and incapacity to deliver satisfactorily. These findings prompted the government to embark on the ongoing Civil Service Reform Programme whose main elements are: downsizing and rationalizing the service, decentralization of decision-making, restructuring salaries and conditions of service and introducing performance management techniques and performance-based remuneration and promotion. (Kavran Commission, 1989)

There are many other problems and constraints that militate against effective and efficient service delivery. Apart from political interference in recruitment of personnel, this interference is evident too in the management of the public service. The Kavran Report commented as follows:

“We have found that political interference by individuals in the management of the public sector is excessive and detrimental to efficiency. We are particularly concerned about the frequency of interference in matters of detail and in individual cases. If politicians intervene in casework, delay is inevitable, fairness will suffer and public confidence in the objectivity of public administration will be undermined.” (Kavran Report 1989, 11)

According to the Kavran Commission, the observations of the general public on the attitudes of public servants “made painful hearing and reading not least because of their frequency and consistency. They covered everything from indifference’ and ‘arrogance’ to ‘insulting’ and ‘rudeness’” (Ibid, 15). Related to this is the problem of accessibility of public servants with many of them being accused of absences from their work stations.

“It was suggested that they arrive late, go early, take long lunch hours, and conduct private business instead of attending to the public. The complaints also include references to officials engaging in long private telephone calls or tea sessions, while the visitors are waiting, as if the public was an intrusion into the officials’ private lives.” (Ibid, 14)

Organizationaly, one of the serious problems is excessive centralization whereby decision-making is virtually the preserve of a very small number of top officials at head office. Even simple but urgent decisions that can easily be disposed of in the field or by lower level offices in the bureaucratic hierarchy are invariably referred to Harare. This causes inordinate delays that have cost the government dearly over the years especially in terms of investment opportunities. To remedy this excessive centralization of decision-making, the government in 1984 instituted a policy of decentralization embodied in the Prime Minister’s Directive of 1984. Four years later, The Kavran Commission reported that “The present trend points in the opposite direction, at further centralization.”
It then warned:

“This is dangerous. It is leading to frustration and demoralization and is slowing down the decision-making process with all the attendant economic and human costs; it threatens to become a breeding ground for corruption. The Commission received frightening evidence particularly from the private sector about the bureaucratic delays - some measured in years - in processing a variety of applications to government, varying from project approval to price increases. There is a widespread view in the private sector that these have had a detrimental effect upon the general development of the country.” (Kavran Report 1989, 10).

The justification for highlighting the Kavran findings at such length is for the simple reason that since their publication, not much has changed despite the intervention of the Civil Service Reform Programme. The malaise that afflicted the bureaucracy is still very much evident, if not deepening. For instance, the baseline survey commissioned by the PSC in 1997 to investigate the state of service delivery in the Zimbabwe public sector made equally painful reading:

“The most common complaints were that government employees were too slow in serving clients and this resulted in long queues and over-crowding, they were arrogant, uncaring and insensitive, they practiced favouritism in attending to clients, were lazy, spent too much time doing their own private business (e.g. chatting on the telephone), or were unnecessarily absent from their work stations (e.g. through lengthy lunch breaks, or going to the bank).” (PSC 1998, iii).

Table 3.2 below provides some of the statistical evidence in support of these findings, and that evidence is from the clients themselves who were predominantly less than satisfied with the service provided.

The PSC Report itself concluded that: “There is considerable scope for improvement in service delivery within the public sector in Zimbabwe. More than two thirds of the users were saying that they were receiving a standard of service that was below that minimum personal acceptable standard of 'good'.” (PSC 1998, 26).

Moreover, the departments that deal with the public the most were identified as the worst culprits. Chief among these are the health sector (rated as giving the worst service), the Registrar-General, the Department of Social Welfare (very central to human development as it is in charge of many social programmes) and the Police.

Some of the problems associated with poor performance are rooted in the reward system and conditions of service in the Public Service. Essentially the incentive system is regarded as poor either in terms of pecuniary incentives like wages, salaries and allowances or, non-pecuniary incentives like provision of affordable accommodation, working hours, availability of basic equipment, supervision and leadership styles. Dissatisfaction with their general work conditions has frequently manifested itself in the form of collective industrial action like strikes, go-slows, and stay-aways especially among health practitioners.

This is compounded by a lack of a systematic collective bargaining mechanism. For a long time, the PSC set salaries, wages and conditions of service for civil servants without any input from worker
representative organizations. Under the Public Service Act that governs civil servants, the latter cannot be unionized unlike the private sector workers who are covered by the more liberal and modern Labour Relations Act. Even in terms of remuneration, private sector employees earn on average two times that of their public sector counterparts. This has resulted in a heavy and debilitating brain drain from the public sector institutions to the private sector or even going outside the country where the grass is almost always greener. In the health sector, for instance, the comparative statistics present a grim picture of the public health worker as reflected in Table 3.3.

Table 3.3: A Comparison of Salaries, Allowances and Working Conditions for Junior Sisters (1999)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Parirenyatwa (Gov. Hospital)</th>
<th>Local Private Institutions</th>
<th>Health</th>
<th>Gaborone Hospital</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salaries per month</td>
<td>US$125</td>
<td>US$500</td>
<td>US$550</td>
<td>US$550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accommodation</td>
<td>Not guaranteed</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Fully furnished flats</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working hours per week</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Availability of equipment</td>
<td>Basic and limited</td>
<td>Fully equipped</td>
<td>Fully equipped</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing allowance (per month)</td>
<td>US$50</td>
<td>US$50</td>
<td>US$50</td>
<td>US$50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniform allowance (per month)</td>
<td>US$2.50</td>
<td>US$40</td>
<td>US$65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Night duty allowance (per month)</td>
<td>US$6.10</td>
<td>US$88</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holiday (per annum)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>US$2,000</td>
<td>US$3,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk allowance (per month)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>US$100</td>
<td>US$175</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport (per month)</td>
<td>US$5.90</td>
<td>Car loan</td>
<td>Car</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ndoro’s research reveals that resignations from Parirenyatwa Group of Hospitals (PGH) have been escalating and haemorrhaging health delivery at the largest referral hospital in the country. While between 1980 and 1991 only eleven junior sisters resigned from the hospital, between 1992 and 1997 close to one thousand junior sisters resigned.

The above scenario in the health sector is repeated in other ministries and professions. It is difficult to see how those who remain in the service can render even a modicum of decent and professional service to their clientele, given the depth of de-motivation. It is said that a contented cow gives the most milk; in the Zimbabwean public service, one is reminded of an informal principle guiding the Zambian civil servants: ‘They pretend to pay us, and we pretend to work.

In reaction to some of these identified problems, the PSC embarked on the Civil Service Reform Programme with a view to addressing some these structural and attitudinal problems. The first phase, (1991-1995) was in fact in response to the findings of the Kavran Commission. The Programme called for:

(i) Decentralization of decision making in the Civil Service
(ii) Trimming of the Service;
(iii) Redefining functions of Ministries;
(iv) Speeding and simplifying administrative procedures; and
(v) Establishing a clear link between performance and the reward system (GoZ, 1991, 13-24.)

However, more than five years down the line, not all of the above five objectives had been fulfilled. While trimming of staff has occurred, decentralization has been introduced and is being implemented in a fragmented manner. What has been eagerly implanted has been the devolution of functions and activities but without the requisite resources in terms of personnel, funding and equipment.

Development capacity-building is an even more challenging but urgent task given the demands of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes (ESAP). This is a sector-wide reform programme that demanded a radical paradigm shift, not only ideologically, but organizationally and attitudinally as well. Therefore, central to implementation of the various reform measures is the need to retool, especially in the area of policy analysis and management (PAN). The skills and competence to carry out PAN are glaringly inadequate at virtually all levels of the public service. Even ESAP itself was not well understood as ZIPAM observed: “Evidence of the misinterpretation of the aims and objectives of the Economic Reform Programme by many in the public and private Sectors IS clear testimony of ignorance and/or the dearth of adequate capacities to meet the challenges.” (ZIPAM 1993, 11).
The PAM skills deficit is acknowledged by all government ministries, more so in the specific area of PAM for poverty reduction. In the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare, for instance, a senior official in charge of Human Resource Development and Planning revealed that the Ministry has a large number of technically qualified staff who are thrust into management positions, yet they lack the appropriate management skills. The Ministry of Higher Education and Technology decried a shortage of PAM skill on the ground and indicated the Ministry needs staff who can go through the process of vision-policies programming-monitoring. The same story is repeated in other ministries and public sector organizations and the reasons for this state of affairs have to do with the systemic and institutional constraints.

To remedy these problems needs a holistic approach focusing at both the level of organization and the individual. There is need for a comprehensive skills and attitude development strategies that focus on the learning environment, and relevant and innovative training provision. The reality is that traditional capacity building models have been ineffective primarily because of:

**Resource Constraints**

Lack of government resources for training has meant that ministries have not had any significant control over, and thus ownership of, the skills development function. Rather than being demand driven, ministries have had to take whatever training courses have been available from national and overseas providers.

**Learning Incentives**

Incentives to learn are frequently very weak. Public servants are so poorly paid and demotivated that neither they nor their managers attach any importance to investing time and effort in acquiring new knowledge and skills. The lack of certification or accreditation of short courses and other learning activities is widely regarded as a major disincentive.

**Sharing of Knowledge and Skills**

The incentives to impart accumulated knowledge and skills are weak in many ministries. This militates against learning on the job. This is worsened by mutual distrust and sometimes antagonism among major stakeholders. Senior government policymakers, in particular, are frequently reluctant to collaborate with civil society organizations and the private sector.

**Relevance of Training**

Many ministries complained that their highly educated cadres have too much "book knowledge and not enough applied knowledge and that as a consequence, they have difficulty utilizing it on the ground. This is so with university level qualifications that are said to be divorced from the world of work. Many of these public servants therefore lack the competence to design and implement sound policies and programmes.

This suggests that there has been something wrong or inappropriate about the past and present training programmes for civil servants. In the area of staff training and staff development, it is evident that there is no coherent, co-ordinated, and comprehensive staff training policy. Each ministry tends to do its own thing almost oblivious to what cognate ministries and departments are doing. Generally the staff development function has been weak due to a number of problems related to.

### 3.7 Corruption in the Public Sector

A growing public sector problem, and one that has already been commented on in passing, is corruption. However, the private sector has not been immune to this problem. Corruption has been defined variously; and it has been argued that many of the definitions are so normatively charged that it becomes difficult to arrive at a common definition. For instance Khan observed that "it is difficult to construct a definition of corruption which is not dependent on the moral or normative judgments of the
observer’ (Khan, 1996). He uses Nye’s 1967 definition as a working definition wherein it is observed that “Behaviour which deviates from the formal rules of conduct governing the actions of someone in a position of public authority because of private-regarding motives such as wealth, power or status” (in Khan ibid, 12).

Box 3.4: Corruption and Governance

In a research project on “Public Opinion and the Consolidation of Democracy in Southern Africa” corruption in the context of government was defined as situations “where those in government and the civil service take money or gifts from the people and use it for themselves, or expect people to pay them money or a gift to do their job” (Mattes, Masunungure et. al. 2000, 35). In “Fighting Corruption to Improve Governance”, the UNDP defines corruption as “the misuse of public power, office or authority for private benefit - through bribery, extortion, influence peddling, nepotism, fraud, speed money or embezzlement” (UNDP 1999, 7). The UNDP document directly links the practice of corruption to governance explicitly seeing it as “a problem of poor governance.” The document elaborates:

Good governance is participatory, transparent and accountable - its social, political and economic priorities are reached by consensus and the poorest and most vulnerable have their say in mailers affecting their well being and in the allocation of development resources. Bad governance, rife with bribery, corruption and maladministration, has the opposite effect” (1999, 3).

From the UNDP's perspective, corruption is not only an issue of poor governance, it also directly and indirectly impacts on human condition in that if public power and authority are used for private gain, then the public interest suffers. Corruption, being self-regarding, is costly to society and human development.

Transparency International (TI), the world’s leading anti-corruption non-governmental organization, views corruption in much the same way as the UNDP. TI focuses on corruption in the public sector and defines it simply as “the abuse of public office for private gain” (TI Zimbabwe, TI 2000 Corruption Perceptions Index September 2000, 7). TI ranks countries in terms of the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians. It is worth noting that TI now sees corruption as a two-sided transaction that involves bribe taking (the conventional understanding of corruption) and bribe giving, the other, but equally important side of the coin. This means any strategy or menu of strategies has to consciously deal with both the demand and supply side of the corruption scourge. The global anti-corruption watchdog also regards corruption in all its forms as undermining democracy:

“where corruption is at its worst, disillusionment with democracy is at its highest’ (ibid, 2). In Zimbabwe, the official definition of corruption is contained in the Prevention of Corruption Act which defines a corrupt practice as:

If any agent corruptly solicits, accepts, obtains, agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person a gift or consideration for himself or any other persons as endowment or reward for doing or not doing, or for having done or not done any act, in relation to his principals affairs or business. UNDP 1999

Corruption in Zimbabwe is now a major problem, as the ZHDR 1998 observed. There is evidence that it may be growing worse. In the two-fold classification of political systems into those having low levels of corruption, and those having high levels, Zimbabwe qualifies for the later distinction. High-level corruption has been described as:

“Present where institutional mechanisms to combat corruption are weak or are not used, extensive government control and regulation of economic resources provide ample opportunity for illegality and corruption is so predominant that it is accepted and tolerated. In these systems, an entrenched political elite dominates and exploits economic opportunities, manipulating relatively scarce and valuable political opportunities in return for personal gains. There are few checks on official manipulation or alternative outlets for exploited interests and groups. In some cases, officials given the job of dealing with corruption are the worst problem. In low-corruption cases, people and firms have alternatives to dishonest officials and recourse against those who try to exploit them. In high-corruption cases these may not exist or may be seriously insufficient.” (UNDP 1999).
Transparency International (TI) organization uses a corruption perceptions index (CPI) to rank corruption among about 90 countries annually. The perceptions of the degree of corruption are those of business people, risk analysts and the general public. The perceptions range between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). In 1999 Zimbabwe was ranked 45 with a CPI of 4.1 along with Brazil, Morocco and Malawi in an index with a total of 99 countries. Many observers see corruption as having become institutionalized, particularly at the top echelons of both the private and public sectors. In 2000, Zimbabwe ranked 65 with a CPI score of 3.0 meaning that corruption is perceived to be worsening.

In the last two years, there have been a number of corruption scandals in the public sector. A few such cases will be illustrative. For example, at the National Oil Company of Zimbabwe (Noczim) over Z$1,4 billion was misappropriated through corruption. Another example is that of the War Victims compensation fund. The Chidyausiku Commission of Inquiry into the War Victims Compensation Fund, verified cases of irregularities and recommended that further investigation be done. In addition, there was the case of a scheme that had been launched by government to help lowly-paid civil servants to purchase houses. However, this was allegedly exploited by top government officials and other influential individuals under a Very Important Persons (VIP) scheme. Finally, amongst other institutions which have allegedly experienced corruption were:

- the Zimbabwe Manpower Development Fund (Zimdef),
- the District Development Fund (DDF) and
- the Grain Marketing Board (GMB).

President Mugabe in a speech in December 2000, stated that there was a connection between corruption and inefficiencies in some parastatals including NOCZIM (The Herald, 28 December 2000). Such corruption had contributed to making 2000 a year of hardships.

According to a study compiled by the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), corruption in high places may have cost the state about $17 billion between 1997 and 1998. Losing such a large sum of taxpayers’ money cannot fail to have an enormous impact on Zimbabwe’s economy and society, especially in a country where up to 70% of the population is classified as poor.

High levels of corruption reflect or symptomise institutional ineffectiveness or even decay. It would appear that in Zimbabwe, the organs and institutions that are supposed to combat corruption seem inadequate.

It is in the light of this that various stakeholders proposed at various fora attended by the public and private sectors, NGOs, political parties, government ministers and representatives of civic organizations recommended the creation of an Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) as a matter of urgency. The Project Document prepared by the Ministry of Home Affairs (which is in charge of the Police) proceeded from the premise that corruption in Zimbabwe has reached unprecedented levels and it is sparking widespread debates (Government of Zimbabwe 2000, 1). A summary of the project is instructive and worth citing in full in Box 3.5.

**Box 3.5: Project Document on the Anti-Corruption Commission**

This project is on the establishment of an Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC). The ACC will be instrumental in combating corruption and related economic crimes. The ACC will fight corruption with its own resources and coordinate the fight with other Government agencies, civil society and the private sector. It will have investigative and prosecutorial powers and be the focal point in civic education. Its power will be established through an amendment to the Constitution. It will have its own recurrent budget directly from Parliament and its independence from undue interference in its day-to-day operations will be secured through a number of safeguarding measures. The external assistance required will mainly be in the area of technical assistance and equipment. It is envisaged that the ACC in the medium to long term will be a financially sound investment for Zimbabwe in the form of proceeds of crime recovered and improved behaviour of civil servants, public officials and others involved in the dealing with public funds. It is also envisaged that the ACC will help improve integrity and accountability in the business community and individuals.

Zimbabwe Government, 2000
The ACC has now been constitutionally provided for under Constitution Amendment No. 16 of 2000. However, it is not yet operational. It is envisaged that it will be a constitutionally guaranteed independent agency that is adequately provided with resources. The ACC is also expected to promote good governance and enhance integrity and public accountability through its statutory functions. Its specific functions will be:

- To develop anti-corruption strategies aimed at counteracting corruption;
- To advise on ways of strengthening anti-corruption legislation;
- To engage in public awareness programmes to educate the public about corrupt practices and the effects of such practices;
- To mobilize public support in the fight against corruption by encouraging the public to report all instances of corruption to the ACC;
- To promote regional and international cooperation to combat corruption;
- To recommend to Parliament that government ratify relevant international legal instruments aimed at combating corruption.

Of significance was the triumph of the school of thought that argued for the separation of the ACC from the Attorney General in terms of determining the fate of anti-corruption investigations. A contending school had wanted the AG to retain the final discretionary power in respect of cases for prosecution. Although the AG will still have role to play in terms of arrangement of the court rolls, his Office will no longer be able to drop cases at his behest.

Also noteworthy is the very visible role of Parliament in the work of the ACC. Parliament will monitor the work of the Commission meaning the latter will be answerable to the legislature. The budget for the agency will be derived from the Consolidated Revenue Fund, voted by Parliament, and will not be a budget item under a given ministerial allocation. This will strengthen its autonomy and operations.

The planning workshops that had deliberated on the need for an anti-corruption agency had recommended that the power of the President to appoint the members of the ACC be qualified. He/she would be required to appoint members from a list of nominees from the Law Society of Zimbabwe, professional bodies of auditors and public accountants, the Police Service Commission, the Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce, Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries, from farmers organizations, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions and from civic organizations involved in curbing corruption. This method of appointment was designed to ensure that the persons appointed as Commissioners would be politically independent.

The appointment system favoured under the draft constitution and incorporated in the present Lancaster House Constitution could compromise the independence and objectivity of the ACC. At the Anti-Corruption Workshop of 18-22 November 1999, participants therefore agreed that the proposed agency be autonomous of the executive, and independent of sectoral interests and that it ought to enjoy both political and operational independence. The workshop observed that the agency should be politically independent from inception, and that the selection of its officials should be free from patronage (Chief Rapporteur’s Report, 3 December 1999). In the last analysis, corruption is not a problem that can be attacked in isolation. However, anti-corruption law and commissions in themselves cannot be substitutes for more structural reforms and conditions which pre-empt those situations which breed corruption in the first place (Rose-Ackermann, 1999).
4. LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND PARTICIPATION

4.1 Introduction

Local governance relates to governance in a local setting, where the three main actors: local government, civil society and the private sector play their distinctive roles and assume their specific responsibilities in enhancing social and economic development. It is distinct from national governance but closely linked to it, in the sense that national level governance provides the legal and institutional framework within which actors at local level interact. Local governance is important in the current discourse because governance institutions at the local level are closer to the people and have the potential for participatory development, a prerequisite for sustainable human development. Both local governance and participation are contested concepts, which are defined and interpreted differently by different institutions and individuals depending on their values and goals.

4.2 Concepts of local governance and participation

The terms local government and local governance are usually used interchangeably by most people in Zimbabwe, probably due to the fact that governance is a new term which is still being internalized and developed.

"The term local government is used to refer to semi-autonomous statutory authorities, which are elected by the local population and are legally responsible for the planning and implementation of specific functions. In the case of Zimbabwe, these comprise the Rural District Councils and Urban Councils. The term local governance, which is a relatively recent term with broader connotations, is used to refer to the variety of institutions and processes (government and non-government) which collectively determine the way in which political and administrative decisions are made and implemented within a locality." (MLGNH, 1999).

President R.G. Mugabe defined good local governance in the following way:

"Good governance is essentially a process of involving people in the making of decisions which affect their livelihood in a transparent and accountable manner. It entails the devolution of power and responsibilities upon lower levels of society, encouraging participation, recognizing the diversity of communities and societies, and the promotion of openness and elimination of corruption in managing public resources." (President R.G. Mugabe quoted in the ARDC Newsletter, 1999).

The Urban Councils’ Association of Zimbabwe summarized the elements of local governance as:

‘Freely elected representatives under universal adult suffrage; the management of local affairs, full and exclusive powers on matters assigned to local government, adequate and assured financial resources commensurate with responsibilities, secure boundaries of the local government area, sharing of revenue with central government; strong partnerships between local authorities and their association.” (UCAZ, 1999)

Zimbabwean citizens and other civic manuals listed the following criteria for effective participation of citizens in local governance:

- citizens need the material conditions for participation i.e. enough food and water, adequate clothing, basic literacy skills and transport;
- citizens need to have a variety of representatives, not only councillors, to promote the interests of children, youth, men and women, able bodied and disabled, from all classes;
- citizens need to participate in economic, political and social decision making, at all stages.

### Box 4.1 Citizens and Local Governance

- Strong community organizations are the foundation for strong local governance.
- Citizens need effective structures for local governance, and they should be thoroughly consulted about the design of these structures, which should begin at neighbourhood level. The roles, responsibilities,
relationships, and channels of communication and accountability should be clearly defined, on the basis of wide spread consultation and consensus. Power and resources need to be fairly distributed between national and local government, and between local government and communities.

- Citizens should choose councillors who represent their local interests, rather than a political faction. Widespread voter education is needed to precede free and fair local elections. The imposition of leaders by political parties, vote rigging, vote buying and the use of violence during election campaigns should be banned, with the police and monitors actively preventing these illegal practices.

- The economic, social and political rights of citizens should be actively promoted, including the right to freedom of expression and association. Conflicts should be resolved peacefully. Citizens should have regular meetings with their elected representatives.

- Citizens need to be involved in the production of local and national budgets and examining of public accounts. They have the right to help decide how their levies and taxes will be used.

- The legal basis for democratic local governance should be included in a new constitution, and the Acts controlling local governance amended accordingly, on the basis of widespread consultation and research.

- The groups who are currently under represented or excluded from local governance, such as children, youth, women, the disabled, and families affected by severe poverty, should be given priority assistance (in the form of policies, training and resources) to enable them to participate in local governance.

- Capacity building needs to be more vigorously defined, researched and carried out, with more emphasis placed on capacity building at community levels, and on the knowledge, skills and attitudes necessary in changing from an authoritarian to a democratic process. (ACPD 1995-2000)

It is clear from the quotations that conceptual clarity on local governance is still evolving. Governance encompasses the public sector, but transcends it by including the private sector and civil society organizations. The role of the private sector and civil society does not come out naturally in the way governance is defined within the Zimbabwean context. This is perhaps a reflection of the dominance of the public sector in governance issues in most countries in Southern Africa. (Fowler A, 1997)

Participation is one of the characteristics of good governance. Like the other characteristics; rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, consensus orientation, equity, effectiveness and efficiency, accountability and strategic vision are also important for local governance institutions. Participation is considered here because it is one of the most visible outcomes of the involvement of citizens, institutions of governance from both the private sector and civil society. Zimbabwean citizens identified common problems with participation.

4.3 An overview of local government structures in Zimbabwe

The current local government set up in Zimbabwe is a product of both the colonial era and post-colonial reconstruction of centre-local relationships. In 1980, Zimbabwe inherited a system of local government divided on racial grounds. The system consisted of Rural Councils and Urban Councils for the white settler population on the one hand, and African Councils for the politically repressed black population. The two types of local authority were managed under different ministries, the Rural and Urban Councils coming under the Ministry of Local Government and Town Planning, whilst African Councils came under the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Following a decade of war, local government, civil society groups and private sector institutions had largely disintegrated. One of the new government’s urgent tasks was the reorganization of local government. The first measure was the 1980 District Councils Act, which consolidated the more than 200 fragmented African Councils into 55 new, administratively more viable, District Councils. However the rural local government remained divided with the District councils covering the communal lands, and 57 Rural councils covering as before the commercial farming areas. The two types of local authority were under one ministry, Ministry of Local Government and Town Planning.

The second measure was the 1984 Prime Ministers directive which was enshrined in the 1985 Provincial Councils and Administration Act. This Act provided for among other things the appointment of provincial governors and for changes in the organization and planning functions of local
government. The central desire of the directive was to define the administrative structures at provincial and district level and the relationship and channels of communication between all participants in development in order to achieve coordinated development of provinces and districts. This was to be achieved through planning, participation, coordination and implementation through a bottom-up system based on a hierarchy of local institutions at village, ward, district and provincial level. The dominant ideology of the postcolonial state was socialist, hence the structures and participation modalities were heavily party centered. The state played a central role of social infrastructure provision, while citizens identified and prioritized their needs through the village and ward plans.

The 1988 Rural District Councils Act provided the legal basis for the amalgamation of the two types of rural local authority into a single Rural District Council with the purpose of removing racially based development as well as strengthening the role of local government in rural areas. It was only in 1993 that Amalgamation was fully realized since there was a lot of resistance from the former Rural Councils who had more resources and had enjoyed more autonomy during the colonial era. During the early 1990s a number of studies were carried out including the Strategic plan for RDC Capacity building and Financing RDCs. This resulted in the national RDC Capacity Building Program, which started in 1994 with basket funding from various donors. Ideologically there were also shifts within central government, as it embraced Structural adjustment programs. There was reduced funding for social infrastructure and encouragement of more private and civil society participation in development.

To provide a concise overview, the main legislation passed during the twenty years since Independence, in relation to local government structures is listed in box 4.4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box 4.4: Key Legislation in Local Government</th>
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<tr>
<td>To provide a concise overview, we will list the main legislation passed since 1980 in relation to local government structures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980 Amendments to the Urban Councils Act This repealed the previous UC Act, and brought about the Urban Councils Act (1980), which included African townships, now known as High Density Areas, under the Act, and extended the vote in local elections to lodgers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980 District Councils’ Act This repealed the previous Act, and brought together the much small, African Councils into 55 larger and more viable District Councils. Although they lacked the autonomy and resources of the 57 rural councils, (which served commercial farming areas), they were given a wide range of functions and brought under the Ministry of Local Government.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1984 The Prime Minister’s Directive This Directive, which outlined decentralized co-ordinating development structures from village to provincial level, led to the establishment of 6000 Village Development Committees (VIDCOS) and 1000 Ward Development Committees (WADCOS) with elected members. See the chart. They were formalized under the Provincial Councils and Administrative Act in (1985.) In addition, there were the District Councils, with elected members, and the District Development Committee, chaired by the District Administrator, mainly made up of civil servants, chair persons of council committees and NGO representatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988, these became the Rural District Councils and Rural District Development Committees). At province level, there were the Provincial Councils, political bodies chaired by the Provincial Governor, with one chief, representatives from each local authority in the province. The Provincial Development Committee is an executive body chaired by the provincial administrator, made up of provincial heads of ministries, chief executive officers of all local authorities in the province, and key representatives of NGO’s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988 The Rural District Councils Act This Act brought about a unified system of local government in rural Zimbabwe, by combining the Rural Councils and District Councils into one local government structure, with a wide range of 64 functions (including development, education, health, water and sanitation, roads, housing, natural resources, and development of the district centres).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997 Urban Councils Act Amendments including the introduction of Executive Mayors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998 Traditional Leadership Act This Act has started being implemented in 2000, restoring power to traditional leaders and reducing the power of elected leaders. ACPD, 2000</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The Traditional Leaders’ Act gives the chiefs, headmen and village heads the following powers:

- to co-ordinate development;
- to allocate land as agents of the Rural District Council;
- to manage natural resources;
- to preserve and maintain family life and culture;
- to keep population records and try a range of crimes;
- to maintain a good standard of health and education; and
- to collect all levies and taxes payable to the council.

At village level, the unit of local governance will be a village assembly, made up of all adults in the village, chaired by the village head. It is expected to meet once in three months. The Village Development Committee (VIDCO) is a sub-committee of the village assembly. The headman chairs a ward assembly made up of the entire village heads and ward councillor. It also meets once in three months. Chiefs will supervise the village heads and headmen and be the final authority in their areas. At provincial level, there will be a provincial assembly, presided over by a chief elected by the other chiefs present, meeting at least twice a year, and dealing with matters of provincial and national interest.

President Mugabe spoke about these structures, at the ARDC second Biennial Congress in 1999:

“These changes attempt to link traditional leadership to the democratically elected Rural District Council structures in a manner that will remove rivalry, tensions and conflicts and promote consultation and teamwork between them.” (ARDC Newsletter, July 1998)

However, some officials, elected leaders and residents regard the new structures as highly problematic in that there is potential conflict in elected representatives and traditional leaders who are not elected. There is a better chance for accountability to the electorate in a system of elections than nomination by traditional right.

4.3.1 Key Structures Relating to Local Governance

A key structure is the Ministry of Local Government Public Works and National Housing. With increased pressure for government ministries to concentrate on core business, the Ministry is trying to play an enabling rather than controlling role in local government. It provides the policy framework within which local government operates. Another important structure is the Local Government Board. This six-person board appointed by central government oversees the operations of local authorities and approves the appointment or dismissal of senior council employees. The board is made up of two public service commissioners, a representative from ARDC and one from the workers, plus two from councils. The District Development Fund (DDF) is another important structure. It is one of the main sources of public finance and services for the development of rural areas. In addition, the Association of Rural District Councils (ARDC) and the Urban Councils Association of Zimbabwe (UCAZ), especially in recent years, have been vigorously involved in research, training and advocacy, in order to strengthen local governance in Zimbabwe. Political parties have also been keenly interested in local governance, and party politics has had a great influence on local governance. NGOs, residents associations, community-based organizations and a few other local organizations play different roles in local governance.

4.3.2 Other Structures Involved in Local Governance

Many NGO’s are involved in working in areas under Rural District Councils. While some have contributed to strengthening community participation in local governance, others have weakened local governance, by introducing programmes directly to communities, in a way that does not take into account existing structures and leadership and in some cases creating parallel structures. Although NGOs are capable of providing community level services, they are usually not accountable to the communities they serve, and their ability to co-ordinate is not yet highly developed.
Residents’ Associations

In recent years, in urban areas, residents associations have become active in promoting their interests and challenging councils to become accountable to them. Where associations have been able to act without being influenced by party politics, they have become a useful new structure which promotes residents’ participation in local governance. The Harare Combined Residents’ Associations is one of the strongest Associations. Residents’ associations are now organized nationally under Zimbabwe United Residents’ Association (ZURA).

Community based organizations

In rural areas, a few residents associations have just been formed, for example, the Gokwe North Ratepayers’ association, which took the council to court. There are also some promising community based organizations, which are beginning to develop structures at community level, in ways that will assist councils to carry out their roles more effectively. It was from programmes such as these (The Chiyubunuzyo Local Leadership Programme in Gokwe North, and the Udondolo and Ihawu Local Leadership programmes in Matabeleland South) that most community views were collected for this chapter.

4.3.3 Farm Development Committees (FADCOs)

In the early 1990s a number of development agencies working on community development on commercial farms, promoted the introduction of Farm Development Committees. These FADCOs provide a forum for community participation in decision making.

FADCOs have not yet been introduced on all farms but by 1998 there were 463 FADCOs in Mashonaland Central. As about 1,8 million Zimbabweans live on commercial farms it is worthwhile and very important to extend FADCOs to all farms and strengthen them, so that farm communities can also play a role in local governance.

Finally, there are other local organizations that could contribute to local governance. These include the Project Committees under the Community Action Programme, in 26 of the poorest districts in the country, and the CAMPFIRE Wildlife Committees which promote the improvement of infrastructure and natural resource management. The SAPRI structures in 45 districts are a forum in which activists meet from time to time to discuss structural adjustment and ways of responding to it. As part of the promotion of citizen participation in local governance, all forms of social organization at sub-district level, in rural and urban Zimbabwe, should be studied and strengthened through civic education.

While the above structures are involved in governance at local level, the linkages with local government are not very strong. This gives these civil society institutions less leverage against local government.

4.4 Experiences in Rural and Urban Structures

Box 4.5: Community Views on Local Governance Structures in Rural Areas

In the mid eighties, there was a lot of enthusiasm for videos and wadcos, as expressed in these comments by video leaders:

‘Before we were told to do things we had never talked about. Now, through the VIDCO, we can discuss things thoroughly before deciding and doing’ (Wedza) “The VIDCO structure has encouraged a lot of people to bring up something from nowhere. We village people have been far away from everything, but one day, through our vidcos. we will be reaching the heights. (Bubi) (ACP, 1987)

People made good use of the new opportunities that videos and wadcos opened up for them, and initiated improvements to agricultural production, nutrition garden, water and sanitation, literacy and preschools, soil conservation and tree planting, and other improvements.
VIDCOS were an accessible structure of decision making for women. In Goromonzi, Chemhazha Ward, five out of six video’s were chaired by women, and in Chiredzana Ward, all seven videos were chaired by women. (ACPD 1992)

What have been the experiences in the post-independence structures and community participation? Councils did not respond to their development plans and suggestions due to the resource allocation mechanisms at central government level, which did not give a budget to planning at local level. By the end of the 1990s, only VIDCOs linked to party leadership and traditional leadership and enthusiastic communal leaders had been able to survive. The situation varies with districts and provinces and has been changing with time.

A persistent issue is that although chiefs and headmen do have a role to play in local government, their role has never been sufficiently harmonized with that of elected leaders in the last 20 years of independence. It is only in a few wards that well-organized citizens have been able, to build democratic local governance from below, integrating elected and traditional leaders and pushing local and national government to provide the services that are their right.

While local government officials are working on harmonizing The Rural District Councils Act and The Traditional Leaders Act, what is needed is thorough, widespread consultation and negotiation about the best potential relationship between appointed and elected leaders.

It has been observed that participation in local governance in urban areas is relatively lower than in rural areas because there are no recognized structures at ward level to encourage residents to participate in governance. The growth of residents associations is a possible response to this need. Most residents feel that their councils are actually sources of their problems, rather than effective structures through which their representatives can tackle their problems. While some councils are operating efficiently others are in trouble, with either important officials or the whole council dismissed after an audit (as in Bindura a few years ago), or residents frequently protesting. The main sources of conflict between residents and councils is the management of public finance, inadequate provision of services, and residents struggling to survive urban poverty through self-employment. Careful analysis reveals that there is insufficient collaboration, transparency and accountability to residents. What is needed are new forms of leadership, partnership relationships, culture of tolerance and mutual trust, support for civil society, institutional learning and developing organisational cultures which match the requirements of collaborative governance (Clarke. M. 1999). Without this shift by local governments, effective participation by local grassroots communities will remain rhetoric.

Both the Urban Councils Association of Zimbabwe, UCAZ, and the Zimbabwe United Residents’ Association, ZURA, are looking into these problems and investigating how urban local government structures can be established at ward and neighbourhood level, and how improved channels of communication and cooperation can be set up between urban residents and urban councils. However, while more accessible structures of local governance are absolutely necessary for democracy, these structures would require careful coordination, equalization of resources, integration with national policies and support.

4.5 Decentralization

There have been references to decentralization and people’s participation in most of the Zimbabwe Government’s policy documents including Growth with Equity. The Prime Minister’s Directive, the Local Government Acts, ZIMPREST, etc. In 1998, some progress was made, when a Committee of Ministers on Decentralization was set up, as well as a Working Party of Permanent Secretaries and the RDCCBP on Decentralization, and the cabinet adopted Thirteen Principles to Guide the Decentralization Process. The first principle of decentralization mentions the objective of strengthening democracy and citizen participation. Although other objectives relate to increasing the effectiveness of government services while reducing the role and cost of central administration, here we will just list the specific objectives which are related to participation. The decentralization programme will seek to:

- increase public participation in plan formulation and implementation,
• create opportunities for local communities and institutions to influence decisions and thus lead to better governance,
• create opportunities for local communities and their institutions to generate the financial and staff resources to implement the decisions which they themselves would have made,
• increase equity in the allocation of government resources, increase government accountability and the ability of government to respond to the needs and demands of local authorities and communities in their productive effects. (CBCC, 1998).

RDCs are keen to have responsibilities for local services and functions transferred to them, especially in relation to roads, water and sanitation and health. However, they want fiscal decentralization to accompany decentralization of responsibilities. The other constraints they identified are: the resistance from people in central government who feared change, laws which limit the autonomy and lack of skilled staff.

Provincial heads concurred that lack of resources and capacity were constraints on decentralization. They also identified the following constraints: lack of widespread consultation and information on decentralization, lack of an understanding of the RDCs’ roles by sector ministries, lack of a harmonized process of decentralization within a time frame, and lack of agreement on governance structures after decentralization.

It appears that the commitment to decentralization is there, but that the major constraint is the lack of a clear policy direction as to where and how far the decentralization policy would involve delegation of responsibilities and where it actually implies devolution of powers and responsibilities. There is need for more public consultation and participation in policy development for wider ownership of the implementation process. Issues that still remain unresolved include fiscal decentralization especially during difficult economic times. Competition for resources between the center and local level remains critical.

4.6 Political, Gender and Social Aspects of Local Governance

The political, gender and social aspects of governance are integral to the democratic process at the local level. For example, the electoral system and process are pivotal. It is important in Rural District Council elections to encourage the following categories of people to vote largely because they have only had the vote in local elections since 1997. These are farm workers, adults living on mining settlements and on mission stations. They require this encouragement because they acquired the right to vote and stand in local elections only recently; previous restrictive provisions relating to residence and property had hindered access to the vote especially by farm workers. Although theoretically residents have the democratic right to vote, and stand as candidates in local elections, in practice there have been many problems, associated with party politics. At least until the new era signaling more competitive party politics in 2000, the domination of party politics has hitherto been the main factor hindering citizen participation in local governance.

Residents are disappointed by the failure of many councillors to represent local interests, report back on council policies, and account for public finance. More generally, party politics do not appear to have been a positive factor in citizens’ participation in local governance. They were based more on patronage than on competition. Below are some of the problems encountered:

• Apathy: less than a third of the potential voters participated in the last council elections.
• Intimidation and violence: like in national elections, these have sometimes been a feature in local elections.
• Allegations of vote buying: also like in general elections, there have been claims that some candidates resorted to offering material incentives in return for political support.

4.6.1 Gender and Social Aspects of Governance

Democracy should be an inclusive political and socio-economic system. In practice, some sections of the population have been excluded on grounds of gender, class, age, disability, culture and language. As the chapter on gender dimensions of governance will explain, women’s participation in politics and
decision-making is circumscribed in Zimbabwe. Similarly, women’s participation in decision-making positions in local governance is low. Women make up less than 10 per cent of the rural district councillors and about 7 per cent of urban councillors despite being over 50 per cent of the adult population. Factors which inhibit fuller participation in local governance include women’s weaker socio-economic position, lack of higher education, the burden of reproductive work, and entrenched cultural prejudices against women participation in decision-making, the socialization process which discriminates women from participation in the public sphere. Summing up the exclusion of women from decision-making, Hope Chigudu observed that:

“The cause of women’s inferior status and unequal gender relations are deeply rooted in history, religion, culture, psychology, law, political systems, institutions, attitudes and economic conditions. If women’s lives are to change at all, the solutions must penetrate as deeply”.

The poor participation of women in local governance has two negative consequences for development. Firstly, discrimination against women is unconstitutional, while development priorities are often gender blind. Secondly, Zimbabwe misses out on one of its most valuable resource: the energy, creativity and commitment of women. The majority of activists would prefer a multi-faceted approach to enhance women’s participation in governance. They recommend the following: civic education should be carried out widely with women forming a majority of participants at civic education and development meetings;

- promising women should be given more opportunities to attend effective leadership and management training;
- literacy and child-care are pre-conditions for women’s effective participation in public life;
- more support should be given to women who are already in decision-making positions especially those at community level and
- strengthening women’s political position has to be linked to strategies to strengthen their economic position.

In a discussion of social groups excluded in decision-making in local governance, the position of the elderly and the disabled needs highlighting. These groups tend to be both economically and politically marginalized. Although they lack resources, the elderly (those 60 years and above)

are now playing a vital role in society which has one of the highest rates of HIV/AIDS infection in the Africa region. Those who are infected and dying from the disease are those in the younger age groups especially between 20 and 49. As chapter 5 explains, the deaths in this age group have resulted in a growing population of orphans currently estimated at 600 000. Most of these orphans are nurtured and looked after by the elderly. Ways and means should be found to support these efforts of the elderly folks in caring for these orphans. Elderly access to funds from the National Aids Trust should be facilitated.

Disabled people are another social group marginalized in local and community governance. They should be included in local and community programs rather than discriminated against. It is notable that while Section 23 of the present Constitution states that there should be no gender and racial discrimination in Zimbabwe, it does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability. For women living with disabilities, the Constitution appears to perpetuate their treble discrimination as women, African and disabled persons [Zigomo - Nyatsanza, 2000]. There is therefore a case of revisiting this particular section of the Constitution. A census of the disabled people (estimated to number about 10 per cent of the total population) should be carried to ascertain their current conditions and needs.

Finally, there are some negative effects of exclusion from local governance. These relate to religious escapism and superstition. In rural areas, for instance unscrupulous witch hunters (Tsikamutandas) are causing confusion and division in some villages, especially after harvest (when farmers have money to pay the witch hunters). The absence of strong local governance at ward and community level makes it easier for communities to be confused, divided and exploited by fake priests and witch hunters.
4.7 Economic and Financial Aspects of Local Governance

With Zimbabwe’s deteriorating economic situation and increasing poverty, which now affects about 75% of the population, the allocation and management of public resources at local and national levels is one of the governance issues which causes most tension and conflict. The councils, especially the rural district councils, believe that national government is giving them an unfair share of national resources, and that this prevents them from offering residents quality services. Communities, on the other hand, believe that council is giving them an unfair share of local resources, which is preventing them from improving their areas. At family level, especially in cotton-growing areas, women and children feel that they are getting an unfair share of the income they help produce.

Seven Rural District Councils in Masvingo Province were on the brink of collapse in 2000 for unauthorized overdrafts, fraudulent use of development levies, kickbacks received for favours and responding to external political pressure. An additional problem that many councils face is that beer outlets and so called ‘income generating projects’ actually end up making losses through mismanagement and lack of stock control. It would be better, according to local government specialists, if councils could concentrate on providing high quality public goods and services, and go into partnerships with efficient private sector businesses to raise income, instead of trying to run businesses on their own.

Former Minister of Local Government, John Nkomo, expressed his concern over these problems in his address to the ARDC 2nd Biennial Congress:

‘Many local authorities have violated the law by failing to produce audited financial accounts, and have therefore failed to qualify for the funds set aside for them. Most of the funds are used for salaries, perks and allowances rather than for infrastructure and services. I believe it is improper for any local authority to lose sight of its mandate and focus on its own needs rather than the community it is supposed to serve. We cannot afford to tolerate such shoddy behavior from institutions that form the cornerstone of our nation’s development.”

Fortunately, ARDC with the assistance of the RDC Capacity Building Programme, and the ARDC Financial Management Assistance project funded by several donors, has introduced a good programme for RDCs to improve financial management and to train internal auditors. However, in addition to these measures, it is important to encourage residents to monitor their council expenditure, and to examine their council audited accounts.

4.8 Financial Problems in Urban Councils

As urban councils have far more resources than rural district councils, and raise 90% of their own costs locally, problems of fraud and mismanagement involve far larger amounts of money. There is frequent newspaper coverage about financial problems in urban councils. For example:

The Executive Committee of Harare City Council appointed staff on political rather than professional grounds, created unnecessary personal assistant posts (the Mayor had 15), and gave themselves and some officials extravagant allowances far higher than the rates set by the Minister of Local Government.

The council illegally allocated municipal land to themselves (20 out of 39 councillors allegedly got land) and to officials and political colleagues.

The council had a distorted sense of priorities. So instead of spending public money on building housing for the homeless (75% of Harare residents are lodgers), providing adequate water, sanitation and refuse collection services, and repairing roads full of potholes and broken street lights, they spent more than Z$50 million on a mayoral mansion.

They incurred a massive and unnecessary debt of $2 billion, by failing to pay contractors and council workers, tax and medical aid.
Box 4.11: Harare City Council and Governance in the City of Harare

Though the city council and ratepayers have a common aspiration regarding the governance of Harare, the two bodies have tended to be suspicious of each other. This difference came to a head with the advent of executive mayorship, because more often than not the dialogue between the City Council and CHRA was poor and left much to be desired. Hardly were residents taken on board in the decision-making process. Ratepayers objections of certain policies, especially the budgetary matters, and representations were generally ignored by the city fathers. Because of this CHRA often felt that residents were being short-changed and were not getting value for the money they paid in form of rates and other accompanying charges. The cost of living in Harare escalated vis-à-vis an endless deterioration of the provision of services to ratepayers. Refuse was piling up in many parts of the city, roads developed deep potholes, street-lighting was poor, grass-cutting during rain seasons was undertaken at random and water, at times, was being rationed even in non-drought years. As a consequence of displeasure in respect of the handling of council affairs, CHRA drafted a petition which 11,950 Harare residents signed and handed the same to the Minister of Local Government and National Housing on 4 December 1998. The said petition read: We the undersigned Ratepayers, Residents and Tenants of Greater Harare call on the Minister of Local Government and National Housing to immediately remove from office the Executive Mayor and the entire Council of Harare for failure to ensure good governance in the Greater Harare area and gross incompetence and mismanagement.

To make sure that the petition was fully understood by the signatories, the text was also in Shona and Ndebele. Subsequent to the CHRA petition, on 25 February 1999, the Minister of Local Government and National Housing suspended the City of Harare Council in accordance with term of Section 114 (1) of Urban Councils Act [Chapter 29:151 as amended by Section 38 of the Local Authorities Election Laws Amendment Act No. 21 of 1997]. At this juncture, it is necessary to underscore the role played by the Combined Harare Ratepayers Association in being instrumental to the dismissal of Harare City councilors including the Executive Mayor. That move had very far reaching effects in the process of moulding good local governance in Zimbabwe. Indeed, it did not only send vibes to all corners of the country but set a national as well as regional precedent. In pursuit of its declared vision: to be an effective watchdog and a vehicle of good governance in Harare and a model for advocacy, CHRA assigned three individuals to sue the City Council in 1999 for unlawful increasing rates. The case was filed with the High Court which finally judged in favour of the ratepayers. Council had collected Z$122 million from the ratepayers over a period. Furthermore, of late CHRA has challenged the Commission currently running the affairs of the City of Harare not to take any decision on the fate of the well publicized council-built Z$80 million mayoral mansion situated in Gunhill. They advance the position that decision on that the property should only be taken by a democratically elected council and not the ministerially appointed Commission. To consolidate this position in the process of moulding good governance in Harare, CHRA has affiliated itself to the Zimbabwe United Ratepayers Association (ZURA) and has also established in the year 2000 an Advocacy Centre through which it will articulate its viewpoints and liaise with the relevant national authorities. In sum, it should be noted that within the short period of its existence, CHRA has, despite all odds, contributed tremendously to local governance issues and indeed its experiences are now being emulated by other urban centers in Zimbabwe.

Mount Pleasant Ratepayers’ Association, 2000

Although a commission has been running the city for more than a year, residents have yet to see major improvements. In sum, both urban and rural residents are concerned that the money they contribute to governing their areas is mismanaged or lost through fraud, that their priorities are not reflected in council budgets, and that many councils are failing to account adequately for their use of public funds.
4.8.1 Financial problems arising out of the relationship between local and central government.

Let us now focus on the RDCs which are much poorer than the urban councils. The frustrations which communities have owing to the way councils handle finance is similar to the frustrations that rural district councils have about the way central government handles finance.

This unfair allocation of resources by national government to rural local government is one of the causes of the continued poverty and underdevelopment of rural areas:

"RDCs are the losers as central government mops up all dependable revenue resources leaving RDC’s with the very little to satisfy the demands of their constituencies. Poverty has therefore rooted itself beyond family units and has manifested itself in the rural communities.” (Mr £ Chikate ARDC Newsletter 2000)

RDCs have responsibility for education, health, roads, water and sanitation, housing, development planning and conservation. In the case of education and health, they have been given increased responsibilities in recent years for central government gives RDC’s grants for administration, health, education and natural resources. In some provinces the grant amounts to more than half of revenue. RDCs are allowed in terms of the RDC Act to levy fees and charges as well as taxes for services and user charges.

These local sources of revenue include levies, land taxes, license fees, service charges, beer levies, royalties (on exploitation of natural resources) and from income generating projects. Of these, royalties provide 37% of local income, and levies and licenses 33% (Hlatshwayo, 1992).

However, sometimes RDCs fail to collect enough revenue from these sources and have limited mechanisms of enforcement especially in rural areas. It is sometimes very expensive to even collect the revenue.

Local councils have very little money for capital development, and according to MLGRUD, in the mid-1990’s 20% of the RDCs had no money for capital development at all, and another 43% had less than $500,000 (MLGRUD 1996). Only 20% had photocopiers, and less than a third had computers.

In a study of the financial relationship between central and local government, by Hlatshwayo (1992), it was noted that:

"The common problem in the history of local government in Zimbabwe seems to have been the transfer of greater responsibilities to local authorities without providing adequate resources to meet them. This resource mismatch was further compounded by ill defined centre-local relations.”

Central government tends to decentralize functions to RDCs, without handing over enough resources and decision making power to make the councils effective. In other words, while accepting the concept of decentralization, in practice, central government has not yet carried out real decentralization. It retains control over anything which is important (like the administration of growth points) or valuable (like income from beer or mining). The area covered by the RDCs contains the majority of Zimbabwe’s population, as well as agricultural and mining production, and wildlife and tourism areas. By giving a fairer share to RDCs of national tax revenues, central government could make a major contribution to improving rural infrastructure and reducing poverty. For example:

If local and central government shared the beer tax revenue raised in rural areas on an equal basis, rural local authorities would be able to raise 82% of the total annual government grants to all councils from this source alone.”

(Hlatshwayo, 1992)

To sum up this section, in order to strengthen the financial base of local governance, central government should give local government a fair and predictable share of national income. In addition, residents wards should have the power to decide how resources directly derived from their areas, like development levies and CAMPFIRE funds, are spent, provided that this is guided by clear principles and procedures. At district level and ward level, building the capacity of local leaders to budget, manage and account for public finance efficiently and transparently should be greatly intensified.
4.9 Legal and Constitutional Aspects of Local Governance

As observed above, the weaknesses of the legal framework are the reasons for continued dominance of central government in local government, and the inequitable resource allocation between these two tiers of government. Another weakness stems from the introduction of the Traditional Leaders Act which could (unless it is amended) increase conflict between traditional and elected leaders. The lack of appropriate local governance structures in urban and rural areas with adequate resources and legal autonomy, at ward and community level, is a major impediment to citizens' participation in local governance. Furthermore, the domination of the executive, and the exclusion of local governance from the current constitution (which only mentions the appointment of chiefs and provincial governors) is another blow to democracy and citizen participation.

In the final analysis, the above-mentioned limitations and gaps in local governance should be addressed through substantive legal and constitutional reform. Stable foundations for good local governance will hinge on a satisfactory constitutional basis just as the national governance should, as we observed in Chapter 2. Most of the structural, financial and political shortcomings might have been avoided if Zimbabwe had a sound legal and constitutional framework for democratic local governance. After 20 years of independence, there is still no provision for local governance in the constitution except for brief references to the role of chiefs and provincial governors.

The Urban Councils’ Association of Zimbabwe, UCAZ, sums up their reasons for being dissatisfied with the existing legal and constitutional framework for local governance and a local government specialist added the point on land tax which could affect RDCs. Firstly, there is insufficient consultation of local government by central government when new laws and policies are adopted which affect local governance. For example, the Electoral Laws Amendment Act (1997) repealed electoral provisions under the Urban Councils Act, and the Rural District Council Act, lowered the age qualification of councillors, changed the grounds on which they could be suspended, gave mayors a different term of office from councillors, and transferred responsibilities for elections to the Ministry of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs and Registrar General. Yet all these changes were introduced without discussions with the key stakeholders.

Secondly, central government has too much control over local government finance, and is not giving local government a fair and predictable share of national income (as discussed in the previous section). It failed to implement the sound recommendations of the Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Tax (1986). The report recommended that there should be a clear division of responsibilities between central government and local authorities, and that “local finances should be placed on an assured basis instead of being dependent on year-by-year central government grant decisions”.

Thirdly, an appropriate compensatory grant mechanism should be instituted to equalize differences of income and revenue potential between local authorities. Fourthly, local authorities still lack autonomy as the Ministry of Local Government and Housing has so much power over them. The implementation of the decentralization policy needs to gather momentum through a stakeholder-based process. UCAZ made some valuable suggestions on constitutional provisions needed for democratic local governance (See Box 4.12).

| Box 4.12 UCAZ recommendations on Local Government |
| Enshrinement of Local Government in the Constitution (UCAZ, 2000) We recommend that it be enshrined in the constitution: |
| That Zimbabwe has a two-tier system of government represented by central government and local government. |
| • That the system of local government shall be based on the urban councils and rural district councils with boundaries as presently constituted can be altered with the consent of the inhabitants. |
| • Those councillors shall be elected on the basis of equal universal adult suffrage. |
| • That the local government elections shall be conducted by an Independent Electoral Commission. |
| • That a local authority has the right to govern its affairs on its own initiative subject to national legislation. |
| • That central government may not compromise or impede a local authority’s right to exercise its powers or |


perform its functions.

• That there shall be established for each local authority a sound financial base with adequate and reliable
  sources of revenue and that local government shall be the sole taxing authority of land and property.
• That the object of a local authority shall be:
  • To provide democratic and accountable government in a sustainable manner
  • To provide services to the community in a sustainable manner.
• That draft legislation that affects the institution of local government must be published in a manner that
  allows local authorities to make recommendations on the draft.
• That persons in the service of local government must be recruited by and subject to the control of the
  local authority,
• That an Intervention Board with a national representation of local authorities be set up with such powers
  to intervene in a local authority’s affairs where it is necessary to restore services or protect the interests
  of the inhabitants.
• That where intervention is necessary in order to restore services in a council area or to protect the
  interests of the inhabitants, the Minister may take such measures as are necessary to ensure that
  objective but that such measures will be subject to ratification within 14 days by the Intervention Board.
• That a local authority fund into which no less than 10% of the total revenues of the Zimbabwe
  Government will be paid be established.
• That Councils have the right to form, take part in and associate with organizations representing local
  authorities.

UCAZ, 2000

4.10 Environment and Local Governance

An understanding of the relationship between environment and local governance is important for the
long-term sustainability of the environment and natural resources. In addition, the poverty-
environment linkage requires particular attention in efforts to reduce poverty.

Poverty and Environment

About 70% of the Zimbabwean population live in the rural areas and they are mostly engaged in
subsistence agriculture. Over 100 years ago, the colonial settlers drove the indigenous population of
Zimbabwe off the most agriculturally productive soils. The resource-poor peasants were settled in
ecologically fragile ‘tribal trust lands’, now referred to as communal areas. The infertile, erodible
granitic sands have not been able to sustain the densely populated rural areas since the colonial era.
Severe erosion as a result of overgrazing, deforestation and unsustainable farming practices has led to
siltation of major rivers and dams in Zimbabwe.

The poverty situation in Zimbabwe has worsened since 1998, with women constituting the majority of
the poor. The high inflation and rise in cost of basic commodities has worsened both rural and urban
poverty. People have resorted to use of natural resources for survival. Deforestation used to be a
major environmental problem in the rural areas of Zimbabwe but of late this has spread to areas
surrounding urban areas, as the urban poor resort to use of firewood for cooking purposes due to the
current shortage of paraffin and high cost of electricity. To supplement the dwindling incomes, the
urban poor have also turned to stream bank cultivation. The increase in urban and peri-urban
agriculture is causing serious land degradation.

Many of the rural poor are also resorting to riverbed and alluvial gold panning as a means of livelihood.
This practice poses serious environmental problems in the country as it leads to erosion, siltation and
pollution of rivers. Chemicals such as mercury are used for gold extraction by the panners. Mercury is
a very toxic substance even at very low concentrations. Consumption of fish with mercury levels
exceeding 1.5 ppm by children and pregnant women has been found to cause neurological problems in
children, including learning disabilities as well as immune system and cardiological problems. The
challenge is to empower poor people, especially women since they are the major players, with the
 techniques to effectively manage the environment while at the same time providing for their
immediate needs.
Local governance and natural resource management.

The importance of local governance in natural resources management cannot be over-emphasized. The history of natural resources management in Zimbabwe has been characterized by centralization of the natural resource management function based on a regulatory approach with little participation of communities. The establishment of democratic rural local government institutions at independence in 1980, through setting up of District Councils and subsequently Rural District Councils (RDCs) in 1984, was in part a realization by the authorities of the need to effectively involve communities in governance and development planning. In terms of the Regional, Town and Country Planning Act of 1975 as well as the Rural District Councils Act of 1984, Rural District Councils are the planning authorities in their respective areas of jurisdiction and they also have a natural resources management responsibility. The Communal Lands Act of 1982 also made the RDCs land authorities. It is by virtue of their responsibility over natural resources management that the Parks and wildlife Act as amended in 1982, for example, provides for the granting of “Appropriate Authority’ status to RDCs. This enabled these RDCs and their communities to gain proprietorship over their natural resources and to directly benefit from these resources.

The alienation of communities in the management of their natural resources over the years resulted in increased degradation since there were no apparent incentives for communities to conserve the natural resources. The erosion of the traditional authority system in the rural areas of the country, coupled with a highly regulatory and centralized approach to natural resources management, aggravated the situation. There was no longer any local rule setting and resource ownership by communities through their traditional structures.

In recent years, Zimbabwe has witnessed the evolution of the Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) concept as a basis of managing rural resources. Many CBNRM initiatives are currently underway in the country. A good example of the application of this concept can be found in the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE). The CAMPFIRE concept is based on the desirability of decentralized resource proprietorship with an in-built incentive mechanism that allows communities to directly benefit from the sustainable management of their natural resources. (see Box 4.13)

**Box 4.13 Objectives of CAMPFIRE**

- To initiate a programme for the long term development, management and sustainable utilization of natural resources in the communal areas;
- To achieve management of resources by placing the custody and responsibility with the resident communities;
- To allow communities to benefit directly from the exploitation of natural resources within the communal areas;
- To establish the administrative and institutional structures necessary to make the programme work.

Under the CAMPFIRE concept, more than 40 RDCs have been given appropriate authority status. Although there still remain many problems encountered in the implementation of the CAMPFIRE concept (including problems associated with benefit sharing), the programme has generally been regarded as successful with respect to improving local governance over natural resources. There are a number of other initiatives that complement the CAMPFIRE programme, including the District Environmental Action Planning Programme (DEAP) that aims to empower local communities to improve natural resource management through the integration of environment into their local development strategies. Initiatives under the Africa 2000 Network also aim to empower communities for sustainable management of natural resources as a basis for improved livelihoods.

In 1997 government developed a decentralization policy that was to guide all government departments. The policy was specific in terms of what responsibilities were to be removed from the centre and given to local authorities. With respect to natural resources management, this responsibility was to be given to local authorities.

It has been observed that while local authorities, in particular Rural District Councils, were given responsibility over natural resources management, they appear to have been reluctant to further devolve this responsibility to lower level institutions and the communities. The establishment of village...
assemblies under the recently promulgated Traditional Leaders Act (Chapter 29:17) provides an opportunity for further improving local governance over natural resources through that local level institution.

As regards urban local authorities, there appears to be a lack of clearly defined responsibility over the environmental management function (beyond human health-related issues) and how environmental considerations are integrated in overall urban planning. There is also weak capacity for environmental planning in the urban local government institutions. Urban growth poses challenges of air and water pollution and waste management. The impact of pollution on urban communities can be seen from the environmental health indicators given in box 4.14 below.

Box 4.14 Objectives of CAMPFIRE

Environmental Health Impacts of Urban Pollution

Although the level of air and water pollution is not well documented, there has been a significant rise in respiratory and water-borne diseases in the urban areas. The five leading causes of death for all age groups recorded by the City of Harare for the year 1999 were:

- Pneumonia 22.2%, tuberculosis 15.8%, HIV related tuberculosis 12.3%, gastro-enteritis 12.3% and malignancies 5.9%. There was a 110% increase in the number of reported cholera cases in 1999 compared to 1998. About 535 cases of Shigella dysentery, a disease caused by poor hygiene, were also reported for the same year. The harsh economic situation in the country has led to proliferation of backyard shacks for human habitation. Sewer systems can no longer cope with the increase in urban population as they were designed for a lower population. The overloading of systems has led to bursting of pipes, sometimes resulting in raw sewage flowing into drinking water sources. The current shortage of fuel has affected household waste collection in most urban centers. Residents have resorted to illegal waste dumping thus posing a health hazard on the communities.

Due to increased poverty as a result of the adverse macroeconomic environment, the urban poor increasingly engage in un-controlled urban and pen-urban agriculture along stream banks resulting in significant environmental degradation. The concept of participatory environmental action in urban areas is not yet developed and as a result environmental planning is largely considered the preserve of central government and some technical departments of the urban local authorities.

Recommendations

Improved local governance over the environment and natural resources management is conducive to the sustainable management of these resources. It is thus important to build partnerships with local communities in efforts aimed at improving environmental quality. Some of the key considerations towards that end include:

- Empowering the communities to identify their problems and seek their own solutions without assuming that they are the problem;
- Engaging local communities as partners, not as beneficiaries, and using people-centred frameworks for environmental planning and implementation;
- Creating incentives for local communities to sustainable manage their environment;
- Seeing value of giving local communities real rights and ownership over natural resources, not just a sense of ownership;
- Developing the capacity of local level institutions for stewardship over environmental resources.

4.11 Institutional Capacity and Capacity Building

The term “capacity building” is often used vaguely in Zimbabwe as elsewhere. It is an equally contested concept. It is therefore necessary to define it more precisely:

“Capacity building is more than training. It refers to strengthening peoples’ ability to understand a situation and take action to improve it. It therefore involves the long- term building of confidence, development of knowledge, skills and creativity, the formation of positive attitudes and the strengthening of relationships.” (ACPD 1996)
In this section, we will refer mainly to capacity building in relation to the rural district councils. However, most points will be relevant to capacity building of urban councils as well. In 1996, the Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development initiated a capacity-building programme for Rural District Councils. The purpose of this programme is to develop the capacity of RDC’s to manage local development effectively and transparently, and to serve their constituencies better so as to improve the standard of living of rural communities.

The RDC Act (1988) unified rural local government, and gave RDCs 64 tasks, some of which they had never carried out before. As preparation for the capacity building programme, the Ministry of Local Government did an analysis of institutional weaknesses in RDCs’ (MLGRUD 1996). They classified the institutional weaknesses of RDCs in two categories:

- resource deficiencies: financial, human, vehicles and equipment
- organizational deficiencies: related to leadership, a sense of mission, management systems and structure, openness and accountability.

This section focuses on the problems related to human resources and organizational characteristics.

The capacity of councillors depends on their ability to:

- represent the interests of their electorates and mobilize local energy and resources;
- adopt a broader view of the needs and potential of the district as a whole
- understand council structures and procedures;
- have a sufficient grasp of technical and professional issues to make a meaningful contribution.

(MLGRUD 1996)

All councillors receive orientation courses, and those with specific positions (chairpersons, vice chairpersons and committee heads) get special courses. Although most councillors understand their role and council procedures, their capacity is limited in relation to:

- understanding the needs of the district as a whole;
- professional and technical skills;
- communicating effectively with their constituencies, consulting them and mobilizing them, expressing themselves confidently in council meetings and influencing decision making.

The capacity of council staff varies according to the different councils. People who previously worked in rural councils in commercial farming areas tend to be better qualified and paid, than those who previously worked for district councils in communal areas. The quality of the chief executive officers is also variable. The most common problem is a lack of specialized planning and technical skills, and limited management skills. In addition, the RDC’s have the following weaknesses in relation to organizational culture. They lack effective management systems for their overall operations, as well as for their specific functions. There is still a lack of a clear division of roles between central and local government. There is still a lack of accountability and transparency, both internally, and externally, in relation to communities. The Ministry of Local Government observed:

“Two areas of concern: firstly, internal transparency, accountability and responsibility in the web of relations between officers and councillors and, secondly, the accountability and responsiveness of the RDC to its electorate”.

The Rural District Capacity Building Programme was therefore designed to correct these weaknesses. It was based on a “learning by doing approach,” giving councils resources, facilitation and specific training as they planned and implemented development. (see chart).
VISION OF RURAL DISTRICT COUNCILS CAPACITY BUILDING PROGRAMME

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GOAL</th>
<th>Improved Rural Service Provision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OBJECTIVE</td>
<td>leading to increased living standards-A more aware, literate, healthy, economically active and wealthy rural population.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PROGRAMME OUTPUTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RDC Institutional Development Programme</th>
<th>RDC Human Resources Development Programme</th>
<th>RUC Capital Development Programme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| To promote clear policies on decentralization and local government. | To develop appropriate training programmes which focus on:  
   a) Technical skills of RDC staff.  
   b) Administrative skills of RDC staff  
   c) Management skills for RDC staff  
   d) Orientation programmes for councilors) | To establish funding systems for District Development Grants provision for each RDC as the basis for the learning by doing approach to capacity building |
| To establish structures at national level for co-ordination, policy implementation and resource mobilization. | | To establish funding systems for one equipment building grants to each RDC. |
| To establish Provinicial RDC Support Teams, so as to provide co-ordinated institutional support to RDCs and relevant provincial institutions through a process learning by doing approach | | To establish funding systems for loan facilities to be available to RDCs which might be used for vehicles, plant, income generating activities or any other purpose where costs can be recovered to pay back the loan. |

PROGRAMME INPUTS

| Personnel for Capacity Building Unit at national level Personnel for RDC Support Teams at Provincial Level. | Funding for short local training programmes  
Funding for vocational and skills training in country  
Funding for external training, scholarship s etc.  
Funding for sub district training | Funds for District Development Grants  
Funds for equipment Grants  
Funds for capital loans. |
| Equipment and operational funding for the above. | | |
| Induction, Awareness and co-ordination workshop budgets | | |
| Experimental training budgets | | |

An official from the RDC Capacity Building Programme gave a concise overview of the programme:

“This programme is aimed at giving people a chance to participate actively in local governance issues. The training comprises management skills, and negotiating contracts with private business entrepreneurs. The training is divided into three management aspects as follows:

- Capital development-financial management and project development and monitoring;
- Human resources-money for training programmes for the local authority staff and councillors;
- Institutional development-hiring staff for the local authorities, who are in turn monitored by local facilitators who are hired by the capacity building unit;
- As local authorities, we realize that civil society plays a big role in the government by means of promoting community participation. This should be done through the training, not only of the executives, but also the local councilors;
- If the programmes that we are doing with the Local Government Ministry are a success, we would be having a civil society that is aware of its rights and duties, and that can not be suppressed.(ACPD, 2000) In general, it appears that the capacity building programme has benefited the Rural District Councils, but it needs to be extended and improved. The two dimensions that are missing are:
  - building the capacity of councils and councillors to carry out all their functions in a more consultative manner, and to involve community representatives in all steps of the development cycle;
  - building the capacity of communities, especially the most disadvantaged residents, to play an active role in local governance.
Although the RDC Capacity Building Programme planned to carry out capacity building at community level, this plan has not yet been realized. Even the other agencies who are doing useful work in capacity building, like the ARDC and Canadian Local Authority Governance and Leadership Programme, put more emphasis on councils being better managed, rather than on developing democratic ways of involving communities in governance.

In order for local residents and communities to participate effectively in local governance, councils have to learn to carry out the development cycle in a democratic way, which encourages participation. Communities themselves need well-designed civic education, to increase their confidence, their knowledge of civic issues and their ability to think and act independently. In addition, they need capacity building in relation to the following aspects of local governance:

- building strong organizations;
- carrying out research, documentation and advocacy on important local issues;
- communicating and relating effectively within the community, with local and national government and with other agencies;
- basic literacy in economics;
- contributing to local and national policies and budgets;
- managing their own collective resources, and monitoring expenditure at local and district level;
- negotiation and conflict resolution;
- planning and carrying out integrated development programmes effectively.

This type of capacity building should be rooted in communities, at sub-district level, with external agencies only providing light support in terms of training teams from the communities to lead the programme, designing the overall capacity building in a consultative manner, and providing appropriate training materials and modest resources, which will be combined with the communities’ own resources. If communities are given this kind of support, they can achieve remarkable results, and gain the ability to do tasks normally only done by highly paid, highly educated professionals, such as research. In Gokwe North and Matabeleland South, for example, village youth are beginning to provide accurate information about their villages, which the local authorities did not have before, and which is essential both for development planning and advocacy. However, the great potential to build the capacity of communities to participate in local governance is hindered by the authoritarian nature of the society we live in and the fear of real change, as well as the restricted conventional thinking of many decision makers, and their patronizing attitude to people disadvantaged by poverty.

In conclusion, the institutions of local governance and participation in Zimbabwe have evolved over time. There is still lack of balance in participation by civil society and the private sector as the state has the biggest space in terms of power and resources. Marginalised groups still need space in an arena that is highly politicized. Gender issues remain critical given that they have been prioritized in the draft national policy. Issues of power relations, accountability, transparency, effective participation and resource allocation remain discussion points between local governance institutions especially in relation to central government. Capacity gaps continue to exist not only at local government level in terms of institutional capacity, but financial and human resources as well. Civil society institutions also lack human, organisational skills and financial sustainability to adequately engage in governance at local level.

5. GENDER, YOUTH AND THE SOCIAL DIMENSIONS

5.1 Introduction

The Zimbabwe Human Development Report of 1998 argued that sound human development should encompass equity, social justice and human rights. An equitable society puts value and worth to each human being’s contribution to the development and well-being of society at all levels. Issues of gender equity and youth development have tended to be side-lined in discussions and strategies relating to governance and human development. Yet in Zimbabwe, the social groups of women and youth form a greater proportion of society. For example, it has been estimated that women constitute about 51 per cent of the population in Zimbabwe. Youth and children form the majority of the Zimbabwean population; about 75 per cent of the population is under the age of 35. These social groups - women,
youth and the disabled - ought to be placed at the centre of any account of governance and sustainable human development. Because these groups continue to be disadvantaged and marginalised in development and governance processes, the toll on society is considerable. The toll or cost is delayed and skewed development.

This chapter examines the present conditions in Zimbabwe relating to gender, youth, the disabled and the social sectors, and then suggests possible options to improve the status of these groups. However, it is important to bear in mind that gender, in particular, is a cross-cutting issue. It cuts through the economic, political and institutional components of governance. Gender has been defined as a socio-cultural construction of men and women in a given historical context (Meena, 1998). It assigns them different roles and responsibilities, power positions, rights and privileges. In other words, gender relations determine who does what between men and women, who has access to resources, and who determines how resources should be used, distributed and controlled.

5.2 Gender and the Legal Framework

Given that one of the core elements of sustainable human development is the advancement of the rights of women instead of discriminating against them, it is vital to analyse the legal framework as it relates to women. However, it is also necessary to have an understanding of the historical context that has shaped women's subordinate position in Zimbabwe so as to better evaluate present efforts aimed at changing the status quo. This subordinate position of women in contemporary Zimbabwe largely emanates from the continued existence of customary and traditional practices which accord women a subordinate status compared to men (Tsanga, 2000). Zimbabwe is today characterised by an overlap of historical transitions of human societies. These societies combine a traditional and highly patriarchal society together with a modern one ushered in by colonialism. However, while rural society and its structures have been under transformation since colonisation in the 1890s, the bulk of the rural-based population still ekes a living as subsistence producers. Patriarchal structures continue to dominate. Given these realities, the framework for implementing changes that are aimed at the advancement of women is of vital significance. Such a framework of action would need to be informed by an integration of a variety of disciplines in order to have a substantial impact. The disciplines include law, economics, political science, history and psychology. In such a context, a strong emphasis on legislative changes that is not accompanied by vigorous efforts to dismantle the basis of unequal power relations, and the interests they seek to protect, would be bound to have a limited effect as a strategy for women's advancement.

Zimbabwe gained its independence in 1980 at a time when issues of women’s legal rights and their greater recognition in all spheres were firmly entrenched in the global agenda. Due to this overall global context, and the fact that they had participated in the liberation struggle, women were in a strong position to make demands on the state regarding their rights. It is therefore not surprising that the early years of independence were characterised by a liberal approach to legislative changes affecting gender rights. Legislative changes which sought to give equality to men and women were encouraging. There was a recognition by the state that customs and practices which freeze humanity at a particular stage have negative consequences for human development. In 1991, Zimbabwe adopted the UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and in 1996 the Zimbabwe Constitution was amended to specifically prohibit discrimination on grounds of gender. Box 5.1 shows the major legislative changes which have passed and their impact on the lives of men and women.

The strategy of inclusion and integration is a recurring theme in the broad range of legislative reforms that we find in Zimbabwe today. It is a strategy which lays emphasis on including women where they had been previously excluded. For example, the Legal Age and Majority Act (now part of the General Laws Amendment Act Chapter 8:07) gave majority status to everyone at the age of 18 in a context in which women had been regarded as minors. This was essentially informed by the recognition of women’s equal capacity and the desire to confront and eradicate prejudices which worked against this recognition. Similar legislation which extended equal status to both men and women were the following:

- the Public Service Pension Regulations (which allow women to contribute to medical aid schemes in their own right);
• the Tax Regulations (which permit spouses to be taxed separately); and
• the Equal Pay Regulations and Minimum Wages Act.

Within this broad liberal framework of equalising the playing field for men and women, there are also a few pieces of legislation that recognise that women's interests are not always catered for by gender-neutral law. There are instances where women's specific interests have to be recognised by the law. For instance, the Labour Relations Act, in so far as it recognises that women's rights to maternity leave can be informed by the recognition of women's unique role in child-bearing. The Matrimonial Causes Act recognises the value of women's unpaid domestic work in so far as it allows the courts to take into consideration, on divorce, women's contribution to the matrimonial property through their housework.

Box 5.2: Organisations Involved in Gender Rights

Thus on the face of it, and from the view point of good governance advancing the rights of women, the Zimbabwean state can be said to have taken measures to at least accord its citizens a measure of equality while acting within the framework of a liberal, objectivist approach to gender. There has also been a steady increase over the years in the number of organisations that have taken on the mantle of taking law to the people especially on women's legal rights. These include organisations such as Legal Resources Foundation, Women's Action Group, Women and Law in Southern Africa, MUSASA*, Zimbabwe Women's Lawyers’ Association**, to mention some of the major ones. Methods used have included the production of pamphlets, the training of community-based intermediaries and the use of both television and radio programmes as well as the granting of legal assistance. In 1992 the Ministry of National Affairs also embarked on a Project sponsored by NORAD to disseminate family laws through the training of trainers and also the use of drama by school children. However, while Zimbabwe’s initiatives at both law-making and legal information dissemination are commendable, the scope of the outreach efforts has been limited due to resources. As a result there are sections of society that have remained steeped in old ways or even if they have heard of the changes have taken a negative view of them despite the fact that objectively speaking these laws are progressive. Negative views have mainly been due to lack of conscientisation.

Tsanga, 2000

* Musasa Project is an organization which campaigns against gender-related violence and provides assistance to victims of such violence.

** The Zimbabwe Women’s Lawyers’ Association is an NGO which represents the interests of women lawyers, and advocates for gender equity.

5.3 Limitations of the Legal Framework

A somewhat less exciting picture emerges when one examines the reactions on the ground to attempts to change society through the instrumentalism in law. Laws that seek to effect equality often fail to achieve their intended results primarily because laws do not operate in a vacuum. In Zimbabwe, the existence of customary laws that affect the bulk of the population alongside other normative structures such as the church, the community and family means that there would be some tension in accepting state laws as a dominant framework of behaviour.

While women’s organisations in particular have generally looked upon the Legal Age of Majority Act (LAMA) (see Box 5.1) as one of the most fundamental post-independence pieces of legislation, feedback from rural- and urban-based communities suggests that certain features of this Act are viewed as not only far-reaching but in direct conflict with customary law. Thus, far from attracting widespread approval, laws such as LAMA have often been criticised by both women and men for seeking to destroy culture in so far as they impact on customary practices such as payment of seduction ‘damages’ and of lobola (Chinemana, 1986; Simmons, 1990; Tsanga, 1998).

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(Lobola is a payment made at marriage by a husband to his wife’s parents as a token to strengthen the bonding of the two families).

The state has played a vanguard role in passing legislative reforms, and women’s organisations have been instrumental raising awareness about legal rights. However, what seems to have been missing has been the instilling in the national consciousness of the notion of liberation as a continuum for all times and for all people regardless of race or sex. Little effort has been undertaken to build on the extremely rich and important struggle against colonial domination to cultivate a culture of liberation on all fronts including gender relations. That liberation has not been addressed from an ideological perspective which explores where we are as a people, and what kind of a society we want to build.

Having won the war and attained independence, people’s expectations regarding the treatment of customary law differed. On the one side were those who had expected that customary law would be approached from a viewpoint of largely preserving its basic outlook as a form of cultural identity. To the extent that the new legislation has interfered with culturally entrenched roles and statuses, those who had hoped for a more conservative approach regarded such legislation as problematic. On the other side were those who were critical towards customary law especially for its treatment of women, and who applauded its steady erosion. The rationale for modernising customary law is that in these times change is happening rapidly; to insist on a rigid view of culture and on maintaining outdated customary practices would serve to block our own development as a people.

However, the responses to LAMA in particular indicate dissatisfaction with top-bottom approaches in the use of law for social change. There were other instances of a similar instrumentalist approach in the earlier legislation. In contrast, legislation such as the Amendment to the Administration of Estates Act was formulated after some considerable debate following the publication of the Government’s white paper on marriage and inheritance. Since culture and customary practices do not exist outside a power context, it becomes vital to seek and obtain broad-based consensus on legislative changes.

This is a difficult process. Participation in such a context takes on a broader meaning of understanding the nature of vested interests, and the structures that need to be changed if legislative change is to have an effect.

5.4 Impact of the Dual System of Laws on Women and Young Girls

The co-existence of general law alongside customary law has consequences for children and young girls, in particular, in that some local customs and practices that are harmful to children are perpetrated in the name of custom. For example, one study on violence and sexual offences indicated that some parents - rather than laying criminal charges against sexual offenders - insist on payment of compensation, and that the violator should marry the girl (Armstrong, 1998). Furthermore, victims are rarely consulted when a decision is made to give them away to their violators because children rights to participate in decision-making are not viewed as a priority.

A fundamental implication of the continued existence of a dual system of laws is that there are differences between behaviours that are considered wrong according to general law, and those that are considered wrong according to local customs and practices. While state law, for example, considers a girl of 12 as incapable of consenting to sexual intercourse, customary law considers it valid for her family to consent to marriage on her behalf. Under general law, an 18-year old may consent to marriage but under customary law, this decision involves the whole family. Finally, while state law does not allow marriage of girls under 16 except with ministerial approval, customary law allows...
marriage of such girls if the parents consent. It is within this context that some girls have found themselves being forced into marriage against their consent (Armstrong, 1998).

In sum, different concepts on when childhood ends mean that issues of marriage and child sexual abuse are dealt with differently by different communities. In some communities, the belief is often held that it will benefit the girl as she will be taken care of by her husband and family. Yet this romanticised notion often falls short of reality as evidenced by numerous court cases for maintenance not just by single parents but by married women as well. The conflicts induced by the dual system of laws means that Zimbabwe falls short in protecting women and children’s rights as stipulated in international conventions concerning these groups.

5.5 Constitutional Arrangements and Gender

The present Constitution of Zimbabwe is fundamentally problematic in so far as its approach to customary law does not lay the foundations for interrogating the basis of unequal power relations that exist between men, women and children in Zimbabwe today. It firmly entrenches customary law as being non-discriminatory in those areas that most affect women’s lives such as marriage, custody, divorce, inheritance and access to land. It was not until 1996 that the Constitution outlawed gender as a basis for discrimination.

The continued exclusion of certain customary practices from the constitutional bar clearly stands in the way of achieving human development not just for women but for young people as well. It has been the basis upon which Zimbabwe has witnessed an erosion of some of the legislative gains made by women. This was exemplified by the case of Magaya v Magaya SC 2 10/98 where the Supreme court questioned the applicability of LAMA to matters under customary law. While the early years of independence witnessed some progressive judgments from the High court in interpreting progressive pieces such as LAMA, it would appear that the Supreme Court has taken a more conservative approach to customary law. Finally, the present constitution in its non-discrimination clause does not embrace the prohibition of discrimination on other grounds such as sex, marital status, pregnancy, age and disability. Its overall notion of the concept of citizenship is liberal and statist instead of also embracing the feminist notion of citizenship which takes into account the realities presented by the community in which one lives.

Considerable gains for women’s advancement were envisaged under the 1999 draft Constitution. However, women’s organisations were unable to endorse it on several grounds. One of them was that the Constitution did not mention specific quotas for women in the political sphere, and another was that it did not recommend the establishment of a Gender Commission to address the specific imbalances that result in the subordinate position of women as compared to men. Furthermore, it did not enshrine women’s access to land as a fundamental right as opposed to a directive right. The concept of the politics of representation and democratic participation has gained momentum in gender debates in Zimbabwe as a result of the perceived failure of liberal approach to politics to obtain meaningful results for women. Not surprisingly, it was largely on the issue of inadequate representation that women’s groups rejected the draft constitution.

5.6 Politics and Representation in Zimbabwe

The representation of women in Zimbabwean politics has increasingly become a central issue of focus in the past few years. This is out of the recognition that compared to their numbers in society, women continue to be under-represented in politics and decision-making in post-independence Zimbabwe. Although they make up 51 per cent of the population, they held only 14 per cent of positions in politics and decision-making (UNIFEM Report, 2000). In the June 2000 elections, only 12 women were elected to Parliament where they constitute 8 per cent of the legislators. This is lowest number of women legislators in post-independent Zimbabwe Parliament.
**Table 5.1: Women’s Participation in Parliament in Zimbabwe**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>House of Assembly</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>91.0</td>
<td>92.0</td>
<td>134.0</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Women</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Senate</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Women</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>129.0</td>
<td>129.0</td>
<td>133.0</td>
<td>128.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Women</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note,** in the 1980’s Parliament was bicameral under the Lancaster House Agreement of 1979. This requirement expired in the late 1980’s resulting in the scrapping of the Senate.

**Source:** Beyond Inequalities: Women in Zimbabwe (ZWRCN& SARDC: 1998) p39

**Table 5.2: Distribution of Political Office by Gender**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ministers</strong></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dep. Ministers</strong></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Governors &amp; Res. Ministers</strong></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Distribution of Political Office by Gender: 1995
Table 5.3: Gender in Senior Civil Service, June 1994
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>% of Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Permanent Secretary</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Secretary</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under Secretary</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Secretary</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Admin. Officer</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It is quite evident that women’s entry into mainstream politics has not been in great numbers. Consequently, their voices have remained marginal to mainstream debates. From the viewpoint of good governance, the area of women’s representation has been a major shortcoming.

**Box 5.3: Women in Decision-Making Roles**

Still a long way to go though women have entered the corridors of power, it is quite evident that their entry to mainstream politics has not been in great numbers. Their voices have remained marginal to mainstream debates. As elsewhere around the globe women in Zimbabwe have generally sought to increase their marginal numbers by advocating for greater inclusion in conventional politics. For example, in May 1997 the then Ministry of National Affairs, Employment Creation and Co-operatives launched a two-year project to increase the number of women in politics and decision making, in cabinet, local Government, parastatals, nongovernmental organisations as well as in churches. One of the primary expected outcomes of the project was to achieve a 50% representation of women in decision making by the year 2000. Because of the broad scope of the project, its implementation ultimately focused on Rural District Council Elections throughout the 57 Rural District Councils in Zimbabwe. At the Projects inception there was only a 2% female representation in Rural District Councils. The initiative was implemented by both state and non-state actors. A total of 1001 workshops were held throughout the country in preparation for the local council elections in 1998. In the final result, the increase throughout the Districts in women’s presentation was marginal rising, to only a total of 2.7%, as indicated in the table 5.4 below (Government Report on Implementation of the Platform or Action, 1999) Tsanga, 2000

**Table 5.4: Local Council Election results 1998**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>No. of Councillors</th>
<th>No. of Females</th>
<th>No. as % of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland East</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland West</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland Central</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masvingo</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matebeleland North</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matebeleland South</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlands</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manicaland</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1554</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Despite efforts by civil society organisations and Government, the numbers of women in mainstream politics at various levels have to yet to increase significantly. The numbers of women in other key positions of power are still low. For example, the High Court has only 5 women judges out of 21. The Supreme Court has none. At the University of Zimbabwe, women academics numbered 187 out of a total staff of 725 in 2000.
A significant cause for the low representation of women in Zimbabwe is the current electoral system. The electoral system in Zimbabwe has remained that of “first past the post” in contrast to proportional representation (PR) which operates according to party lists and multi-member constituencies. Through the PR system, conscious efforts are made to increase women’s participation in politics and decision-making.

Three major arguments have been advanced to support women’s greater participation in politics. These relate to women’s greater numerical and proportional representation, and the observations that women would be able to represent their own interests, and that women have special abilities and talents that need to be promoted and utilised in politics. These were identified as some of the intended outcomes in a Ministry of Nation& Affairs’ project document on increasing women’s participation in decision-making.

However, from a perspective of guaranteeing meaningful participation and representation of women, the arguments about equality and women’s specific interests are increasingly criticised by feminists as weak bases for increased participation of women. Although important, the argument about including women on the basis of equality and justice is limited in that it does not necessarily challenge the root causes of women’s exclusion nor is it a guarantee that the lot of women will change substantially as a result of their greater participation. Indeed, it was the failure to problematise the exclusion of women from a grounded conceptual and strategic perspective that has resulted in the continued low participation in politics and decision-making.

The enormous challenge for women in Zimbabwe is that both themselves and men have internalised patriarchal values which exclude the feminine not just in principle but in practice. It is important that this be addressed as part of the process of moving to a higher level of political consciousness in terms

Source: Government of Zimbabwe, Report on the implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action
of gender relations. Clearly, if progress in human development in Zimbabwe in the area of political participation is to be made, then broadening the politics of presence to include diverse groups and the ideas of these groups would capture a fair system of representation. The politics of presence would include groups that have currently been left out of politics such as various classes of women, the disabled and the youth and so on. In order to ensure the representation of diverse marginalised groups, a political system founded on PR is an essential way forward. PR systems are able to address the inclusion of women and other marginalised groups whereas geographic representation based on single-member constituency representation works against a more open and inclusive form of representation.

5.7 The Position of Women in the Economic Sphere

Civil liberties and equal rights are largely theoretical if they are not accompanied by economic rights and freedom. From a governance perspective, advancing the rights of women through economic empowerment is crucial. It is therefore important to assess the progress that has been made in relation to women’s economic empowerment.

In the formal sector, the employment of women grew from 168 000 in 1983 to 228 000 in 1991. In 1995, women workers in the formal sector comprised an estimated 20 per cent of the total work-force. Women were engaged primarily in such lowly-paid occupations as agriculture and primary domestic service. There are also considerable numbers of female workers in the education and health sectors, and in the services sectors such as finance and retail.

Some studies have shown that due to economic hardships and retrenchments in the formal sector, there has been a steady growth of women entering the informal sector. They do so to supplement the family income (Mupedziswa and Gumbo, 1998). It is noteworthy that the proportion of women engaged in the informal sector grew from 68 per cent in 1991 to 71 per cent in 1993. By 1996, there was an estimated 2 million people employed in the informal sector. While the informal sector has experienced phenomenal growth due to ESAP, several constraints have been encountered. These are prohibitive laws and regulations, and lack of finance and training opportunities. Much of the growth in the informal sector has, however, been in low profit activities (Kanyenze, 1997). Most activities engaged in by women include the following:

crocheting, knitting, tailoring, vending, gardening, poultry, tie and dye and batik. Women are also involved in cattle fattening and occasionally in carpentry (ZWRCN and SARDC, 1998). A study on activities carried out by women in Harare’s urban sector revealed that women are predominantly engaged in the vending of fruit and vegetables to supplement family income. Table 5.5 shows the basic activities in which women were found to be most engaged in.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of trading activity</th>
<th>1993 %</th>
<th>1995 %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fruit and vegetables</td>
<td>(33.0%)</td>
<td>(37.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothes</td>
<td>(3.6%)</td>
<td>(7.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-border items</td>
<td>(15.4%)</td>
<td>(15.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crafts</td>
<td>(13.0%)</td>
<td>(12.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooked foods</td>
<td>(9.5%)</td>
<td>(5.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crochet work</td>
<td>(7.1%)</td>
<td>(2.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweets, frozen lollies</td>
<td>(6.0%)</td>
<td>(7.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plastics</td>
<td>(2.3%)</td>
<td>(4.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other productive activities</td>
<td>(1.2%)</td>
<td>(7.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other trading activities</td>
<td>(10.1%)</td>
<td>(100.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>169 (100%)</td>
<td>140 (100.0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Mupedziswa and Gumbo, 1998

Far from being dependents, the study by Mupedziswa and Gumbo (1998) also shows that assumptions about male financial responsibilities and female dependency in the family are often erroneous. Instead what emerges is a pattern of increasing, albeit not sole financial responsibility for family up-keep being borne by women traders.
As table 5.6 shows, women assumed major responsibility for food, rent, medicines and so on despite being in a weaker economic position.

**Table 5.6: Responsibility For Household Share**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Person Paying Major Share</th>
<th>1992</th>
<th>% Change</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>% Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Food:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self</td>
<td>58.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td>57.6%</td>
<td>- 4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
<td>+ 2.9%</td>
<td>31.8%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>- 6.3%</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>+ 2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rent:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self</td>
<td>53.5%</td>
<td>+ 7.8%</td>
<td>58.5%</td>
<td>- 2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td></td>
<td>29.7%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband</td>
<td>24.8%</td>
<td>- 13.1%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>+ 0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Utilities:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self</td>
<td>54.2%</td>
<td>+ 6.7%</td>
<td>57.5%</td>
<td>+ 3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
<td></td>
<td>30.8%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
<td>- 9.3%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>+ 0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>School fees:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self</td>
<td>57.4%</td>
<td>÷ 4.1%</td>
<td>58.7%</td>
<td>- 2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td>28.3%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
<td>- 12.7%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>+ 5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Medicines:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self</td>
<td>57.4%</td>
<td>+ 4.7%</td>
<td>60.3%</td>
<td>- 0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td>32.5%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
<td>-14.6%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>÷ 1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maternity fees:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>+ 17.8%</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td>36.1%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband</td>
<td>32.3%</td>
<td>- 25.1%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>÷ 16.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mupedziswa, Roderick and Gumbo, Perpetua

**1998 Structural Adjustment and Women Informal Sector Traders in Harare, Zimbabwe**

Although there has been some progress in women’s entry into the formal and informal sectors, two factors continue to act as constraints on their empowerment. These are the sexual division of labour, and the family as an institution. Social practices and institutions affect men and women differently and exert an impact on women’s entry into the labour market. The assumption that women’s economic interests are generally taken care of by male breadwinners continues to act as impediments in women’s earning capacity. Their earnings are often deemed as pin money when, in reality, they are instrumental in maintaining the family.

Furthermore, women carry the burden of unpaid work in the reproduction and maintenance of human resources whilst at the same time engaging in work outside the home in order to meet family needs. Women’s work is regarded as having no monetary value, and viewed as private rather than social. There are therefore no incentives nor rewards or penalties that are provided as a means of fostering change. As Table 5.6 shows, women continue to carry the major responsibility for domestic duties. The double burden means that women are often unable to compete fully with men in the market unless they are able to employ child-minders and domestic helpers. The fact that women spend a significant proportion of their time as carers and in unpaid domestic work limits their participation in political citizenship while their economic dependency limits their civil citizenship.

The situation is especially difficult for rural women. It is estimated that 60 per cent of the households in rural areas are headed by women who run family smallholdings (ZWRCN and SARDC,1998). The entry of rural women into formal and informal sectors is particularly limited by their domestic work and subsistence production. This means that, by and large, women have been confined to the domestic sphere. Access by women to basic services such as water supplies, electricity, sanitation facilities, public transport, health care and education which would lighten the burden of unpaid work is important. A great deal of time is often consumed by lack of reach to such facilities. This in turn impacts on their ability to devote time to gaining skills that they need to enter the market.

Economic policies, and their resultant influence on social policies, have had specific gendered implications in Zimbabwe. For example, cutbacks on health care have led to an increase in community-based care, which has been criticised as a euphemism for the unpaid work of women for their family members. Challenging the notion that it is natural for women to care for others involves policy shifts in the provision of care for children, the sick, the elderly, and the disabled.
The challenges faced by women in economic empowerment raise specific questions regarding women’s participation in setting priorities and in the allocation of resources. Without the democratic participation of women in decision-making, the desirability of redistributing resources in order to address the specific needs of women is likely to continue to be under-emphasized. This is why the current women’s initiative in analysing the budget to ascertain its gender sensitivity is a welcome development (ZWRCN, 2000).

Box 5.4: The Feminisation of Poverty

While poverty is a generic problem, realities on the ground point to different experiences of poverty for men and women. Although the structural adjustment programme adopted in the 1990's has had differential class effects, it nonetheless has had gender specific effects in that it has increased the vulnerability of women as compared to men for a number of reasons. Firstly, women already represented a disproportionate share of the poor, and secondly they were already represented in large numbers among low wage earners. Their full entry into the market has also always been hampered by the need to balance wage work with subsistence and domestic production in meeting household needs.

The problem with structural adjustment programmes is that they are not conceptualised in terms of operations of households. The fact that cutbacks on food subsidies and health budgets appear to affect everyone does not address the fact that in reality women are largely the ones who have the major task of strategising to maintain social life under conditions of economic hardship. The assumption is often that they will be taken care of by the state or by their husbands. Initiatives such as the Social Development Fund (SDF) which have been adopted to cushion the effects of structural adjustment remain problematic not only in terms of their inadequacy and general inaccessibility, but also in so far as they are merely aimed at protecting the vulnerable as opposed to challenging the conditions that create a significant proportion of the nation’s impoverished masses. For example, one of the conditions for assistance under the Social Welfare Assistance Act of 1988 is that the person is a dependent or a person who is destitute or indigent or incapable of looking after himself. The assumption in assessing the need for social welfare is generally that men will look after women. Assistance is therefore given where the person is unable to secure support from the family or the market economy. Household politics are not problematised in line with the view that sees a man’s home as his castle. In rural areas the public assistance programme is not accessible because the offices are situated far away from rural areas. People are also unaware of the existence of the office and the welfare officers themselves are reluctant to publicise their existence for fear of creating an artificial demand. In reality, many women in rural areas who need welfare assistance are therefore not able to access it. (Tsanga 2000)

5.8 Institutional Mechanisms for the Advancement of Women

What institutional mechanisms have been set to facilitate the advancement in the various spheres mentioned above? In 1981, the Ministry of Community Development and Women’s Affairs was established to oversee the integration of women into development programmes. Its mission included the organising, co-ordinating and monitoring of private, public and non-governmental programmes geared towards closing the gap between men and women. However, a major limitation in implementing its goals was an insufficient budget. For instance, between 1985 and 1994, the Ministry only received about 1,4 per cent of the national budget for its programmes. (Zimbabwe Government, 1999).

In 1996, the Ministry was scaled down to a unit in the Ministry of National Affairs, Employment Creation and Cooperatives whose primary function was the creation of employment. The Unit was headed by a Deputy Secretary with a small annual budget for women’s programmes. This Unit is now located in the re-named Ministry of Youth Development, Gender and Employment Creation. In 1994, various gender focal points were set up in various ministries and departments with the aim of monitoring gender mainstreaming in these ministries. In 1997, the government set up a Gender Issues department headed by a woman Minister. The department was located in the President’s Office and had the responsibility of coordinating all gender activities within ministries, NGOs and the private sector. The department was also seen as an arm of the Women in Development Unit in the Ministry of National Affairs. However, with the restructuring of government ministries following the 2000 elections, the department was abolished. All gender issues are now handled by the Ministry of Youth Development. Gender and Employment Creation whose current substantive Minister and deputy are respectively a man and a woman.

While the government has clearly put into place an institutional framework designed to advance the rights of women, a number of limitations have been experienced. First, a major limitation has been the
absence of a clearly articulated gender policy to guide the operation of these institutions in so far as they seek to advance the rights of men and women. Although a gender policy draft has been written, it still remains to be publicly debated. The effectiveness of the gender focal points has been limited by the absence of such a fully-fledged policy. The government acknowledged this in its own assessment of the implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action which outlined 12 critical areas for government to focus on. Second, another limitation relates to the fact that the work on gender has been assigned to officers in various ministries as an additional work-load. Consequently, this work on gender issues was not taken seriously enough.

**Box 5.5: The Need for a National Gender Policy**

Due to the delays in putting in place a national gender policy it is not surprising that one of the chief criticisms of Government by women’s organisations has been the perceived lack of commitment by government to gender issues. The need for nationwide gender sensitisation is also seen as an area where government could play a more active role. There is clearly a need for a visible and active political commitment by Government by speeding up the finalisation of the national gender policy through a national consultative process involving civil society. For its part, government has observed that civil society organisations have not been responsive to invitation to participate in the formulation of a gender policy. There is also a need to improve the national machinery through clarification of its mandate and power as well as improved human and financial resources. Government also needs to show greater commitment to gender equity in its budgetary allocations and to devote more time and resources training at all levels. Government could also play a more positive role in ensuring nationwide access to legal information given the limited geographical spread of current initiatives that predominantly rely on donor funding. Government also needs to put in place an affirmative action policy in sectors such as employment, education, decision-making, and tertiary training.

Tsanga, 2000

5.9 Engendering the Governance Debate

Efforts to improve the situation of women as a marginalised group are unlikely to have widespread impact without women’s increased participation. Particular attention needs to be paid to the nature and role of the family. Due to the over-arching impact of the family, it is important for policy initiatives to problematise the characteristics of domestic life, and the way in which they limit women’s access to the political arena and positions of power both within the state and civil society. As long as governance takes the limited view that excludes focus on the personal and the private, the gendered exclusion of women from governance will remain. It is these broad distinctions between the political and the social, and between the social and personal that continue to largely contribute to the entrenchment of gendered divisions which marginalise women in Zimbabwe. The tendency has been to regard the political as public and the domestic realm of the family as lying outside the domain of the study of politics. The private sphere which includes areas of sexuality, child-bearing and child-rearing is seen as natural and biological and therefore not political. Yet it is these aspects of life that are shaped by patriarchal power and which sustain gender inequalities. Women’s role in the family has limited their access to positions of power within both state and civil society, and as such the family should be included in discussions about power. The role of the family and its contribution to good governance should be an integral component of the concerns of the state and civil society as a whole if current imbalanced power relations are to be altered.

5.10 Youth, Development and Governance

As in most developing countries, the youth form a large segment of the population. In Zimbabwe, the youth consists of those who are aged between 18 and 24. Although youth and children constitute the majority of the total population, they are marginalized in the development process and their numerical weight and potential is rarely given serious attention in matters of governance. There is also little systematic planning for the role and preparation of youth in national development programmes. It is therefore necessary to review briefly the major constraints on a more active and fuller participation of youth in the development and governance processes.

Let us assess how the youth has fared in terms of access to education and employment opportunities. The education system itself has not successfully equipped the youth for employment. For example, the Presidential Commission of Enquiry into Education and Training (1999) established that is only 7 per
cent of students who complete “0” levels go on to do “A” levels. Of the “0” level students, only about 23 per cent pass five subjects with Grade C or better which means that about 77 per cent are relegated to failure. As such, there is a sense in which the present education system, as presently structured, is wasteful. The present education system does not put much emphasis on practical skills, and this limits the opportunities for both after-school youth employment and self-employment.

To the extent that the education system is regarded as inadequate in terms of its ability to equip youth with practical skills for the job market, recommendations have focused on revamping the education system. The school curriculum is viewed as irrelevant to the country’s development needs because it does not develop children’s talents in the local context. It has been recommended that the project method (rather than the narrower examination-oriented system) be used to develop problem-solving skills as well as practical business ventures in schools. Strong institutionalised links with business were also recommended so that children could be exposed to the world of work (Presidential Commission on Education Report, 1999).

Whilst training is the principal tool to equip youths for the world of employment, training opportunities for youths remain scarce. Youths generally struggle for the few opportunities in skills training as Table 5.7 shows.

**Table 5.7: Applications for Apprenticeship Against Available Places**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of Applications for Apprentice Training</th>
<th>Available Places</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>36 729</td>
<td>1 727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>42 280</td>
<td>1 541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>45 723</td>
<td>2072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>26 425</td>
<td>1 525</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Kanyenze, 1997 p.15

The lack of state of the art technologies in the training centres has an adverse impact on the quality of skills training for youth preparing to enter the labour market. Furthermore, high import duties and red tape frustrate the efforts of the private sector to supply such technologies. As a result, its contribution to tertiary education remains minimal.

Meanwhile, youth unemployment is a major social and economic problem. While national unemployment is estimated at between 40 and 50 per cent, youth unemployment itself is higher at 62 per cent of the unemployed total. Youth unemployment has a direct impact on the growth of delinquency, hooliganism and deviance as well as on the number of young offenders. It also exposes young girls to early marriage, and in some cases to prostitution as a way of making a living. In the current context, lack of training opportunities and employment leads to situations which inadvertently increase the exposure of youth to HIV/AIDS.

National efforts to address problems and needs of the youth are undermined by lack of central co-ordination. There is an imperative need for such co-ordination despite the existence of specific government ministries mandated with the responsibility for youth matters. The following ministries are in one or another involved in youth employment schemes: Industry and International Trade, Local Government, Public Works and National Housing, Education, Sport and Culture, Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare, and Finance and Economic Development. Indeed, the duplication between youth training centres administered by the Ministry of Youth Development, Employment Creation and Gender and the vocational training centres administered by the Ministry of Higher Education and Technology appears to be a waste of national resources. It has been argued that when labour market policy falls under one authority, it might be easier to create conditions for a co-ordinated effort to develop a common vision on youth training and employment policy.

The youth has not benefited from the assumption that ESAP was going to create jobs through growth. Active labour policies and programmes would be preferable as a strategy to deal with unemployment. Clearly, the formal sector alone would not be able to cope with the 300 000 or so school-leavers who enter the labour market each year. The sector would have to grow by at least 20 per cent annually in order to absorb them. An enabling macroeconomic environment needs to be installed. Governments
The SME sector provides a potentially feasible option for tackling school-leaver unemployment. The cost of creating a job in the formal sector is estimated at Z$80 000 - Z$100 000 while it costs only about Z$10 000 in the SME sector (Kanyenze, 1997). In 1996, it was estimated that the informal sector employed at least 2 million people as compared with 1.6 million in 1992. However, the SMEs and informal sector operate under considerable constraints. For example, prohibitive laws and regulations as well as lack of finance pose specific impediments to youths starting their own businesses in the informal and SME sectors. Particular attention will, therefore, need to be taken to provide start-up capital to entrepreneurial youth, and to relax those regulations which inhibit their entry into business. Another deficiency which should be addressed is the absence of an enterprise culture among the youth. This culture should be inculcated amongst the youth. Other problems which constrain the entry of youth into the informal and SME sectors are limited training opportunities in business and management skills, absence of linkages with business firms, and lack of appropriate curricula to address the needs of the informal sector. There are some experiences that can be drawn from. For instance, there are several existing initiatives and policies aimed at addressing the needs of the informal sector. They include the provision of work shelters, a business linkage programme which links small businesses with large ones, people's markets, and entrepreneurship training programmes (Kanyenze, 1997). Under the “start your business programme” run by the then Ministry of National Affairs, some 15 per cent of the participants were youth. This proportion should be expanded. It is also important that counselling in career choice be stepped up because it has a positive effect in unleashing youth initiatives.

**Box 5.6: Youth Perspective of Governance in Zimbabwe**

Youths have always been a political force to reckon with in Zimbabwe during the first and second Chimurenga, Umvukela and the Liberation Struggle for they made the bulk of the dedicated sons and daughters of the soil. It is, therefore, surprising to note that when decisions of national importance are being made, they are not consulted. They are often excluded in economic empowerment programmes. Youths the pillars of the nation, are only useful when it comes to political election campaigns. Youths were caught up in a dilemma since no specific Ministry dealt with youth issues as all Ministries had duplicate programmes. It was against that background that the Government of Zimbabwe formed the Ministry of Youth Development, Gender & Employment Creation (MIYDGEC). The youth are vulnerable because of unemployment. Some companies started have closed down, rounded up their operations since the introduction of ESAP and the devaluation of the dollar.

The Government of Zimbabwe chums our 300 000 school leavers and the employment market can only absorb up to 30 000 jobs. Approximately 30 000 advance in education and nearly 100 000 people join the informal sector while the rest would be lacking adequate educational qualifications. Meanwhile, financial institutions require youth to have collateral security for loans. Most youths do not meet the criteria for such collateral security. However, the MIYDGEC has been instrumental in trying to come up with a Youth Policy. The preliminary audits of the Youth Policy have reflected the following aspects: consultation of the youths by the Government was very minimal which is a big weakness in policy formulation, which is supposed to be participatory in nature. It is therefore our objective that we increase youth participation in policy formulation especially where youth interests are concerned. Strategies of addressing the question of lack of financial resources among the youths to empower themselves are currently rudimentary. For instance, there is a proposal to raise funds from a youth levy, a strategy which we think is unworkable when considering that the taxpayer is already over burdened. We therefore seek to propose the establishment of a revolving fund to be granted to youths intending to venture into business and self-employment.


An account of the impact of economic and social governance on youth would not be complete without acknowledging some important developments relating to youth participation in politics and in the policy-making process. The growth in the momentum of party politics has involved a more visible participation of youth. In the politics of constitutional reform as well as the 2000 election campaign, the youth were prominent in mobilising support for the parties and organizations to which they belonged. The positive aspect of this involvement in political and civic mobilization relates to the growing maturity and social engagement of the youth. However, there is a negative aspect as well: this has largely concerned the use of youths in campaign of intimidation and violence during election time, as in the Bikita West by-election. The youth and the organizations which mobilize them should desist them from such campaign tactics which undermine tolerance and democratic culture.
Another dimension is the desire of youth to be consulted in policy matters which affect them as a social group. This includes the Draft Youth Policy which the Zimbabwe Government drew up in 1999-2000. As one youth association argued:

'The youth must be engaged in a participatory approach to map its destiny and create a credible national youth policy, which the majority of youth can identify with.. (ZIFAYA, undated), Some of the policy issues in which youth organizations have expressed an interest include economic empowerment, leadership, peace and security, land reform and civic education. It would enrich the governance process if the enthusiasm and skills of youth (including students) were drawn upon in formulating and implementing specific policies.

5.11 The Social Sectors and Governance

The social dimensions of governance are no less important than other dimensions such as the economic one treated in the second chapter. Of particular note is the role of social policy and individual social sectors in human development. This is a theme which the 1998 and 1999 Zimbabwe Human Development Reports explored at length. Here we may observe that social policy has undergone a review in the light of the economic reform programmes implemented in the 1990s. Whereas real social sector expenditure was more generous in the 1980s, the tighter macro-economic conditions in the 1990s have resulted in a shrinkage of sectoral budgets. This has in turn limited access to services especially in the health care sector, and contributed to a deterioration in quality of services. This is indeed a worrying trend not least because of its wider long-term impact on sustainable human development.

5.11.1 The Education Sector

Let us briefly look at developments in individual social sectors beginning with the education sector. Zimbabwe’s strides in democratising access to education, particularly at primary and secondary school levels are well known (Loewenson, 2000). For example, during the first five years of independence (1980-1985), the expansion rates were 61 per cent at primary school level and 63 per cent at secondary school level. The number of primary schools increased from 2 401 in 1979 to 4 234 by 1985 and 4723 in 1999. At secondary school level, expansion rates were even higher: the number of schools went up from 177 in 1979 to 1215 in 1985, and then to 1 548 in 1999. However, the introduction of economic reforms, in particular ESAP, was followed by a drop in enrolments at both primary and secondary school levels, more so in females than in males. Access to secondary education remains inadequate in some parts of the country.

Urban schools have become congested with children coming from rural areas where they have lost faith in district council schools whose infrastructure has not improved. Distances of 30km or more for children to walk to school lead to dropout and absenteeism. Cases have been reported of pupils living in makeshift shelters so that they may attend schools not within walking distances, called ‘bush boarding’. Access to secondary education has also been constrained by the harsh economic climate that has made it difficult or impossible for urban and rural parents from low-income groups to afford the school fees that are charged for secondary schools. Gender equities become pronounced at secondary school level with about 46 per cent of girls in secondary school compared to about 53 per cent boys. The highest drop-out occurs between Form 4 and Form 6, with only about 6 per cent of pupils from Form 4 proceeding to this level. This is despite the fact that more than 75 per cent of pupils doing their ‘O’ levels aspire to proceed to ‘A’ level (Nberera, 2000). The rapid expansion in enrolments has also put pressure on the limited human, financial and physical resources compromising the quality of education provided. Some schools have lacked funds to buy books and other materials. Migration into urban areas in search of better quality education has intensified pressure on urban schools. Poor infrastructure and resources and accommodation facilities have been a deterrent to qualified teachers, leading to higher numbers of unqualified teachers in poorer rural schools, and consequently poorer examination results at these schools.

Real per capita spending on all aspects of education declined in the 1990s with the biggest declines in 1991/92 and 1993/94. A deteriorating economic climate under structural adjustment, related
reductions in government spending on social services has led to the squeeze in the education budget and the corresponding reduction in investments in teaching resources, with approximately 96 per cent of the education budget going towards salaries. This has seriously undermined efforts towards improving the quality of services, even while access problems in under-served groups still remain unaddressed.

Balancing the need for a sustained production of skills outputs, for equity in access to quality education, for enhanced coverage of basic education and for greater relevance of education to employment and economic needs of the economy and households will be a challenging task during this decade. Implementing this task in the context of a rising number of orphans and declining public sector resources makes the education sector one of the key areas for creative social re-investment. There will be need to more equitably direct public investments to under-served areas, to maximise returns on investments in information technology, science and technology, and entrepreneurship as well as establishing a continuum of learning though a range of public, private and community inputs.

The experience of the 1990s signals the rising costs of education to households and the public sector, declining public allocations for education and growing pressure on use of available resources to sustain basic infrastructures and personnel (Loewenson, 2000). The demands have increased not only for educated labour, but for enhanced skilled competence with new technology and information that will enable economic activities to move up the skills and quality ladder. Ironically, the competitive edge that the country achieved in the first decade of independence is now being eroded at a time when it needs to be channeled towards these goals.

### 5.11.2 The Health Sector

In health and nutrition, Zimbabwe had achieved by 1990 better indicators than many countries in sub-Saharan Africa, narrowing inequalities between urban and rural areas, between gender and to some extent across income groups in health status and access to primary health care services (Loewenson, 2000). These health gains of the first decade are documented in many sources including in the 1998 ZHDR. This resulted in the country ranking relatively highly on human development for its GNP by the mid-1990s (Loewenson and Mumbengegwi, 1997).

Government allocations to the health under structural adjustment fell from 2.6 per cent of GDP in 1980 to about 2.2 per cent by 1997. Since 1990, there has been a steady decline in real per capita spending on health. A disproportionate share of public spending continues to go tertiary and quaternary institutions (44 per cent) despite the smaller share of people using these services, and national policies of primary health care and district service strengthening. Preventive care has received a declining share of the health budget, weakening the capacity to support or lever community-based action. Associated with this ‘budget squeeze’, inflation and falling value of the local currency have made imported drug purchases more expensive.

Economic reforms and performance in the 1990s have also made it more difficult to address other health sector constraints. Specific scarcities in health personnel, particularly high skill personnel, have become more pronounced. By 1996, the number of health workers in Zimbabwe was one for every 454 Zimbabweans, a ratio approaching the situation in 1980, despite significant investments in training over the 1980s and 1990s. Decreased budgets worsened professional and working conditions and inflation eroded real wages in the sector. Liberalisation and the growth of the private sector generated pressures for greater leeway for private practice in the sector, including by public employees, a practice that has proved difficult to regulate. The health sector appears to have been particularly prejudiced under liberalisation by the fact that it imports inputs (drugs, equipment), while producing for the domestic market and being paid in local currency. The sector thus lost rather than gained from the currency devaluations under structural adjustment.

These changes over the 1990s in the financing and resourcing of health have resulted in shifts in access to and quality of care. Poor resources, inadequate staffing, inadequate pay have had a negative impact on both working conditions and quality of care sometimes leading to tension between staff and patients. Communities have complained of negative attitudes in health workers towards patients. Patients indicate that they fear exercising their patient rights, while health workers are worried that patients will make demands that they will not be able to fulfil given their current resource constraints.
Reduced access and quality have had their own negative impacts in coverage at a time of obvious need. For example, attendance at and use of maternity services was noted to be affected by access to services, cost barriers due to fees and household socio-economic status. Immediately after fees were raised in 1993 and 1993/94, declines were noted in hospital out-patient attendances, prescriptions dispensed, admissions, X-rays, fractures, lab and dental services. These consequences have also affected preventive inputs as toilet construction and water supply programmes slumped due to declining access to cement and reduced outreach of environmental health workers. The increasing costs of mosquito spraying, seriously exacerbated by the decline of the dollar have posed difficulties in making spraying sustainable. On the positive side, this has led to new approaches involving community participation in prevention and management of malaria.

As the ZHDR 1999 showed in greater detail, the HIV/AIDS epidemic has immensely increased the burden on the health sector. Over 400 000 AIDS-related deaths have occurred in Zimbabwe since the onset of the epidemic. Furthermore, 600 000 children have been orphaned due to AIDS while about 1.6 people are estimated to be living with HIV/AIDS (PRF, 2000). It is estimated that about 1.2 million people would have died from HIV/AIDS-related diseases by 2005, and the number of orphans would have increased to almost a million during the same period. HIV/AIDS has significantly increased costs and demands on the health sector and placed heavy demands on insured benefits. The health sector therefore is operating under a very tremendous strain as it seeks to cope with patients with AIDS-related illnesses. At the heart of the human development process and challenge is whether the preventive national AIDS programme will be consolidated to the extent that new HIV infection will drop significantly. The launch of the National AIDS Levy, dogged as it might initially have been with controversy, provided some urgently needed resources to supplement the costs of treating AIDS patients. Structures to facilitate access to the fund created out of the levy were in the process of being set up in 2000. Some organizations and institutions have already had access to the fund. However, it is still early to assess the administration and reach of the fund as a whole. In the light of increasing costs of health, the right to health care is increasingly taking centre stage as an issue of governance. Social policies have a clear bearing on the degree of access and quality of health care, and it is therefore proper that these policies feature highly on the governance agenda.

5.12 Poverty Trend

There has been no decline in poverty trends since the national survey conducted in 1995, and subsequent analysis of the survey data in the ZHDR 1998. In fact, the trend would appear to be upward from an estimated 61 per cent in 1995/96 to an estimated 75 per cent in 1999. The Poverty Assessment Study Survey (PASS) in 1995 established that about 61 per cent of households lived in poverty and 45 per cent in extreme poverty. Levels of poverty were higher in rural areas (75 per cent of households) compared to urban households (39 per cent of households). The incidence of poverty was found to be higher in female (85 per cent) as against male-headed households with levels of 72 per cent respectively.

The incidence of poverty has primarily been associated with unemployment, low pay and drought. Urban studies indicate that households have experienced a series of shocks under economic adjustment. Basic food price increases on a regular basis followed by spiralling inflation (which climbed to above 70 per cent before dropping to 55 per cent in 2000) are one of the major shocks. Permanent employment has often been substituted by casual and insecure forms of employment with a loss in health, pension and related benefits, and together with unemployment these have exacerbated poverty. Furthermore, households have experienced the impact of increased levels of long illness and death primarily due to HIV-AIDS, as we observed above. Households which lack housing tenure, education and skills are particularly vulnerable to these shocks as are households headed by single parents, the elderly and disabled persons.

The coping strategies used to deal with these economic shocks have themselves increased stress and involved recourse to borrowing from friends, support from informal networks, use of savings, sale of assets, remittances from family members and other forms of community support. In rural households, water and land shortage is a major source of poverty. Rural-urban support networks have been weakened by high transport costs, recurrent droughts, inflation and price instability of rural produce and basic household goods. Local community mechanisms such as burial societies and savings clubs
have been hampered by lack of funds even though they are regarded as the more effective forms of support.

**Box 5.7: NASCOH’s Perspective on Governance in Zimbabwe**

With about 1.3 million people with disabilities in Zimbabwe, mechanisms should be put in place to ensure that the rights of such a sizeable population are accommodated at every level of governance. The constitution of Zimbabwe which is the supreme law of the land allows discrimination on the basis of disability and therefore undermines any other piece of legislation meant to promote the rights of people with disabilities (section 23). The above therefore dilutes the strength of the provisions of the Disabled Persons Act of 1992 which, if implemented, would improve the life situation of people with disabilities. At global level, the UN Standard Rules on the Equalisation of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities (1993) has provisions which ensure that all people with disabilities exercise the same rights and obligations as others and that the state through central and local governance has the responsibility to ensure equalisation in consultation with people with disabilities. Zimbabwe has not done much in this regard since it has not even implemented the Act it has put in place, hence people with disabilities are excluded in most development programmes. Zimbabwe like other developing countries does not have instruments or the regulatory capacity to ensure that transactional firms have satisfactory standards of accountability and transparency in their operations. Profit, market expansions and lower production costs are the prime considerations, which guide corporate governance; as a result, the job security of employees is not guaranteed. There should be strict policies and regulations by the state to ensure the safety and health of employees. Affirmative laws should be in place to protect people with disabilities and tax incentives for firms that employ people with disabilities, which is not in place today. Corporate governance has to be improved if it is to contribute to human development among the poor, especially people with disabilities. Since governance consists of mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, mediate their differences and exercise their legal rights and obligations, people with disabilities should be given enough room in our legal provisions to contribute meaningfully to the overall governance of the country's affairs. Economic policies have been imposed on society with inadequate consultation. This has led to difficulties in the implementation of the country’s economic policies like ESAP and ZIMPREST and most likely the Millennium Economic Recovery Programme. These programmes have negatively impacted on people with disabilities. NASCOH believes that political, social and economic priorities should be based on broad consensus in society, the voices of the poorest of the poor and the most vulnerable groups among them people with disabilities should be heard in decision-making over the allocation of development resources. NASCOH feels this is not happening at the moment hence the state’s support rate of $2 250 per month per disabled person who can prove that he/she is a destitute.

NASCOH, 2000

To protect the poor and assist the unemployed during economic adjustment in the 1990s, the government created a Social Development Fund (SDF) within the Social Dimensions of Adjustment Programme. According to the constitution of the Fund, women and youths, who constitute two-thirds of the disadvantaged groups were the main targets of the programme. The programme had the following components:

- an employment and training programme, including support for informal small-scale enterprises and public works;
- targeting of food subsidies;
- provision of exemption from cost-recovery measures for vulnerable groups; and
- monitoring and evaluation of projects.

The employment and training component of SDF focused entirely on the re-training of retrenched. These retrenchees were offered a 5-day training course on how to start your business after which they could apply for project funding through their training agency. By the end of the first phase of training in 1995, some 12 946 retrenched (about 28 per cent of the total) had been re-trained. A total of 2 237 projects worth Z$207 million were approved by the end of 1996. Nearly 9 000 jobs would be created as a result.

However, the programme suffered from under-funding and over-centralisation. Although the original programme was designed to assist the poor, it mainly benefited the retrenched workers. Given these limitations, and the lack of proper funding, the programme was restructured in 1996. Training was re-organised such that trainees had to pay Z$500 for the training but this aspect only lasted until December 1996. A new programme, the Micro-Enterprise Development Programme which covered all sectors was initiated. Through this programme, funds are now disbursed through micro-finance
Institutions (MFIs). The MFIs select beneficiaries on the basis of new criteria whereby the focus is on the urban and rural poor who can pay. To make the programme more broad-based and effective, it may be useful to adapt a more decentralised approach.

In addition, a Community Action Programme (CAP) is being implemented to assist mainly rural communities in the funding of infrastructural development programmes. CAP operates under the Grants Allocation Committee (GAC) and disburses funds to participating organisations in the form of grants. Under CAP, communities are expected to identify their own programmes and obtain funding from a government ministry through local authorities. In view of it being a quick-dispensing fund, approval of projects under US$50,000 is delegated to the Rural District Councils, and amounts above this have to be approved by the GAC. However, it has been observed that one weakness of the GAC is that it draws its membership only from government ministries. The programme is being implemented in the poorest districts on an experimental basis. Lessons from evaluation of the programme will be useful in its future refinement. However, the suspension of some of the donor funding has curtailed the size of the CAP programme. Another important programme is the Enhanced Social Protection Programme which has a component of a community support programme.

6. CIVIL SOCIETY, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND GOVERNANCE

6.1 Introduction

What role does civil society play in enhancing human development and good governance? This is the principal question which this chapter seeks to answer. The previous five chapters have highlighted critical challenges which must be urgently addressed in the areas of economic and political governance, institutional capacity as well as gender and social dimensions of human development. The role of the state and its institutions in policy design and implementation and delivery was shown to be paramount in the addressing of these challenges and priorities. This includes the formulation of laws and the administration of rules and regulations, and the allocation of resources for development programmes and basic social services such as education and health. However, as we observed, these are currently difficult times for Zimbabwe's economic and social sectors. The government cannot alone bear the burden and responsibility of ensuring sustainable development, and of safeguarding conditions for good governance. Its capacity has certain limits as we observed in our discussions on economic performance and social sector needs.

This is where civil society organizations (CSOs) come in. In the Zimbabwean context, an assessment of the current and potential contribution of CSOs to governance and human development is necessary and overdue. Such levels include the community and local levels where they play a critical role in representing citizens on social issues such as housing, education, health and social welfare. They also mobilize them around economic issues such as access to credit, agricultural extension services and marketing outlets amongst other issues. Additional areas in which CSOs are active include the conservation and management of natural resources, and facilitating participation in decision-making structures at community and local levels as observed in chapter 4. There is also an array of different roles which CSOs play in de-centralized structures and activities at local and provincial levels.

The roles which CSOs play in the broader development process are no less important or less strategic. In Zimbabwe, the human development process encompasses the provision of resources and services such as basic literacy, education, health, shelter and social welfare amongst others. Furthermore, in the form of a myriad of NGOs, they have been in the forefront of stimulating and assisting local and community-based development projects through the provision of technical expertise and resources. An assessment of these experiences illuminate the capacity and potential of CSOs in contributing to the human development process in Zimbabwe. In this section of the Report, the concept of civil society is defined; and an overview of the development of the CSOs provided. The structure of CSOs and their contributions to human development are then considered. Finally, the increased weight of CSOs in shaping governance is examined with particular reference to several case-studies.
6.2 What is Civil Society?

Although civil society is a widely used and fashionable term, it is not always clearly defined. A simple definition is that civil society refers to “the organizations through which citizens participate and exert influence over public life” (ACPD, 2000). Civil society is where citizens who do not control the levers of political and economic power have access to locally-constituted voluntary associations that have the capacity to influence and even determine the structure of power and allocation of material resources (Swilling, 1992). The concept broadly relates to associational life which is outside the ambit of the state. One theorist observed that civil society is an aggregate of institutions whose members are engaged primarily in a complex of non-state activities such as economic and cultural production, and voluntary associations (Keane, 1988). These institutions exert pressure and controls as ‘watch-dogs’ on state institutions in the areas of governance and development; and they jealously guard their autonomy and identity. Examples of CSOs would include labour unions, business organizations, media, student and youth organizations, women’s associations, civic groups, human rights groups, community-based organizations (CBOs) and various types of other non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

Southern Africa witnessed a proliferation of CSOs in the 1990s especially in areas relating to development and governance. They have been valuable monitors over the observance of political and human rights while some have been directly involved in constitutional reform initiatives. Some CSOs have been involved in such initiatives as development programmes, civic and voter education, election monitoring, publishing of materials on democracy, and holding workshops on transparency and the rule of law.

Zimbabwe has been no exception to this trend. The growth and activism of CSOs has been a notable feature of its political and development landscape in the 1990s (Sibanda, 1999). The catalytic role of CSOs have been summed up in these terms:

“They are able to channel and mobilize people’s participation in economic and social activities and organize them in ways that can influence public policies and access public resources, particularly for the poor. Together with independent and professional journalism, citizens groups, universities and others, they can provide checks and balances on government power and monitor social abuses. They can make valuable contributions to policy formulation... TM (Speth, 1997).

More generally, a strong civil society is an important insurance or bulwark for democracy. A dense civil society bulwark can be a cornerstone for democracy because it acts as a counterweight to state power (Rueschemeyer, et. al., 1992). A vibrant civil society is therefore a vital national asset.

6.3 Civil Society Organisations: An Historical Overview

During the early decades of colonial rule, associational life among Africans in the towns tended to be as temporary as the time spent by migrant workers in the first urban settlements. Nevertheless, even under those fragile conditions, Africans organized burial societies and other types of associations in order to provide themselves with support networks in the often hostile colonial environment. Workers also developed recreational organizations such as football clubs and dance societies.

In addition, Africans developed more directly political forms of organization in the 1930s. Examples of such organizations were the Industrial Commercial Workers Union (ICU), the National Home Movement in Matabeleland, the Rhodesian Bantu Voters’ Association, the Rhodesian Native Association, and the Bantu Congress. These organizations represented a nascent African civil society. During the post-World War 2 period, the increasing number of workers in urban areas, combined with the growing crisis of labour reproduction, led to the growth of trade unions in the major towns. The 1945 Railway Strike and the ‘General Strike’ of 1948 announced the arrival of a more organized labour voice that grew in strength in the I 950s and early 1960s. The fortunes and setbacks of unions were now linked to the emergence of nationalist politics during this period. The growth of nationalist political organizations during this period provided Africans with a broad civic forum in which to organize. However, this experience was both inclusive and subordinating. This was because although the nationalist movement provided a broad framework for political organization, it constrained the autonomous growth of other
organizational structures in the name of a centrally imposed unity. Apart from these organizations, there were also church-based bodies that were concerned with both welfare activities and ecumenical dialogue. A variety of women's clubs were established to instill values of domesticity in the urban population. On the whole, however, civil society at the time of independence was weak and fragile.

6.4 Civil Society in the Post-Colonial Period

The immediate years after 1980 were characterized by a state which had a substantial legitimacy based on the legacy of the anti-colonial struggle and a developmentalist social programme. However, it was a state which still sought to consolidate its wider support base through control over CSOs such as the fledgling labour, women and student movements. Coercion and violence characterized the crisis in Matabeleland during the early independence years as we saw in Chapter 3.

Under these conditions, CSOs sought a low-profile, complementary approach to the interventions of the state. They preferred an entryist approach in dealings with the new strongly interventionist state. For example, during the period 1980-1983, NGOs mobilized women in such areas as rehabilitation, relief and social services, developed close links with external donors, and sought a close working relationship with the ruling Zanu-PF party. By the mid1980s, as the government set out its first five-year plan, the focus of NGOs moved to income-generating projects. NGOs also provided agricultural and vocational training on the assumption that there was a deficit of such skills among rural women in particular. Another assumption was that there existed surplus labour and technology shortage in rural areas which could be mobilized through cooperative labour to embark on non-farm activities. However, these income-generating projects suffered due to weak distribution systems, depressed local purchasing power, competition from large industries, and the demands on women’s labour. For most of the 1980s, a predominant NGO strategy was to draw on donor assistance for their development projects.

The decade of the 1990’s brought with it new challenges and alternative strategies for NGOs. The era of economic reform (represented by ESAP) and post-cold war political dispensation created conditions for more political liberalization and advocacy on a number of issues. These included human rights, gender rights, constitutional reform, AIDS, the environment, culture and economic issues. The economic marginalisation of the majority of Zimbabweans under structural adjustment created an environment for advocacy on poverty issues. The labour movement, student groupings, human rights and women’s organizations began to organize effectively around the central issues of poverty and democratization. This transition is characteristic of many NGOs which begin as providers of welfare services for the poor and then evolve into organizations that question the basis of poverty in society.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box 6.1 Phased Development of NGOs in Zimbabwe</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phase</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Phase (1982-1986)</td>
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</table>
The challenge of tackling poverty is a huge one. Levels of poverty have increased, as we observed in Chapter 5. The challenge has nevertheless provided NGOs with opportunities to complement state efforts at poverty-reduction, and to advocate reforms to ensure a strategic resolution of key development problems. In this regard, NOOS have supported economic activities over a wide range of areas including:

- crafts
- sewing and knitting
- agro-processing
- brick-making and building
- carpentry
- irrigation schemes
- livestock schemes
- transport and marketing schemes
- wild-life management schemes
- soap-making and
- financial mobilization.

Although many of these projects experienced limitations in management and financing, they still succeeded in the provision of a satisfactory measure of goods, services and employment in the absence of private sector activity. Meanwhile, in the area of policy debate on poverty, the establishment of a Poverty Reduction Forum in 1996 provided a valuable structure through which academics, state officials and donors, and NGOs have been able to develop an on-going dialogue on poverty reduction measures.

However, these efforts face considerable difficulties. For instance, the ZHDR 1998 pointed out that: “Most poverty-related activities are rarely anything more than ameliorative. The problem is related to the donor community’s lack of meaningful consultation with civil society, including NGOs, about the development agenda and priorities. NGOs point out that they have little scope to influence the agenda within specific parameters set unilaterally by donor organizations.. (ZHDR, 1998)

To address poverty-related issues, the 1990s witnessed the emergence of various organizations around housing and employment. There was a re-emergence of residence associations which have been revitalized as a response to poor performance by local government authorities, as chapter 4 explained. This growth of community-level civic organizations provided a broad basis for the development of resistance to unpopular state policies.

In addition, the era of structural adjustment also witnessed the formation of organizations to deal with concerns of aspirant African entrepreneurs. These entrepreneurs had largely been neglected in the policies of the 1980s, when the ruling party was espousing a rhetorical attachment to socialism. They used the era of economic liberalization to press claims for more state support. These indigenous groupings crafted their advocacy strategy on the basis of a close relationship to the state and ruling party, and concentrated their demands on cheaper credit facilities, legislative backing for affirmative action, preference in the government tender system, and on the use of the state to source donor funding. An important part of the advocacy function that civic groups developed during this period was the emergence of coalitions to campaign around a number of issues (see box 6.2).
An important part of the advocacy function that civic groups developed in this period was the development of coalitions to campaign around a number of issues. Examples of such coalitions include:

- The Non-State Actors’ Forum started in 1999 to develop optimal ways of institutionalising beneficiary participation in Zimbabwe. It is hoped that the Forum will enlarge the capacity of non-state actors ‘to represent their constituencies more effectively at multiple levels and in relation to a variety of power structures.’

- The Women’s Land Lobby and Advocacy Coalition developed to press for a more gender-sensitive land redistribution programme.

- The Women’s Coalition on the Constitution, formed in 1999, ‘to inform, educate and mobilise women in Zimbabwe in a bid to participate more fully in the constitutional reform process.’ The coalition consists of women across races, cultures, linguistic and ethnic groupings, classes, religions, occupations, political parties, geographical locations, marital status and disabilities. In July 1999, the coalition carried out an outreach programme for women to discuss the constitution, followed by a national workshop’s conference on the constitution attended by 1600 women. The four areas discussed by the women included: the separation of powers; human rights issues; economic issues; and institutional mechanisms. Out of these deliberations emerged a Zimbabwe Women’s Charter.

The National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), formed in 1998 to initiate a discussion on the constitution and to advocate for constitutional reform (see below). The NCA is composed about 135 organisations, and is the largest coalition developed in the post-colonial period. The Assembly successfully campaigned to place constitutional reform at the forefront of Zimbabwean politics, largely through a more confrontational lobbying strategy against the state.

Raftopoulos, 2000

Other CSOs which play an important role are those which champion press and academic freedom. The organization representing the media, the Zimbabwe Union of Journalists (ZUJ), frequently speaks about the need to respect and uphold press freedom. As we observed in Chapter 3, the political environment in which newspapers and magazines publish is a difficult one although no formal censorship exists. Nevertheless, some newspapers and their editors have received threats, and offices belonging to The Daily News group were bombed during the 2000 election campaign and its press bombed in January 2001. The press should not be an object of vilification, threats and physical attacks. An investigative and outspoken press is indispensable in a society which seeks to nurture and consolidate a democratic culture.

Organisations which represent the teaching profession include the Association of University Teachers (AUT), and the Zimbabwe Teachers’ Association (ZMTA). The AUT has been particularly vocal about the issue of academic freedom and autonomy, and has viewed provisions of the Universities Amendment Act passed in the early 1990s as a threat to that freedom and autonomy. ZMTA actively organizes the large teaching profession around issues of salary conditions and related working conditions. It also takes positions on civic and social issues including those relating to spending on education, and conditions in the schools and colleges. These professional associations play a vital role in articulating civic and social issues which have a direct bearing on the human development process.

An overview of civil society organizations in Zimbabwe would be incomplete without reference to the Zimbabwe National War Veterans Association (ZNWVLA) which was founded in the early 1990s. It has brought together thousands of fighters who participated in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle, and has grown increasingly powerful. In 1997, the ZNWVLA was able to secure generous gratuities, pension and other benefits from the government. This was, however, achieved at a considerable economic cost as the Zimbabwe dollar soon depreciated significantly in value. Under the leadership of Chenjerai Hunzvi, the war veterans became associated with both land occupations and the ZANU-PF 2000 election campaign. Some of the war veterans have since been brought to the courts on charges of intimidation and violence. The leadership of the war veterans has actively campaigned against some members of the Judiciary demanding that they resign from their current positions in the High and Supreme Courts.
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6.5 Structure and Development Role of Civic Organizations in Zimbabwe

It has been estimated that about two-thirds of a total of 850 NGOs recorded were community-based organizations (CBOs), church groups and national NGOs. These organizations consist largely of locally based, self-help groupings specializing in a particular activity. They include farming groups and collective cooperatives. The second category consists of intermediary NGOs which make up 18 per cent
of the total. These NGOs assist in the operations of the smaller groups, and mediate between such groups and government and donor agencies. They work in areas such as relief services, rural sanitation and water provision, refugee support, and back-up for cooperatives in the fields of manufacturing, agriculture, fishing, transport, security and printing. The third category consists of service NGOs which make up 9 per cent of the total. These NGOs provide support for project formulation and execution, consultancy and research activities in training, education and information. Another category is that which consists of trusts and unions and constitutes 5 per cent of the total. Belonging to this grouping are provincial development organizations, and unions of various interest groups such as farmers, workers, women and business. Finally, international and regional NGOs are another category. They engage in coordination or collaboration with local NGOs.

Box 6.3: Sectoral Activities of NGOs

In terms of the sectoral activities of the NGOs, these included the following:

- Agricultural and rural development (30%).
- Health and sanitation (5%).
- Education and training (10%).
- Children and youth (2%).
- Environment (3%).
- Women (30%).
- ADS (1%).
- Culture and information (1%).
- Senior citizens and the disabled (2%).
- Human Rights (1%).
- Relief (15%).

The major part of NGO activities in 1994 were concentrated in the fields of Agriculture and Rural Development, Women, and Relief Work. In the first area activities included: Land advocacy; food security; water security; income generating projects; provision of agricultural inputs; improvement of appropriate technology; food-for-work programmes; borehole drilling; dam construction; poverty alleviation. In the grouping on Women, activities centred around: income generating projects; monitoring effects of ESAP; awareness raising; lobbying of the state, banks and donors; start-up grants; women’s legal rights advocacy; poverty alleviation; and networking. The category of Relief included: Drought relief; refugee relief work; supplementary child feeding; and shelter for the destitute.

More recent information from NANGO provides information on 600 NGOs. Unlike the Moyo, Makumbe and Raftopoulos study, this figure does not include the large number of community-based organisations (CBOs).

As Table 3 below indicates, most NGO activity is concentrated in the following sectors:

- Education/Training- (17.5%)
- Gender/Women’s Organisations- (16.7%)
- Health/Elderly- (13.8%)
- Children/Youth- (10.2%)
- Poverty Alleviation- (9.6%)

Source: NANGO, 2000

Table 6.1: Estimated Distribution of NGO Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of NGO</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Proportion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 CBOs</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Intermediary NGOs</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Service NGOs</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Trusts and Unions</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 International and Regional NGOs</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Computed from various records, including the NANGO Directory, various NGO evaluations and assessments made by experts.
Table 6.2: NGOs by Sector of Activity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Alleviation</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children/Youth</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender/Womens’ Organisations</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Development</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Micro Enterprise and Small/Medium</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scale enterprises/ Micro Finance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good Governance/Human</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rights/Democracy</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment/Agriculture/ Wildlife</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research/Documentation and</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infonnation dissemination</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education/Training/Funding/Embassy</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hugh Commission</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health/Elderly</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disabled</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11 990</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1. The total figure is inflated because NGOs operate in more than one sector. 2. The actual total of NGOs according to the NANGO Directory is 593.


The developmental role of NGOs is clearly quite significant in Zimbabwe. For example, a major part of NGO activities in 1994 were concentrated in agriculture and rural development, women’s projects and relief work.
More and up-to-date information on NGOs has been provided by NANGO, an umbrella organization of domestic NGOs. This information shows that the major sectors of NGO activity are in education and training, gender-related activities, health and care of the elderly, children and youth-related programmes, and poverty alleviation (See Box 6.2). However, more recent data concerning newly-formed NGOs especially in the field of health and HIV/AIDS is not captured in the table (6.2).

It can be noted that the major areas of activity remain in the welfarist sector where NGOs carry out activities which complement those of the state. In particular, in periods of crisis, NGOs have played a vital role in the delivery of assistance at the local community level. It is at this level where the organizational capacities of NGOs are most apparent. At such crisis points, the government has shown a greater openness to working with NGOs. Such an instance was that of the devastating drought of 1992. A study carried out in 1997/98 showed that, in drought years, NGO activities were concentrated around water development programmes, child and school-children supplementary feeding programmes (Raftopoulos, Hawkins and Matshalaga, 1999). However, it also observed that national coordination needed improvement to ensure effective delivery of services.

Notwithstanding the positive interventions which NGOs have made in human development in Zimbabwe, they continue to experience several problems. These include:

- A weak funding base dependent on donors, and the growing tendency for short-term results-oriented development funding by such donors. Lack of sustained funding reduces the capacity of such organizations to maintain professional institutions.
• U lack of accountability of some NGOs to their constituencies as a result of the marginalisation of the latter. This feature should be differentiated from instruments of accountability - such, as regular financial and annual reports- put in place by NGOs for their sponsors.

• U the quantitative growth of civic groups has often not been accompanied by effective coordinating initiatives. This has largely been due to conflicting approaches, wariness to being controlled in the name of coordination, and competition over dwindling resources within the NGO community (Moyo et. al. 2000).

The issue of funding lies at the heart of sustainability of NGO activities. Not many NOOs have recourse to sustainable alternative sources. Membership fees are not sufficient to sustain their operations. The consequence is that only a few NGOs can cover their annual institutional costs. NGOs receive minimal support from the private sector. There is scope for more support and collaboration between the two sectors.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Box 6.4: Common NGO Operating Principles</th>
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These operating principles for NGOs, address a need within the NGO sector to clarify the role of NGOs for all parties namely Civil Society, donors and government. As NGOs we must first examine ourselves, before we examine the work of our government and society in general. The core characteristics representing an ideal NGO are mutually reinforced and cannot stand alone. These areas are:

**Participation**
All men and women should have a voice in decision-making, either directly or through legitimate intermediate institutions that represent their interests. Such broad participation is built on freedom of association and speech, as well as capacities to participate constructively.

The question for people concerned with participation issues is whether participation is effective. Effective participation is achieved when group members have an adequate and equal opportunity to place questions on the agenda and to express their preferences about the outcome during decision-making. Participation can occur directly or indirectly.

**Transparency**
Communicating, sharing information and acting in an open manner. Transparency allows stakeholders and employees to gather information that may be critical in uncovering abuses and defending their interests. Transparent systems have clear procedures for public decision-making. Transparency is built on the free flow of information. Processes and information are directly accessible to those concerned with them, and enough information is provided to understand and monitor them.

**Accountability**
Requires that officials answer to stakeholders on the disposal of their powers and duties, expenditure, act on criticisms or requirements made of them and accept (some) responsibility for failure, incompetence or deceit. Decision-makers in an organization are accountable to the public, the board, and the donors, as well as to institutional stakeholders. The accountability differs, depending on the organization and whether the decision is internal or external to an organization.

**Equity**
All men and women have equal opportunities to improve or maintain their interests.

**Effectiveness and Efficiency**
Organisations, management and employees must produce results that meet the needs, requirements and expectations of civil society, while making the best use of resources.

**Strategic Vision**
Management, employees and stakeholders must have a broad long-term perspective on good governance, the development and vision of the organization, along with a sense of what is needed for such development. There is also an understanding of the historical, cultural and social background in which that perspective is grounded.

**Good Management**
Legal frameworks should be fair and enforced impartially. All organizations should implement gender friendly policies. The establishment of transparent systems within a NGO is not all that necessary; in addition, efficiently managed accounts, corruption-free zones, best use of resources, and above all, participatory decision-making is
Not all CSOs adhere to the principles and practices of accountability and transparency in the way in which they conduct their affairs. They have sometimes been influenced by the standards and culture of the wider social environment in which they operate. Instances of authoritarianism, nepotism and corruption have occurred in some CSOs. Such instances have undermined their capacity and their broader credibility in society. Fortunately, the number of such CSOs is not large. However, the issue of internal governance in CSOs should not be shirked. Public confidence in CSOs would be greatly enhanced if they maintained high standards of transparency and accountability. In this respect, it is interesting that the issue of drawing up a Code of Ethics for CSOs (including NGOs) has now been raised. It is a step in the right direction. Just as CSOs expect state institutions to operate democratically and transparently, so they should strive to set an example in their missions and operations.

Clearly, NGOs have made vital contributions to human development. They continue to be important development actors despite the above-mentioned structural constraints under which they operate. Their comparative advantage has been particularly in the provision of social services, drought relief, AIDS care and environmental work. In AIDS prevention and care programmes, there have been significant interventions by NGOs. For example, the Family AIDS Caring Trust was established in 1989 to provide support, education and counseling as well as offer home-based care to AIDS patients. For its part, the AIDS Counseling Trust has developed AIDS education materials and courses, and also provided counseling and support services for people affected by HIV/AIDS.

6.6 Case-Studies of CSOs engaged in Development and Democratization

In this section we provide profiles of different types of relations between CSOs and the state. These relations vary from corporatist links to forms of politicized conflict. We draw out the advantages and disadvantages of different forms and trajectories of state-civil society relationships.

6.6.1 Case Study 1: Indigenous Business Pressure Groups

Indigenous business pressure groups are CSOs which have sought to pursue their objective of greater indigenisation’ of the economy through a close linkage with the state and the ruling Zanu-PF party. With the introduction of ESAP in 1990, these aspiring black business persons emerged as a vocal lobby group. There were a number of reasons for this. in the 1980s, the African middle class in the private sector was still largely marginalized in the policies and priorities of the state. Whereas the Africanisation of the state, largely through the Presidential Directive, was more or less completed by 1985, the mobility of blacks in the private sector was hindered by the white monopoly of that sector.

In general, the state neglected the development of a black entrepreneurial class in the private sector. The adoption of economic reform measures in the 1990s and the change in the ideological milieu of the country’s politics provided a new scenario for this aspirant black entrepreneurial class to pursue its agenda. This class rapidly mobilized around the policy of indigenisation. In 1990, the Indigenous Business Development Centre (IBDC) was formed to develop a more focused and pro active approach to identifying “ the economic, political, legal, and social factors, including the institutional frame work that militate against the development of a vibrant small and medium scale sector” (IBDC, 1993). The IBDC the decisive support of the government in the form of policy reforms, and the allocation of resources to emergent black business people on preferential terms The major elements of this strategy included:

- the de-regulation of laws and procedures hindering black businesses.
- directives to financial institutions to finance black businesses on preferential terms.
- access to finance at below market interest rates.
- land reform designed to develop a strong black commercial class in the agrarian sector.
- and anti-trust legislation to reduce the monopoly of large corporations.
The IBDC went further to demand that the Government Tender Board should direct that 25 per cent of all goods and services in the public sector should be purchased from indigenous enterprises. By the mid-1990s, the IBDC had succeeded in giving the indigenisation issue a very high profile through close relations with the ruling party, state officials and members of parliament. It had also succeeded in attracting extensive donor support. By mid-1994, it had received funding from a diverse set of donors such as NORAD, IRISH AID, AUSTRIAN AID, BARCLAYS, USAID and INDIAN government. This funding was for training, business extension and advisory services and related projects.

However, the increasing access of the IBDC to resources created a potential source for conflict within its leadership. There was some concern that gaining access to IBDC leadership positions might be used as a stepping-stone to political appointment within the ruling party and government. Indeed, in subsequent years, some leaders used the IBDC as a springboard for their political ambitions. By 1994, the IBDC had become embroiled in conflicts which resulted in a split which led to the formation of the Affirmative Action Group (AAG). The AAG adopted a more aggressive lobbying strategy using a stridently nationalist discourse. However, as in the case of the IBDC, it has shown little concern for transparency, and has suffered similar internal wrangles over the leadership.

Moreover, the AAG also provided members of its leadership with a bridge into politics. Thus a central feature of both organizations has been their closeness to the politics of the ruling party. The result of this was that in both organizations, sections of the leadership have sought to pursue the original objectives of indigenisation campaign in the political arena.

Notwithstanding the close relations between the indigenisation groups and the ruling party, the state was slow in providing an overall policy on indigenisation. Emergent business groupings complained repeatedly about the loan conditionalities they were exposed to, with the conservative practices of the banking system guiding the dominant practice in this area. In 1994, the National Planning Commission as well as a Committee of Experts of the ruling party, produced draft reports on indigenisation. These reports, however, amounted to vague programmatic statements.

Certain black business persons attempting to enter the private sector without the patronage of the state have encountered obstacles. The case of the legal tussle between the state and the telecommunications company, ECONET, over the granting of a cellular phone license, is an example of the lack of transparency in the indigenisation policy. The case was eventually settled in the Supreme Court in 1995 in favour of ECONET. The lack of support given to ECONET by indigenisation groups reflected political divisions within the indigenous business groups. Some of them had become deeply immersed in politics of patronage.

6.6.2 Case-Study 2: The Labour Movement

The case of the labour movement is one of a CSO which developed from modest foundations into a powerful organization in both spheres of development and governance. Formed out of six different national centres in 1981, the ZCTU initially played a marginal role in policy matters and politics. Indeed, the government played a catalytic role in the formation of the ZCTU, and dominated it till the mid-1980s. In 1985, the Labour Relations Act was passed to broaden the scope of labour relations management and advance the right of workers to join unions and workers committees. However, the Act restricted the right to strike, and put considerable powers at the disposal of the Minister of Labour. By the mid-1980s, the ZCTU, which was still under state tutelage, faced serious legitimacy problems amongst affiliate unions. A government-appointed Administrator conducted an enquiry which unearthed corrupt practices by the leadership of the time. However, in 1988, a substantive new leadership emerged in the ZCTU which instituted a restructuring programme in the labour centre itself resulting in a growth in the number of affiliates and a stabilization of membership. In the late 1980s, a more assertive and independently-inclined labour movement had emerged. It focused its campaign on a number of issues. These included:

- wider tripartite consultation in labour legislation matters;
- pressing the state to allow free collective bargaining;
- demand for more clarity and commitment to the governments stated socialist programme;
• a call for trade union representation in Parliament; and
• a critical posture on the state’s shift towards economic liberalization.

Significantly, the labour movement now broadened its agenda into a wider campaign for democratization. This campaign took the form of struggles against the one-party state, corruption and the continuation of the State of Emergency. In these campaigns, the labour movement began to develop alliances with other civic groups which also sought to challenge the dominant political position of the ruling Zanu-PF pay. Linkages were forged with civic groups such as student and human rights organizations to lobby for a greater democratization of state structures.

In 1990, the launch of ESAP drew sustained criticism from the ZCTU. The programme was criticized for its flawed conception, and for lack of consultation of CSOs in the process of its design. In 1992, the state introduced the Labour Relations Amendment Act that set out to deregulate labour relations in line with ESAP. During the same year, an anti-ESAP demonstration was forcefully broken up by the police. Six unionists were arrested and charged under the Law and Order Maintenance Act. A subsequent High Court judgment acquitted the six and affirmed their constitutional right to assemble and demonstrate. The souring of relations between the state and the ZCTU led to the refusal of the government leadership to attend May Day celebrations in 1992. The government accused the ZCTU of taking the Zambian or ‘Chiluba’ route through seeking to transform the labour movement into a labour party. Given the growing rift between the state and labour in this period, and the continued marginalisation of the ZCTU from the policy process, the latter adopted a different approach in 1995. As the state prepared to develop a second phase of the adjustment programme, the ZCTU produced a document entitled ‘Beyond ESAP’. The document was an attempt to engage the state in a more constructive debate on economic adjustment reforms. While the document accepted a good deal of the neoliberal premise of macro-economic stabilization, it nevertheless attempted to draw the state into a greater social dialogue on the process, in particular the need for a social contract.

However, over the next two years, two events occurred that once again opened the rift between the state and labour. First, there was a public sector strike organized by nurses and teachers over wage conditions. The strike seriously unsettled the state and consolidated the support for the ZCTU amongst public sector workers. Second, a strong war veterans’ lobby emerged within Zanu-PF calling for greater financial compensation and political recognition. The government decision to pay each veteran Z$50 000 in 1997 had an enormous impact on the fiscus resulting in the imposition of a levy on taxpayers. Even though this decision was eventually dropped after opposition from the ZCTU and other sectors of civil society, the labour movement went on to organize a general strike in December 1997. The strike sought to protest against other levies still in place, and against the general lack of transparency in the state’s budgetary decisions. The strike received massive support not only from workers in most sectors but also from employers frustrated with the lack of policy consultation by the state. The strike was followed by more stay-aways in March and November 1998.

Notwithstanding the central role of the ZCTU in taking the lead in protest against specific social and economic policies, it was not able to halt the declining standards of living of its membership. This was a more general reflection of the downturn in the national economy in the late 1990s. The indicators of this declined were:

• real wages declined from an index of 122 in 1982 to 88 in 1997;
• the share of wages in gross domestic income fell from 54 per cent in 1987 to 39 per cent while that of profits increased from 47 per cent to 63 per cent during the same period;
• the PASS study of 1995 estimated that 61 per cent of households lived in poverty; and
• employment growth declined from an average of 2,4 per cent in 1985-90 to 1,5 per cent in 1991-97 (Z1-IDR, 1999; Kanyenze, 1999).

Despite these setbacks, the ZCTU has proved a cohesive force and focal point for affiliate unions. It succeeded in having collective bargaining accepted as an effective machinery in the private sector and in the parastatal sector. However, the male dominance of union structures remains a problem. Even though women can be found in increasing numbers in agriculture, food processing, commercial, textile and clothing unions, they have not been well represented in workers’ committees and trade union structures.
By the end of 1998, the ZCTU and other CSOs had reached the decision that further lobbying of the state could only take place through the formation of a formal political party. In February 1999, a National Working People’s Convention (NWPC) was convened bringing together many of the 100 affiliated groups that were already working together with the ZCTU in the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA). Following the NWPC, a mandate was sought to develop a political party - resulting in the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The formation of the MDC has nevertheless created a dilemma for the labour movement. This relates to what form its relationship with political parties should be. One of the major challenges that the labour movement has faced in the post-colonial period has been to maintain some autonomy from political parties. The ZCTU will therefore need to negotiate its relationship with the MDC carefully in order to avoid falling victim to the kind of party domination that was exerted over it during the early years of independence.

6.6.3 Case-Study 3: The NCA

The National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) is a useful case of a CSO formed to lobby and organize around a single issue: that of constitutional reform. It was formally launched in 1998 after initial meetings with the Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC), with NGOs and trade unions committed to working on constitutional reform. The major objectives were:

- to initiate and engage in a process of enlightening the general public on the current constitution of Zimbabwe;
- to identify shortcomings in the current constitution and to organize debate on possible constitutional reform;
- to facilitate debate in ways that allowed broad-based participation;
- to subject the constitution-making process to popular scrutiny with a view to entrenching the principle that constitutions are made by and for people; and
- to encourage a culture of popular participation in decision-making.

Responding both to reform-minded concerns within ZanuPF itself as well as to pressures from the NCA, the ruling party called for a constitutional review at its party congress in 1998. For its part, the NCA sought a stakeholders conference that would first agree on the process while the ruling party’s position favoured a central role for the President in selecting a Commission after consultation with relevant stakeholders.

In April 1999, after several meetings between the ruling party and the NCA failed to reach an agreement on the process, the President set up a Commission under the Commission of Enquiry Act to review the constitution. The NCA resolved not to enter into any constitution-making process except in terms of the principles which it had already set out to the government. It called a People’s Constitutional Convention (PCC) in June 1999 where it was recommended that the NCA should continue to reject the government’s constitutional process as inherently defective, and to inform and mobilize people on the reasons for this rejectionist stance. The PCC mandated the NCA to implement an alternative process which would involve all major groups of Zimbabweans, in particular women, youth, students, workers, the rural inhabitants and the disabled.

The latter half of 1999 was dominated by bitter exchanges between representatives of the two processes in what became a battle for legitimacy. Moreover, the NCA carried out a widespread civic education campaign and a programme of provincial meetings and a series of stakeholder meetings with particular interest groups such as employers, farmers, labour, women and students. The referendum on the draft constitution was held in February 2000. The result was a rejection of the draft constitution by a vote of 697,754 against the 578,210 who voted for it. The vote at one level was a protest against the manner in which the process was carried out as well as against the content of the constitution. Additionally, however, the vote against the draft was a protest against the state of the crisis in the economy and the government performance in handling it.

Clearly, the processes set in train by the activities and organization of the NCA provided an important framework for the development of opposition politics in Zimbabwe. The linkage between the struggles of the labour movement and those of the constitutional groupings within the NCA provided strong
organizational and mobilisational spaces for the development of opposition politics. In addition, through its strong emphasis on alliance-building and respect for the organizational autonomy of its affiliates, the NCA has sought to engender a respect for organizational pluralism.

Nevertheless, the NCA has encountered some criticism. This has centred on the criticism that the biggest opposition party, the MiX, has had excessive representation in an organization that purported to be non-partisan. This issue continues to be at the centre of criticisms against the NCA, even though those members who have taken up leadership positions in the MDC no longer sit on the task-force of the NCA.

6.6.4 Summary of Issues Stemming from Case-Studies

A number of issues relating to governance emerge from these case-studies. These are that:

• civic groups have used various strategies in their relationships. These have ranged flora a close ‘entryist’ relationship to more confrontational positions, and sometimes a combination of both:

• major civic organizations of the 1990s have provided a bridge from civic struggles to politics, whether ruling party opposition politics;

• the tensions which have emerged between the state and civic organizations is often the result of a lack of consultative structures the part of the state. The lack of consultation on major economic policies governance issues often leads to polarisation of positions between the to sides,

• where tensions have occurred between the state and civic organizations, this has in some cases strengthened democratic structures through the development of a vigorous debate and lobbying process. Tensions can produce a creative process of participation if there is a broader enabling environment. The constitutional reform debate is a case in point;

• in cases where civic organizations surrender their critical autonomy to a political party, the results are often unsatisfactory. The structures, functions and transparency of such organizations tend to deteriorate;

• the emergence of a stronger civil society has nurtured the idea of political pluralism, and a more open discussion of what it means to be national. Legitimacy in the contemporary period has to be worked for tenaciously through a process of democratic renewal.

6.7 Conclusion

During the last 20 years, and particularly in the 1990s, Zimbabwe has witnessed the emergence of a vibrant civil society. This has been the result of a plethora of struggles over a broad terrain of issues. These have ranged from human rights to economic marginalisation. Central to this process has been a questioning of the role of the state, and the accountability of the ruling party. Civic organizations have moved away from a broad and unquestioning acceptance of the development goals and liberation credentials of the state and the ruling party. They now assert their autonomy more jealously. This development has provided a more enabling environment for tackling the broader issue of human development especially as it relates to the opening of more spaces for democratic and more inclusive forms of participation.

The major target of the critique of CSOs has been the national state particularly its deficit in areas of management and accountability. However, as important as this emphasis has been in placing the issue of state accountability at the centre of the political debate in Zimbabwe, civic organizations appear to have aimed insufficient attention to the global dimensions of the crisis in the country. As the ZHDR 1999 warned:

“In the final analysis, globalization cannot be reduced to a technical phenomenon. Talk of the ‘world becoming smaller’, and the emergence of ‘a global village’ obscures the fact that globalization is a political and social phenomenon, as well as a technical and economic one. It involves and implicates
states, international organizations, domestic political organizations, businesses, unions, households as well as cultural, health and education systems.” (ZHDR, 1999)

There are a number of challenges that should be tackled in order to strengthen and sustain the progress made by CSOs, and provide a more enabling environment for governance and human development. These are:

i) In order for civic organizations to increase their effectiveness, they need to improve their co-ordination. This particularly relates to lobbying for policy changes over a wide range of issues. This could be facilitated by the strengthening of the capacity and legitimacy of a central umbrella NGO organization. This development would enable NGOs to have a mechanism to monitor their own activities as well as ensure more transparency in their operations.

ii) The state needs to develop more substantive structures for policy dialogue in order to create a more open and inclusive environment in the policy process. Through the development of such structures, there would be a stronger basis for generating legitimacy and consensus. This process could begin through the establishment of a social contract. Elements that could form the basis of such a contract are prices and incomes policies, social services and social security, labour legislation, employers’ and workers’ rights, and productivity-related issues.

iii) The matter of constitutional reform needs to be revisited in order to provide parameters for more democratic and accountable structures. The process should be resumed soon probably firstly in Parliament, and then through the convening of a stake-holders’ conference to agree on the process.

In conclusion, it needs to be stressed that in order to provide an environment more conducive for the growth of human development, it is essential that the problems of governance are dealt with as a matter of urgency. CSOs have played a prominent role in bringing the matter to the fore. The burden is on the state to provide a more facilitative environment.

7. CORPORATE AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

7.1 Introduction

The national context of governance has so far been emphasized in this Report. The role of state institutions, political parties, civil society institutions as well as organised business interests is a major determining factor in the shaping of governance in any society. Their combined role cannot, therefore, be minimised. However, the larger global environment in which these institutions and forces operate should not be ignored. It is an environment which has become increasingly significant in the context of globalisation. This was a theme explored in depth in the ZHDR 1999 Report. It was observed, for example, that:

Increasing globalisation and its intricate linkages with modern technology permits the interests and powers of other nations, as well those of the economically powerful multinational corporations, to penetrate deeply into the lives and decisions at local level. Those developments have made action and initiatives by local communities, interest groups and national governments increasingly difficult. As all economies, both large and small, increasingly depend on international trade, national economies have become less amenable to direction by domestic policy (Chitauro in ZHDR 1999).

While the national institutions still retain some autonomy and responsibility for policies and programmes, they now have to negotiate with various other institutions and forces in the international context. This makes policy-making and implementation, and indeed governance more complex. In this section of the Report, we explore the role of corporate and global interests in national governance and human development. In doing so, we seek to provide a more complete picture of the factors which shape, facilitate or constrain governance and human development at the national level. After examining the salient aspects of corporate governance in Zimbabwe, this section then analyses the
issue of corruption as it relates to the corporate sector. It will conclude by assessing the impact of global governance on Zimbabwe with particular reference to its effects on human development.

7.2 Corporate Governance

In a world in which globalisation is proceeding fast, corporate firms and institutions play a very significant role in the ownership and control of economic and cultural flows and power. However, despite their massive reach and influence, transnational corporations remain largely untouched by any form of international regulation (UNRISD, 1995). Most developing countries, including Zimbabwe, do not have instruments or regulatory capacity to ensure that such transnational firms have satisfactory standards of accountability and transparency in their operations.

The institutional and legal framework in which firms operate forms the fabric of corporate governance (Jarret, 1997). Boards and shareholders are expected to be actively interested and involved in governance issues in their firms but the mechanisms of doing so are often weak. Important indicators of governance in corporations are the institutional mechanisms which mediate the relationship between management and employees, and those which seek to curb such practices as “insider trading”. Corporate governance is often shaped by two conflicting interests: those of the owners, and those of the employees. The search for bigger profits by firms and the push for increased wages by employees form a potential conflict zone. Further, in the corporate arena, sectional interests as against public realm interests are pre-eminent. Profit, market expansion and lower production costs are the prime considerations which guide corporate governance. However, pressures are mounting across the globe for the corporate firms to be accountable for their actions: for instance, on environmental protection, job security for employees and on the general welfare of society.

At the national level, expectations are also growing regarding the social responsibility of corporate firms. They are expected to re-invest a portion of their profits in social projects or programmes that benefit the wider society. In Zimbabwe, some corporate firms have contributed to sport and recreation while others have provided education scholarships and infrastructure such as schools and clinics. But such firms involved in philanthropy form a minority. Most would contribute to charitable causes for public relations purposes and advertisement. Corporate firms need to re-invest on a more sustained basis in the societies from which they draw their resources and profits. In that way, they can positively contribute to human development especially amongst the poor strata of society.

Box 7.1: Corporate Governance

Governance in Zimbabwe’s corporate world is characterized by the mutual suspicions of each other by all stakeholders and in some situations it has taken a political dimension. Although it is agreed that corporate governance in any system, in general, takes its cue from the politics of the system, the governance in corporations has taken too much of a political dimension and is now unable to function as a lever in checking abuses of the system, to the detriment of all the stakeholders. The Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance (CACG) says that Good Corporate governance requires that the state puts in place and maintains an enabling environment in which efficient and well managed companies can thrive. Companies are expected to play their part in encouraging dialogue between the public and private sectors in promoting good public governance and an enabling business environment. Under the current circumstances it could be said that companies and/or business organizations have shied away from their role of encouraging dialogue and seeking good public governance. It could be argued that this posture is political. However as can be seen everyday, an enabling business environment can only exist in a system that has good public governance whose pillars are based on dialogue and transparency rather than confrontation. For a long time the tendency in business has been to look the other side and continue with their business as long as they have been making their profits. What they did not realize was that, much as they were bringing in profits under the inequitable environment these were only short term, or until the situation got out of hand.

This approach has failed to secure the maintenance and increase of shareholder value and the continued satisfaction of other stakeholders in the long term. By not having engaged the government and other stakeholders at an earlier stage, the business community should share or take the blame for the current situation which is not conducive for good corporate governance or long term returns to the shareholders. Be that as it may, it can however never be too late to take corrective action. The corporate world must appreciate that the current volatile situation may even get worse if business does not genuinely engage the government and facilitate negotiation and co-operation. It has to be emphasized that all stakeholders have to be prepared to give
and take with a view to produce a win-win solution. This process is not an option but a must because the consequences of not doing anything are too ghastly to contemplate. As a way of trying to protect their long term interests it is therefore incumbent upon companies to engage government, and all the other stakeholders including the landless and the landowners, and facilitate negotiation and rapprochement, educate or share with them the ramifications or results of the current state of affairs in the long term, not only for individuals and companies but for the whole country, and a whole generation or generations that will be born and raised in poverty. This cannot be shied away from, as corporate in terms of good corporate governance have a duty to look after the society they live in, as well as nurture that society to ensure the company of long term survival and maximization of shareholders wealth in the long term. It must be emphasized that the absence of, or little regard to, good corporate governance standards has a huge impact on the poverty levels of the general public. For instance lack of transparency, in the award of contracts, lack of genuine competitive bidding and the use of backhanders (bribes) results in higher than necessary costs, and sometimes poorer products or both. More scarce funds are then spent on huge rectification costs or on purchasing more items (as in hospital drugs) where they should not have been the case. It is unfortunate that even the company-to-company deals have now also been affected by lack of transparency, bribes and backhanders. This again is a result of company shareholders not being serious about good corporate practice. They have allowed their management teams and employees to break the rules of the game and operating procedures that have been set. The shareholders need to shoulder much of the blame. It is them who have allowed standards of best practice to deteriorate. Since it is their responsibility to elect directors, they must elect competent people and ensure that the individuals elected, govern the corporation in a manner that is consistent with their stewardship.

Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administration, 2000

Reforms in corporate governance could go some way to alleviate poverty and socio-economic marginalisation. One possible approach is to increase the equity owned by employees and thereby enlarge their economic stake in a particular firm. Involving employees in equity holding, profit-sharing and decision-making would go a long way to make corporate governance more responsive and accountable. Worker participation in corporate governance should be initiated well before a crisis engulfs a firm. In Zimbabwe, the tendency has been to give workers a share or equity in firms under threat of closure. There is a compelling case to raise the amount of equity or shares which should go to employees when public sector corporations are slated for commercialisation or privatisation.

At the international level, corporate governance is exercised through the widening role of transnational corporations (TNCs). By 1994, there were an estimated 37 000 TNCs with 200 000 affiliates worldwide (UNRISD,1995). With combined annual sales measured in trillions of US dollars, some TNCs have annual sales which exceed the GDP of individual countries including Zimbabwe. This makes TNCs very powerful economic players. However, there are number of characteristics of TNCs which are of concern to those who care about governance and human development:

- Despite their massive power, TNCs remain largely untouched by any form of international regulation.

- TNCs have often used their bargaining power to strike very lucrative deals in developing countries-buying up land cheaply when governments are too weak or poor to exploit the resources themselves, and continuing to extract raw materials under low-price long-term contracts. This is rapidly exhausting the resource base.

- The environmental standards followed by TNCs are usually far below those they are obliged to follow in industrial countries. Although they may behave better than domestic companies, they should be able to set a much better example since they have enormous resources.

- The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), for example, enhances the power of TNCs to enforce patents, trademarks and copy-rights - while simultaneously impeding government efforts to require TNCs to assist with indigenous technological development.

Similarly, the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) restricts developing host governments that wish to put conditions on investment.
The current arrangements for regulating international business are somewhat ad hoc. A framework for international regulation would be based on these principles: (a) that national regulatory systems have an important role to play and can be applied in the international arena (b) that democratic accountability for corporations can and should be applied internationally - to do any less represents a double standard (c) that without some level of international business regulation many global social problems will never be solved, and indeed may get worse (UNRISD, 1995).

Corporations have not been exemplary where it concerns monopoly stranglehold in some sectors, and where environmental matters are concerned. Through monopolies they have exerted predominant influence in weaker developing countries, and thereby blocked the fuller development of indigenous enterprises which could provide healthy competition. Furthermore, there is a steady accumulation of copyrights by TNCS, and this strengthens their monopoly position. However, the adverse effects of monopoly power are recognized even in the developed economies themselves. Attempts to loosen the control and grip of such corporations as Microsoft on the computer and software sector in the United States are aimed at diluting the excessive power which some corporations now wield.

Related concerns have been expressed about the impact of corporate policies towards the environment. In addition to the above-mentioned depletion of local non-renewal resources by some corporations, there are mounting worries concerning their dumping of certain harmful products in developing countries. For instance, some pharmaceutical firms sell to developing countries products that have been banned in their own home countries. In other instances, pharmaceutical products sold by corporations to developing countries have severe labelling deficiencies - failing to provide doctors with the information to prescribe the drug safely and effectively (UNRISD, 1995). Pesticides can also represent a serious health risk. Yet a considerable proportion of pesticides exported by TNCS from the US in the late-1980s were chemicals banned, regulated or withdrawn from sale in the US (ibid). This has adverse effects on both the workers who apply the pesticides, and the consumers who use the products sprayed with the pesticides. Furthermore, there have been those cases where corporations have exported toxic products to certain developing countries for a fee. This dumping of toxic materials will have long-term effects on the pollution levels in those countries which import the materials out of economic desperation. Sound corporate governance would not sanction nor include such measures to take advantage of poor developing countries. Furthermore, since the TNCs are involved in so much of the worlds productive activity, they also contribute to more general forms of environmental degradation. For example, they are the primary producers and consumers of ozone-depleting CFCs, and also generate an estimated 50 per cent of greenhouse emissions responsible for global warming (UNRISD, 1995).

Corporate governance is therefore a matter that should be tackled at national level by individual states. National regulation is vital. However, internationally agreed regulations or codes of conduct which specify good corporate governance practices should be drawn for TNCs. Social auditing of TNCs has also been proposed. Similarly, codes of good corporate governance should be drawn for national firms. Such regulations or codes would be worked in consultation with all the interested parties including the firms themselves, labour unions and state institutions.

7.3 Corruption in the Corporate Sector and Impact on the Economy

When we discussed the issue of corruption in the chapter on the political and institutional aspects of governance, we confined our attention to the public sector. It would be misleading to give the impression that corruption is a monopoly of the public sector. It is not. Corruption in the form of bribery of officials for purposes of securing contracts or tenders is an activity in which both domestic and international firms have dabbled in. The other side of the coin of public sector corruption is often corporate sector corruption itself. The search for undeserved gain by public sector officials can be coupled with the search for quick and early profit by corporate firms. To a large extent, corruption thrives under certain conditions:

- Unrestrained executive authority among private corporate leaders who claim to be fulfilling the goals of a corporate organisation while disguising influence-peddling, bribing and personal acquisition of undeserved rewards.
• Weak institutions of government involving inadequate executive, legislative and judicial mechanisms to deal with greed, vice and excessive ambition.

• Citizens who seek short-cuts through paying quickly for public or private services but without fulfilling the necessary conditions to attain their goals (Kambudzi, 2000).

As in the public sector, the impact of corruption on the corporate sector is similarly negative. But it is mostly the weak, poor and unorganised groups of citizens which are the direct victims of corruption (Kambudzi, 2000). These vulnerable groups are victims of both public and corporate sector corruption. The costs of corruption in the form of higher prices, diminished services and delays are often borne by these groups.

In Zimbabwe, there were a number of highly publicised cases of alleged corruption in the corporate sector in 1999 and 2000. Although the rate of successful prosecution of the cases is low, such cases have not reflected well on governance practices in firms. Probably, it would have been somewhat unusual if public sector corruption had not been reflected (albeit on a different scale) in the corporate sector. It is difficult to quantify the full costs of corruption on the national economy and society but it is massive. Corruption in both the public and corporate sectors discourages investment, and taints the image of a country. For instance, it will take many years for countries such as Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Cameroon to recover from their image of being 'corrupt' societies. Zimbabwe faces the stigma of being viewed as sliding deeper into corruption unless it puts into place concerted measures to root it out, and thereby rehabilitate its image. The ZHDR 1998 Report, for instance, observed that corruption contributes significantly to poverty and inequality. It also results in mis-targeting and inefficiency in social spending programmes. Other negative forms and effects of corruption include tax evasion, diversion of funds to the wealthy, a high concentration of asset ownership leading to powerful lobbies on government for favourable policies and treatment (ZHDR, 1998).

In recent years, evidence has been gathered to demonstrate that corruption reduces a country's economic competitiveness in the regional and international arena. The 2000 Africa Competitiveness Report, for example, observes that while some countries in Africa are relatively "clean", others experience varying degrees of corruption (ACR, 2000). The relatively clean group of countries include Botswana, Namibia, Tunisia and the Seychelles. The corrupt countries include Madagascar, Nigeria, Kenya and Uganda. The situation regarding corruption in Zimbabwe was highlighted, and the situation viewed as deteriorating. A number of observations have been made on the wider impact of corruption on the economy and society:

• Corruption severely distorts markets and the allocation of resources.

• Given Africa's particular need for capital and technology, the cost of corruption appears particularly high.

• With the selection of public investment projects being distorted by corruption, their productivity and a country's infrastructure in general are adversely affected.

• Corruption undermines a government's ability to impose and enforce necessary regulatory controls to correct for market failures.

The benefits of corruption eradication ought to be self-evident. Clearly, there is need for incentives and rewards for those public and private corporate interests which shun corruption in their operations. Publicity of exemplary corruption-free record of a corporation could be one form of reward. More generally, there will be need for reform measures in order to reduce corruption. Such measures could include:

• streamlining and reducing cumbersome regulations,

• privatisation a possible source of corruption, should be carried out with maximum transparency,

• existence of a strong and independent judiciary, and

• existence of a free press and active civil society, and a committed leadership (ACR, 2000).
While the campaign against corruption rests primarily with the authorities of respective countries, international efforts could also play a role. It was observed that, until recently, bribing foreign officials was not illegal in some OECD countries, and that the USA made it illegal only in 1977. An international treaty which aims to strengthen the collective behaviour of all TNCs not to pay bribes would be a useful supplement to domestic policy measures (ACR, 2000). However, there should be no illusions that combating corruption, both at the national and international levels, will be simple and not protracted. Simplistic approaches would be doomed to fail. The structural conditions and forces which abet corruption need to be tackled as well (Szeftel, 2000).

### 7.4 Global Governance

Global governance has become increasingly central in a rapidly globalising world. It cannot be ignored by national governments and regional organisations. The global level of governance relates to processes and systems of governance in international economic, financial, political and security institutions, and the ways they interact with individual countries. Amongst the institutions engaged in global governance are those that come under the umbrella of the United Nations family of organisations; and those which make up the Bretton Woods system. As we have already pointed above, the rapid acceleration of globalisation (especially in the economic sphere) has raised new issues in global governance. National autonomy in spheres such as economic and social policy is being eroded under the impact of globalisation. Thus globalisation is not only shaping processes of economic, political and cultural change but it is also depriving local and national institutions of a good deal of their autonomy. There is a growing opinion that in this integrating world - in which marginalisation also persists - there is a clear need for equitable global governance, (UNRISD, 1995; UNDP,1999). Such governance is imperative for the resolution of global problems which include international conflicts and security, trade disputes and debt issues. The development of an international civil society that is forging new transactional links and simultaneously presenting demands to governments in many countries is another source of pressure for such an equitable system of global governance. At the same time there is growing concern about the current levels of representation in key global institutions. The concern also relates to problems of leadership and efficiency in major multilateral institutions, and this has led to proposals for the reform of these institutions (UNRISD, 1995).

Major multi-lateral organisations involved in global economic governance include the World Bank, the IMF and the Bank of International Settlements. These institutions wield enormous power especially vis-à-vis the developing countries. Their rules and conditionalities are aimed at creating a secure and favourable environment for open markets. However, there are no countervailing rules to protect human rights and promote human development (UNDP, 1999). Although developing countries are home to about 80 per cent of the worlds population they have less than a fifth of the world’s GDP. As a consequence, they have little say and leverage in key institutions involved in global economic governance.

Yet, as we saw in the chapters on economic and social governance, the conditionalities attached to lending to countries like Zimbabwe had wide social ramifications. Social sector spending especially in education and health is one of the early targets for drastic cuts in funding. This often has a direct impact on the poor’s access to these basic services. In Zimbabwe, the intervention in economic and social policy by the WB and the IMF was particularly marked during the ESAP era in 1990-95. They exerted considerable leverage through their conditions for lending to finance the programme. Several issues arise from this mode of intervention in economic and social policymaking through an economic adjustment programme. The first relates to accountability and responsibility for the outcomes of these policies and programmes. Essentially, it is the host government which bears the responsibility of the outcomes. Such outcomes vary from food riots“ to government loss of popularity and legitimacy. The global institutions do not account for their specific intervention through the adjustment programmes, nor do they bear responsibility for the subsequent social and political fall-out. It has been observed that these institutions have leaned hard on national governments to adopt their preferred systems of social protection, and that most experiences would suggest that the WB and IMF should incorporate principles of democratic and equitable governance into their policies and programmes. The same may be said of the programmes of these institutions in Zimbabwe.
The second aspect relates to representation on these Bretton Woods institutions and theft internal governance. They are heavily dominated by the rich countries especially the US, Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom. The economic interests of these richer countries are reflected in the policies and decisions of these institutions. It is scarcely surprising that some countries and currents of opinion argue that the WB and IM for example, should be subject to greater controls to ensure that they represent the interests not only of the creditor but also debtor nations. A related position is that in order to address the large inequalities in economic power and influence embedded in such international institutions as these ones, voting arrangements need to be revised for fairness and efficiency (UNDP, 1999). Decision-making in international finance and trade needs to be more transparent, and independent evaluations of international public policies could be a first step towards increased accountability. Thus improving institutional accountability is a priority in reform of global governance.

The same concerns about accountability may be expressed with regard to ad hoc and self-selected countries and institutions which have emerged in the past decade to make de facto global economic policy. These include the G-7 group of countries, as well as the G-10 central bankers which guide the supervision of the international banking system. These various powerful groups are neither accountable to states nor transparent in their operations from the point of view of developing countries. The major challenge therefore remains on how global governance may be shaped to ensure democratic decision-making, wider participation and accountability (Desai, 1995).

A similar set of issues may also be raised in relation to global political governance. The representation and leverage of developing and poor countries in institutions such as the UN Security Council is small. The interests of the developing countries such as Zimbabwe are given less attention. The debate on levels of representation and criteria of membership of these institutions is therefore likely to continue. A reformed global architecture for international governance is overdue. Of course, regional arrangements such as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are important building blocks for such an architecture. Developing countries should strengthen these regional institutions in economic and political fields. They should use regional economic institutions to develop and coordinate common positions in economic negotiations, develop regional initiatives in financial matters and generally improve their bargaining capacity in the global arena (SADC RHDR, 1998).

Global governance should serve the purposes of human development. It should have as its priorities the broadening and deepening of human development on international levels in the social and economic arenas. This will entail measures to narrow global inequalities and ensure that poor countries and disadvantaged strata of society receive opportunities and assistance for a decent existence. The world has enough rich nations and social strata that are capable of bearing this social investment in human development. The principles of human development and social protection should be incorporated into the concept and practices of global economic governance. The human development priorities of poverty reduction, equity and sustainability should similarly be incorporated into programmes of global governance institutions. The interests of the poor and other disadvantaged should not be sacrificed on the altar of those of “market force” or the rich few.

It is against this background that we need to reflect on the enormous responsibilities which international institutions bear especially in the arena of economic reform in developing countries such as Zimbabwe. Reforms like ESAP and ZIMPREST have not borne the anticipated success. Although the government bears part of the responsibility for the shortfalls of these programmes, the lending institutions share some of the responsibility. There were errors of commission and omission in the implementation of these programmes. Some of the errors relating to the timing of the reform measures and others to avoidable delays in disbursement of funds by the institutions (Gibbon, 1995). In its audit of ESAP, the WB admitted that mistakes were made in the design of the programme (WB, 1995). It also conceded that the social costs of the programmes turned out to be heavier than originally anticipated. There is therefore need for less dogmatism in the drawing up of reform packages and the accompanying conditionalities. For in the last analysis, it is the host developing country which largely, if not entirely, bears the flak from failed policies and programmes.
A major issue which should be addressed in the context of global governance is the huge debt of the developing counties. Most of these highly indebted countries, like Zimbabwe, are poor, and have enormous problems in servicing the debt. Zimbabwe’s debt in October 2000 had soared to over Z$123 billion and to Z$160 billion in January 2001. The foreign component of this debt is quite considerable, as we saw in the chapter on economic governance. A direct outcome of the high indebtedness is the significant cutback in social sector spending, especially health where conditions have declined in the past few years. We concur that the slow progress in tackling the accumulated debt of 41 heavily-indebted countries (HIPCs):

“Is one of the clearest examples of how globalisation has been failing the poorest and the least developed countries. For several years, most commentators have agreed that the debt of these countries is excessive and unpayable. Yet the actions so far have been minute in relation to needs. The debt burden has undermined growth, health and education. By the test of human development, sub-Saharan Africa and other HIPCs deserve more support” (UNDP, 1999).

An important initiative aimed at sensitising the Zimbabwean public about the debt issue is that of the Zimbabwe Coalition on Debt and Development. It is a network of civil society organisations that have come together to campaign for economic justice through debt cancellation (SAPEM, 2000; Goncalves, 2000). Global economic governance should address the debt issue as a matter of urgency. Other related measures would include breaking barriers to markets in rich countries to products from the developing countries. Similarly, conscious efforts at encouraging investment in developing countries ought to be taken in a concerted fashion rather than leave it to individual firms. Countries such as Zimbabwe would benefit from a more favourable international trade and investment regime.

The alleviation of debt and promotion of investment should be accompanied with the lowering of trade protectionism by industrialised countries. The protectionism has prejudiced the exports and economies of developing countries significantly. Some estimates are that developing countries lose about US$20 billion annually due to government subsidies to products in developed countries. The lowering of protectionism and subsidies to inefficient producers in the developed countries themselves would therefore be a huge boost to producers in developing countries. The role of UNCTAD should be enhanced in this push towards the lowering of trade protectionism.

It is noteworthy that international civil society has demonstrated a close interest in these issues of economic governance, debt and trade protectionism. The role of such organisations as Fifty Years Is Enough (which has campaigned against Bretton Woods institutions’ policies), and those of Jubilee 2000 (on debt forgiveness) has been extremely useful in sensitising both the public and governments on the implications of adjustment programmes and the debt situation in developing countries. These initiatives need to be consolidated until there are significant changes in the present lending policies and debt situation.

In sum, there is a strong imperative for a more humane global governance. Just as there are warts or shortfalls in national governance (as we saw in the case of Zimbabwe in previous chapters) so there are also such warts in institutions involved in global governance. Like ‘good governance’ good global governance is still some way off. But like the vigorous national debates on governance, there should also be a wide-ranging debate on how to reform global institutions to make them more democratic, representative, effective and relevant in the 21st century. The test of good global governance will be the degree to which basic goods of education, health, nutrition, welfare and security become accessible to populations in different parts of the globe.
8. CONCLUSION: SETTING AN AGENDA FOR REFORM

Human development remains Zimbabwe’s greatest challenge at the start of the 21st century. How it is tackled will be the decisive factor in determining the success or failure of its development process in the new century. As this Report explained, it is people who are, or should be, at the centre of this process. It is their initiative, participation, education, skills and other resources which make a difference in a country’s development fortunes. The overall framework in which these conditions of human development exist and are utilised is extremely vital. It can be “an enabling” or conversely a “disabling” environment. This is the governance framework which we have sought to explore in previous chapters. A sound framework of governance is therefore indispensable for successful and sustainable human development. Policies and programmes which impinge on the human condition - on education, health, food security, employment, housing, welfare and rural and urban development, etc. - are shaped within a governance framework. If the policies and programmes are conceived and implemented in a participatory, equitable and consistent fashion, they stand a better chance of greater legitimacy and success.

The system and process of governance in Zimbabwe should therefore purposefully aim at promoting all the aspects of human development in a systematic, participatory and democratic fashion. This will require an efficient, effective and equitable use of limited national resources. It should not be a small elite that benefits from the governance system; all classes and social groups should be beneficiaries. Indeed, there needs to be a deliberate focus on the poor and disadvantaged social groups. Their upliftment is a pre-requisite and boost to overall human development in Zimbabwe.

The previous HDR reports have examined the issues of poverty and globalisation, and made recommendations on how they should be addressed to remove barriers to human development in Zimbabwe. This Report has sought to show how governance can contribute to sustainable human development in a systematic, consistent and participatory fashion. Like democracy, governance is not a short-term process; it should rest on democratic foundations so that it achieves broad legitimacy. Increasingly, however, governance has become more complex in a world of rapid globalisation. This has restricted the room of manoeuvre of most states, especially in developing world, in realm of social and economic policy. States have to navigate carefully in a sea of external and domestic pressures.

The remainder of this concluding chapter restates the salient issues and recommendations raised in the Report. Taken together, these issues could form the basis of an agenda for reform in governance and development policies so as to promote and consolidate the human development process.

8.1 Economic Governance for Human Development

Sustainable human development gives highest priority to poverty reduction, productive employment, social integration and environmental regeneration. Governance is a means for achieving sustained human development. The two are mutually reinforcing as this Report has shown. While sustainable development is the goal of policy, economic governance is one of the means of attaining that goal. Without good governance, economic growth does not necessarily and sustainably improve the livelihoods of the majority of the people.

Realism in economic and social planning and commitment to set priorities and targets should inform economic governance. Often there has been a gap between post-independence development plans and policy targets on the one hand, and implementation on the other. This has been as much the case with national development plans as with adjustment programmes. Economic plans and reform programmes have been more a matter of elucidating the pleasant ends desired than concretely setting out the means of achieving them, and mobilising the necessary resources for this purpose. There needs to be a different approach, a more serious and consistent approach.

As the previous ZHDR reports have advised, there should be a more systematic and concerted approach to issues of the high budget deficit and mounting government debt. Defence spending and wasteful expenditure should be reined in. More generally, macro-economic conditions should be improved in order to facilitate growth which would lead to more investment flows, jobs and revenues.
The current crisis management of the economy on a “fire fighting basis undermines competent economic governance.

A major challenge will be the management of commercialisation and privatisation of public enterprises in the near future. It will be vital to establish a stake-holder driven authority to ensure transparency, accountability and credibility in the exercise. To ensure that privatisation becomes an effective vehicle for indigenising the economy, the National Investment Trust (NIT) should be revamped. Equally importantly, Employee Share-Ownership Plans (ESOPs) should be included in the privatisation programme to cater for the interests of workers.

The shortfalls of the adjustment programmes have been widely conceded and acknowledged even by the WB and IMF themselves. A major challenge, therefore, is to design reform programmes which avoid the mistakes encountered in ESAP and subsequent programmes. Issues such as sequencing of programme measures, incentives to industry and exporters, and the promotion of employment-intensive enterprises should be addressed in future reforms.

In general, the development strategies which have been devised and implemented since independence have not secured a broad “national ownership”. Civil society groups have conspicuously been marginalised in reform design and implementation. This needs to change. Such groups, especially organised labour and business, should be consulted and involved extensively in the design of future programmes. While the creation of the NECF was a recognition of the need for such consultations, it does not go far enough. This is largely due to that it has very limited clout and institutional mandate, and therefore needs strengthening through restructuring.

Economic governance is a tool to enhance human development. It should be consciously aimed at ensuring that the economy delivers basic goods and services to all sectors of the population. Good economic governance would ensure that poverty is arrested, and that each citizen receives access to basic nutrition, health, education and income.

8.2 The Political and Institutional Dimensions

Most societies value the attributes of good political and institutional governance. These attributes include basic political freedoms, a free and fair electoral system, supremacy of the rule of law, and broad participation in local governance and community forums. The political system and institutional structures should provide “an enabling environment” for the exercise and enjoyment of these rights.

In its overview, the Report identified a number of gaps and sources of weakness in the political system. These included firstly an excessive centralisation of power. There are worries and signs that this can lead to arbitrary use of power. This was highlighted during the constitutional reform debate, and so the matter deserves attention. Secondly, Parliament has been a weak link in the system of checks and balances. This can largely be explained by the overwhelming dominance by the ruling party until the 2000 election. It is important that Parliament plays a more vigorous role as a guardian of the constitution and democracy. The quality of debates and capacity to check the Executive should improve given the more balanced character of the new Parliament. Another important element in the system of checks and balances is the Judiciary. Its independence is indispensable for good governance and democracy, and it should continue to be preserved.

Thirdly, the present electoral system should be reformed. There is a strong case for an Independent Electoral Commission which enjoys genuine autonomy. The emerging consensus for such a case of reform was reflected in the submissions to the Constitutional Commission, and the provisions regarding the electoral system in its draft as well as that of the NCA. A related issue concerns broad civic education to address voter apathy which was deepening at least until the 2000 election campaign. Fourthly, the constitutional reform process should be resuscitated. There is a greater chance now for a narrowing of contentious areas of disagreement between the key stakeholders both on the issues of the process and content of such reform. It would be wise to proceed with the necessary consultation and drafting well before the political temperature rises much higher.
Fifthly, the issue of institutional capacity was shown to be central to the performance in public institutions. There is need for systematic capacity-building as well as the necessary incentives to public servants to inspire their productivity and conscientiousness. A collective bargaining system ought to be installed in the public service as a matter of urgency. It will serve as an important instrument for negotiating and regulating conditions of service in that sector.

Finally, corruption in the public sector should be addressed more vigorously than before. Corruption is a major obstacle to sound development. Some bureaucrats and politicians have been involved in corruption whose incidence increased in the 1990s, as the examples in this Report showed. One principal recommendation is that an Anti-Corruption Commission should be established to combat corruption. Amongst its specific functions will be to develop anti-corruption strategies aimed at countering corruption, to advise on ways of strengthening anti-corruption legislation and to engage in public awareness programmes to educate the public about corrupt practices. This would be a step in the right direction. The suggestion of an incentive for 'whistle-blowers who uncover corruption was made in the 2001 budget speech. It needs to be supported and implemented as one of the ways of curbing corruption.

8.3 Local Governance and Participation

Political and institutional governance is complemented and reinforced by local governance. It is at the local governance level that most citizens participate in programmes that relate to their well-being. It is therefore essential that their participation in local governance be as broad and democratic as possible. This Report has surveyed trends in local governance and participation highlighting shortfalls as well as innovative community and local-level responses that are emerging to enhance human development. There is a compelling need to set up more effective structures for democratic governance at neighbourhood and ward levels. There is a case for consultations about the appropriate harmonisation of traditional and elected leadership.

With respect to the economic and financial aspects of local governance, local governments should be given a fair share of local resources. Similarly communities should be allocated a fair share of local resources. There should be a framework in which citizens contribute to the formulation of local and national budgets as well as to the monitoring of local and national expenditure.

The participation levels of women, youth, the disabled and other disadvantaged groups in local governance are marginal. Yet their contributions are vital if human development concerns are not to be sidelined at the local level. Civic education, affirmative action and capacity-building programmes should be carried out to promote the participation and empowerment of these groups. Similarly, widespread civic education (including voter education) is necessary to inform citizens about local elections and national affairs so as to inspire their participation to replace the general apathy that has existed before.

Citizens have tended to be marginalised in the management of their local urban and rural environments. Their concerns and interests have therefore not been placed at the centre stage. Programmes such as CAMPFIRE need to be broadened to cover the local management of natural resources. But their structures and control need to be democratised. The innovative strategic planning by ARDC and UCAZ on environmental issues should be supported.

This Report elaborated on the problems of lack of institutional capacity in local governance in both urban and rural areas. There is an imperative need for a systematic capacity-building programme. However, such a capacity-building programme should move beyond improving efficiency to enabling local councils to undertake democratically all stages of the development cycle. Indeed, the main thrust of capacity-building should be at community level to enable residents to participate in local governance and development.

Finally, the positive contributions which the ARDC and UCAZ associations are making through research, advocacy and training to promote effective and democratic local governance should be more widely publicized, supported and co-ordinated with other civil society initiatives.
8.4 Empowering Women, Youth and other Disadvantaged Groups

Plentiful evidence was presented in this Report to illustrate the marginalisation of women, youth, the disabled and other social groups in the development and governance processes. This marginalisation results in the loss of the creative energies and participation of these social groups. This represents an enormous cost to the economy and society, and to the development process generally.

This Report argued for a revisit of the legal and constitutional framework in order to remove the remaining impediments to gender equity. While it documented the achievements which have been made so far, particularly in the 1980s, it showed that there remains a great deal to be done to ensure an equal advancement of women. In particular, the relationship between customary and modern law needs to be reviewed in the broad context of removing impediments to gender equity while preserving good aspects of our culture.

In the economic and political spheres, women lag behind in terms of representation in positions of authority, influence and power. Ways and means should be sought to facilitate “an enabling environment” that provides enhanced opportunities for women. Possible measures include incorporating proportional representation into the electoral system, and an affirmative action programme in the economic and social sectors. The vulnerability of women to poverty and unemployment is more pronounced than that of men. Policy-makers should design their economic and social programmes accordingly in order to accommodate women’s specific needs. A major limitation has been the absence of a clearly articulated gender policy to guide institutions involved in gender-related affairs, and to influence public attitudes more generally. The gender policy draft which now exists should be publicly debated.

The problems which beset youth as a social group are multiple. There is skewed access to educational opportunities, skills training programmes and to employment opportunities. To the extent that the education system has had limited results in equipping youths with practical skills for the job market, its revamping is overdue. It is encouraging but not surprising that this revamping has also been recommended by the Presidential Commission on Education. Furthermore, entrepreneurial skills should be widely imparted to the youth. Resources ought to be invested in job creation opportunities to alleviate youth unemployment which is currently estimated to be at 62 per cent of the unemployed. Conditions should be made more favourable for the youth to enter the small and medium enterprise (SME) sector.

National efforts to address the needs and problems of youth are undermined by lack of central coordination. There is imperative need for such coordination especially in view of the dispersion of responsibility between government ministries. This Report observed that up to six different ministries are involved in one way or another with youth training and employment schemes leading to duplication of efforts. This needs to be reviewed urgently and stronger co-ordination instituted to save on costs and waste of duplication.

The disabled have received mainly marginal attention in development programmes and participatory forums. There are historical and legal factors which have sustained this marginalisation. Constituting about 10 per cent of the population, it imperative that the social and economic needs of this social group were addressed. There should be a conscious policy to ensure their full participation in the political process by providing an enabling environment such as a facilitating their access to voter registration and voting. The additional constraints under which disabled women labour should be removed. Finally, that section of the constitution which removes protection of the disabled from discrimination should be urgently reviewed. Previous ZJEIDR reports have made extensive recommendations on social sectors of education and health whose budgets have continued to decline in real terms. The deterioration of conditions in the health is particularly worrying. The deepening of the HTV-AIDS epidemic is exacerbating the decline. Clearly, social sector budgets need to be restored to meaningful levels. High government deficits and soaring debt as well as the considerable commitments in foreign military intervention are proving a major drain on resources which could have been invested in these key human development sectors. Diminishing access to these basic services undermines both development and stable governance. There is need for the government to urgently reconsider its expenditure priorities and current external military intervention.
The HIV/AIDS epidemic is undoubtedly having very far-reaching effects on society and the economy, indeed on the human development process as a whole. Together with its neighbours, Botswana, South Africa and Zambia, Zimbabwe is experiencing a crisis from the epidemic. The economy is being significantly affected as the epidemic has hit those from the more productive and skilled age-groups. Losses due to high absenteeism resulting from illness, and from deaths of those who succumb to the disease are considerable. But it is the social dimension of the epidemic which is the most obvious and painful. The impact on the extended family networks has been considerable. The elderly have to bear the costs and responsibility of nurturing a growing orphan population. It is therefore vital that a scheme be devised which targets assistance to these elderly covers for the orphaned. Furthermore, a stronger and more committed political leadership is required to spearhead a national programme of heightened awareness and prevention of the disease.

8.5 Civil Society in Democratisation and Development

An important source of pressure for democratisation and of resources for human development is civil society, as we observed. The Report presented material to show the engagement of CSOs in development work at various levels in the economy and society. Despite their jealously guarded autonomy and occasional critique of specific government policies, they are vital partners of the state in the development process. In addition, CSOs have been active lobbyists for human rights, gender equity, political pluralism, academic and press freedom. The conditions of the growth of a dense and strong civil society should not be stifled.

While the matter of governance by state institutions has been one of the principal focal issues for CSOs, the issue of their own internal governance should not be overlooked. Not all CSOs practise good governance. Nor do they all adhere to the principles and practices of accountability and transparency. CSOs must be encouraged, as much as possible, to practise what they preach. A code of conduct for CSOs would be a useful first step in encouraging them to attain good governance practices themselves.

In order for CSOs to increase their effectiveness, they need to improve their self-coordination. In particular, this relates to co-ordinated lobbying for policy changes over a wide range of issues. This could be facilitated by strengthening the capacity and legitimacy of a central, umbrella NGO or CSO organisation. This development would enable CSOs to monitor their own activities, and develop more transparency in their operations.

For its part, the state needs to develop more substantive structures for policy dialogue with CSOs. This will facilitate the creation of a more open and inclusive environment in the policy process. The establishment of such structures would provide a stronger basis for generating legitimacy and consensus for policies. This process could begin with the drawing up of a social contract or pact between the key stakeholders. It is encouraging that negotiations for such a pact are currently at an advanced stage.

Finally, in order to provide an environment more conducive to the enhancement of human development, it is vital that the current problems of governance in Zimbabwe are addressed as a matter of urgency. Similarly, the constitutional reform process, as argued above, should be resuscitated as soon as possible. CSOs have played a crucial role in bringing governance and constitutional issues to the fore. It is vital that the state provides a more facilitative environment to address and settle these issues.

8.6 Corporate and Global Governance and Human Development
The global context of national governance and human development has become an increasingly determinant influence. Both corporate and global institutions now wield considerable influence which they use to shape national governance and development processes. National autonomy and sovereignty are being gradually eroded as a result.

This Report has drawn attention to serious shortfalls in both corporate and global governance. For example, it was observed that profits, market expansion and lower production costs are the prime and exclusive considerations which motivate and guide corporate governance. It is necessary that mechanisms be applied to make corporate firms accountable for their actions and policies. This relates to environmental protection, conservation of renewable resources, job security, and employee welfare. Most developing countries, including Zimbabwe, do not have instruments nor regulatory capacity to ensure that transnational firms meet satisfactory standards of accountability and transparency in their operations. This should change. Some form of internationally accepted regulatory mechanisms should be put in place.

Not many corporate firms own up to their social responsibilities in the form of re-investment in the economic wellbeing and social capital of the communities from which they derive their resources and revenues. Corporate firms should be encouraged to invest in these communities on a more sustained basis. Health, education, skills training, social welfare and food security are some of the areas where corporate interests could make a difference to the fortunes of communities especially the poor ones. More innovative programmes to increase employee ownership and decision-making role in corporate firms should be designed and implemented.

The case has been made for social auditing of both domestic and transnational corporations. The criteria for such auditing should be specified in codes of conduct for the corporations. Such a code of conduct would have the objective of encouraging good governance practices.

Thus the challenge of practising good governance should not be confined to governments and CSOs. Corporate firms have a responsibility to their stakeholders and the wider society to meet good governance criteria.

As we have already observed, global governance has increasingly become an important influence in international and national affairs. However, concern has been expressed about the lack of democratic and equitable representation in institutions of global governance. Similarly, concern has been voiced about the lack of transparency in these global institutions. Notable examples are the UN Security Council, the WB and IMF to mention a few. Similarly, ad hoc groups of the richer countries have banded together to wield a powerful role in global economic governance. These institutions should be made more inclusive, democratic and accountable. In particular, they should be encouraged to place the issue of human development at the centre of their concerns. The institutions should demonstrate their commitment to reducing the large inequalities in wealth between the rich and poor countries, and contribute more to poverty reduction. A more vigorous and proactive approach to the debt issue and to development assistance should be taken by these global institutions.

**Towards the Future**

In the final analysis, better governance and sustainable human development cannot be attained by the state alone. Civil society has the potential to make immense contributions. There is a greater promise of success and sustainability where there is a strong working partnership between the state and CSOs. These two key players need to share their skills, resources and dedication to the pursuit of good governance and improved human development. In the present conditions of limited resources, neither the state nor the CSOs can go it alone. As we observed in the Report, there remains the major challenge of consensus-building within society over key social and economic development programmes, something which has lacked in the past. However, the conditions for consensus building, as for good governance, need to be right. Previous mind-sets should change: openness, transparency and accountability call for a new mind-set amongst the principal players. A new approach is also required in the key institutions involved in governance and development processes.
This Report has attempted to outline those areas which require immediate attention to create favourable conditions for national consensus-building, and for greater participation in governance and development. The agenda of issues is neither exhaustive nor prescriptive. However, the Report would have achieved one of its purposes if these issues become a basis for a wider debate on governance and human development in Zimbabwe. It would be therefore extremely useful if the issues raised in the Report become issues for advocacy campaigns, and for policy dialogue between state and civil society organisations. The time is ripe for a serious national effort and commitment towards building good governance and sustainable human development.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Technical Notes

Methodological Approaches to The 2000 Human Development Indices for Zimbabwe

1 Introduction

The notion of human development was first popularised by the publication of the 1990 Human Development Report by the UNDP. The idea behind the concept of “Human Development” is to put people at the centre of all development efforts. Clearly this is a departure from the traditional way of assessing development whereby economic indicators are used as a measure of development. The former recognizes the fact that the end result of all development effort is to enhance people’s welfare. The latter presupposes that once we have economic growth then such growth would eventually benefit all, a presupposition which has clearly not stood the test of time.

The level of human development has traditionally been measured using the human development index (HDI). The idea behind the human development indices is to capture the level of human development in one acceptable measure. The HDI captures both economic growth and improvements in the quality of life. It comprises three indicators, longevity, knowledge, and income. Longevity is measured by life expectancy at birth and it captures the extent of poverty. Knowledge is measured by two stock variables, adult literacy and the mean years of schooling, and it measures the extent of development of human capital. The income variable is based on Atkinson’s formulation of diminishing marginal utility of income. This formulation of the income variable enables us to capture both the level of economic growth and the extent of income inequality and it also gives more weight to the poor in the HDI. The HDI itself is a weighted average of these three variables. Other indices that are closely associated with the issue of human development that have been included in most of the recently published Human Development Reports include the Gender-related Development Index (GDI), the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM), the Democratic Governance Index (DGI) and the Human Poverty Index (HPI).

The 1998 and the 1999 Zimbabwean Human Development Reports included both the Human Development and the Human Poverty Indices. The methodologies used in the computation of the HDI and the HPI are given in the 1998 and 1999 JEIDR. The calculation of these indices requires that micro-survey data be available to enable one to make policy-relevant analysis of human poverty and human development. Since the 1995 Poverty Assessment Study Survey, the only micro-survey that has been carried out is the 1995/96 Income, Consumption and Expenditure Survey (ICES). These two data sets are too close to each other to warrant any meaningful comparative analysis based on the two surveys. The measurement of all the indices associated with human development is based on the most recent available data. While it is quite possible that some indices that were used in the computations of the HDI and HPI for the 1998 and the 1999 ZHDR might have changed since the production of the 1998 NJEIDR these changes are likely to be recorded at the national level and would be quite minor to substantially alter the findings of the HDI and HPI analyses in the 1998 and 1999 Reports. For these reasons the HDI and the HPI are not recalculated for the 2000 NHDR. Instead, it is proposed that the 2000 Report include those indices that were not included in the 1998 and the 1999 HDRs, i.e. the Gender-related Development Index (GDI), and the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM). In this paper we present the methodologies for the computation of the HDI, GDI, GEM and the HPI.

2. Computing The Human Development Index (HDI)
Introduction

The 1-IDI includes three components, namely, longevity, knowledge and income. Longevity is measured by life expectancy at birth. Knowledge is measured by two stock variables, adult literacy and mean years of schooling. The knowledge variable is arrived at by assigning a weight of two-thirds to the adult literacy variable and one-third to the years of schooling variable and adding them up. Thus if we call E the education variable, AL the adult literacy variable, and YS the years of schooling variable then

\[ E = \frac{2}{3} \text{AL} + \frac{1}{3} \text{YS} \]

Up until now the tradition has been to base the income variable on Atkinson’s formulation of diminishing marginal utility of income. This can be written as:

\[ W(y) = \frac{1}{1-\epsilon} (y)^{1-\epsilon} \]

where

W(y) is the well-being derived from income y, and is the elasticity of the marginal utility of income. takes on values ranging from 0 to 1. When =0 then there is no diminishing marginal utility with respect to income. Diminishing marginal utility of income increases as increases. The limit of W(y) as approaches I is log y. For purposes of the HDI incomes are divided into multiples of Zimbabwe’s per capita GDP, y. For incomes below y’ W(y) is set equal to the actual income, y. For incomes above y W(y) is calculated using the following formulae:

\[ W(y) = y^* + 2(y-y^*) \text{ for } y < y^* \]
\[ W(y) = y^* + 2(y^*) + 3(y-2y^*) \text{ for } 2y^* < y < 3y^* \text{ etc.} \]

Based on the work by Amartya Sen and Sudhir Arnand (1999) the 1999 Global HDR adopted the use of the natural log of income to adjust incomes. It is argued that this approach significantly improves the results by not penalizing those with incomes beyond a certain threshold. In fact this approach is not a departure from the previously used methodology. What it does is to give a value of 1 thus giving the marginal utility of income its maximum possible value.

Calculation of the HDI

The HDI is the arithmetic mean of three indices, namely the life expectancy index, the educational attainment index and the income level index. The educational attainment index is a weighted average of the mean years of schooling index and the adult literacy index with the latter receiving a weight of one third.

All the indices except the income level index are computed using the general formula:

\[ \text{Index}_n = \frac{\text{Actual}(x_i) - \text{Minimum}(x_i)}{\text{Maximum}(x_i) - \text{Minimum}(x_i)} \]
where $x$ is the human development indicator such as adult literacy, average years of schooling or life expectancy.

(a) Calculation of the Life expectancy Index ($L$)

The Life Expectancy Index is computed using the formula

$$L = \frac{\text{Actual}(L) - \text{Min}(L)}{\text{Max}(L) - \text{Min}(L)}$$

Where Actual$(L)$ is the actual life expectancy, Min$(L)$ is the minimum life expectancy and Max$(L)$ is the maximum life expectancy. Following the Global Human Development Report Min$(L)$ and Max$(L)$ are set equal to 25 years and 85 years respectively in the calculation of the Zimbabwean HDI. To give an example Harare has a life expectancy of 64 years and therefore its life expectancy index is calculated as follows:

(b) Calculation of the Educational Attainment Index ($E$)

As was pointed out earlier the Educational Attainment Index is based on two indices, namely the Adult Literacy Index and the Average Years of Schooling Index.

(i) Computation of the Adult Literacy Index (AL)

The Adult Literacy Index is computed using the following formula

$$\text{AL} = \frac{\text{Actual}(AL) - \text{Min}(AL)}{\text{Max}(AL) - \text{Min}(AL)} = \frac{\text{Actual}(AL)}{100} \quad \text{where}$$

Min$(AL) = \text{Minimum Adult Literacy Rate}$  
Max$(AL) = \text{Maximum Adult Literacy Rate}$  
Actual$(AL) = \text{The Actual Adult Literacy Rate}$

Following the Global Human Development Report Min$(AL)$ and Max$(AL)$ are set equal to 0 and 100 respectively. Again using Harare as an example, its adult literacy rate is 94.04 and therefore its adult literacy index is 0.9404 (using the above formula).

(ii) Computation of the Average Years of Schooling Index (YS)

This is computed using the following formula:

$$\text{YS} = \frac{\text{Actual}(MYS) - \text{Min}(MYS)}{\text{Max}(MYS) - \text{Min}(MYS)} = \frac{\text{Actual}(MYS)}{\text{Max}(MYS)} = \frac{\text{Actual}(MYS)}{16} \quad \text{where}$$

Actual$(MYS) = \text{Actual Mean Years of Schooling}$  
Min$(MYS) = \text{Minimum Mean Years of Schooling}$  
Max$(MYS) = \text{Maximum Mean Years of Schooling}$

In the calculation of the Zimbabwean HDI the minimum mean years of schooling is set equal to 0 just like in the Global Human Development Report and the maximum is set at 16 as opposed to 15 used for
the Global Report. This is because in Zimbabwe an average graduate takes 16 years to graduate, assuming that there are no repetition of grades. The actual mean years of schooling for Harare is 8.06 and therefore its average years of schooling index is 0.5038 using this formula.

(iii) **Computation of the Educational Attainment Index (E)**

The educational attainment index is calculated using the following equation

For Harare \( AL = 0.9404 \) and \( YS = 0.50375 \) and therefore the

\[
E = \frac{2}{3} \times 0.9404 + \frac{1}{3} \times 0.50375 = 0.79
\]

(c) **Computing the Income Level Index (ILI)**

Following the new methodology the ILI is computed using the following formula:

\[
ILI = \frac{\ln(y) - \ln(\text{Min}(y))}{\ln(\text{Max}(y)) - \ln(\text{Min}(y))}
\]

where

\( \ln(y) \) is the adjusted income and \( \ln(\text{Min}(y)) \) and \( \ln(\text{Max}(y)) \) are the natural logs of the minimum and maximum incomes. For Harare \( \ln(y) = 8.44 \) and following the Global HDR \( \text{Min}(y) \) and \( \text{Max}(y) \) are set equal to 100 and 40000 respectively, giving \( \ln(\text{Min}(y)) = 4.60517 \), \( \ln(\text{Max}(y)) = 10.59663 \) and ILI = 0.64.

(d) **Computing the Human Development Index (HDI)**

The HDI is the mean of the education attainment index, the life expectancy index and the income level index. It is computed using the formula:

\[
\text{HDI} = \frac{1}{3} (L + E + ILI)
\]

For Harare the

\[
\text{HDI} = \frac{1}{3} (0.65 + 0.79 + 0.64) = 0.69
\]

3. **Computing the Gender-related Development Index (GDI)**

The GDI follows closely the computation of the HDI but differs from it in that it takes into account the concerns about inequality in the opportunities and predicaments of men and women. The GDI uses the same variables as the HDI. The variables are, however, adjusted to take care of disparities in achievements between men and women. The concept of GDI was first published in the global HDR in 1995. The theoretical underpinning of the methodology behind the GDI is presented in depth in that report. Here we merely present the steps followed in computing the GDI figures presented in this report.

(a) **Calculation of the Life expectancy Index (LEI)**

The Life Expectancy Indices for females and males respectively are computed using the formulae:
Where LEIf is the life expectancy index for females, LEIm is the life expectancy index for males, Actual(LEf) is the actual life expectancy for females, Actual(LEm) is the actual life expectancy for males, Max(LEf) is the maximum life expectancy for females, Max(LEm) is the maximum life expectancy for males, Min(LEf) is the minimum life expectancy for females and Min(LEm) is the minimum life expectancy for males. The minimum and maximum life expectancies for male and female take into account the fact that females tend to live longer, cet par. Following the global report the maximum and minimum life expectancies for females are set at 87.5 years and 27.5 years respectively while that for males is set at 82.5 years and 22.5 years respectively.

The Life Expectancy Index (LEI) that is adjusted to take care of disparities in achievements between men and women is computed using the following formula:

\[
LEI = \left( PS_f \times LEI_f^{-1} + PS_m \times LEI_m^{-1} \right)^{-1}
\]

where

PSf and PSm are the population shares of females and males respectively.

(b) Calculation of the Educational Attainment Index (EAI)

The Educational Attainment Index is based on two indices, namely the Adult Literacy Index (ALT) and Combined Gross Enrolment Index (CGEI) or the Average Years of Schooling Index (AYSI). The AYSI rather than the CGEI was used for the 1998 NHDR for reasons given there. The same reasons are still valid to date and hence this report uses the AYSI and the methodological approach described below pertains to AYSI.

(I) Computation of the Adult Literacy Index (ALT)

The Adult Literacy Index for females (ALTO) is computed using the following formula

\[
ALf = \frac{Actual(ALf) - Min(ALf)}{Max(ALf) - Min(ALf)} \times 100
\]

Min(ALf) = Minimum Adult Literacy Rate for females; Max(ALf) = Maximum Adult Literacy Rate for females; and Actual(ALf) = The Actual Adult Literacy Rate for females. The Adult Literacy Index for males (ALTm) is computed using the following formula

\[
ALm = \frac{Actual(ALm) - Min(ALm)}{Max(ALm) - Min(ALm)} \times 100
\]

where

Min(ALm) is the Minimum Adult Literacy Rate for males; Max(ALm) is the Maximum Adult Literacy Rate for males; and Actual(ALm) is the Actual Adult Literacy Rate for males. Following the Global Human Development Report Min(AL) and Max(AL) for both males and females are set equal to 0 and 100 respectively.
(ii) Computing of the Average Years of Schooling Index (AYSI)
The Average Years of Schooling Index for males (AYSIm) is computed using the following formula:

\[
AYSIm = \frac{Actual(MYSm) - Min(MYSm)}{Max(MYSm) - Min(MYSm)} \times \frac{Actual(MYSm)}{Max(MYSm)} \times 16
\]

Actual (MYSm) = Actual Mean Years of Schooling for males; Min(MYSm) = Minimum Mean Years of schooling for males; and Max(MYSm) = Maximum Mean Years of Schooling for males. The Average Years of Schooling Index for females (AYSIf) is computed using the following formula:

\[
AYSIf = \frac{Actual(MYSf) - Min(MYSf)}{Max(MYSf) - Min(MYSf)} \times \frac{Actual(MYSf)}{Max(MYSf)} \times 16
\]

Actual(MYSf) = Actual Mean Years of Schooling for females; Min(MYSf) = Minimum Mean Years of Schooling for females; and Max(MYSf) = Maximum Mean Years of Schooling for females. In the calculation of the Zimbabwean HDI the minimum mean years of schooling is set equal to 0 just like in the Global Human Development Report and the maximum is set at 16 as opposed to 15 used for the Global Report. This is because in Zimbabwe an average graduate takes 16 years to graduate, assuming that there are no repetition of grades. Since the GDI follows closely the computations of the HDI the same minimums and maxmums are used for the GDI for both males and females.

(iii) Computation of the Educational Attainment Index for males and females

The Educational Attainment Index for females (EAf) is computed using the following formula:

\[
EAf = \frac{1}{3} \times AYSIf + \frac{2}{3} \times ALf
\]

The Educational Attainment Index for males (EAm) is computed using the following formula:

\[
EIm = \frac{1}{3} \times AYSIm + \frac{2}{3} \times ALIm
\]

(iv) Computation of the Equally Distributed Educational Attainment Index (EAT) The equally distributed educational attainment index is computed as

\[
EAI = \{PSf \times EAIf^{-1} + PSm \times EA\}
\]

(c) Computing the Equally Distributed Income Index

(i) Proportional Income Shares

**Economically Active Population**

Percentage Male Share (EAPm)
Percentage Female Share (EAPf)

**Population Share(%)**

Male Population Share (POPm)
Female Population Share (POPF)
Female/Male Wage Ratio (%) (Nonagricultural)6

\[ WS = \frac{Female - Wage}{Male - Wage} \]

**Average Wage,**

\[ W = EAP_f \times WS + EAP_m \times 1 \]

not (%) percentages.

Note: EAPf, WS, and EAPm are expressed as ratios and

**Wage/Average Wage Ratios**

Females: \( WAW_f = \frac{WS}{W} \)

Males: \( WAW_m = \frac{1}{W} \)

**Share of Earned Income**

Females: \( SE_{lf} = WAW_f \times EAP_f \)

Males: \( SE_{lm} = WAW_m \times EAP_m \)

**Proportional Income Shares**

Females: \( PIS_f = \frac{SE_{lf}}{POP_f} \)

Males: \( PIS_m = \frac{SE_{lm}}{POP_m} \)

(ii) Applying the GESI formula \( (c = 2) \)

**The Equally Distributed Income Index**

\[ EDI = \left( PS_f \times LEI_f^{(1-\epsilon)} + PS_m \times LEI_m^{(1-\epsilon)} \right) \left( \frac{1}{(1-\epsilon)} \right) \]

\[ EDI_a = (EDI \times 3340)^8 \]

\[ EDII = \frac{(EDI_a - 100)}{(6040 - 100)} \]
The Equally Distributed Educational Attainment Index

\[ EDEAI = \frac{1}{(1-\varepsilon)} \left( PS_f \times EAl_f + PS_m \times EAIm \right) \]

The Equally Distributed Life Expectancy Index

\[ EDLEI = \frac{1}{(1-\varepsilon)} \left( PS_f \times LEI_f + PS_m \times LEIm \right) \]

(iv) Computing the Gender-related Development Index (GUI)

\[ GDI = \frac{1}{3} (GSI + EDEAI + EDLEI) \]

GESI = Gender-Equity Sensitive Indicator

4. Computing the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM)

(i) Calculating Indices for Parliamentary Representation and Administrative, Managerial, Professional and Technical Positions

Percentage Share of Parliamentary Representation

Female: \( PR_f \)

Male: \( PR_m \)

Percentage share of Administrative and managerial Positions

Female: \( AM_f \)

Male: \( AM_m \)

Percentage Share of Professional and Technical Positions

Female: \( PT_f \)

Male: \( PT_m \)

Percentage Share of Population
Female: \((\text{POP}_f)\)
Male: \((\text{POP}_m)\)

(ii) Calculating the Equally Distributed Equivalent Percentages (EDEP)

EDEP for Parliamentary Representation

\[
EDEP_{PR} = \frac{1}{(1 - \varepsilon)} \left[ \text{POP}_f \cdot \text{PR}_f (1 - \varepsilon) + \text{POP}_m \cdot \text{PR}_m (1 - \varepsilon) \right]^{(1 - \varepsilon)}
\]

EDEP for Administrative and Managerial Positions

\[
EDEP_{AM} = \frac{1}{(1 - \varepsilon)} \left[ \text{POP}_f \cdot \text{AM}_f (1 - \varepsilon) + \text{POP}_m \cdot \text{AM}_m (1 - \varepsilon) \right]^{(1 - \varepsilon)}
\]

EDEP for Professional and Technical Positions

\[
EDEP_{PT} = \frac{1}{(1 - \varepsilon)} \left[ \text{POP}_f \cdot \text{PT}_f (1 - \varepsilon) + \text{POP}_m \cdot \text{PT}_m (1 - \varepsilon) \right]^{(1 - \varepsilon)}
\]

(iii) Indexing the Variables

Parliamentary Representation

\[
PR_{\text{index}} = \frac{EDEP_{PR}}{50}
\]

Administrative and Managerial Positions

\[
AM_{\text{index}} = \frac{EDEP_{AM}}{50}
\]

Professional and Technical Positions

\[
PT_{\text{index}} = \frac{EDEP_{PT}}{50}
\]

(iv) Computing the Combined Index for Economic Participation and Decision making

\[
EPD_{\text{index}} = \frac{(AM_{\text{index}} + PT_{\text{index}})}{2}
\]
(v) Calculating the Index for Share of Earned Income

Economically Active Population

- Percentage Male Share (EAPₘ)
- Percentage Female Share (EAPᵢ)

Population Share (%)

- Male Population Share (POPₘ)
- Female Population Share (POPᵢ)

Female/Male Wage Ratio (%) (Non-agricultural)

\[ WS = \frac{\text{Female Wage}}{\text{Male Wage}} \]

Average Wage

\[ W = EAPᵢ * WS + EAPₘ * 1 \]

**Note:** EAPᵢ, WS, and EAPₘ are expressed as ratios and not (%) percentages.

Wage/Average Wage Ratios

- Females: \[ \text{WAW}_f = \frac{WS}{W} \]
- Males: \[ \text{WAW}_m = \frac{1}{W} \]

Share of Earned Income

- Females: \[ SEIᵢ = \text{WAW}_f * EAPᵢ \]
- Males: \[ SEIᵢ = \text{WAW}_m * EAPᵢ \]

Proportional Income Shares
5. Computing the Human Poverty Index

Human poverty is measured by the human poverty index (HPI). The HPI comprises three composite indices, namely the life expectancy deprivation index, the educational attainment deprivation index and an index for the deprivation of a decent living standard. In the global HDR life expectancy deprivation index, P1, is measured by the percentage of people not expected to live beyond the age of 40. The educational attainment deprivation index, P2, is measured by the percentage of illiterate adults. The index for the deprivation of a decent living standard, P3, is a composite index comprising the percentage of underweight children, the percentage of the population without access to safe water and the percentage of the population without access to health care. The derivation of the Zimbabwean HPI follows closely that of the global HDR. The life expectancy deprivation index is computed using the Mortpak-Lite software package developed by the UN Population Division. The life expectancy rates used in the model are those supplied by the Central Statistical Offices (CSO) 1992 Population Census. The percentage of underweight children, the percentage of the population without access to safe water and the percentage of the population without access to health care are computed using the 1995 Poverty Assessment Study Survey. The Poverty Assessment Study Survey (PASS) measured the mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC) for children below the age of 5. Children with MUAC of less than 13.5cm are deemed to be underweight. Using this information the percentage of under-weight children is calculated. The proportion of the population without access to safe water is calculated using the information on water supply in the PASS data. The possible responses in the PASS data on the question about the sources of water were:

1. Piped inside the house;
2. Piped outside the house;
3. Communal tap;
4. Well/borehole - protected;
5. Well - unprotected;
6. River/Stream/Dam; and
7. Other.
Safe water was then defined to include options 1 to 4. Those who indicated options other than 1 to 4 as their sources of water were then expressed as a percentage of the total sample size to give the proportion of those without access to safe water. The global Human Development Report defines lack of access to health care as having to walk more than an hour to get to a health facility. In the absence of such data the proportion of the population without access to health care had to be arrived at in a rather round about way. The PASS data contains information on those who visited a medical facility and those who did not.

The data set also has information on the reasons why those who said they did not visit a health facility didn’t. The range of responses were:

- Facility too far;
- Cannot afford;
- Received treatment at home;
- Treatment was not necessary; and
- Treatment was not taken for religious reasons.

Those who said they did not visit a health facility either because it was too far or because they could not afford the treatment were taken not to have access to health facilities. These were then expressed as a proportion of the sample that was asked whether they visited a health facility or not to get the proportion of those without access to health care.

The human poverty index (HPI) is computed using the following indicators:

\[ HPI = \left( \frac{P_1^3 + P_2^3 + P_3^3}{3} \right)^{\frac{1}{3}} \]

The data for Mashonaland Central give:

- \( P_1 = 20.65\% \);
- \( P_2 = 33\% \);
- \( P_{31} = 16.9\% \);
- \( P_{32} = 28.38\% \);
- \( P_{33} = 9.6\% \);
- \( P_3 = 18.3\% \);

This gives an HPI of 25.69 for Mashonaland Central.
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