




The Historical Roots of Well-Being and Social Cohesion

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ABSTRACT

A country's levels of well-being and social cohesion are largely stable over long periods of time. Two key determinants of well-being—equality and education—follow this 'path dependence'. This paper reviews these relationships and then moves to a discussion of how early levels of education influence contemporary well-being. It finds that education matters for social cohesion, and that historical levels of education are mostly more important than contemporary enrolments. The evidence largely comes from the West because of data availability, but there is support for this claim in other regions. There is also evidence that countries can catch up, as the case of many East Asian nations shows. Yet change is not easy given the 'stickiness' of inequality and the high correlation between mean school years in 1870 and 2010. It is difficult to organize poor (and uneducated) citizens, and to ensure a country's leaders will provide resources for the poor. Many countries do not have sufficient economic or other resources or the political support to enact policies to change the distribution of human capital.

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Introduction

A country's levels of well-being and social cohesion are largely stable over long periods of time. This is what Douglas North has called 'path dependence'. In his address accepting the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1993, North argued that "economies once on a path of growth or stagnation tend to persist." Some countries can adapt to new challenges, both domestic and international, but others do not: "Societies that get 'stuck' embody belief systems and institutions that fail to confront and solve new problems of societal complexity." Path dependence stems from a country's values: "It is culture that provides the key to path dependence" (North 1993).

In Uslaner (2017), I present evidence of how two key determinants of well-being—equality and education—follow this 'path dependence'. Both are stable across time. Early levels of education shape contemporary good governance. I will review these relationships and then move to a discussion of how early levels of education influence contemporary well-being.

But first I need to:

- Discuss what constitutes social well-being, and
- Argue why education can be considered a surrogate for culture. I do not argue that some societies are 'more predisposed' to higher levels of education than others. Rather, education levels are higher when there is more equality (*ibid.*). Equality in turn is strongly related to social cohesion and other aspects of well-being (Uslaner 2002, 2012).

I will not try to define 'social cohesion', since it is a broad concept. The general idea behind social cohesion is that it brings people together around a common purpose. For generalized trust, this means that we accept strangers as part of our 'moral community' and that we share "an underlying commonality of values" (Uslaner 2002, p. 1). Generalized trust is based on a sense of optimism and control: The world is a good place, is going to get better, and I can help make it better (*ibid.*, ch. 2). This sense of optimism means that we don't consider it risky to put faith in strangers who likely are different from ourselves.

Other measures of social cohesion come from the Gallup World Poll. One is community well-being (or 'community attachment'), which is a summary of whether people are satisfied with the city or area where they live, whether they are likely to move away from it, and whether they would recommend it to a friend or associate as a place to live. Another measure is the diversity index (Gallup World Poll 2016, p. 54), which is a measure of how welcoming a community is to people of different backgrounds. It is a composite measure of a community's acceptance of people from diverse racial, ethnic or cultural groups.

How we see our communities is a key component of social cohesion. If we have an optimistic view of the lives of ourselves and our neighbours, we are more likely to see common bonds among community members. Thriving communities are not just good places to live, but good places to live for people of varying backgrounds. The latter also reflect two key components of generalized trust: an upbeat and optimistic world view, and a commitment to treat people of different backgrounds as they would treat their own family.

Social cohesion, education and equality

Measures of social cohesion are linked to equality and education. Equality leads to a common sense of purpose. When it is lacking, we are less likely to believe that we have much in common with people who are not like ourselves. Inequality makes people less likely to believe that what affects you affects me. Communities will not be welcoming to people of diverse backgrounds, and those at the bottom will have little reason to believe that they can control their own fate or that anyone cares about them. There will not be a strong sense of community.

Education is important for social cohesion for two reasons. First, it is a great equalizer. Universal education is most likely to be found in countries with the greatest equality. In turn, education leads to more equality. Gylfason and Zoega (2002, p. 24) report that a 1 percent increase in public expenditure on education reduced the Gini index by 2.3 points across 74 countries from 1980 to 1997.

Second, Darden (2013) and Uslaner (2002) argue that universal education creates strong social bonds among different groups in a society. In turn, this makes cleavages based on clientelism less likely. The introduction of free universal education will lead to a ‘virtuous cycle’ of widespread education and increased socio-economic equality. High levels of inequality enable the elite to undermine legal and political institutions, and use them for their own benefit. If inequality is high, the economic elite is likely to pursue socially harmful policies, since legal, political and regulatory systems will not hold them accountable (Dutta and Mishra 2013; Glaeser et al. 2004, p. 200; You 2008).

Much of the evidence on education and equality comes from the United States of America, especially in the early years of the nation. The United States had neither a feudal past (Sombart 1976) nor a system of apprenticeship, whereby young people would learn a trade under the tutelage—and obligation—to craftspeople. Apprentices were bound to their communities for the rest of their lives. Young Americans, however, were far more mobile. They could make their own way in the world in positions that paid more and gave them more freedom. By the early 20th century, a quarter of young men and women held jobs that required a high school education or more. Each additional year of secondary school led to gains of 10 percent or more in salaries. The school system was open to all—

even those who had fared poorly early on were given second chances to gain the skills necessary to obtain diplomas (Goldin and Katz 2008, pp. 29, 133, 167, 177, 183).

The public school system in the United States rested more upon the equitable distribution of wealth than upon just access to political influence. The American public saw schooling as the foundation of economic equality. Horace Mann, the 19th century politician and educational reformer, wrote in his Fifth Report as Secretary of the Massachusetts Board of Education (in 1842): “Education, then, beyond all other devices of human origin, is the great equalizer of the conditions of men.... It does better than to disarm the poor of their hostility toward the rich; it prevents being poor” (quoted in Bowles and Gintis 1976, p. 28). Cremin (1976, p. 86) made a similar argument almost a century and a half later: “[the American educational system...afforded more varied and extensive opportunities to many who had previously enjoyed rather limited opportunities.” The public school system was the pathway to widespread literacy. Where schools were mostly private, only the wealthy could afford them, and this exacerbated economic inequality (Engerman and Soloff n.d., p. 14).

Access to education provided more people with the skills to find gainful employment so they did not have to rely on corrupt or clientelistic structures of power (Goldin and Katz 2008, pp. 29, 133; Uslaner 2008, pp. 239-241). Over time, educational inequalities between the rich and the poor in countries that established universal education were sharply reduced (Morrison and Murtin 2009). Universal education led to a more equal distribution of income in the early years of American independence compared to England and Wales (Lindert and Williamson 2011, pp. 4, 23). In the late 19th century, the United States was one of the most equal countries in the world, according to van Hanen’s measure of the share of farms owned by families (instead of estates). England, its former colonial power, was a far more inegalitarian society: Only 5 percent of its farms were owned by individual families, and its level of education fell behind that of its erstwhile colony. Education had direct economic payoffs.

Universal education was directly linked to economic equality. In Uslaner (2017, ch. 5), I show strong relationships between levels of education and equality from the 19th to the 20th century using data from Goldin and Katz (2008) and Saez and Zucman (2014) for education and the share of income of the top 1 percent of the population. What distinguished the United States was the availability of education for children of all incomes as well as for both boys and girls. Widespread education was critical for increasing gender equality. Nineteenth century school enrolments were highest where girls had access to education, notably in the United States, and lowest when girls were excluded (Goldin and Katz 2008, pp. 21, 133).

Beyond promoting economic advancement and equality, education in America promoted the teaching of moral values as well as citizenship and participation. Public schools taught values such as “punctuality, achievement, competitiveness, fair play, merit, respect for adult authority” (Cremin 1976, p. 51). They also groomed boys and girls with the “education needed to allow Americans to perform

civic duties such as voting and to prepare them to run for office and to lead the nation” (Goldin and Katz 2008, pp. 135-136).

Education is the strongest objective predictor of generalized trust. Education shapes cohesion by teaching people about different cultures and bringing them into contact with people of different backgrounds, so it is not simply a surrogate for wealthier, more educated people having more faith in others. This makes it an important determinant of generalized trust (Uslaner 2002, p. 35). Education thus leads to social cohesion directly and indirectly (through its effect on equality).

The weight of the past

Levels of education and inequality are ‘sticky’. They do not change much over time. The r^2 for the most commonly used measures of economic inequality (Deininger and Squire 1996) between 1980 and 1990 is substantial at .676 for a sample of 42 countries. Solt’s (2009) measure of inequality also shows substantial continuity: The r^2 for net inequality in 1981 and 2004 is .731 for 43 countries. And the r^2 for mean school years for 1870 and 2010 is .58 (see Figure 1 in the Annex).

What I show in Uslaner (2017) and below is that mean school years in 1870 had uniformly higher effects than contemporary education levels on measures of social cohesion. This is evidence for path dependence, especially when changes in education levels are not significant (as with trust) or have much lower effects (as with the percentage seeing their lives as ‘thriving’). The past matters.

Measurement

My measure of school attendance over time comes from Morrison and Murtin (2009). They provide estimates of levels of education (I use mean school years) for 78 countries from 1870 to 2010. I adjusted the country codes to match current nations (since many countries, especially in Africa, did not exist in the late 19th century). The community well-being index is a measure of whether people believe that the “city or area where you live is a perfect place for you,” and whether “you have received recognition for helping to improve the city or area where you live” (Gallup World Poll 2016, pp. 52, 59). This sense of community well-being is an expression of the belief that others share our basic values. Scores are aggregated to the country level. The index is correlated with a range of measures indicating one’s social connections (a social life index) and optimism, as reflected in satisfaction with one’s standard of living, the belief that one is living comfortably, and expectations for improved standards of living both for one’s self and for the larger community (ibid., p. 35).

My measures of inequality are: (1) Solt’s (2009) estimates of the net Gini index for a country in 2004 (the year was chosen because it had the largest number of observations; and (2) Vanhanen’s (1997, p.

48) estimates of the percentage of family farms in a country in 1868, with the share of all farms that are owned and operated by small farmers (with no more than four employees) as our indicator of equality. Boix (2008, p. 207) argues: “The percentage of family farms captures the degree of concentration and therefore inequality in the ownership of land.” Easterly (2006, p. 15) holds that “...the family farm measure from earlier dates since 1858 is a good predictor of inequality today.”

The level of education has been increasing over time (see Figure 1), in every region in the world (see Figures 2 and 3 in the Annex). Education levels increased most dramatically in Africa (139 percent) and Asia (70 percent) compared to just 5 percent over time in the West. The West’s overwhelming advantage in education persisted over time, however (see Figure 2): The most educated countries were the same in 1870 and 2010, especially for the West and for Asia, though somewhat less so for the Middle East and Africa (both $r = .53$).

There is also a very strong relationship between historical and contemporary measures of inequality (see Figure 4 in the Annex). The r^2 between economic inequality in 1878 and 2004 is: $r = .816$. The strength of this relationship is remarkable since the two measures are not identical.

The most widely used indicator of social cohesion is what I have called ‘generalized trust’. The generally accepted measure of trust is the survey question, “Generally speaking, do you believe that most people can be trusted or can’t you be too careful in dealing with people?” The question has been asked in many surveys in the United States and elsewhere, notably the General Social Survey and the American National Election Study in the United States, and the World Values Survey and Global Barometers cross-nationally, among other examples. Here I use the most recent and comprehensive data set with the generalized trust question, the Gallup World Poll. The Gallup World Poll covers 166 countries with a common questionnaire (see below). The questions on generalized trust were asked in 123 countries. Surveys were conducted from 2005 to 2016. For some countries, surveys were conducted in multiple years. I aggregate these survey waves into a single entry for each country. The data are proprietary and are not publicly available; I obtained the data under a contract with Gallup. The description of the data set and the questions come from Gallup’s proprietary data and documentation.

The World Values Survey has included the generalized trust question from its inception. It now has the largest and most recent publicly available international sample (Wave 5 is for 2005 to 2009, Wave 6 is for 2009 to 2014). There are two reasons for preferring the Gallup World Poll data. First, the data are more recent. Second, data are collected under the supervision of the Gallup organization, whereas independent survey firms in each country conduct the World Values Survey without a central authority to ensure quality control.

Both the Gallup World Poll and the World Values Survey show anomalous results for some countries. But these are more readily explicable in the former given the likely lower reliability of surveys in less developed countries. The World Values Survey estimates seem unreliable even in countries with well-

established survey organizations. In Wave 4 (and following waves) trust was estimated at under 40 percent for Canada, compared to 54 percent for Wave 3 and identical figures for three surveys in 2000—the Canadian Election Study, the Quebec Referendum Survey (conducted throughout Canada) and the University of British Columbia Economy Security Community Survey—and 45 percent in the Gallup World Poll. Trust for the United Kingdom was 29 percent in wave 4 of the World Value Survey but 44 percent in the 2007 UK Citizenship Survey and 38 percent in the Gallup World Poll. Spain was at 34 percent in 2000 and 20 percent in 2005. Other anomalous results are 65 percent in Iran in 2001 (compared to 11 percent in 2005). The degrees of trust recorded in Vietnam at 40 percent (2001) or 53 percent (2005), Indonesia at 43 percent (2005) and Cyprus at 13 percent (2005) are also puzzling (see Mullet, Torgler and Uslaner 2012 for a discussion of these problems).

The Gallup World Poll’s anomalous results include inexplicably high levels of trust for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Malawi, Niger, Rwanda and Swaziland. The most reasonable solution is simply to exclude these countries from analyses when examining trust.

Measures of well-being from the Gallup World Poll are indicators of whether a country’s population is thriving, suffering or struggling. A description of this measure is publicly available in the Gallup World Poll (2016, p. 44).

The measurement of cohesion and well-being

Before presenting some preliminary data on how education and equality promote social cohesion and well-being, I will discuss measurement of well-being. The indicators of social cohesion and well-being examined in this report are ‘generalized trust’ and the Gallup measures of diversity and community

Other measures of social cohesion are indicators of diversity and well-being from the Gallup World Poll. The diversity index comprises questions about whether the community where one lives is a good place for racial and ethnic minorities, gays and lesbians, immigrants and people with intellectual disabilities. A more welcoming community is a sign of social cohesion.

Drawing on the work of Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman, Edward Diener and Norbert Schwartz (1999), the Gallup World Poll constructs indices of the quality of life in people’s communities. The highest category is ‘thriving’, followed by ‘struggling’ and ‘suffering’. Based on the Gallup World Poll (2016, p. 44), Gallup measures life satisfaction by asking respondents to place the status of their lives on a ‘ladder’ scale with steps numbered from 0 to 10, where 0 indicates the worst possible life and 10 the best possible life. Individuals who rate their current lives a 7 or higher AND their future an 8 or higher are ‘thriving’. Individuals are ‘suffering’ if they report their current AND future lives as a 4 and lower. All other individuals are ‘struggling’.

A respondent must answer both questions to have indexes calculated. The final country-level index is a variable that codes respondents into one of three categories of well-being and represents the percentage of respondents in each category.

The measures of thriving, suffering and struggling are the percentages of respondents in each category. The countries ranking highest on thriving are the Nordic countries and Canada; seven African countries are at the low end. Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Burundi and Haiti have the greatest shares of people suffering. The Nordic countries and the oil-rich countries in the Middle East have the fewest people suffering. Countries with the greatest struggling population share are in South Asia and Africa, while the least struggling are again the Nordic countries but also Costa Rica, Israel, Mexico and the United States.

These indices are mostly highly correlated: Thriving and struggling are polar opposites. The share of people who support this argument ($r = -.90$) and the share of people responding that their countries are suffering are also strongly related to the share saying that their nations are thriving ($r = -.69$), though this relationship is not as strong. The shares responding that they are struggling and suffering are not as strongly linked ($r = .29$), so these categories are distinct.

The countries scoring highest on community well-being are a diverse group: Austria, Panama, Sri Lanka, Switzerland and the Nordic countries have the highest levels; African countries and Haiti have the lowest levels.

Countries with the highest values on the diversity index are Australia, Canada, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain and the United States. The two indices are moderately correlated ($r = .522$, $N = 145$) but they reflect different dimensions of social cohesion.

Trust, like education and inequality, is 'sticky'. I show (Uslaner 2002, chs. 4, 6) that at both the individual and aggregate levels, trust is stable over time. The measure of trust I use there, mostly based on the World Values Survey cross-national database Wave 3 responses from 1995 to 1996, is strongly correlated with the Wave 5 responses ($r = .877$) and the Gallup World Poll responses ($r = .806$). Trust (the Gallup series) is strongly related to historical inequality ($r = .770$ for the Vanhanen index), even more than the contemporary measure from Solt ($r = .624$, signs adjusted). Trust is also more strongly linked to historical levels of education across countries ($r = .653$) than to contemporary levels of school attendance ($r = .464$). The legacy of the past has strong effects on contemporary levels of cohesion.

Well-being is also strongly related to historical inequality and education levels (see Table 1 in the Annex). Struggling countries were highly unequal in the 19th century. They also had lower levels of universal education, and the correlation is the same for the 19th century as it is for the beginning of the 21st century. For suffering and thriving countries, as well as for levels of community well-being and diversity, the correlations with 19th century education levels are stronger than for contemporary

schooling. Gross national income (GNI) has very high correlations (approximately .9) for historical and contemporary levels of education and for historical inequality.

Individuals who are thriving have fewer diseases, fewer sick days and higher incomes. They are more highly educated and have better work environments. Countries with a higher percentage of thriving respondents also report that the area they live is a good place for people of different ethnicities, races and cultures (see the diversity index description below). In comparison to thriving respondents, struggling respondents are much more likely to worry about money on a daily basis, and suffering respondents are less likely to have basic necessities such as food and shelter.

The story so far is straightforward: The past matters. A few indicators do show greater impacts from the present than the past, but these (at least so far) are objective measures (GNI per capita and life expectancy at birth). What stands out are the greater impacts of historical measures on subjective measures such as attitudes towards life and one's community in the Gallup surveys. Here one would expect contemporaneous measures to be more powerful predictors than historical indicators. Yet precisely the opposite is the case, which suggests the power of path dependence and history. For all measures of well-being, historical inequality matters more, usually considerably more, than contemporary inequality. Even for the contemporary (2010) measure of school enrolment (Morrison and Murtin 2009), historical inequality matters a lot more than contemporary inequity.

Measuring education levels

Is mean school years a good measure of the impact of education? School years by themselves may not suffice since the quality of education may be poor. Teachers may not be qualified or even show up for class, and the curriculum may not provide students with the tools they need to succeed after graduation. It is difficult to measure these problems, especially over time. Nor does mean school years give us any evidence about which children receive education. In many countries, parents may be required to pay bribes to get their children into school or they may have to keep their children out of school to work and help the family. Opportunities will not be equal so I employ Van Zanden's database on historical educational inequalities (Van Zanden et al. 2011).

For the first concern, I draw on standardized test scores, namely, under the Programme for International Student Assessment or PISA (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development n.d.). It "...aims to evaluate education systems worldwide by testing the skills and knowledge of 15-year-old students who are nearing the end of their compulsory education. PISA assesses how well they can apply what they learn in school to real-life situations. Over 90 countries have participated in the assessment so far which began in 2000. Every three years students are tested in the key subjects:

reading, mathematics and science.” These scores do not tell us about the curriculum, but they do give us an indication of how well the schools fare in an international context.

I employ average PISA scores across the three subject areas as a means of validating mean school years as a measure of educational achievement. I cannot employ PISA scores in the models estimated below, however, because PISA scores cannot be compared with mean school years for 1870; data are not available outside the West.

Average PISA scores are more strongly related to contemporary years of schooling ($r = .814$) than to mean school years in 1870 ($r = .640$) for 41 countries. Even more impressive is the correlation between average PISA scores and educational inequality in 1915, which is slightly larger ($r = -.844$, $N = 24$) than for educational inequality in 2010 ($r = -.813$, $N = 26$). In 1891, the correlation of PISA average scores with educational inequality is $-.627$; this correlation increases only to $-.73$ for the same sample in 2010. The past clearly shapes the present.

What accounts for variations in average PISA scores? I estimate regressions for 39 countries using mean school years in 1870, mean school years in 2010 and change in educational levels from 1870. I also employ as predictors the 2014 inequality level in a country from the World Bank that is included in the Gallup World Poll database (Gallup World Poll 2016, pp. 77-78) as well as the share of Muslims in a country (World Religion Database n.d.) and whether a country is in Asia. Less equal countries will have a more difficult time ‘catching up’ with more equal countries in providing education. Muslim populations have been served by schools run by religious authorities (*waqfs*) that have placed religious doctrine ahead of secular knowledge (Kuran 2014, p. 18). I add a variable for Asia because Asians have developed superior public education—yet mostly Asian-American students have surpassed others in schools, especially on standardized tests (Zhao 2017 and Wang 2015). Asia lagged behind the West in education for all of the 19th century and most of the 20th century, catching up only in the last three decades of the century, but at a very rapid pace.

I present the regressions in Tables 2 and 3 (see the Annex). In the first equation, mean school years in 1870 is a significant predictor of PISA scores, but is eclipsed by the level of inequality in a country. The contemporary level of education is not stronger than the 1870 measure either in the magnitude of the regression coefficient or its significance level. The salience of the 1870 measure is reinforced by the third regression, where the change in mean school years is not significant as a predictor of PISA scores. For all three equations, the share of Muslims in a country does lead to fewer students in public schools. Asian countries do have more students enrolled, but most critically, countries that are less equal have fewer students in public schools in all three estimations.

Since the level of inequality is the key determinant of education levels across countries (Uslaner 2017, pp. 36-38), I estimate additional regressions, this time instrumental variable regressions with the percentage of family farms as the major exogenous factor shaping mean school years. These equations

have just 29 cases compared to 39 for the simple regressions, which is why I estimate both simple and instrumental variable regressions. The Vanhanen measure of family farm ownership overwhelms the other predictors of schooling—and now the instrument for mean school years is as powerful a predictor as any of the contemporary measures. For 2010 mean school years, economic inequality in 1878 still shapes the contemporary mean school years, though not quite as powerfully as it does for 1870 levels (the t-ratio falls from 12.54 to 4.98 and the regression coefficient from .155 to .116). For the change in mean school years, the family farm measure is barely significant (at $p < .10$). For all three systems of equations, the contemporary level of inequality and status as an Asian country is significant for PISA scores. Most critically, mean school years in 1870 is as powerful a predictor of contemporary PISA scores, so this is another justification for using the historical measure.

What leads to social cohesion?

What factors shape social cohesion? I present some preliminary evidence on mean (average) scores for the six cohesion variables and the main predictors reflected in Table 4 (see the Annex). I present the overall means as well as those for the countries/areas selected for case studies below: Denmark, the Republic of Korea and Turkey as well as for the West for comparison, since it has the highest cohesion scores. Cohesion is rather low for most of the world, most notably for Turkey. This is not surprising, since education levels are low, even as late as 2010, and inequality levels are high, compared to Western countries.

Next I estimate the determinants of social cohesion: the thriving, struggling and suffering indices as well as community well-being, the diversity index and trust, I use the same predictors for all six measures. Do historical levels of education in the late 19th century predict cohesion in the early 21st century? Or does path dependence reflect stronger institutions in earlier periods of history, as Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) argued? I use the Polity IV democracy scores from Treisman (2007). Ranging from 0 to 10, the Polity IV democracy score is a measure of democratic governance in the early 20th century.

I also include the Gallup optimism index in which respondents are asked if their standard of living is getting better or worse, and whether economic conditions in the city or area where they live, as a whole, are getting better or worse. They are also asked to rank their future status on a 0 to 10 ladder about “the best possible life for you and the bottom of the ladder represents the worst possible life for you...about five years from now” (Gallup World Poll 2016, p. 56). Since generalized trust depends most strongly on optimism, I include this measure for all six indicators of social cohesion. Finally, I include GNI per capita (2017) since one can argue that social cohesion should be stronger in wealthier countries.

I present the estimations in Table 5 (see the Annex). Since I employ the same predictors in all six equations, I use Zellner's (1962) seemingly unrelated equations technique, which corrects for correlations in the error terms for such systems of equations. Historical levels of education are statistically significant predictors in four of the six equations: the exceptions are the suffering index and for community well-being. The latter result may reflect a problem with collinearity between mean school years in 1870 and GNI per capita in 2017 ($r = .861$). Optimism is significant in four of the six equations (exceptions are for trust and suffering). GNI per capita is significant in four as well (except for community well-being and diversity). But the power of institutions is not evident in these estimations: Early democracy is significant in five of the regressions (not for trust), but in two equations is significant only at $p < .10$ (the struggling and suffering indices).

Because of the problem of multicollinearity, I use instrumental variables to estimate a more complex model (see Table 6 in the Annex). For each cohesion measure, I estimate a first equation predicting mean school years from the percentage of foreign stock (Acemoglu and Robinson 2010) and the percentage of farms owned by families. In Uslaner (2017, p. 39), I presented evidence that the percentage of the population of European stock was a powerful determinant of early education: European powers only invested in education in their colonies if they were educating many people like themselves. And the percentage of family farms (relative equality) was a key factor leading to the provision of universal education in the 19th century. For the cohesion measures, I include the instrumented measure for mean school years, GNI per capita and the optimism index. The story is simpler once I use a more complex estimation. For the reduced sample ($N = 36$, not all variables were measured in the 19th century), the percentage of family farms is always significant in predicting mean school years, but democracy never is. The instrument for mean school years is significant in three of the six equations, and GNI per capita in only two.

I can rule out reciprocal causation since all of the cohesion indicators were measured in the early 21st century, and the major institutional variable was measured in the early 20th century and the family farm share in the late 19th century. I cannot rule out collinearity, so I present simple correlations between the predictors employed and the cohesion measures in Table 8 (see the Annex) in Western nations. I also include contemporary mean school enrolments to test whether there really is an effect from historical levels of education. The results are clear: Historical levels of education do shape cohesion. Four of the six correlations are above .5, and the other two are close to .5. For five of the six cohesion measures, the correlation with 1870 enrolment is greater than it is for 2010 school levels. For the one correlation where the 2010 correlation is greater, the difference is only .008 (suffering index). The correlations with GNI per capita and family farm percentage are all strong, but none of the zero-order correlations with the Polity IV measure of democracy is greater than .25. Two are below .10. History matters, but in terms of historical patterns in education and equality rather than institutions.

Finally, I consider how these predictors shape cohesion outside the West. The major problem is that data are scarce. So I present a small number of correlations that are reasonably strong in Table 8. There are not enough cases even for simple correlations in either the Middle East or transition countries. But there are some strong correlations of mean school years in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Historical levels of education predict GNI per capita in all three regions. In Africa, the level of education in 1870 is more strongly correlated with GNI per capita in 2017 than contemporary education. This is remarkable since almost all African nations were colonies in the 19th century. Historical education levels more strongly predict diversity and trust in Latin America, and both community well-being and trust in Asia. Thus, even outside the West, there is evidence that history matters. These results are telling, but I will present a more detailed story in three case studies.

Case studies

I selected three countries for case studies. The first is Denmark, an early leader in the provision of education to every child. It has long been one of the most equal countries in the world and also stands out on measures of social cohesion (notably generalized trust). The second is the Republic of Korea, historically a highly stratified society with little access to education for people with few resources. After World War II (and the Korean War), the Government adopted a radical programme of land reform that led to much greater equality, yet with at best mixed evidence that increases in education and equality led to social cohesion. In Turkey, the interconnection of inequality, a weak State, and an education system left to religious and military authorities has resulted in low levels of social cohesion.

Turkey shows that inequality shapes levels of education, and ultimately social cohesion, more than institutional structures. The repressive Ottoman empire fell in 1922 to a nominally democratic Government led by the reformer Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Even as higher education flourished, mean school years (for the bulk of the population) barely budged, from an average of .59 at the beginning of the Turkish revolution in 1920 to .92 in 1940, after Atatürk's tenure ended in 1938. In 1868, Turkey was highly unequal compared to the West (by the percentage of family farms). Inequality remained high in 2004 (by the Solt index) as did educational inequality (see Table 4). The “democratic” revolution in Turkey did little to overcome the Islamic authorities who controlled education. Nor did it foster the tolerance that underlies trust and acceptance of diversity, since minorities were never accepted as equal to Muslims.

Denmark

Denmark was relatively equal in the late 19th century: 35 percent of farms were family owned. Denmark also had a long tradition of social equality, which by the 1930s was ‘codified’ in a series of commandments about proper behaviour towards one’s fellow citizens. These were known as the “Jante

Law after a small town in Denmark renamed ‘Jante’ by the author Sandemose. Among the ten prescriptions of Jante Law were: You shall not believe that you are any wiser than we are, know more than we do, and are more important than we are” (Booth 2014, pp. 81-83). Danes have long believed that education is a basic right. Frederick VI abolished serfdom at the beginning of the 19th century, and one of his first reforms was to require that all children had to take examinations certifying that they had basic competence in subjects covered in schools (Hald 1857). In 1870, Denmark ranked seventh in the world in the mean school years of young people (4.7), behind only Switzerland, Canada, Norway, the United States, and Germany and the Netherlands (almost tied).

Danes are Lutherans. Lindmark (2009, p. 102) argues that the Lutheran Church is the origin of the universalist model of the Nordic welfare system found in Norway and Sweden, and more recently also in Finland. Nordic universalism stresses the equality of people and the right of each person to benefits, especially education, from the State (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005). Universalism originated from "the mission of the Lutheran state church: to bring the divine word to everyone" (Lindmark 2009, p. 102).

Denmark’s long tradition of universal education stemmed from two beliefs. First, the economic well-being of Denmark rested on education (OECD 1999, p. 5):

Talk to any Dane, from the taxi driver to the cabinet minister and you will hear the same story: “We have nothing -- no ore to mine, no forests to fell, only enough oil to meet our own domestic needs, no waterfalls to send through generators. There is little on the ground or underneath its surface that will sustain us. We have only our people -- their skills, their knowledge, their creativity. That is our national asset and we have no choice but to invest in it.

Second, “ every child, however destitute, has an inherent and indisputable right to be educated” (Hald 1857, p. 45). Denmark enacted a law in 1814 requiring that every 14 year old had to pass an examination to prove that (s)he has “received at least the minimum of education demanded by law; so that all children are obliged regularly to attend the public school” (ibid., p. 46).

In addition to State-run schools, there was an extensive system of ‘folk schools’, part of a decentralized grass-roots movement that gave farmers a means for personal and social transformation (Folk School Alliance n.d.). For peasants dispersed in small communities distant from each other, the folk schools were boarding schools for children. For the urban merchant class as well as for peasants, the schools “would provide the lower classes of society with the educational level required for them to be active participants in a modern and less elitist society” (StateUniversity.com n.d.). For adults, the folk schools offered practical learning for life.

Denmark consistently has been one of the leaders in mass education in the 20th century. From its seventh-place ranking in 1870, the mean level of schooling steadily increased over the 140 years to 2010 ($r = .976$ with time). Denmark has also had one of the most equitable distributions of education,

as measured by the education Gini, from 1910, the first year of data for Denmark (ranking second of 27 countries) to 2010 (ranking third of 47 nations). Its PISA average is 500, on par with other Western nations but well above the world mean. And in 2010, its school attendance ranked 13th in the world. Even more critically, it leads the world in generalized trust (73 percent believe that “most people can be trusted”). By a substantial margin, more Danes see their country as thriving (73 percent compared to 66 percent for runners-up Canada and Iceland) than in any other country. And fewer Danes see their country as suffering (1.2 percent) compared to residents of 166 other countries. Denmark ranks fourth of 150 countries on community well-being (lower scores are better) and 12th of 158 countries on the diversity index.

Denmark is widely seen as the model that developing nations need to emulate: “Denmark is a mythical place that is known to have good political and economic institutions: it is stable, democratic, peaceful, prosperous, inclusive, and has extremely low levels of political corruption. Everyone would like to figure out how to transform Somalia, Haiti, Nigeria, Iraq or Afghanistan into ‘Denmark’” (Fukuyama 2011, p. 14). The high levels of trust and well-being stem from the national trait of *hygge* or ‘coziness’—a sense of social cohesion that “is entirely democratic and egalitarian, open to all” (Booth 2014, p. 91). Denmark is not unique. Norway and Sweden have high levels of trust and well-being as well as education (and educational equality and quality as reflected in PISA scores). But Danes will point out that they score higher on most of these measures (but won’t brag too loudly, since that would violate the Law of Jante).

Republic of Korea

The Republic of Korea, You (2015, p. 203) argued, “...was primarily an agricultural economy with few landlords and a vast number of peasants” before it was liberated from Japanese rule in 1945. The richest 2.7 percent of rural households owned two thirds of all the cultivated lands (ibid.). An extensive system of land reform led to a rapid decrease in the share of land owned by the wealthiest segment of the population and a sharp decline in the share of land cultivated by tenants.

The movement for universal education in the Republic of Korea first came as a reaction against the Japanese occupation that ended 1945. Japanese rule limited access to education, but reform attempts were put aside when China intervened on behalf of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and started the Korean War in 1949. When the war ended in 1954, education spending rose dramatically as the political elite saw education as the key to economic development. Free compulsory primary education was adopted in 1954 and achieved by 1959.

After 1945, the Republic of Korea began a programme of land reform. You (ibid., p. 86) argued that “...the prime motivation...for launching land reform was to cope with communist threats from North

Korea and the Chinese mainland.” After the United States pressed the Government to enact land reform, the land Gini fell by half (*ibid.*, p. 89).

Land reform, You (*ibid.*, p. 90) argues, “facilitated the expansion of education, which in turn contributed to the development of professional bureaucracy, active civil society, industrialization and economic growth” in the Republic of Korea as well as in Taiwan Province of China.

In 1968, the Republic of Korea replaced the comprehensive examination system for middle-school admission with a more egalitarian lottery. By 1980, 96 percent of students in primary schools went on to middle schools and 85 percent of middle-school graduates went to high school. The trigger event for mass educational policies was the need for State-building coming from the conflict with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

Primary school enrolment increased by more than 100 percent from 1945 to 1955, even though the Korean War “led to the destruction throughout the country” (*ibid.*). These reforms made the entreaties of China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea less attractive to peasants who now owned their own land (*ibid.*, p. 91).

The Republic of Korea’s increase in education was remarkable. In 1870, mean school years averaged 1.1 years, tied for 13th place with South Africa and Venezuela, but just one sixth of the level of Switzerland. In 2010, the level rose to 13 years, sixth in the world, almost equal to the second-ranking United Kingdom (13.3); not far behind the leader, the United States (13.61); and ahead of the Nordic countries and Western European nations (including the 1870 leader, Switzerland). The closest Asian country is Malaysia at 9.63 years (ranked 26th). There are no PISA scores in the UNDP (n.d.) Human Development Report database or Gini indices of education for the Republic of Korea, but the overall Gini index was .325, ranked 19th out of 70 in this data set (which does not include Taiwan Province of China) and second in Asia (after Pakistan). The Republic of Korea does rank highly on PISA in the PISA database, at ninth overall and seventh (among 70 countries) in the most recent data (Fact Maps n.d.).

The case of the Republic of Korea shows that neither equality nor education guarantee social cohesion, although I present evidence that greater equality and education levels do lead to better governance (Uslaner 2017, pp. 149-150). The Republic of Korea does not fare well on most indicators of social well-being. Generalized trust is a mere .26, ranking it 53rd out of 128 nations, between Zambia and Spain, and well below most other Asian countries and some African countries. Fifty-two percent of people in the Republic of Korea say that their country is struggling, twice as many as in Denmark. Thirty-two percent say that their country is thriving, which places the country at 48th, but far below the leader (Denmark at 73 percent), and behind most Latin American countries as well as Thailand in Asia. And 12 percent say that their country is suffering, only slightly less than Africans say about their own

countries (14 percent). The Republic of Korea does not rate highly on community well-being (111th of 150) or diversity (105th of 158).

The Republic of Korea shows that it is difficult to overcome low levels of equality and education. Even with greater equality and education, social cohesion has remained low.

Turkey

Under the Ottoman empire, which lasted from 1299 to 1922, Turkish society was highly inegalitarian, divided between a ruling elite and the peasantry. Schools were run by the Muslim authority, the *waqf*, with a religious curriculum. Secular schools were run by the military, serving few students. Only boys, the children of the wealthy, received an education (Frey 1964). The State played little role in education. As late as 1928, only 3.7 percent of the population was in school, with a literacy rate of less than 11 percent (ibid., p. 218). The Islamic schools were unregulated (Kuran 2014, p. 12).

The *waqfs* were the agencies of religious charity in Islamic societies. They were essentially private funds, run by wealthy landowners, not State institutions (ibid., p. 18). In the Ottoman empire (Turkey), only 7 percent of the *waqfs*' contributions were devoted to education (Cizakca n.d., p. 34).

Since the *waqfs* controlled substantial amounts of public land and provided many essential services, they were beyond the reach of secular authorities. According to Hyll-Larsen (2013, p. 55), over a quarter of Turks in 2010 to 2011 said that they paid bribes to educational institutions, compared to 17 percent across all countries, and 4 percent in the European Union.

Turks had an average of .16 years of schooling in 1870 compared to 1.68 for all other countries and 2.88 for non-colonies. The 2004 Solt net Gini index is 45 compared to 30 for industrialized countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United States and Europe). The PISA scores were lower than the overall average (at 428) and far lower than for the industrialized countries. The Gini for educational inequality in 2010 is .509 (very unequal) compared to .14 (very equal) for industrialized countries. Among Turks, 22 percent rated their country as thriving, compared to 52 percent in the industrialized countries, while three quarters said their country was struggling (compared to 43 percent in the industrialized countries). Only 12 percent hold that “most people can be trusted,” which is not surprising for a country with a low level of community well-being and little diversity (so that people will only trust people like themselves).

Reprise

Education matters for social cohesion. Historical levels of education are mostly more important than contemporary enrolments. The evidence largely comes from the West because of data availability, but there is support for this claim in other regions. There is also evidence that countries can catch up.

History is not determinative, as the case of many East Asian nations shows. Middle-class movements in Singapore and Taiwan Province of China, in particular, overcame centuries of inequality and low levels of well-being. Yet general well-being and social cohesion are largely determined by historical forces. While change is possible, if not easy. It is difficult to organize poor (and uneducated) citizens, and to ensure a country's leaders will provide resources for the poor.

If there appears to be an external threat, leaders may perceive the need to rally their constituents to provide support to keep them in power, and thus will be willing to offer the services that will inspire public support. But there does not need to be an actual threat from abroad. King Frederick II established widespread education in Prussia following defeat by the forces of Napoleon in 1806 because he wanted to assure the loyalty of Prussians in the event of a future conflict. Enhancing the well-being of a country's population not only provides some assurance of loyalty to the regime against potential external enemies, but also against rivals from within (as the cases of the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China in the 1950s and 1960s suggest). Enhancing the well-being of the citizenry may thus be a wise political strategy.

Nations can create greater cohesion by enhancing their levels of education and promoting economic equality. This is not an easy task given the 'stickiness' of inequality and the high correlation between mean school years in 1870 and 2010. The past does not 'simply matter'. Rather, many countries do not have sufficient economic or other resources or the political support to enact policies that would change the distribution of human capital.

Annex: Figures and tables

Figure 1






Figure 2




Source: Uslaner 2017, p. 135.

Figure 3



Source: Prepared for this paper.

Figure 4



Source: Uslaner 2017, p. 70.

Table 1: Correlations of Gallup measures of cohesion and GNI with trust, equality and education levels

| Variable | Trust | Family farms 1878 | Solt Gini net 2004 | Mean school years 1870 | Mean school years 2010 |
|-------------------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|
| GNI per capita | .671 | .895 | -.622 | .875 | .865 |
| Struggling share | -.293 | -.734 | .387 | -.771 | -.769 |
| Suffering share | -.274 | -.544 | .128 | -.499 | -.382 |
| Thriving share | .348 | .721 | -.344 | .780 | .733 |
| Community well-being share | -.230 | -.490 | .337 | -.589 | -.532 |
| Diversity index | .372 ¹ | .728 | -.303 | .732 | .535 |

Table 2: Regressions of mean school measures on PISA scores

| | Mean school years 1870 | | | Mean school years 2010 | | | Mean school year change 1870-2010 | | |
|----------------------|------------------------|---------------|---------|------------------------|------------|---------|--------------------------------------|------------|---------|
| | Coefficient | Std. error | t ratio | Coefficient | Std. error | t ratio | Coefficient | Std. error | t ratio |
| Mean school years | 7.970** | 3.112 | 2.56 | 9.076** | 3.250 | 2.79 | .150 | 4.033 | .04 |
| Inequality level | -32.276*** | 7.001 | -4.61 | -25.906*** | 8.106 | -3.17 | -41.767**** | 6.843 | -6.10 |
| Muslim percentage | -66.305**** | 16.983 | -3.90 | -49.861** | 19.146 | -2.60 | -79.226**** | 18.834 | -4.21 |
| Asian country | 34.790** | 14.351 | 2.42 | 22.363*** | 13.396 | 1.67 | 22.797* | 16.110 | 1.42 |
| Constant | 505.342**** | 17.810 | 28.37 | 22.363** | 13.396 | 1.67 | 540.796* | 16.110 | 1.42 |
| | R2 | S.E.E. | | R2 | S.E.E. | | R2 | S.E.E. | |
| | .729 | 793.662 | | .737 | 770.063 | | .677 | 946.731 | |

Note: N = 39, **** p < .0001, *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .01.

Table 3: Instrumental variable regressions of PISA scores from mean school year variables

| | Mean school years 1870 | | | Mean school years 2010 | | | Mean school year change 1870-2010 | | |
|----------------------------------|------------------------|------------|---------|------------------------|------------|---------|-----------------------------------|------------|----------|
| | Coefficient | Std. error | t ratio | Coefficient | Std. error | t ratio | Coefficient | Std. error | t ratio |
| Percentage of family farms | .155**** | .012 | 12.54 | .116**** | .023 | 4.98 | -.040* | .025 | -1.56 |
| Inequality level | .061 | .177 | .34 | -.618** | .331 | -1.86 | -.679** | .361 | -1.88 |
| Asian country | .706** | .417 | 1.69 | 1.241* | .782 | 1.59 | -.536 | .853 | .63 |
| Constant | -1.354** | .566 | -2.39 | 8.736**** | 1.062 | 8.22 | 10.090**** | 1.159 | 8.71 |
| Primary equation for PISA scores | | | | | | | | | |
| Mean school years | 11.396*** | 3.800 | 3.00 | 15.281*** | 5.061 | 3.02 | -44.810 | 35.300 | -1.27 |
| Inequality level | -26.761*** | 8.277 | -3.23 | -16.619* | 10.586 | 10.586 | -56.502*** | 19.552 | -2.89 |
| Percentage of Muslims | -8.623 | 31.482 | -.027 | 21.825 | 34.938 | .62 | -97.907 | 90.342 | -1.08 |
| Asian country | 348.082** | 18.863 | 2.55 | 37.156** | 17.991 | 2.07 | 80.121* | 57.463 | 1.39 |
| Constant | 488.638**** | 22.552 | 21.45 | 334.716*** | 68.994 | 4.85 | 920.33** | 301.488 | 3.05 |
| | N | R2 | S.E.E. | N | R2 | S.E.E. | N | R2 | S.E.E. |
| | 29 | .664 | 857.846 | 29 | .669 | 847.276 | 29 | ! | 4792.101 |

Note: **** p < .0001, *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .01, ! indicates not estimated.

Table 4: Social cohesion, education and equality measures

| Variable | Overall | West | Denmark | | Republic of Korea | Turkey |
|---------------------------------|---------|------|---------|-------|-------------------|--------|
| Community well-being | 1.89 | 1.72 | | 1.57 | 2.01 | 1.88 |
| Diversity index | 49.68 | 68.2 | | 74.12 | 42.39 | 40.13 |
| Country thriving | .26 | .52 | | .73 | .32 | .22 |
| Country suffering | .12 | .05 | | .01 | .11 | .17 |
| Country struggling | .61 | .43 | | .26 | .57 | .74 |
| Trust | .23 | .38 | | .67 | .26 | .12 |
| PISA average | 468 | 500 | | 504 | NA | 428 |
| Education Gini 2010 | .30 | .14 | | .06 | NA | .51 |
| Mean school years 1870 | 1.27 | 3.7 | | 4.7 | 1.1 | .26. |
| Mean school years 2010 | 8.00 | 11.8 | | 12.1 | 13.0 | 6.75 |
| Solt net Gini 2004 | .39 | .30 | | .23 | .33 | .45 |
| Vanhanen family farm percentage | .20 | .33 | | .39 | NA | .20 |

Note: NA = not available in data set.

Table 5: Seemingly unrelated regressions of social cohesion measures

| Thriving index | Coefficient | Std. error | z ratio |
|------------------------|-------------|------------|---------|
| Mean school years 1870 | 2.587** | 1.359 | 1.90 |
| Optimism index | .681**** | .136 | 5.02 |
| GNI per capita 2017 | .0004*** | .0002 | 3.17 |
| Democracy Polity IV | 1.1062** | .495 | 2.14 |
| Constant | -22.973** | 7.520 | -3.05 |
| Struggling index | | | |
| Mean school years 1870 | -2.627** | 1.239 | -2.12 |
| Optimism index | -.174* | .124 | -1.41 |
| GNI per capita 2017 | -.0003** | .0001 | -2.19 |
| Democracy Polity IV | -.697* | .451 | -1.54 |
| Constant | 41.612**** | 3.797 | 10.96 |
| Suffering index | | | |
| Mean school years 1870 | .052 | .686 | .08 |
| Optimism index | -.507**** | .069 | -7.40 |
| GNI per capita 2017 | -.0001**** | .0001 | -1.41 |
| Democracy Polity IV | -.353* | .250 | -1.41 |
| Constant | 41.611 | 3.796 | 10.96 |
| Community well-being | | | |
| Mean school years 1870 | -.016 | .017 | .95 |
| Optimism index | -.006**** | .002 | -3.27 |
| GNI per capita 2017 | -.000002 | -.000002 | 1.06 |
| Democracy Polity IV | -.018**** | .006 | -2.86 |
| Constant | 2.318**** | .095 | 24.41 |
| Diversity index | | | |
| Mean school years 1870 | 5.215**** | 1.383 | 3.77 |
| Optimism index | .393** | .138 | 2.19 |
| GNI per capita 2017 | -.00007 | .0002 | -.46 |
| Democracy Polity IV | 1.457*** | .504 | 2.89 |
| Constant | 22.917** | 7.650 | 3.00 |
| Trust | | | |
| Mean school years 1870 | .021* | .013 | 1.55 |
| Optimism index | .001 | .001 | 1.10 |
| GNI per capita 2017 | .000004* | .000001 | 2.83 |
| Democracy Polity IV | -.005 | .004 | -1.01 |
| Constant | .092 | .073 | 1.25 |

Note: **** p < .0001, *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .01, N = 58.

Table 6: Summary of instrumental variable estimations

| | Mean school years equation | | | | | | | | Primary equation | |
|----------------------|---------------------------------|------------|---------------------|------------|------------------------|------------|---------------------|------------|------------------|---------|
| | Vanhanen family farm percentage | | Democracy Polity IV | | Mean school years 1870 | | GNI per capita 2017 | | R2 | SEE |
| | Coefficient | Std. error | Coefficient | Std. error | Coefficient | Std. error | Coefficient | Std. error | | |
| Thriving | .144**** | .022 | -.027 | .061 | 5.558*** | 2.294 | .000014 | .000013 | .679 | 97.220 |
| Suffering | -.008* | .005 | -.027 | .061 | -.642 | 1.180 | -.0001 | .0001 | .534 | 25.674 |
| Struggling | .144**** | .022 | -.027 | .061 | -4.916*** | 1.622 | -.232** | .121 | .637 | 48.679 |
| Community well-being | .144**** | .022 | -.027 | .061 | -.022 | .028 | -.000001 | -.000003 | .364 | .014 |
| Diversity | .144**** | .022 | -.027 | .061 | 7.515*** | 2.706 | -.0002 | .0002 | .442 | 135.256 |
| Trust | .151**** | .021 | -.294 | .111 | .011 | .019 | .000006** | .000002 | .719 | .007 |

Note: **** p < .0001 *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .01, N = 36. Other variables in the models are the optimism index and the percentage of the population of European stock in 1900. The main model includes mean school years, the optimism index and GNI per capita.

Table 7: Correlations of social cohesion measures with predictors: Western nations

| | Mean school years 1870 | Mean school years 2010 | Vanhanen family farm percentage 1878 | Optimism index | Democracy Polity IV | GNI per capita 2017 |
|----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------------------|----------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Thriving index | .646 (21) | .606 (21) | .850 (16) | .906 (28) | .146 (21) | .743 (21) |
| Struggling index | -.646 (21) | -.580 (21) | -.848 (16) | -.859 (28) | -.247 (21) | -.673 (21) |
| Suffering index | -.526 (21) | -.534 (21) | -.697 (16) | -.795 (28) | .032 (21) | -.711 (21) |
| Community well-being | -.647 (21) | -.337 (21) | -.620 (16) | -.750 (28) | -.198 (21) | -.724 (21) |
| Diversity index | .469 (21) | .368 (21) | .571 (16) | .758 (28) | .072 (21) | .511 (21) |
| Trust | .445 (18) | .397 (18) | .708 (15) | .795 (23) | .242 (18) | .646 (18) |

Note: Entries are correlation coefficients, sample size in parentheses.

Table 8: Correlations of social cohesion and economic measures with predictors: outside the West

| | Mean school years 1870 | Mean school years 2010 |
|----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| Asia | | |
| GNI per capita 2017 | .756 (11) | .962 (11) |
| Thriving index | | .606 (11) |
| Community well-being | .893 (11) | .536 (11) |
| Trust (N = 9) | .678 (9) | .568 (9) |
| Latin America | | |
| GNI per capita 2017 | .527 (27) | .577 (27) |
| Diversity index | .693 (17) | .441 (17) |
| Trust | .535 (15) | .354 (17) |
| Africa | | |
| GNI per capita | .704 (19) | .465 (19) |

Note: Entries are correlation coefficients, sample size in parentheses. The Middle East and Africa did not have enough cases for analysis (< 5).

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