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Caste, Ethnicity and Exclusion in South Asia: The Role of Affirmative Action Policies in Building Inclusive Societies

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Caste, Ethnicity and Exclusion in South Asia: The Role of Affirmative Action Policies in Building Inclusive Societies

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The kind of social inequality and exclusion that exists in different South Asian societies, exhibits some common cultural and social structural characteristics, in some respects quite distinct from many other societies in the world. The distinctiveness is on account of the stratificatory system of caste that prevailed, in one form or the other, in these societies for centuries. Despite some basic differences in the political and religious organization of these societies, caste or caste-like institutional practices survive in them even today—in diluted or even transmuted form in some, while manifesting greater continuity in others—with their corresponding structures of social exclusion.

I

The Caste-ethnic Dimension of Exclusion

Caste is the most intensively and widely studied South Asian institution and there is no need to reiterate the established wisdom here. I however wish to focus on, rather attempt to reformulate, some propositions on caste in terms that can facilitate a more direct and precise understanding of the contemporary structures of social exclusion in South Asia, the structures which indeed have emerged from the core of the caste system.

First, from the perspective of social exclusion caste can be seen, more appropriately, as the institution that has been structuring and maintaining for centuries relations of power among different *communities*, and seeks to legitimise these power relations: (a) through systematically dispensing various mixes of economic and cultural assets/opportunities *and* deprivations to different communities and (b) through endowing religious/ideological sanctification of such dispensations. Second, the hierarchical structures based on a sacrilized system dispensing economic/cultural rewards and punishments, however, did not/could not permanently and fully incorporate or recast the cultural and historical identities of different communities in terms of hierarchical relations. In sum, if we were to grasp the special nature of exclusion in the South Asian societies, it is appropriate that caste is seen in terms of its historical-empirical character: i.e. sacralized power structure—rather than just a hierarchy of statuses—that has been reproducing itself in different contexts and times in the various South Asian societies.

Caste: A Self-reproducing Power Structure

Evolved over centuries, caste sustained communitarian identities of innumerable groups ethnically, culturally and socially distinct from each other and at the same time, held these communities together in a vast network of local hierarchies. Communities in different local hierarchies were arranged, normatively uniformly, in an ascriptively unequal macro-system of graded exclusion, which was politically, economically and epistemically dominated by a few, select communities through ages. The graded structure of exclusion was never a permanently fixed arrangement, and a fairly frequent upward and downward movement of communities took place within and across local hierarchies.

However, a large divide always existed between communities in the small ruling sector (the *dvijas* or the twice born) which among themselves held virtual monopoly of different *types* of power (intellectual, political and economic) and a vast sector of the numerous other communities ascriptively expected to engage directly in production and service related activities (the *sudras*). A third and a relatively smaller sector of communities (of the excluded others: *a varna*) developed over time at system's periphery as a consequence of persistent enforcement of the principle of graded exclusion by the ruling communities. For these communities of the third sector, the system functioning on the principle of *graded exclusion* produced a situation of an all round, permanent exclusion. They were never formally recognized as a part of the system. As such, they were not assigned any specifically defined role or work in the system's production and service domains nor in any other domain—thus depriving them of any means of livelihood.[Ambedkar] This systemic deprivation of livelihood accompanied by the social, cultural and moral exclusion of these communities forced them to live in a perpetual situation of economic and moral compulsion and 'adopt' means of livelihood involving work that was discarded as 'unclean' and degrading by the communities whom the system granted one or the other entitlement, ensuring them some kind of a right to work.[Ref] These communities of the third sector being ousted even from graded exclusion, remained permanently degraded, leaving them, unlike the other communities, little or no scope for upward mobility.[Srinivas]

The intriguing question is how the caste character of exclusion—a hegemony of a few traditionally empowered communities based on graded exclusion, over the rest of the society—has survived in the South Asian societies in one form or the other, despite the

fundamental ideological and structural changes that have occurred over a long period through the spread of religions like Islam and Christianity as well as of modern secular and egalitarian ideologies, all opposed to the very idea of hierarchy based on inherited statuses. Even more intriguing is the fact that such hegemony survived for so long with consent and collaboration of the subjugated communities. It is therefore not possible to problematize contemporary situations of inequality and exclusion in South Asian societies and evolve any agenda (policies and politics) for making these societies progressively inclusive, unless we take account of these long surviving, highly adaptive and hence resilient structures of exclusion.

Two Faces of Caste

Two commonly misconceived notions of caste held by policy-makers and often even by the analysts, come in the way of understanding its resilient and adaptive nature: first, that caste is a permanently fixed hierarchy *of hereditary groups*, second that a caste derives its identity almost exclusively from the status it has in the hierarchy. In fact caste has another face which is often shrouded in theory, i.e. of a *community*. It is important to elaborate and clarify here these two rather different existences of caste—the hierarchical and communitarian—in order that we understand why caste has remained the most resilient among the stratificatory structures.

1. **Caste as a hierarchy of statuses**

Seen in a historical perspective caste, or a caste-like structure, is a hierarchy of social *forms* within which concretely existing groups hold statuses, but from which they may move out and occupy other statuses. Thus the actual groups to which statuses are

attached have always moved up and down in the hierarchies, in which process a group could detach itself from a given (born in) status and credibly adopt another higher status or may get pushed to a lower one. Thus when a group moves in the hierarchy, from one status to another, it inheres the power and privilege (or lack of it) of the status it enters. In this sense power and privileges are structurally tied to a status and not necessarily to a specific hereditary group. It is by resolutely sticking to certain statuses that historically a few groups traditionally representing epistemic, political/military and economic power have been able to dominate the entire system and maintain a degree of legitimacy of their power. This relationship between the group/community and status is although sustained by the ideology of hereditary virtues fixing permanent ritual distances among groups, historically there have been continuous countervailing movements to caste, which periodically resulted in several groups moving out of their born-in statuses and getting into new statuses. In the past the movements like Jainism, Buddhism, Tantricism and Bhakti caused such reshuffling of groups across statuses, in the ongoing hierarchal system. Yet, despite formidable ideological challenges and some structural impacts they made on it, by and large, traditionally dominating groups retained power in the system, usually by redefining, often relaxing the rules which maintained ritual distances and prevented choices. But it is only in the modern times that both ideological *and* structural challenges have converged, with implications for imploding the old hierarchical structure. These changes have, however, yet not appreciably reduced the power of the old status groups in the society. They have only made it unnecessary for the ruling status-groups to sustain and justify their claims to power in ritual or ascriptive terms; insofar as the

intrinsic value of status survives in the society, the traditional status-groups can discard the old ideological terms and use new ones for validating their continuing status-power.

2. **Caste as a network of ethnic communities**

It is important to note that even in the traditional hierarchy-determined system of social hegemony the included and excluded communities did not exist in a bi-polar structure of power. The graded structure of exclusion also *linked* communities to each other in such a manner that caste could also be seen as a graded structure of *inclusion* in which power percolated to every community irrespective of its location in the hierarchy. This caused each community experience a sense of social salience in the system. Put in more concrete terms, despite being tied in a structure of hierarchy a community at each level, except probably at the bottom most level, enjoyed a degree of dominance over some others below it. The dominance was however maintained not just through exercise of power but also by a system of mutual obligation and dependence among the communities. While this system never pretended to establish one, culturally homogenized political community it did sustain a common symbolic meaning system making communications possible across *types* of communities (representing denominational, ethnic, linguistic, and occupational-cultural differences) and *levels* of hierarchy. No community had a cultural identity autonomous of the other, it was always expressed in *relational* terms, where a particular identity could not be self-perceived or perceived by others in terms independent and underivable from those defining the systemic whole.

It will thus be an overly simplified view of the traditional caste system, if it holds that in it the distinct and hierarchically ordered communities lived a completely localized existence and had their identities constituted by statuses they occupied. In the system of

graded dominance no community, not even the one at the top, enjoyed absolute power. Each dominating group was entitled to only one type (intellectual or political or economic) power, which again percolated downward to other similar communities. This allowed many communities, despite hierarchical differences, to interact with each other in horizontal spaces marked by a degree of mutuality and cooperation among them. In this system of hierarchy each community was simultaneously a status group and an autonomous community in its own right. A community also developed some kind of a social capital for itself, ironically, through performing specific roles and developing specialized skills and crafts assigned to it in the hierarchy. But this contributed also to the growth of social assets for the community and imparted it with some specially identifiable psycho-cultural characteristics. These characteristics and assets cumulatively formed a basis of a cultural recognition of the community—often in terms independent of its status in the social hierarchy—and of its social mobility. All this allowed/encouraged every community, irrespective of its location in the hierarchy, to construct its special 'history' and build legends justifying its autonomous existence in a non-hierarchical, horizontal space and the place of pride it held in the society.

A community also maintained a degree of political and social governance for itself, and evolved mechanisms and procedures for settlements of disputes within it and of resolving conflicts vis-à-vis the other communities. The political authority of the state wherever and in whatever form it existed (King, an oligarchy, ruling council, a panchayat) was usually negatively defined as the one charged with *preventing* major transgressions or defiance of the generally and conventionally recognized social and economic codes of the system as a whole. It also sought to prevent the use of raw power

or unsanctioned dominance by one community over the other. In short, operating within the rules of an ascriptively ordered hierarchy, (rather by constantly bending these rules) the communities were able to find large social and economic spaces, and acquire distinctive cultural identities for themselves.

To conclude, in this hierarchically ordered world of communities, contrary to common belief, no community was expected to live, or really lived, with a hierarchically defined (caste) unidimensional identity. Probably that made it possible for the system to constantly accommodate immigrant and invading ethnic groups as well as the ever arising new occupational groups, in the system's flexible hierarchy. It even made possible for some of them to move vertically upward in the hierarchy and be structurally a part of the ruling status groups. To put it differently, the communities did not live in a prison house of identities; just as they detached and reattached themselves with statuses, they also discarded the old and donned new identities, through their movements in time and space.

The Colonial Caste

Along with being simultaneously caste-hierarchical and multi-ethnic, the South Asian societies shared in common *two* other historically interrelated conditions: the colonial past and the modernity sponsored by the colonial regime and processed through the ideological and institutional structures of colonialism.

This dialectic between the hierarchically ordered multi-ethnic society and colonial modernity sustained and even further developed the caste-like features of exclusion in these societies, which were only partially blunted or mitigated by the ongoing processes of urbanization and industrialization.[Susan Bayly] Even the religious and political

differences which eventually led to formation of different types of states in these societies, did not affect the nature of exclusion they shared among them.

The structure of exclusion that developed during the colonial rule in the South Asian societies had the following common features.

1. *A small middle class* whose members were almost exclusively drawn from communities occupying higher statuses (the *dvijas*) in the traditional caste/feudal hierarchies, but had acquired (mainly by virtue of their inherited statuses) modern (English) education and "family traditions" of serving in (colonial) Government administration, the military, or of owning large businesses and/or lands or following modern professions.[B.B. Misra] They usually, but not necessarily, belonged to a homogenous and empowered linguistic group but invariably had English as their second, if not first, language. The class remained culturally exclusionary and socially stagnant; the members of the erstwhile non-*dvija* communities could rarely enter it.[A.R. Desai]
2. *A vast majority of the socially and culturally subordinated population* of the ethnically diverse agricultural and artisan communities occupying lower and subaltern statuses in the traditional caste/feudal hierarchies and whose members were engaged in agricultural labour, in skilled and semi-skilled jobs and some at lower-level jobs in military and Government administration.[Galanter] They remained systematically unexposed to modern English education and usually belonged to a majority language group in the society. The colonial regime enumerated, classified and characterized these communities in a variety of ways, affording them a self-perception of an "oppressed majority".[G. Omvett]

3. *A demographically dispersed minority consisting of numerically smaller communities of the excluded and culturally deprived people.* They belonged to communities that were traditionally confined to the peripheries of these societies and were now officially enumerated and classified by the colonial regime as nomadic tribes, criminal tribes, the hill tribes, the untouchable communities of scavengers, leather workers and groups of weavers etc. Members of these communities remained far removed from modern education and were generally denied any cultural opportunity to access modernity and its institutional advantages. Members of these communities were engaged in different types of low paid or sometimes even unpaid (forced labour) works, such as scavenging, skinning and tanning of leather, landless labour, manual and unskilled jobs. In short, members of these communities remained systematically confined to such works when the society as a whole was experiencing significant degrees of modernization and industrialization, all on account of their traditional social and cultural exclusion.[Ambedkar]

This aspect of the exclusionary structures in South Asia has lent a distinct character to poverty in the region: where social segregation and cultural deprivation is a *cause* of poverty and not its consequence, with the result that poverty has remained systematically confined for centuries to certain social groups. Its occurrence is not random.

The in Post-Colonial Caste: Emergence of Ethno-Political Dimensions

Decolonisation radically changed the context in which the above structure of exclusion had survived in the South Asian societies. It created such moral, ideological and structural compulsions for the traditionally dominant groups that they could not have maintained their power in the society and the political hold they had acquired over the new independent states by insisting on maintaining the social-cultural *status quo* and not address conditions of social inequality and cultural divisiveness in their societies. In fact, decolonisation that came after decades of modernization and social and political movements of the oppressed had already caused pervasive refutation of the ideology of (caste) exclusion and loosening of the hierarchical structures. The changes produced some direct consequences for the caste-colonial structures of exclusion.[Omvett, Gail.]

First, the ruling elites still consisting of the traditionally dominant communities but now also wielding the state power, could no longer depend or take for granted their inherited statuses, as a permanent resource for legitimating their rule. The continuation of rule by these elites in the modern, independent state required that they monopolize the means of accessing modernity (esp. through designing for this purpose the educational and language policies) and receive at the same time support from a large number of people (the 'oppressed majority') in the society; irrespective of the fact whether that state was democratic or not. Of course, if it were a democratic state—where peoples' consent to their rule was mandatory and required to be regularly obtained—it became necessary for the ruling elites to incorporate/co-opt *in significant numbers* members of the hitherto subordinated communities into the power structure. In any event the logic of the modern state, democratic or otherwise, required that the rulers practised such politics and devised

the policies that kept the people on their side, at the least checked the resentment and dissatisfaction that inevitably grew on account of the rising aspirations among them.

Second, the vast number of agricultural and artisan communities traditionally occupying subaltern statuses had not just become aware but were keen to assert their new, collective political identity of "oppressed people" consisting a numerical majority. Released from the acuteness of hierarchical pressures they, on the one hand, had recovered and begun to assert their separate caste-community based identities (often competing and conflicting among themselves in the social and economic realms) and, on the other, find or create any occasion to forging larger multi-caste, ethno-political conglomerations (e.g., the 'dalits', the 'backward castes' etc.) and assert their numerical power in politics. In any event, this large mass of people, acutely aware of its new political value, became the most coveted political object of appeasement as well as of manipulation even as it became available for all manners of campaigns for social and political mobilization. It became increasingly difficult for the ruling elites to act in pure self-interest in politics. They could not formulate any new social and cultural policies or launch mobilizational campaigns to demonstrate a majority support to such policies or a 'cause', without taking interest of these various conglomerations of communities into account, even if such acts sometimes went against the ruling elites' own perceived interests. In short, after decolonisation the erstwhile subordinated communities in a South Asian society although remained economically poor, became politically empowered *people*, without whose support the ruling elite (even a dictatorship) could not feel confident about its power.

Third, although constituting a substantial mass of multi-caste conglomerate the socially excluded and culturally deprived communities of the third sector (the *dalits*) did not really experience the moment of decolonisation. Their dispersed demography made that all the more difficult for them. With the withdrawal of the colonial regime they now came under direct pressure of the ruling elites and other dominant communities, and were induced to accept their leadership in politics. Besides their traditional exclusion their smaller numbers and dispersed demography prevented them from organizing themselves politically effectively. They could participate in politics under patronage of the upper-status groups, and their representation in power became possible usually by proxy—assumed by or given to the rulers.

In some South Asian societies where the state was not democratic and had itself donned a religious-nationalist identity, either suppressed or made invisible the cultural identities of excluded communities. In the democratic states, although these communities were enumerated and classified for receiving benefits of policies like affirmative action, they for a long time, i.e. until they acquired political salience of their own through aggressive and organized participation in politics, had to remain reconciled to the politics of proxy and patronage. Even when they acquired political salience and began to assert their rights and cultural identities, they often got into conflicts and met with violence from dominant communities.

II

Nation-building as a Model of Social Inclusion

It was in response to this radically changed social and political context that the new ruling elites in the South Asian societies were virtually compelled to create a much wider base for renewal and acceptance of their rule in the society. Even a more compelling reason was the challenge, rather an impending crisis,[Ref. Huntington] that the new states faced soon after decolonisation, threatening stability, and for some even their existence. This was the crisis created by relentless, violent conflicts among the various ethno-religious and ethno-linguistic communities that, released from the hierarchical pressures and the colonial political management, were now competing for power. Faced with this situation the leadership of the new states now increasingly ceased to see diversity as a way of life to be celebrated; they rather saw it as a source of religious, linguistic and ethnic strife.

Seen in the above context it is not surprising that the leadership of different South Asian societies saw in the model of 'nation-building' a panacea for all their problems. It provided a modern ideological basis for unification of their population into a *national* society and for their new states to acquire a *national identity*—an identity overriding all other identities in the society.

There, obviously was no question of *choosing* this model; it was a model *given* to all new, decolonised societies. For, as the then prevailing global political wisdom had it: a post-colonial modern state was incomplete, both in its nationhood and modernity, until it became a *national* state, in the European mould.[Sheth] The idea of *building a nation*, was also upheld as an ultimate goal to be achieved by the freedom movements in the

South Asian societies. It had become an object of popular aspiration whose realisation was seen as synonymous with achieving Independence. But after Independence the ruling elites in these societies needed this idea even more desperately than they probably did during their Independence movements; they saw in it a great potential for eliciting support of the new majority of the subalterns, to their rule.

The leadership of the new states, thus posited nation-building as an overall goal of the state policies and of making their societies egalitarian and inclusive. It was seen as a 'continuous process' of mobilization that would keep a majority of the people politically involved, hopefully, without threatening the stability of their own rule—even in a democracy. At a more general level, the model was seen as a paradigm of social transformation. It was expected to detach vast populations of these 'traditional' societies from their segmented, parochial milieus and induce them, through process of massive political and social mobilization, to enter as 'one people' the new world of modern governance (of a democratic nation-state), and technologically empowered economy.[Karl Deutsch, *et. al.*] This process was visualized to be initiated through policies of the state, and sustained through mobilizational politics in the society. It held special attraction for the ascriptively iniquitous and now 'conflict-ridden' South Asian societies, for it was expected to demolish the barriers dividing the communities, and include them all in the new homogenous whole of a *national* society. It was further expected that through this process their unstable states will acquire a unified cultural basis for their rule in the society.[Gellner]

South Asian Nation-building: A Model of Inclusion or Exclusion?

Working under historical and cultural conditions radically different from those which gave rise to nation-states in Europe, the South Asian countries found the task of building an inclusive *national* society and retain at the same time the autonomy and neutrality of the state—crucial, among other things, for protecting cultural identities and rights of minorities—not just difficult but almost an insurmountable task. In the course of coping with this dilemma two different approaches to nation-building emerged: Nation-building through (a) ethno-majoritarian state or (b) through ethno-neutral state.

Pakistan and Bangladesh:

Following the first approach the leadership of some countries soon yielded to the temptation of seeking popular support to their newly created regimes by politically catering to the majoritarian ethno-religious sentiments and ended up by aligning their states with an ethno-religious identity. This became evident in Pakistan, when the ruling elites ignoring the wishes and advice of its founder, kept on with the old politics of ethno-religious mass mobilization and ended up making Pakistan an Islamic nation-state. Such politics of building an ethno-religiously inclusive and homogenous national society, in fact, produced negative, exclusionary consequences. First, it resulted in severe discrimination of the miniscule religious minorities, especially of Hindus and Christians (whatever numbers that survived after the Partition) resulting into suppression of their political rights and cultural identities. [Ref.] Second, perhaps because of negligible presence of the non-Muslim minorities in the country new minorities began to be identified and targeted from the old, and original majority in whose name the homeland of Pakistan was created. [Nandy, A] The Ahmedis and the Mohajirs. This has unleashed

what looks like a continuous process of *minoritization* [Gupta] of sections of people who initially belonged to the majority. The provincial majorities now began to emerge as new minorities on the basis of ethno-linguistic identification (e.g. the Sindhis) as also the denominational divisions (e.g. the Shias). Decades latter, East Pakistan whose population constituted a majority of the Pakistanis at the national level, but was ethno-linguistically different (Bengali), territorially separated and politically dominated, began to defy its Islamic (religious) nationhood and assert its Bangla national (linguistic) identity. The result was creation of another Muslim-majority state in the region, but founded on the principle of ethno-linguistic nationhood.

Soon after its separation from Pakistan, the leadership that had led the ethno-linguistic national movement for Independence of Bangla Desh was brutally removed from power by a militant Islamist faction of the movement, claiming to represent the 'oppressed majority' of the Muslim Bangladeshis.[Ref.] This unleashed a high-intensity politics of mass mobilization resulting in Islam becoming formally and constitutionally the religion of the state and the defining feature of its national identity. The result has been suppression of political rights and cultural identities of the Hindu, Chakma and Garo minorities of Bangla Desh.[Mohsin] In sum, the state in these countries could not retain its autonomy and neutrality in the process of creating a 'nation' as it was increasingly seen in majoritarian cultural or religious terms. The consequence of all this has been severe social and cultural exclusion of minorities.

The lesson to draw from the nation-building experience of Pakistan and Bangladesh: once the *state* aligned itself to either a cultural or religious majority it could sustain itself only by subjugation, even disenfranchisement and expulsion of the cultural

minorities however defined—in religious, linguistic or ethnic terms. Pursuit of such policies and politics, by the ethno-cultural state could even lead to its own decapitation when a territorially based and numerically strong ethnicity suffering exclusion asserts its 'nationhood' and eventually demand a separate state for itself. [I shall not elaborate any further on the kind of policies and politics the ethno-religious states in these countries have promoted, and their impact for the cultural and political survival of the minorities, as this theme is to be dealt in another HDR paper.] With respect to the role of policies, it is sufficient at this point to make a broad inference: the policies of affirmative action designed to enable equal participation and cultural identities of the minorities are not integral to the nation-building design of an ethno-majoritarian state. Whenever they promulgate affirmative action kind of policies, which they indeed do in some specific contexts, the policies almost invariably result in benefiting members of the ethno-religious *majority*. Occasionally, when genuine efforts are made to reach out to the non-religiously defined communities (linguistic of regional minorities) the policies meet with stiff, often even violent opposition from members of the elite (themselves the ideologues of the ethno-religious state) making them (the policies) virtually defunct and unworkable in practice.

Sri Lanka and India:

The countries that adopted the second approach to nation-building in South Asia, i.e. of establishing and maintaining an ethno-neutral state as an agency for national integration and economic development, found the task even more challenging. The first and foremost challenge, rather a nightmare, the leadership of these countries faced was to cope with the ever present possibility of the politically awakened, but culturally insecure

and marginalized ethnic communities organizing themselves into an ethno-political majority through movements of mass mobilization.

Second, the ethno-neutral identity the leadership of these countries gave to their new states was conceived as being integral to the *democratic* state. This meant that the mobilizational politics would proceed, and in fact it did, on pre-existing lines of ethnicity in these societies. In fact collective pursuits of power by the politically organized caste/ethnic communities became a permanent feature of competitive-representative politics, especially of the party system in these countries. At one level, such caste/ethnic politics are eminently manageable in a democracy but that requires a sustained process of *democratisation*. By politicising the traditional caste/ethnic identities and organizations democracy could transform (and, in fact, to a considerable extent it has) their socially and culturally opaque character by making them responsive to growing secular aspirations of their members. In this process, many such entities have forged in these countries larger political-social coalitions with other castes and ethnicities, all together assuming broader political-cultural identities. The result has been that the claim to power by these broad-based caste-ethnic formations has become more credible and effective in larger politics. At another level, however, the ethno-neutral democratic state in these countries lives with a permanent threat that the process of forming larger, broad-based caste/ethnic political organizations may give rise to ethno-religious nationalist backlash to what is perceived as permissive minoritism, resulting into formation of an ethno-majoritarian state. (India, in fact, is currently undergoing through such a phase of democratic politics.)

Third, the ruling elites of these newly independent countries (usually bearing the caste-colonial character: traditionally upper-status, westernised—English educated and

politically liberal) faced a complex situation for themselves: balancing the need for retaining their own power over the state and keeping their commitment to liberal democratic values which involved progressive inclusion of the hitherto excluded populous sections of the society into the power-structure of the independent democratic state. In practice it meant keeping the ascendant subaltern ethnic majority (a potential support for ethno-religious majoritarianism) politically constantly involved, but not allowing it to become a serious contender to the state power which could happen if they acquire ethno-religious identity. To put it differently, the success or failure of the ethno-neutral democratic state for nation-building, as we shall see presently with the examples of Sri Lanka and India, depended on the kind of policies and politics the ruling elites in these countries initiated and sustained after Independence.

Sri Lanka: The Sri Lankan leadership (a small, top-level social coalition of the upper status, urban, English educated and modernist Sinhalese and Tamil elites) whom the power was transferred at Independence was committed to secular, democratic values and had significant experience of democratic governance.[M.K. de-Silva] The colonial regime, since as early as in 1931, had delegated administrative powers to the leaders elected by *universal suffrage*. This leadership had by and large dispensed governance, with considerable pragmatism and a sense of accommodation vis-à-vis different ethnic communities, through several elections till Independence. It was itself committed to liberal, democratic values and was constitutionally bound, not to allow any ethno-religious considerations in the functioning of the government. Soon after independence when the electorate became widely and nationally expanded, the political parties began to mobilize their prospective supporters by appealing to the ethnic-majoritarian sentiments

and aspirations of the Buddhist-Sinhalese majority, which so far had remained dormant but were now brought to the fore of Sri Lankan politics.

The ruling elite, divided in two major political parties (UNP & SLFP)[FN] alternated in power from election to election. In this process they began to make what then appeared to be symbolic, but "necessary" concessions to the emergent cultural majority of the Sinhalese-Buddhists. Fortunately, this politics of symbolic appeasement of the cultural majority[FN P. deSouze] did not come in their way of pursuing the social and welfare policies they had initiated when they worked in colonial government in their capacity of elected representatives or as bureaucrats. They not only remained committed to these policies, but effectively implemented them by dispensing free universal education, extensive health care, subsidies on food and public transport and so on. All this brought about remarkable increases in literacy rates, reduction in infant mortality, substantial improvement in life expectancy (the famous Physical Quality of Life (PQL) index). The figures compared reasonably well with many European countries. The policies embraced the entire population, even as the country registered a low level of per capita income. This constitutionally established ethno-neutral welfare state functioning in a multi-party system survived a military coup (in 1962) and a Leftist insurrection (in 1971).[Manor]

But all along, during this process, an undercurrent of ethnic-majoritarian aspiration to acquire state power also survived. The Sinhalese-Buddhist masses saw coming of Independence and of democracy, as the power of the state coming to them. Thanks to increased material needs and aspirations—caused largely by the welfare and other economic-distributive policies of the state—not backed by requisite economic

growth, seem to have contributed to an acute sense of relative deprivation among the majority, which now saw itself as constituting 'the nation'. They attributed their condition of deprivation to not having the state-power that, they believed, was due to them. They saw the Tamil-Sinhalese ruling coalition not only as a bunch of manipulators of power but people who denied the (Sinhalese-Buddhist) national culture a place of pride in their 'own country'.[Ref.]

Although six parliamentary elections took place between 1956 and 1977, the competing parties, the UNP and SLFP, led by the same class of elites divided on party lines, now became increasingly inclined to respond to populist majoritarian demands. In this process a kind of inter-party competitive majoritarianism took over the old self-perceived politics of 'responsible elitism'. In the absence of a well thought out positive affirmative action policy, the political system could not *gradualize*, let alone diffuse, what came as a sudden and massive incursion of raw majoritarian power into the institutions of democratic governance, upsetting the normal democratic ethos of parties. The social coalition of the Sinhalese-Tamil elites began to collapse with a section of Sinhalese political elite shifting their allegiance, through successive elections, to the growing Sinhalese-Buddhist majoritarian movement. This movement had begun in form of pro-vernacular, anti-western protests against the use of English language in public institutions and for restoration of indigenous Sri Lankan cultural values and organizations, and, ironically, was then joined by some Tamil elites.[Manor] But during the 1980's the movement became a basis for cultural and political mobilization against the Tamil minority, resulting in massive violent attacks on the Tamils. One such riot took

place even as back as in 1958, the 'normal phase' of electoral politics, but that was seen more as an aberration than representing a trend.

Since the late 1970's, however, periodic mass scale violence against the Tamil minority almost became a means of expanding and consolidating the Sinhalese-Buddhist majoritarian movement culminating in the most barbarous attacks of 1983, during which elements within the state appeared to collaborate, more openly and directly than before, with the perpetrators of violence, sabotaging all efforts and initiatives of the moderate sections of the ruling Sinhalese elite keen to address the Tamil hurt and evolve a durable accommodative political arrangement.[Manor] The formally and constitutionally established state of Independent Sri Lanka which had its identity as a multi-ethnic secular state, was altered by the successive constitutions of 1972 and 1978 which enjoined the State to give prominence to Buddhism and to "protect and foster" the religion. But after 1983 anti-Tamil violence, Sri Lankan state seems to have become irreversibly an ethnic-majoritarian state, where the Tamil minority will have to find its own political arrangement within, more likely outside, the existing Sri Lankan state. In short, the constitutionally altered state promulgated many educational, language and cultural policies causing almost total alienation of the Tamils and severe exclusionary consequences for the other smaller minorities. The worst outcome of this process has been adoption of terrorism by the Tamil Elam movement as a means of establishing a Tamil national state (the Tamil Elam). The inexorable logic of building ethno-national state is least likely to end this mutually destructive 'politics' of ethnocide, even if the Sinhalese and Tamils are separated in two different states; for in each state there still will

be significant numbers of the minority of the 'others', i.e. Sinhalese in the Tamil state and *vice versa*.

To conclude, the Sri Lankan state which was constitutionally established as a secular democratic state and whose leadership was committed to maintain the institution of representative democracy and was oriented to human development kind of thinking in devising its welfare policies could not withhold for long against the ethno-majoritarian mobilizational pressures in politics. (Lessons for India?) This severe attenuation of ethno-neutrality and autonomy of the Sri Lankan state took place, in my view, largely because of the ruling elite's inability to expand the power by devising social and cultural policies of diffusion and inclusion of the rising subaltern majority. The consequences were: the removal from power of the upper-status caste-colonial coalition of the ruling elite; mobilizational inclusion of the upper as well as lower caste/classes as well as cooptation of some smaller minorities in the expanding Sinhalese-Buddhist majority; ruthless suppression of leftist insurrections and almost total alienation of the Tamil minority taking recourse to violent means for having a separate state for itself, and severe neglect of rights of some other minorities. Strange though it may seem, all this happened in the process of the democratic welfarist state, building a *nation* for itself. The lesson to draw from this experience: Even for a secular democratic state, with a territorially based ethno-linguistic/religious minority, building of an inclusive national society requires that *special policies and programmes* are evolved ensuring autonomy to such an ethnicity at the regional level through federal arrangements of sharing power at the national level. Even a more important lesson, as we shall see presently, the state must view the policy of Affirmative Action as an *anticipatory* measure and implement it proactively in order to

ensure participation and share in the political and bureaucratic power by the culturally deprived and socially excluded communities—these be the minorities or even a majority.

India: Unlike some other countries in the region, India chose not to adopt, constitutionally and politically, a religion-based, majoritarian-ethnic state of the Hindus (82 per cent), a Hindu *rashtra*, as a means of nation-building. The leadership of independent India to whom the power was transferred (the upper-caste English educated, liberal-modernist) rejected religion as the basis of either state formation or nation-building. Instead, it chose to have a liberal, secular state governed by a democratic Constitution and a *nation* conceived as a territorial-political community of citizens. In effect, it legitimised and charged the agency of the state to build the nation premised on *political unity* within which communities with diverse cultural identities could survive, even flourish. It is in this context that the Constitution, departing from the textbook definition of a uni-cultural nation-state, established both, the collective rights of communities to maintaining cultural identities and to pursue religious freedoms *and* individual rights of civil liberty to all citizens, *as fundamental rights*.

The Constitution thus not only explicitly rejected religion, language, or any other ethnic criterion for creating and maintaining a political majority to ensure the stability and legitimacy of the new state, it even ruled out federalism as a means of distributing power among the *ethno-linguistically-based* territorial provinces. Instead, it mapped out large multiethnic and multilingual provincial states as constituting political-administrative units of a quasi-federal state, called the Union of India. Such non-recognition of ethno-linguistic identities in governance, only five years after the Constitution came in force, gave rise to strong and widespread movements demanding re-

organization of provincial states into ethno-linguistic states. The movements compelled the central Government—despite the opposition of the ruling Congress party and particularly of the Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to this demand—to reorganize provincial states on linguistic basis in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The ethno-linguistic movements which were then seen as a threat to the idea of India as a homogenous nation-state, were thus effectively dealt with, thanks to the open, competitive politics through which the linguistic identities could articulate themselves and even change the ruling elite's idea of a unitary nation-state for India. By using a rather long-drawn democratic institutional procedure of forming the commission for state reorganization, holding public hearings and the ruling elites themselves taking electoral sense of the 'popular mood' the policy of forming ethno-linguistic provincial states was adopted and implemented over a decade.

Similarly, the problems of persistent social inequality and exclusion arising from divisions based on caste hierarchy and ethnic identifications were redefined by the state, in new non-ritual terms, i.e. such were seen divisions as constituting a *problem for the state* of achieving *political equality* and *social justice*. This new discourse sustained by democratic politics had many outcomes: (a) it prevented the emergent majority of the populous, subaltern communities from aggregating and acquiring *majoritarian political-religious* identity; (b) it brought the emergent caste and ethnic conflicts within the ambit of social policies of the state and; (c) it encouraged and induced diverse and conflicting communities to process their social and cultural problems through the open, competitive politics of elections and parties. Thus, over time, thanks to the functioning of the ethno-religiously autonomous and democratic state, the conflictual relations among

communities based on caste, ethnicity and language became integral to the normal politics of multi-party, competitively representative democracy.

Thus, the Indian ruling elites conceived nation-building as a *state-driven* process, through which it sought to bring about economic development, social transformation and cultural integration of the country as a whole. In this pro-active process the leadership saw the multi-ethnic character of the society as a *passive cultural 'context'*; rather than it representing any active principle that could interrogate even raise protest against the ruling elite preference for the homogenizing model of national unity. The expectation was that the universalization of citizenship rights and the induction of the cultural pluralities into the democratic process of open and competitive politics would evolve new, civic equations among ethnic communities and between them and the state. At the same time, it was also expected that the cultural communities would, in the process of nation-building, maintain their distinctive identities, even as their individual members exercised their rights as citizens and, often even of exit from communitarian pressures.

This approach to nation-building has served India so far, reasonably well. Firstly, it helped the Indian state in maintaining its integrity and the nation its inclusive, multi-ethnic character. It on the whole, helped the state in managing ethnic conflicts arising from conflicting claims to political power, made by various regional, linguistic, religious and caste-oriented groups. And, at the same time, such pressures arising from democratic politics has restrained the built-in tendency of the state to centralize power and homogenize cultures. In responding to these pressures the Indian state has shown or has been compelled to show, considerable flexibility; for example, by forming newer and smaller states as well as autonomous state-councils in some tribal regions, by devising the

policy of affirmative action for communities of ex-untouchables, the tribals and the socially and educationally backward classes (the political and social impacts of which we shall discuss later), and lately by initiating the process of devolution of power to the provincial states and, more importantly, to the village *panchatyats*. Thus, in practice, the state-centred project of nation-building has all along been subjected to the dialectics of democratic politics and social movements. It is through this process of nation-building that the democratic and secular state has been linked to the idea of India as a multi-ethnic nation.

The model, however, has not been able to address effectively to the issue of ensuring equal access to means of achieving social equality. Primarily because the ruling elite (English-educated upper-caste) while found the promulgation of affirmative action cognitively necessary and morally self-appeasing for inclusive nation-building, its implementation, as we shall see later, always remained tardy and often even dishonest. This bias showed in the elites not connecting affirmative action with other policies that were theoretically conceived by them as a part of the larger vision of inclusive nation-building; they responded by improvising such policy connections only when democratic pressures threatening their rule were mounted through movements. For example the education policies, despite laudable recommendations of many commissions has all along favoured the urban, upper-caste English-educated sections of the population, enabling their social and physical (international) mobility, but resulting in massive illiteracy for the members of the poor, lower status communities. Massive financial allocations were made for higher education, to which the poor did not have much access. This prevented them from effectively availing the benefits of affirmative action. Similarly, it took decades and virulent protests from linguistic minorities to achieve a degree of stability and consensus to evolve a

language policy that has now found a degree of consensus and stability. Yet, many problems remain, which by and large are being dealt with through the process of democratic politics and evolving federalism. (For data on language policy see Sheth, also Sumi Krishna.)

The model has also produced some negative consequences for national integration. More specifically, it has all along failed to cope with the territorially based ethnic *and* ethno-religious movements for political autonomy and separate nation-statehood in the border regions of the North East and in the Kashmir valley. People in these regions have seen mainly the coercive face of the Indian nation-state. Over time this has produced violent ethnic conflicts and insurgencies often leading to expulsion, and even annihilation of minorities from these areas by the militant ethnic movements. Unless radical modifications and innovations are made by the ruling elites in the structure of governance (through innovative federal arrangements) for these regions, making it responsive simultaneously to ethnic and developmental aspirations of the people, the model's claim to success (i.e. inclusive nation-building) would remain suspect.

A more serious threat to this model has emerged in recent years, from the ethno-religious majoritarian movement of *Hindutva*, a movement that has been kept at bay for over half a century, among other things, by the affirmative action policies accompanied by the social movements of *dalits* and the backward classes for social justice. But now the movement of Hindutva is threatening to create a rupture in the ongoing, even if slow and piecemeal process of political and cultural inclusion of the historically deprived and excluded communities. The model of inclusive nation-building of which affirmative action policies constituted a centrepiece, indeed established a rather firm, constitutionally institutionalised structural linkage between the secular, liberal-democratic state and the idea

of India as a plural, multi-ethnic society. This linkage is now sought to be disrupted by the Hindutva movement.

The Hindutva movement was launched in unison by various Hindu nationalist organizations in the early 1980s. Although the ideology of Hindutva was propounded by V.D. Savarkar during the Independence Movement, it all along lay dormant and failed to attract any significant support from the Hindus. Even today, despite their strong missionary zeal the Hindu nationalists find it difficult to sale the idea of *Hindutva* to a majority of Hindus. They rely more on the politics of discourse and of electoral alignments in the hope that someday in the future they can make *Hindutva* the ideology of the Indian state. Accordingly, The politics of *Hindutva* is addressed to detaching the idea of India as a pluralist 'nation' from the state, and redefining India as representing a unitary nation of the Hindus—a Hindu Rashtra. The movement's long-term objective is, thus, to make the Indian state dependent for its legitimacy, on the idea of unitary nationalism symbolized in Hindu Rashtra. Put simply, Hindutva seeks to legitimise ethno-religious majoritarianism, in the name of cultural nationalism, and re-shape the Indian state in majority-ethnic terms. In my view this project of Hindu nationalists is unlikely to succeed nationally, despite their political party—the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leading a multi-party coalition centrally and is a ruling party in some states at the provincial level. Even the recent savage attacks by the activists of the Hindutva movement on the Muslim minority in Gujarat aided and abetted by the provincial state, is not likely to help it to achieve its cynical objective. Firstly, because *Hindutva* ideology is against the grain of all that Hinduism and modern India is about. Second, the heterogeneity of interests and identities among Hindus would not allow their political mobilization on a sustained basis on the issue like *Hindutva*. In the competitive

politics of representative democracy these identities and interests are difficult to be aggregated and patterned in any single, ideological direction. Thirdly, and most importantly, the emergence of strong, countervailing political forces as a consequence of fifty years of affirmative action policies. Among other things these have given rise to several regional political parties, many of them led by the aggressive anti-*Hindutva* leadership of the subaltern majorities, stubbornly preventing the political consolidation of the Hindus.[Sheth]

If, however, for some reason this established model of nation-building, allowing for democratically processed incremental inclusion fails, and the Hindutva movement succeeds in cultivating a long-term political support of the majority of Hindus, the Indian nation-state would acquire, without doubt, the character of a majoritarian-ethnic state which would then treat its minorities like other such states in the sub-continent. In that event, the Indian enterprise of building a politically inclusive and culturally plural modern nation-state would be shown as having failed.

New threats, besides *Hindutva,* have also emerged. The state driven model of nation-building is now itself undergoing radical changes as it faces the newly emergent forces of globalism from above, and regionalism (in form of ethnic and political-religious assertions) from below. In this process of change entirely a new set of issues—such as of 'national sovereignty' and preservation of indigenous cultures and lifestyles—have been inserted in the old discourse of nation-building, creating far-reaching implications for the concept of nation-building itself. I shall not elaborate this point here, as it falls outside the scope of this paper. I however would wish to suggest that this change is likely to produce, in fact is in the process of producing, qualitatively different forms of exclusion by introducing a new dimension of cultural *division* globally, and in every national society: the metropolitan

world of globalised elites and its vast peripheries of the vernacular masses. In this process the poor are increasingly becoming 'invisible' and poverty being seen as the poor peoples' own failure, rather than a moral issue.[Sheth]

III

Affirmative Action: The South Asian Context

Only few countries in South Asia adopted Affirmative Action policies, each in response to some special situations/problems it faced in the course of nation-building. Accordingly, the policy has produced different consequences in different countries. As we shall see presently, the countries where the policy was explicitly conceived as a means of removing persistent conditions of structural exclusion that caused injustice and deprivation to people of certain communities and regions and was administered by ethno-neutral and *democratic* state, it has enormously contributed to making the society more inclusive, even equitous. On the other hand, in countries where the policy was adopted and implemented by an ethno-majoritarian state (democratic or otherwise), even for the good reason of uplifting and accommodating the deprived and backward communities within the country, it almost invariably ended up as an instrument for appeasing the ethno-religious majority and discrimination of the minorities.

In Pakistan [M. Waseem] the policy was conceived, firstly as a means of correcting the prevailing, sharp *inter*-regional economic and cultural imbalances, and secondly, to alleviate depressed economic and cultural conditions in which a majority within a particular region lived, e.g. the rural areas of Sindh. The policy provided for a *modest* (i.e. proportionally much less than the population size) degree of representation in

government services to residents of backward regions (in reality the territorially based ethno-linguistic minorities) and the populous community of Bengalis in East Pakistan where a majority of Pakistanis lived in conditions of physical and cultural separation. The distinctive nature of this policy lay in the ethno-majoritarian state not recognizing, in fact suppressing, the ethno-cultural differences within the country, resulting in the policy makers' unwillingness to identify beneficiaries of the policy in ethnic or cultural terms, and its insistence to use geographical criteria for their identification. In reality, however, both the backwardness and discrimination in the Pakistani society were based on ethno-cultural and feudal-hierarchical identities of communities within the larger Islamic fold. The result was a half-hearted and intermittent implementation of the policy. It produced deep resentment among the beneficiary groups who felt they did not receive benefits in any appreciable measure. These included: people from the Northern (tribal) areas, Sindhis, Baluch, the Bengalis and the Kashmiris in Pakistan. Of these, the Bengalis most acutely felt that they, despite being a majority, were kept away from the centre of power in Pakistan and eventually got themselves a separate nation-state. The policy was vociferously opposed by the dominant Punjabi community and the Mohajir minority (migrants from India who had led Pakistan movement for a separate homeland for Muslims in undivided India). The dominant groups, not only opposed the affirmative action policy, however infirm it was, they, being in power, sabotaged it from within in various ways, one of them being issuing fake domicile certificates to un-entitled, non-backward residents of a backward province. Ironically, the non-recognition of the cultural and ethnic identities of communities within Islam, the religion of the Pakistani state, led to strong ethnic identification by members of the communities who felt being

discriminated by the policy. The policy's use of administrative euphemisms for ethnic minorities enabled the cornering of advantages by the economically advanced dominant groups who were formally opposed to the policy. In short the policy, the way in which it was conceived and has been implemented, instead of maintaining national unity, contributed, on the one hand, to the rise of the militant (Mohajir) and separatist (Bengali) movements, and to diversionary counter-mobilizational and violent movements by the sectarian and denominational organizations, on the other.

It, however, will not be entirely correct to conclude from the above that the policy has not worked at all in Pakistan. In fact the phase during its phase of its effective implementation after the separation of Bangladesh, particularly between 1973 and 1993, the policy achieved its intended objective. It tamed the separatist movements in the provinces (especially in Sindh) and gave representation to educated elites of different ethno-linguistic provinces in the structure of political and bureaucratic power. [Data-Table from Waseem] This function is performed even today, insofar as the policy still allows such representations, although if in a smaller measure. But this new post-1973 policy caused an intense feeling of loss of power among the Mohajirs, making their movement much more militant. It also could not appreciably reduce the performance of the dominant Punjabi community in governance.[Data, Waseem] On the whole, it seems, the ethno-religious majoritarian approach to nation-building did not allow the ruling elites of Pakistan to draw the right lesson about the policy: its role in making the state more stable and the nation a culturally and politically inclusive society.

In Sri Lanka the affirmative action policy came as late as in 1970, in the wake of the ethno-religious (Sinhalese-Buddhist) majoritarian movement. At one level, it was

aimed at correcting severe rural-urban and ethnic imbalances in utilization of educational opportunities and bureaucratic power which for historical reasons had remained tilted in the favour of Tamil minority even as it favoured a section of upper status (Goyigami) urban Sinhalese. But, at the level of implementation, the policy appeared as a set of too swift and sweeping measures, deliberately and viciously targeting interests of the ethno-lingual minority of the Tamils. This aggravated the ethnic-conflicts, making the policy a means of cultivating and consolidating majoritarian support for the competing political parties and for the government of the day. Thus the affirmative action policy, the way in which it was conceived and the manner in which it was implemented, by the ethno-majoritarian, democratic state of Sri Lanka, instead of addressing the real need of correcting the ethnic imbalance of opportunities and power in the society, contributed to the growing ethnic polarization in the society (for details M.K. de-Silva).

Recently, the Hindu state of *Nepal*, controlled by its traditional, upper-status elites consisting of Bahuns, Chhetris and the Newars, facing Maoist insurrections, has awakened to the need for affirmative action policies for the country's hitherto suppressed and made-invisible ethnic minorities and the untouchable communities.[Ref. I. Exp.] It is premature to comment on what kind of impact it will have in terms of making the Nepali society more *or* less inclusive, even on whether the policy will at all take off from the ground.

IV

Affirmative Action in India

The policy of Affirmative Action in India (hereafter to be referred to also by the Indian nomenclature: Reservations) is by now an established social policy addressing issues of social inequality and marginalization of the numerous communities which, taken together, make up a majority of Indians.

Provisions and Rationale of the Policy:

The policy provides for reservations of seats in legislative bodies at all levels (local, provincial and national), of jobs in government services and seats in educational institutions for the socially marginalized and culturally peripheralized sections of the population. Reservations is a part of a comprehensive policy package that has evolved in India over half a century. The package comprises a series of legislations, ameliorative programmes and preferential schemes, explicitly designed to socially and politically empower the weaker sections of the society as well as to increase economic opportunities for them. The package has been administered by the central as well as the state (provincial) governments. Although the history of affirmative action in India dates back to the first decade of the Twentieth century,[FN, Mysore State] the present set of policies, including Reservations, derive their legal status and legitimacy from the Indian constitution.

The overall package, now in operation, addresses three sets of policy goals:

1. *ending* of social and religious disabilities suffered by certain specified groups by virtue of their social segregation and ritual exclusion (the communities of ex-untouchables, officially characterized as Scheduled Castes, the SCs) and spatial

and cultural isolation; (the tribals, officially categories as Scheduled Tribes, the STs).

2. *to facilitating and promoting* equal participation of *all* socially disabled and disadvantaged groups (which besides the SCs and STs, in this context include communities classified as Other Backward Classes, OBCs comprising a vast number of ritually discriminated and culturally deprived agrarian and artisan communities) by means of provisions for preferential treatment in education, in government employment, and representation in legislative bodies.
3. *to protect*, if necessary through legislative action and executive orders, all these groups, also described in the constitution as socially disadvantaged and *weaker* sections of society—generally identified as the backward classes—*from all forms of social injustice and exploitation*.

The overall, long-term goal, as was repeatedly expressed by the policy makers in the course of the Constituent Assembly debates, was: building a political community of *all* Indians, based on the principle of social equality.[Ref.]

In articulating these goals, the policy has over the years widened its scope and enlarged its content. Reservations (Affirmative Action) is one of the many avenues that have opened up in the pursuit of an equitable social policy. A series of laws (e.g. the *Untouchability Offences Act of 1955*, the *Protection of Civil Rights Act of 1976*, the *Prevention of Atrocities Act of 1989*—a legislation prescribing severe punitive provisions against practice of untouchability—the amended *Criminal Tribes Act of 1*952 removing the legal disabilities suffered by the so-called criminal tribes and legislation to end forced labour) have been passed to further the cause of social justice. Protective laws also have

been passed preventing alienation of land owned by a tribal to any one belonging to a non-tribal community, regulating money-lending, and providing debt-relief and legal aid to the weaker sections of society. Besides, there are many other promotional schemes and programmes for backward classes concerning land allotments, housing, scholarships, subsidies and credits aimed at providing physical security as well as promoting occupational mobility of these groups. Special laws have also been made providing for self-rule arrangements to tribals populating specified territories.

The most controversial aspect of this overall policy is, however, the provision of reservations. Although these provisions are based on the same *values and rationale* that inform other parts of the policy package listed above, their impact is felt adversely and directly by those outside the beneficiary groups and that too in the vital area of competition for political/bureaucratic power and social mobility where the means are always scarce and competition intense.

The Beneficiaries and the Benefits

The beneficiaries of Reservations comprise *three* types of communities: (a) ex-untouchables, (b) tribals and (c) Other Backward Classes; all, together, making about 65 per cent of the Indian population. In the beneficiary categories are also included the deprived and marginalized sections of the *religious minorities*: Sikhs, Buddhists, Christians and the Muslims.

(a) *Communities of the ex-untouchables*: Specific castes/communities who traditionally suffered almost total ritual prohibition resulting in their continuing social discrimination have been identified, enumerated and listed in every provincial state of

India and the lists have been consolidated and incorporated in the *schedule* of the Constitution. These communities hence are officially designated as Scheduled Castes (SCs). The implicit criterion for inclusion in the SC list is the social and religious disability suffered by a caste on account of untouchability, i.e. being at the pollution end of the social hierarchy. Formally, however, any group considered to be eligible for inclusion by the President of India (i.e. by an executive order of the Central Government) can be included in the list. However, only the Parliament has the power to de-list an SC community.

Included in the SC category are communities from three different religions, Hinduism, Sikhism and Buddhism, all having within them communities traditionally suffering the odium of untouchability. They together constitute 16 per cent (160 million) of the Indian population.

The term SC has by now become a term of common usage in the public sphere for referring to an ex-untouchable community or its member. This administrative nomenclature has by now become an established *social* category and is also a preferred term of self-identification for members of these communities themselves. This is probably because it has a secular, non-ritual and stigma-free connotation. The other such preferred term is *dalit*, which literally means oppressed (crushed, broken) people. The term emerged from the movement of untouchables for social justice and political rights led by Dr B.R. Ambedkar and has replaced the old terms (one of them being *harijan*) which sounded ritualistic, having religious connotations. The term *dalit* is also meant to remind everyone about social injustice and discrimination the communities still suffer and to inspire the *dalits* themselves to continue to fight for their social and cultural rights.

It has by now become a common symbol of political-cultural identity for *all* ex-untouchable communities, a singular term for their *ethnic* identification.

The policy entitles the SCs to receive three types of benefit. (a) Political reservations: Seats in the national Parliament, state-legislatures and local-government bodies, reserved *in proportion to their size (percentage) in the population*. (b) Job reservations: Seats are reserved for SCs in all Government and Public Sector jobs, in proportion to their size (percentage) in the population. (c) Educational reservations: Seats are reserved in educational institutions, especially where there is intense competition for entrance. Here also the quantum of reservation is in proportion to their size (percentage) in the population.

(b) *Communities of tribal and indigenous people*: Specific tribal communities are identified and listed in the constitutional schedules and are officially categorized as Scheduled Tribes (STs). They receive similar benefits of Reservations as the SCs, i.e. seats in legislatures and local government bodies, in government employment and in educational institutions. The number of seats reserved for them in each of the three sectors is in proportion to their size (per cent) in the population. They constitute about 8 per cent (*80 millions*) of Indian population. The implicit principle of inclusion in the scheduled category of the tribals (STs) is their physical and cultural isolation, their habitat being conventionally in and around hills and forests. Formally, however, like in the case of SCs, inclusion in the lists is by executive order and exclusion only through a decision of the Parliament. Included in the ST lists are communities from different religions: Hinduism, Christianity and Islam as well as a large number of communities practising their indigenous tribal faiths.

Over the years the communities belonging to the category ST have become internally highly differentiated, at one end there are the communities living in relative conditions suggesting a high degree of physical and cultural isolation and almost totally unexposed to literacy and at the other end are those communities, with high literacy rates and a significant number of their members being university educated, leading middle and upper-class lifestyles. In some states of the North-East they have been the traditional ruling elites.[FN] But taken as a whole the tribal communities have been lagging behind the SCs in the extent of benefits they have been able to receive from the educational and job reservations.[Ref: Xaxa]

There has been a permanent, independent commission, to monitor the working of social policies relating to SCs and STs, and report their findings, and recommendations for improvement of their conditions to the Parliament.

(c) *Communities of the socially and educationally 'backward' people*: The category Other Backward Classes (OBCs) is the most numerous and heterogeneous of all. Obviously, they are in no need of legislative reservations, as they constitute numerical majority in many states of India. Over the years their representation in legislatures has vastly increased through the normal processes of competitive politics.[FN Data: CSDS, Jeffrelot] In India's representative democracy, political reservation is not their problem. In fact it is by converting their numerical strength into political power that the OBCs whose entitlement to Reservations was ambiguously articulated in the Constitution, re-entered the Reservations system after Independence and have managed to stay there.[FN on re-entry] The story of reservations for the OBCs is the one of prolonged struggles, agitations and counter-agitations that has made Indian politics quite volatile and often

even tumultuous. At another level it is an account of democratic politics managing inclusion of members of the socially deprived and discriminated majority through progressive expansion of affirmative action policies and, thus, preventing the Indian state (so far?) from acquiring ethno-majoritarian character. We shall return to this account later. At this point it is sufficient to note that it was only in 1991 that an uniform central policy was adopted, institutionalising the OBC reservations at the national and state levels, when the report of the Second Backward Class Commission (the Mandal Report) was accepted by the Central Government for implementation, which was subsequently endorsed by the Supreme Court of India.

The quantum of reservations for the OBCs has since been fixed at 27 per cent at the national as well as state levels which is a little over half to their proportion in the population. Until 1991 several states did not have any provision of reservations for them. The states were: West Bengal, Orissa, Assam, Rajasthan and the territories administered by the Central Government (Union Territories). The states in which the provision was made the quantum of reservations was arbitrarily fixed at much lower level, i.e. between 2 to 15 per cent. For entrance in prized educational institutions standards were only marginally lowered for them. For example, all the OBC students admitted between 1979-80 and 1983-84 under the reservation provisions in a medical college in Ahmedabad had obtained between 76 and 79 per cent marks at the Std XII examination.[M. Dave]

The situation, however, has all along been different in the south Indian states, where reservations for the other backward classes have existed, in one form or the other, containing for over half a century. The extent of reservations there has reached the point of saturation, covering almost their proportional strength in the population.

Unlike the SCs and STs, the communities identified under the OBC category are not identified and enumerated in India's decennial censuses. A community can enter the OBC category and receive benefits of Reservation only on the recommendation of the statutorily appointed commission. The Second Backward Class Commission listed such communities and estimated their population at 52 per cent which seems too liberal on the higher side. My estimates of OBCs entitled to receive Reservations benefits, based on CSDS sample surveys, is between 38 to 40 per cent.

The OBCs comprise, by and large, the lower rungs of the Sudras who, in the past, suffered from varying degrees of ritual prohibitions applied to the *a-dvijas* (literally, those not 'twice born) and remain till today socially and occupationally disadvantaged. A substantial number of the erstwhile non-*dvijas* (Sudras), however, had achieved to a considerable extent social mobility and a degree of political and economic advancement, in the late medieval period, and especially during the colonial regime. These communities, e.g. the Reddies, Kammas, Marathas, Patidars etc. have been kept out of the OBC lists. But a vast majority of the Sudras officially included in the OBC category belong to communities that have been ritually and socially discriminated and were backward. Accordingly, a number of such Sudra communities, along with many such other similar Muslim and Christian and Buddhist groups have been included in the lists of beneficiaries of the Reservation policy.

Even so, a few such communities in the southern States, which by the policy's own criteria would not qualify today for Reservations benefits, continue to be on the list of beneficiaries. Although their inclusion in the reservation list was justified when the scheme was started, their social and educational conditions have since improved to such a

degree that they can no longer be considered as socially and educationally disadvantaged. In the northern and western States, although there are some communities identified by sociologists as 'dominant castes' and have acquired political clout by virtue of their numerical strength, they by and large, they continue to remain backward in social and educational terms. In these States (unlike the southern States), reservation for OBCs is of recent origin and till yesterday the quantum of reservation for them remained much smaller in proportion to their numbers.

Viewed from the national or the State levels, the OBCs today constitute a far more (economically and educationally) heterogeneous category by comparison with the SCs and Sts. On the one hand, the OBCs include some of the dominant castes of agriculturists who at the local levels are often locked in conflicts with the SCs, both in the north and in the south. Some of them have entered, and few more have been forcing their entry, in the list of beneficiary communities making use of electoral clout rather than their eligibility. Yet, on the other, the category includes a wide array of socially and economically deprived groups which suffer at least as much (if not more than) as the SCs and STs. These include the so-called 'criminal' tribes (stigmatised as such during the colonial period), nomadic communities, lower-status and ex-untouchable communities converted to Islam, and Christianity from the SCs, as well as a whole range of minor castes subjected to a condition of 'relative untouchablity' and engaged in caste-bound marginal occupations. On the whole the OBC is an open category of 'inclusion' to which claims of entry could be made by *any* community, at any time by representing its case to the permanent commissions specially set up in the states and at the national level specially for this purpose. The commissions are also charged with the responsibility of

exclusion of those communities from the lists whom it finds, after due investigation, being wrongly included or having ceased to be backward. As the category comprises the country's largest section of the electorate this official open-endedness is found politically useful by the political parties cultivating vote banks and by the leaders of the majoritarian ethno-religious movement (Hindutva) as their potential supporters. All this has resulted in intense competition for seeking OBC support in politics, generating trends threatening to bring into question the established policy of making India an inclusive society, among other things, through affirmative action. Two processes are at work which may decide the direction in which the question of inclusion and exclusion may be settled:

1. *political-ethnicization of castes*, i.e. the numerous lower status castes organizing themselves into larger ethno-political formations in competitive politics, for asserting their rights and maintaining cultural identities, and in the process achieve social justice and prevent any distortions of the policy as a part of their larger democratic politics;
2. political ethno-majoritization of lower-status communities, through their cooptation in the Hindutva movement, suppressing ethno-cultural interests and identities of communities through their emotional-communal mobilization *for* 'Hindu unity' and *against* the non-Hindu minorities. I shall highlight some aspects of this politics, in the next section, in the course of examining the outcomes and impacts of the affirmative action policy for different groups, and generally for the whole system.

V

Performance and Outcomes of the Policy

Despite tardy and often even dishonest implementation for over fifty years the policy of Reservations has worked reasonably well. It in fact can claim some significant achievements, not only for the beneficiary groups of SCs, STs and OBCs, but for the whole nation.

First, Reservations have changed the nature and composition of the Indian middle-class, making it more inclusive. At Independence, it was a small caste-like social formation. Its membership almost entirely consisted of the English-educated, urban sections of the *dvija* castes.[A.R. Desai] Today, thanks to Reservations, members of 'lower castes' have been able to enter the middle-class in significant numbers. A recent CSDS study shows that a sizeable section of India's middle-class consists of the second and third generation beneficiaries of Reservations. [Table]

Second, fifty years ago dalits, tribals and OBCs could aspire only to a limited degree of upward mobility and that too as collectivities functioning *within* the caste structure. Today, with Reservations opening for them gates of the middle-class, not only the incidence of their upward mobility has increased, but for achieving it they have not to depend on ritualistic modes sanctioned by the caste system, such as *sanskritization*. This changed pattern of social mobility—a larger number of *individual* members of 'lower castes' acquiring middle-class identity—has deeply shaken the economic and cultural roots of the caste system. For, 'middle-class' identity is no longer perceived in ritual status terms; consumerization rather than *sanskritization* has become a middle-class marker.

Third, working for over fifty years Reservations have made cumulative and lasting impact on India's political system. With educational and occupational opportunities provided by Reservations a new political leadership has emerged from among the SCs, STs and OBCs. For example, the very origin and growth of the powerful dalit-based party in the north of India, the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) lay in the formation of a trade-union like association of the *dalit* and the backward class Government employees. In the course of about five decades of Reservations the entire structure of political power in almost all the states and lately at the national level has changed. The established pattern of the upper caste English educated elite rule has changed. In almost all provincial states of India the OBCs and members of the other beneficiary categories of affirmative action are now occupying important power positions in Government and, of course, at a relatively much less important levels in the bureaucracy. In this process several political parties supported by subaltern groups have appeared on the political scene. They bitterly resent and fight reproduction of the traditional, caste-hierarchical (*jajmani* type) client-patron relationship in politics, which had for long characterized Indian politics: the vertical political relationship between the leadership of the lower-status, rural groups and the English-educated, upper caste elite. Leaders of these communities now aggressively assert their interests and identities in the electoral arena. Put differently, this new political class, empowered by Reservations, worked for ending the upper-caste, elite-oriented Congress monopoly of power. In this process, it gave a material basis to its own power in the rural economy. In short, Reservations have contributed to changing the old balance of power in the society. Viewed from a long-term perspective, the political inclusion of the hitherto excluded

groups, initiated by the social policy but realized through competitive democratic politics, has resulted in disruption of the the reproductive process of caste being periodically incarnated into ideologically sanctified power structure that assigned political power to hereditary groups.

Reservations has made a significant impact for *individuals* of the beneficiary categories. The most crucial impact is that *education has become a social and cultural value* for the members of all the beneficiary categories. They now see education as an accessible means for them to *individually* attaining modernity and social mobility. Some of them having entered the middle class now, unlike their parents, go great lengths to educate their children so that they can receive benefits of reservation and are able to stay in the growing, competitive Indian middle class. Having entered the middle class not only has their *lifestyle changed*, they now redefine the conventional, caste-like culture of the middle class, increasingly in *non-ritual* status terms. Even for many non-educated, but of the aspirant generation, alcoholism is on the wane and savings are increasing. This expansion of opportunities has enabled members of these communities to attain, in greater numbers than before, high professional stature and positions of power. (Such achievements are however rare in business and industry.) As in the case of every other upwardly mobile community, this has created an upper crust whose members are expected not only to serve as a role model but also provide a protective device, a 'spear-head' for their people to enter the system.

Successful individuals always had *a role model impact*, but now with large enough number from among these groups having entered the power structure, they have been able to install protective mechanisms within the bureaucracy and political parties,

facilitating entry of their compatriots in the power structure. For example, in Surat District of Gujarat, as back as in the sixties *about 40% of primary school teachers were tribals*. This opened up, on a long-term basis, for the tribals of the district the doors of political power in Gujarat. In the course of twenty years few of them became not just MLAs and MPs (which was mechanically possible through quotas) but Ministers and even Chief Ministers of the state. Once they became a critical mass in power, it became easy to build other linkages. By using their political influence they acquired a say in decision-making, including in recruitment matters expanding the linkages further. Let me conclude this part on impact of the policy by reproducing from a field report published in a reputed national daily, a day after the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh (UP) Ms. Mayawati stepped down from power. It aptly illustrates how political power acquired by the socially excluded people through affirmative action policy and democratic politics can have revolutionary impact for opening up the system.

> In Lucknow and Delhi, politicians may scoff at Mayawati's *Dalit ki b*eti (daughter of a dalit) histrionics, but spend a day in some of these Ambedkar villages—settlements with more than 50 per cent Dalit populace were declared as such and promised special development schemes—and you realise why she, in many a home, finds place on a pedestal.
>
> No, she hasn't transformed hovels into bungalows. Nor has expelled the woes of the most wretched. To a first time visitor, there's little to rejoice: flies crawl over half-naked children, debris and dung raise a stink in the lanes and even the pucca homes show signs of abject poverty. So what's new?
>
> Check with the Dalits of these villages. They will tell you this was God's forsaken country. They tilled the land of the upper castes, looked after their animals, washed their clothes, shaped their pots, made their shoes and cleaned their mess. In turn, they were declared untouchable and unclean—and forced to live in the dirtiest quarters of the village.
>
> They cleaned toilets but never dreamed of a toilet of their own. This is why the dismal brick homes with "latrines' that have come up in the last year or two under

the Indira Awas Yojana means so much to Bisesar and his brethren. And it is not just the latrines.

"You want to know how things have changed?" asks Ram Ratan. "When I was young, no Dalit could wear a shirt. We didn't have shoes. We would be beaten up if we tried. If we went to town or to a wedding far away, we would take them off before we returned to the village." Today, our children go to school. And they have to comb their hair, wear clean clothes, put covers on their books. Those who don't send their children to school look at the others and make sure their children too don't look dirty," says Babhooti.

That obsession with cleanliness, it's easy to see why. They had lived so long in squalor that it was accepted as unchanging fate. In the Indira Gandhi years came the first hint of change. Many schemes were announced but they remained largely on paper.

Mayawati, they insist, changed all that. "*Badlav ki gati tezi se badh gayi* (The momentum of change picked up rapidly)," says Ram Rattan. Others nod their heads and point to the brick-paved lanes in the village, the tube-wells and hand pumps, the Indira Awas homes (for the poorest Below Poverty Line (BPL) families) and, of course, the latrines.

They had been promised all this and much more by previous regimes but the work started only after Mayawai assumed power for the first time in 1995. But real change cannot be measured in brick and steel. It lies in the loss of fear. Now that Mayawati is gone, do they fear the return of the old days? "There was a time when we were scared to speak out, even look up. Now we go and meet the tehsildar, the thanedar and they listen to our complaints." Everyone concedes that there can be no comparison between the old days and the present.

The most visible sign of change is the enthusiasm for education. In the cluster of four villages in this area—Abbasganj, Hasanpur, Kaneri, Chatauni—there are four primary schools, two junior schools and one high school. Almost every Dalit parents send their sons—and daughters—to school.

Outside the Kaneri gram pradhan's home, a group of women talk of their joys and sorrows. They never went to school—there was no school around in their time and no one thought of sending them to one. But as Phuljara talks of her wasted life, her daughter Kes Kumari comes down the lane after a day in school. We meet another bunch of Dalit girls cycling home from a distant high school. And 14-year-old Kanti in Hasanpur is too busy doing her homework to gaze at passing strangers. Education may not give them jobs or make them rich, but Kes Kumari and Kanti already exude a sense of hope and a quiet dignity worth more than all the diamonds on Mayawati's ring.

— *The Indian Express*, 1.9.2003

All this when the policy is far from achieving some crucial physical targets. The scheduled quotas still remain unfilled at higher levels of Government jobs. [Table] The capacity to receive benefits of the policy, e.g. attainment of minimum educational levels, remains abysmally low among several smaller communities comprising the SC, ST and OBC categories which has kept them out of the policy's reach. The other enabling measures envisaged to compliment Reservations, remain by and large inadequate. Yet, it cannot be denied that Reservations have helped the SCs, STs and the OBCs. By providing a concrete basis to their mobility aspirations, it has induced them to achieve higher levels of literacy and living standards. For example in the south and west Indian states where the policy has been more efficiently implemented, educational and occupational profiles of SCs and OBCs have shown much greater improvement. [Table]

The need to continue and strengthen the policy of affirmative action is greater today than ever before. As the economy is freed from the state control, government have to see that the weaker and vulnerable sections in the society are not only protected from predatory market practices, but that they are enabled to participate in it and derive benefits of the expanding economy. No economic reforms can work unless a vast majority of a country's population—who in India go by such names as SCs, STs and OBCs—acquire a stake in them. Liberalization does not mean, not even in the most liberalized economies of the world, that government cease to rule and surrender the fate of the country's poor and deprived to the 'market forces'.

For the market to really become an equalizing force the state has to perform more astutely its role of maintaining—and creating where they do not exist—level-playing fields. Affirmative action is the most potent instrument for achieving this state. For such a

policy, to be effective the state has to proactively dispense social justice to those of its citizens who still exist on the peripheries of both, the market economy and the civil society. Even a minimalist state cannot escape this responsibility. If it does, not just economic reforms but its very existence as an ethno-neutral and democratic state may come in danger.

New Policy Initiatives:

It is in this light that there is a need to re-invent the affirmative action policies:

1. An exit policy from Reservations for members of those beneficiary communities who may be found, after careful investigations, having ceased to be socially and educationally backward. This will enable those extremely backward communities who are technically entitled to Reservation benefits but do not receive them in reality. A lion's share of such benefits go to a small elite-minority that has emerged among them. The exit policy, however, should not apply to *dalits*, at least until their discrimination in public sphere totally ceases and incidence of 'atrocity' on them completely stops. Same will apply to a section of tribals still living in conditions of physical isolation.
2. Special developmental and promotional measures need to be thought of and implemented for reaching directly the poor and 'backward' households among the upper-caste communities, usually due to their disadvantageous physical locations and parental background: rural residence, i.e. residence in small villages poorly connected by road or rail and ill served by education and health services; rural-schooling, parent (mother) uneducated. This developmental and promotional measures should *not be* confused or tied with the Reservations made for the

socially deprived under affirmative action policies, which are founded on an entirely different value premise and rationale.

3. The recruitment policy of the corporate (private) sector needs to be modified and adapted to the principle of diversity. It is now being increasingly recognized that having culturally diverse personnel working at any workplace is not just healthy management but, beneficial to the company. The policy of diversity should particularly be conceived as special promotional measure for the routinely unrepresented cultural groups in business and organized economy, but it should not be equated or confused with existing affirmative action policies, which aims at, among other things, inclusion of the traditionally and systematically excluded groups in the power-structure of the state and its institutions.

PART I: (Tables 1 to 6) GENERAL TABLES: CONTEXT FOR THE POLICY

Part I—Table 1: Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Population 1991 Census—India & States

S. No.	States/Union Territories	Scheduled Castes (SC) (Lakh)	% SC Population to total Population	Scheduled Tribes (ST) (Lakh)	% ST Population to total Population
1	2	3	4	5	6
	INDIA(*)	1382.23	16.48	677.58	8.08
	States:				
1.	Andhra Pradesh	105.92	15.93	41.99	6.31
2.	Arunachal Pradesh	0.04	0.47	5.50	63.66
3.	Assam	16.59	7.40	28.74	12.83
4.	Bihar	125.72	14.56	66.17	7.66
5.	Goa	0.24	2.08	N	0.03
6.	Gujarat	30.60	7.41	61.62	14.92
7.	Haryana	32.51	19.75	–	0.00
8.	Himachal Pradesh	13.10	25.34	2.18	4.22
9.	Karnataka	73.69	16.38	19.16	4.26
10.	Kerala	28.87	9.92	3.21	1.10
11.	Madhtya Pradesh	96.27	14.54	153.99	23.27
12.	Maharashtra	87.58	11.10	73.18	9.27
13.	Manipur	0.37	2.02	6.32	34.41
14.	Meghalaya	0.09	0.51	15.18	85.53
15.	Mizoram	0.01	0.10	6.54	94.75
16.	Nagaland	–	0.00	10.61	87.70
17.	Orissa	51.29	16.20	70.32	22.21
18.	Punjab	57.43	28.31	–	0.00
19.	Rajasthan	76.08	17.29	54.75	12.44
20.	Sikkim	0.24	5.93	0.91	22.36
21.	Tamil Nadu	107.12	19.18	5.74	1.03
22.	Tripura	4.51	16.36	8.53	30.95
23.	Uttar Pradesh	292.76	21.04	2.88	0.21
24.	West Bengal	160.81	23.52	38.09	5.60
	Union Territories				
1.	A&N Islands	–	0.00	0.27	9.54
2.	Chandigarh	1.06	16.51	–	0.00
3.	D&N Haveli	0.03	1.97	1.09	78.99
4.	Daman and Diu	0.04	3.83	0.12	11.54
5.	Delhi	17.95	19.05	–	0.00
6.	Lakshadweep	–	0.00	0.48	93.15
7.	Pondicherry	1.31	16.25	–	0.00

N = Negligible. Lakh = 100,000

(*) = Excludes Jammu & Kashmir as the 1991 Census was not conducted

Source: Census of India, 1991, Series – 1 Final Population Totals, Paper–1 of 1992, Vol. 1, Registrar General & Census Commissioner of India.

Part I—Table 2: Some Indicators of Social Development (1991-92 and 1996-97), Projections for 2006-7

			1991-92	1996-97	2006-2007
(1)	**(2)**		**(3)**	**(4)**	**(5)**
1	Life Expectancy (years)	Male	57.7	60.10	66.10
		Female	58.7	61.10	67.10
2.	Infant Mortality Rate (per 1000 births)		78[(a)]	68[(b)]	48
3.	Death Rate [(b)] (per thousand)		10.0	8.7	7.4
4.	Birth Rate [(b)] (per thousand)		28.9	25.72	21.7
5.	Fertility Rate (per thousand)		130.3	113.0	91.4
6.	Literacy Rate (%)	15-35 years	56.0[*]	90.0	100.0
		7 years and above	52.0	75.0	90.0
7.	Per Capita Consumption of food grains (kg)		182.0	193.6	225.0
8.	(a) Villages without drinking water (thousands)		3.0[@]	0	0
	(b) Villages partially covered (less than 40 lpcd)		150.0	negligible	0
9.	Electricity as a source of Lighting (per cent of Dwellings	Rural	27[©]	50	80
		Urban	75[©]	80	95

Notes: [(a)] Estimate based on SRS Data

[(b)] Based on assumption implicit in the population projections made by the Standing Committee of Experts on Population Projection (1989)

[©] Estimate for 1988-89 based on NSS 44th Round

[@] The figure indicates the number of villages not having any source of drinking water by end of March 1992 (Source: Ministry of Rural Development)

lpcd: Litres per capita per day

[*] Estimates for 1986-87 based on NSS 42nd Round

Source: Eighth Five Year Plan: 1992-1997, Vo.1, P. 29, Planning Commission, Government of India.

Part I—Table 3: Sex Ratio, 1901-2001

Census Year	Sex Ratio (Females per 1,000 males)
1901	972
1911	964
1921	955
1931	950
1941	945
1951	946
1961	941
1971	930
1981	934
1991	927
2001	933

Source: Provisional Population Totals, Paper—1 of 2001, Series-1, Census of India, 2001

Notes: 1. For 1991, the interpolated figures for Jammu and Kashmir have been used.

2. While working out the sex ratio for India for the year 2001, the estimated population of entire Kuchch district, Morvi, Maliya-Miyana and Wankaner *talukas* of Rajkot district, Jodiya *taluka* of Jamnagar district of Gujarat and entire Kinnaur district of Himachal Pradesh have been used as the population enumeration of Census of India, 2001 could not be conducted in these areas due to natural calamities.

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Part I—Table 4: Literacy Rate, 1951-2001

Census Year	Persons	Males	Females
1951	18.33	27.16	8.86
1961	28.30	40.40	15.35
1971	34.45	45.96	21.97
1981	43.57	56.38	29.76
1991	52.21	64.13	39.29
2001	65.38	75.85	54.16

Source: Provisional Population Totals, Paper—1 of 2001, Series-1, Census of India, 2001.

Note: Literacy rates for 1951, 1961 and 1971 Census relate to population aged five years and above. The rates for the 1981, 1991 and 2001 Census relate to the population aged seven years and above.

Part I—Table 5: Population by Religion

Religious group	1961[1]		1971		1981		1991	
	Number (million)	Percent to total	Number (million)	Percent to total	Number (million)	Percent to total	Number (million)	Percent to total
Hindus	366.5	83.5	453.4	82.7	549.7	82.6	672.6	82.41
Muslims	46.9	10.7	61.4	11.2	75.6	11.4	95.2	11.67
Christians	10.7	2.4	14.3	2.6	16.2	2.4	18.9	2.32
Sikhs	7.8	1.8	10.4	1.9	13.1	2.0	16.3	1.99
Buddhists	3.2	0.7	3.9	0.7	4.7	0.7	6.3	0.77
Jains	2.0	0.5	2.6	0.5	3.2	0.5	3.4	0.41
Other[2]	1.6	0.4	2.2	0.4	2.8	0.4	3.5	0.43
Total	**439.2**	**100.0**	**548.2**	**100.0**	**665.3**	**100.0**	**816.2**[3]	**100.0**

Source: (i) Census of India, Series I, India, Part II c (i), (ii) Census of India 1981, Series I, Paper 3 of 1984 (Religion), (iii) Census of India, Series I, Paper 1 of 1995 (Religion)

Notes: [1] Excludes Assam and Jammu and Kashmi
[2] Excludes Mizo district, now constituted of U.T. of Mizoram
[3]Including unclassified persons

Note: 1981 data do not include Assam

Part I—Table 6: Comparative Strengths of Scheduled Languages

Language		Persons who have written the language as their mother tongue			Percentage to total population		
		1971	1981	1991	1971	1981[1]	1991
1.	Hindi	20,85,14,005	26,45,14,117	33,72,72,114	38.04	38.71	33.85
2.	Bengali	4,47,92,312	5,12,98,319	6,95,95,738	8.17	7.51	8.22
3.	Telugu	4,47,56,923	5,06,24,611	6,60,17,615	8.16	7.41	7.80
4.	Marathi	4,17,65,190	4,94,52,922	6,24,81,681	7.62	7.24	7.38
5.	Tamil	3,76,90.106	N.A.[2]	5,30,06,368	6.88	N.A.[2]	6.26
6.	Urdu	2,86,20,895	3,49,41,435	4,34,06,932	5.22	5.11	5.13
7.	Gujarati	2,58,65,012	3,30,63,267	4,06,73,814	4.72	4.84	4.81
8.	Kannada	2,17,10,649	2,56,97,146	3,27,53,676	3.96	3.76	3.87
9.	Malayalam	2,19,38,760	2,57,00,705	3,03,77,176	4.00	3.76	3.59
10.	Oriya	1,98,63,198	2,30,21,528	2,80,61,313	3.62	3.37	3.32
11.	Punjabi	1,41,08,443	1,96,11,199	2,33,78,744	2.57	2.87	2.76
12.	Assamese	89,59,558	N.A.[3]	1,30,79,696	1.63	N.A.[3]	1.55
13.	Sindhi	16,76,875	20,44,389	21,22,848	0.31	0.30	0.25
14.	Nepali	14,19,835	13,60,636	20,76,645	0.26	0.20	0.25
15.	Konkani	15,08,432	15,70,108	17,60,607	0.28	0.23	0.21
16.	Manipuri	7,91,714	9,01,407	12,70,216	0.14	0.13	0.15
17.	Kashmiri	24,95,487	31,76,975	N.A.[4]	0.46	0.46	N.A.[4]
18.	Sanskrit	2,212	6,106	49,736	N	N	0.01

Source: Census of India, 1971, 1981, 1991.

Reproduced from *India: 2004*, pp. 19-20, Ministry of Information, Government of India, New Delhi (2004).

Notes: [1] The percentage of speakers of each language for 1981 have been worked out on the total population of India including the estimated population of Assam where the 1981 Census was not conducted due to disturbed conditions.

[2] Full figures for Tamil and Assamese for 1981 are not available as the Census records for Tamil Nadu were lost in floods and the 1981 Census could not be conducted in Assam due to disturbances then in the State. Therefore, percentage to total population for Tamil and Assamese is not given.

[3] The percentage of speakers of each language for 1991 has been worked out on the total population of India including the projected population for Jammu and Kashmir where the 1991 Census could not be conducted due to disturbances.

[4] Full figures for Kashmiri language for 1991 are not available as the 1991 Census was not conducted in Jammu and Kashmir for reasons explained above.

N.A. : Not available
N : Negligible

PART II: (Tables 1 to 15) RECORD OF PERFORMANCE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION POLICY: GOVERNMENT SERVICES, PUBLIC SECTOR UNDERTAKINGS, DEFENCE SERVICES, EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS etc.

Part II—Table 1: Percent Increase in Dalit/Scheduled Caste (SC) Representation to different (higher and lower) Classes/Categories of the Central Government Services – From 1971 through 1994

Year: As on	Categories of Services				All Groups	Total Central Govt. Employees
	Group A (High)	Group B (Middle)	Group C (Low)	Group D (Lowest)		
1.1.1971	2.58	4.06	9.59	18.37	N.A.	N.A.
1.1.1974	3.25	4.59	10.33	18.53	13.66	2895359
1.1.1991	9.09	11.82	15.65	21.24	N.A.	N.A.
1.1.1994	10.25	12.06	15.73	20.46	15.97	3567112

Sources: Data for 1971, 91 from Eighth Five Year Plan: 1992-97, Vol. 2, p. 419, Government of India (Delhi: 1992).

Data for 1974, 1994 from Ninth Five Year Plan: 1997-2002, Vol. 2, p. 362, Government of India (Delhi: 1999).

Part II—Table 2: Percent Increase in Tribal/Scheduled Tribes (ST) Representation to different (higher & Lower) Classes/Categories of the Central Government Services from 1971 through 1994

Year: As on	Categories of Services				All Groups	Total Central Govt. Employees
	Group A (High)	Group B (Middle)	Group C (Low)	Group D (Lowest)		
1.1.1971	0.41	0.43	1.70	3.65	N.A.	N.A.
1.1.1974	0.57	0.49	2.13	3.84	2.81	2895359
1.1.1991	2.53	2.35	4.89	6.82	N.A.	N.A.
1.1.1994	2.92	2.81	5.38	6.15	5.48	3567112

Sources: Data for 1971; 91 from Eighth Five Year Plan: 1992-97, Vol. 2, p. 419, Government of India (Delhi: 1992).

Data for 1974, 1994 from Ninth Five Year Plan: 1997-2002, Vol. 2, p. 362, Government of India (Delhi: 1999).

Part II—Table 3: Representation of SCs and STs in Central Government Services as on 1.1.2000

GROUP	TOTAL	SC	%	ST	%
A	88567	9535	10.77	2940	3.32
B	127148	15424	12.13	3631	2.86
C	2290323	362799	15.84	145202	6.34
D (Excluding Sweepers)	1002694	183004	18.25	66608	6.64
Sweepers	130285	74285	57.02	6096	4.68
Total (Excluding Sweepers)*	3508732	570762	16.27	218381	6.22
Total (Including Sweepers)	3639017	645047	17.73	224477	6.17

Note: Information in respect of Department of Revenue is not included.

*Sweepers are excluded as their recruitment is unrelated to working of the policy; SCs have been traditionally recruited as sweepers by the Government.

Source: Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances & Pensions Annual Report 2001-02 (Para 5.2).

Part II—Table 4: Percent Representation of Brahmins and other Upper Caste Members to the elite all-India Services: Indian Administrative Service (IAS), Indian Foreign Service (IFS), Indian Police Service (IPS) during the period when Reservations Policy did not make an impact: 1947–56

Name of the Service	Brahmins		Higher (Dwija Castes: non-Sc, non-ST, non-OBC)	
	1947–56	**1957–63**	**1947–56**	**1957–63**
IAS	34	36	94	81
IFS	22	22	82	89
IPS	31	21	81	77
Other Services	38	29	84	79

Source: V. Subramaniam, 'Social Background of India's Administrators'. Reproduced from H. Mehta and H. Patel (eds.), *Dynamics of Reservations Policy* (New Delhi, 1985), p. 99.

Part II—Table 5: Representation of SC and ST Members to the elite all-India Services during the period when the impact of Reservations Policy began to be felt: from 1994 to 2000

Year of Examination	Total vacancies filled	Vacancies filled by SC candidates % SC in 1991 population = 14.48	Vacancies filled by ST candidates % ST in 1991 population = 8.08
IAS			
1994	80	12 (15.0)	6 (7.5)
1995	80	12 (15.0)	6 (7.5)
1996	76	12 (15.8)	6 (7.9)
1997	55	8 (14.5)	4 (7.3)
1998	55	7 (12.7)	3 (5.5)
2000	59	9 (15.3)	5 (8.5)
IFS			
1994	14	2 (14.3)	1 (7.1)
1995	16	2 (12.5)	1 (6.3)
1996	14	3 (21.4)	1 (7.1)
1997	16	3 (18.8)	1 (6.3)
1998	10	1 (10.0)	1 (10.0)
2000	18	0	2 (11.1)
IPS			
1994	98	15 (15.3)	7 (7.1)
1995	98	15 (15.3)	7 (7.1)
1996	96	15 (15.6)	8 (8.3)
1997	84	12 (14.3)	7 (8.3)
1998	36	2 (5.6)	3 (8.3)
2000	36	6 (16.7)	4 (11.1)

Source: Ministry of Personnel Annual Reports: 1999-2000 and 2000-2001

Part II—Table 6: Percentage of Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe Representation in Public Sector Undertakings: 1971 to 1984

Category	Scheduled Castes		Scheduled Tribes	
	1971	1989	1971	1989
Class I (Group A)	**0.52**	**5.76**	**0.17**	**1.29**
Class II (Group B)	**1.54**	**8.41**	**0.16**	**2.31**
All categories	**8.17**	**20.36**	**2.24**	**9.68**

(Separately for CI.III & IVB not available)

Source**: Eighth Five-Year Plan, Vol. 2, p. 419.**

Part II—Table 7: Representation of SCs & STs in different job categories in Central Public Enterprises (PSUs) as on 1.1.2002

Job Category	**Total No. of Employees**	**SCs No.**	**Percentage**	**STs No.**	**Percentage**
High Level : Group 'A'	1,95,027	21,848	11.20	6,545	3.36
Middle Level: Group 'B'	1,89,089	22,707	12.00	9,275	4.90
Lower Level: Group 'C'	8,89,379	1,69,401	19.04	78,271	8.80
Lowest Level: Group 'D' (Excluding Sweepers)	3,63,267	78,721	21.67	39,457	10.85
Total	16,36,762	2,92,667	17.88	1,33,548	8.16

Note: **Sweepers have been excluded from this category as these jobs are traditionally held by the SCs and as such it does not reflect on the working of the policy.**

Source**: Department of Public Enterprises, official web: http://www.dpe.nic.in/anrch5.htm**

Part II—Table 8: Table Showing Castewise Representation in Managerial Cadre (non-Government Sector)—1971

Caste	Percentage in the cadre of manager
Brahmins	41.4
Business castes: Bania, Arora, etc.	43.2
Cultivators: Jat, Patels, etc.	24.3
Other low castes (OBCs)	0.8
Untouchables (SC)	0.4

Note: The principle of affirmative action is not practised in any form in the private/corporate sector in India. The debate initiated recently by some civil society groups on the issue of 'equal opportunity' and 'diversity' in recruitment has not found any resonance in the corporate sector.

Source**: Jain Sagar C., *Indian Manager: His social origin and career*, 1971. Reproduced from H. Mehta and H. Patel (eds.), *Dynamics of Reservations Policy* (New Delhi, 1985), p. 98.**

Part II—Table 9: Representation of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the Defence Services

Presence of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the Army in the years-1990, 1995 and 2000.

Year	Total Strength	SC	Percentage	ST	Percentage
1990	10,01,523	85494	8.53	23405	2.34
1995	9,14,970	66213	7.3	16538	1.80
2000	10,78,281	77841	7.21	25750	2.38

Source: 17th Report of the Committee on the Welfare of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (2001-2002), Thirteenth Lok Sabha, Ministry of Defence.

Note: Data are not separately available for the number of SC/ST officers in the army.

Part II—Table 10: Details of regiments that are composed wholly or partly by specified SC/ST

Regiment/Battalion	Class Composition	Percentage
Bengal Engineering Group	Other Hill Tribes (Less Garhwali and Kumaoni	05
Bombay Engineering Group	Sikh (M and R)	37
Bihar	Adivasi	50
	SC	25
Mahar	Mahar	80
Para	Sikh (M and R)	25
	Adivasi	05
Sikh Light Infantry	Sikh (M and R)	100
Assam	Tribes from North East States	85
Naga	Naga	50
	Other Hill Tribes	50
Guards	Hill Tribes	100

Source: 17th Report of the Committee on the Welfare of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (2001-2002), Thirteenth Lok Sabha, Ministry of Defence.

Note: A regiment with a group name need not have all the officers or cadres belonging to the same group.

Part II—Table 11: Number of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe Personnel in the Indian Army as of 31st Dec 1999

Scheduled Castes			Scheduled Tribes		
Officers	**Others**	**Total**	**Officers**	**Others**	**Total**
82	70330	70412	34	25913	25947

Source: **17th Report of the Committee on the Welfare of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (2001-2002), Thirteenth Lok Sabha, Ministry of Defence.**

Part II—Table 12: Designationwise Position of SC/ST Teachers in University Teaching Departments/University Colleges (1992-93)

Designation	Total	SC	Percentage	ST	Percentage
Professor	3338	32	0.96	11	0.33
Reader	5837	104	1.78	31	0.53
Lecturer	10191	328	3.22	81	0.79

Source: UGC, 'Representation of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in Enrolment, Teaching and Non-Teaching Staff in University Teaching epartments/University Colleges', p. 55. Reproduced from Virginius Xaxa, "Protective Discrimination: Why Scheduled Tribes Lag Behing Scheduled Castes", *Economic and Political Weekly*, July 21, 2001, p. 2769.

Table 13: The OBCs (and SC/ST) in the Central Government Services: 1989*

Depts/Bodies	Class I			Class II			Class III & IV			All Classes		
	Total	**SC/ST**	**OBC**	**Total**	**SC/ST**	**OBC**	**Total**	**SC/ST**	**OBC**	**Total**	**SC/ST**	OBC
1. Ministries/ Departments	11707	840 (7.18)*	303 (2.59)	43803	5985 (13.66)	1742 (3.98)	17829	5518 (30.95)	1500 (8.41)	73330	12343 (16.83)	3545 (4.83)
2. Autonomous Bodies/ Attached & Subordinate Offices	81325	5399 (6.64)	4147 (5.09)	503337	91431 (18.16)	59079 (11.74)	322948	67118 (20.78)	67786 (20.98)	907610	163948 (18.06)	131012 (14.43)
3. Public Sector Undertakings	80994	3652 (4.51)	3719 (4.59)	365785	68566 (18.74)	36242 (9.91)	143910	45646 (31.72)	22689 (15.77)	590689	117864 (19.95)	62650 (10.61)
Total	174026	9891 (5.68)	8169 (4.69)	912925	165982 (18.18)	97063 (10.63)	484687	118282 (24.40)	91975 (18.98)	151638	294155 (18.72)	197207 (12.55)

*Figures in parenthesis represent percentages

Source: Report of the Backward Classes (Mandal) Commission, 1980, Vol. II, p. 92.

Part II—Table 14: The OBCs in the Central Government Services: 1999

GROUP	Total Employees	Reserved for OBCs	%	OBCs Recruited	%
A	**82129**	**988**	**1.2**	**432**	**0.53**
B	**107622**	**632**	**0.59**	**263**	**0.24**
C	**2313481**	**17975**	**0.78**	**8834**	**0.38**
D	**1102262**	**9460**	**0.86**	**3833**	**0.35**
TOTAL	**3605494**	**29055**	**0.81**	**13362**	**0.37**

Note**: Reservations for OBCs in Central Government jobs came into force for the first time by the Government order providing for 27% reservations in only 1991. However, OBC representation in the provincial states services has been there since many states has reached allocated proportions.**

Source: **Ministry of Personnel Annual Report: 2000-2001.**

Part II--Table 15: Amenities Available to Dalits (Percentages)

Amenities	**All**		**Dalits**	
	Rural	**Urban**	**Rural**	**Urban**
Safe Drinking Water	55.5	81.4	59.84	80.59
Electricity	30.5	75.8	21.84	56.32
Toilet	9.3	65.5	5.15	38.28
Safe Water, Electricity and Toilet	3.9	50.5	3.35	32.34
None of the above facilities	31.3	5.4	32.14	9.62

Source: Census of India 1991 for columns 2 and 3; Advocacy Update: National Centre for Advocacy Studies, No 15, January-March 2001 for columns 4 and 5.

PART III: (Tables 1 to 9) IMPACT ON EDUCATION

Part III—Table 1: Literacy Rates for Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe Population by Sex-1991

State/Union Territory		Scheduled Caste			Scheduled Tribe		
		Person	Male	Female	Person	Male	Female
	INDIA*	**37.41**	**49.91**	**23.76**	**29.60**	**40.65**	**18.19**
1.	Andhra Pradesh	31.59	41.88	20.92	17.16	25.25	8.68
2.	Arunachal Pradesh	57.27	66.25	41.42	34.45	44.00	24.94
3.	Assam	53.94	63.88	42.99	49.16	58.93	38.98
4.	Bihar	19.49	30.64	7.07	26.78	38.40	14.75
5.	Delhi	57.60	68.44	43.82	—	—	—
6.	Goa	58.73	69.55	47.51	42.91	54.43	29.01
7.	Gujarat	61.07	75.47	45.54	36.45	48.25	24.20
8.	Haryana	39.22	52.06	24.15	—	—	—
9.	Himachal Pradesh	53.20	64.98	41.02	47.09	62.74	31.18
10.	Karnataka	38.06	49.69	25.95	36.01	47.95	23.57
11.	Kerala	79.66	85.22	74.31	57.22	63.38	51.07
12.	Madhya Pradesh	35.08	50.51	18.11	21.54	32.16	10.73
13.	Maharashtra	56.46	70.45	41.59	36.79	49.09	24.03
14.	Manipur	56.44	65.28	47.41	53.63	62.39	44.48
15.	Meghalaya	44.27	54.56	31.19	46.71	49.78	43.63
16.	Mizoram	77.92	77.54	81.25	82.73	86.67	78.74
17.	Nagaland	—	—	—	60.59	66.27	54.51
18.	Orissa	36.78	52.42	20.74	22.31	34.44	10.21
19.	Punjab	41.09	49.82	31.03	—	—	—
20.	Rajasthan	26.29	42.38	8.31	19.44	33.29	4.42
21.	Sikkim	51.03	58.69	42.77	59.01	66.80	50.37
22.	Tamil Nadu	46.74	58.36	34.89	27.89	35.25	20.23
23.	Triupura	56.66	67.25	45.45	40.37	52.88	27.34
24.	Uttar Pradesh	26.85	40.80	10.69	35.70	49.95	19.86
25.	West Bengal	42.21	54.55	28.87	27.78	40.07	14.98
	Union Territories						
1.	Andaman and Nicobar Islands	—	—	—	56.62	64.16	48.74
2.	Chandigarh	55.44	64.74	43.54	—	—	—
3.	Dadra and Nagar Haveli	77.64	88.03	66.61	28.21	40.75	15.94
4.	Daman and Diu	79.18	91.85	67.62	52.91	63.58	41.49
5.	Lakshadweep	—	—	—	80.58	89.50	71.72
6.	Pondicherry	56.26	66.10	46.28	—	—	—

*Excludes Jammu and Kashmir.

Source: *Registrar General of India, Decennial Census 1991, Series 1 Paper 1 of 1993, Primary Census Abstract for SC and ST. Reports*.

Part III—Table 2: Increase In Literacy rate of Total Population SC/ST During 1961–1991

Year	Scheduled Caste (% Increase)			Scheduled Tribe (% Increase)			Total SC & ST Population (% Increase)			All India Literacy Rates
	Total SCs	Male	Female	Total STs	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	
1961	10.27	16.96	3.29	8.53	13.83	3.16	28.31	40.40	15.34	24.02
1971	14.67	22.36	6.44	11.30	17.63	4.85	34.45	45.95	21.97	29.46
	(42.84%)	(31.83%)	(95.75%)	(32.47%)	(27.48%)	(53.48%)	(21.69%)	(13.74%)	(43.22%)	
1981	21.38	31.12	10.93	16.35	24.52	8.04	43.56	56.37	29.75	43.67
	(45.74%)	(39.18%)	(69.72%)	(44.69%)	(39.08%)	(65.77%)	(26.44%)	(22.67%)	(35.41%)	
1991	37.41	49.91	23.76	29.60	40.65	18.19	52.21	64.13	39.29	52.21
	(74.98%)	(60.38%)	(117.38%)	(81.04%)	(65.78%)	(126.24%)	(19.86%)	(13.77%)	(32.07%)	

Source: Census of India 1961-91 and National Literacy Mission: Literacy Scenario in India, Government of India
Web: http:/www.nlm.nic.in/tables/f_scst.htm

Part III—Table 3: Literacy Rates of SCs and STs—The Gains and the Gaps

Category	1971	1981	1991*	% Increase of 1991 over 1971
General Population including SC/ST)	29.45	36.23	52.21	77.28
Scheduled Castes	14.67	21.38	37.41	155.01
Scheduled Tribes	11.30	16.35	29.60	161.95
Gap between SCs and the General Populations	14.78	14.85	14.80	0.14
Gap between STs and the General Population	18.15	19.88	22.61	24.57

*Excludes 0-6 age group

Source: Educational Development of SCs and STs, Department of Education, 1995. Reproduced from Ninth Plan: 1999-2002, p. 358.

Part III—Table 4: Female Literacy Rates of SCs, STs and General Population

Category	1971	1981	1991*
Female Literacy Rates			
All Communities including SC/ST	21.97	29.85	39.29
Scheduled Castes	6.44	10.93	23.76
Scheduled Tribes	4.85	8.04	18.19
GAP			
Gap between female literacy rate of SCs and of All communities	15.53	18.92	15.53
Gap between female literacy rate of STs and of All communities	17.12	21.81	21.10

*Excludes 0-6 age group

Source: Educational Development of SCs and STs, Department of Education, 1995. Reproduced from Ninth Plan: 1999-2002, p. 358.

Part III—Table 5: Gross Enrolment Ratios of SCs & STs and General Population

Level/Years	General Population			Scheduled Castes			Scheduled Tribes		
	Boys	Girls	Total	Boys	Girls	Total	Boys	Girls	Total
1980-81									
I-V (Primary) (6-11 yrs.)	95.8	64.1	80.5	105.4	57.8	82.2	94.2	45.9	70.0
VI-III (Middle) (11-14 yrs)	54.3	28.6	41.9	41.4	16.2	29.1	28.2	10.8	19.5
1990-91									
I-V (Primary) (6-11 yrs)	114.0	85.5	100.1	122.7	80.6	102.2	126.8	78.6	103.4
VI-III (Middle) (11-14 yrs)	76.6	47.0	62.1	61.4	33.3	47.7	51.3	27.5	39.7
1995-96									
I-V (Primary) (6-11 yrs)	114.5	93.3	104.3	127.6	95.1	111.9	130.0	94.9	113.0
VI-III (Middle) (11-14 yrs)	79.5	54.9	67.6	74.9	46.8	61.3	61.6	37.6	50.0
Pace of Progress									
I-V (Primary level)	18.7	29.2	23.8	22.2	37.3	29.7	35.8	49.0	43.0
VI-III (Middle level)	25.2	26.3	25.7	33.5	30.6	32.2	33.4	26.8	30.5

Source: Selected Education Statistics, 1995-96, Department of Education, New Delhi.

Reproduced from Ninth Plan 1997-2002, p. 359.

Part III—Table 6: Drop-out Rates amongst SCs and STs at various stages of Education

Category	Classes I-V		Classes I-VIII		Classes I-X	
	1980-81	**1989-90**	**1980-81**	**1990-91**	**1980-81**	**199-91**
General	58.70	48.08	72.70	63.40	82.46	71.34
SC	60.16	49.03	76.84	72.09	86.91	80.58
ST	75.66	63.81	86.71	80.10	91.18	86.00

Source: Educational Development of SCs and STs (1995) and Unpublished Data of the Department of Education.

Note: 1. Since the latest data on the drop-out rates of SCs and Sts is available only for 1990-91, data for General Population was also used for the same year for effective comparison.

2. Figures for 1990-91 in respect of SCs and STs are not available for primary level.

Reproduced from Ninth Plan: 1997-2*002*, Government of India, p.360.

Table 7: Enrolment by Stages of Dalit Children, 1994–95 (in millions)

Stages	Dalits			Tribals			Others		
	Boys	**Girls**	**Total**	**Boys**	**Girls**	**Total**	**Boys**	**Girls**	**Total**
Primary	1.00	0.75	1.80	0.54	0.36	0.90	6.20	4.70	10.90
Middle	0.35	0.21	0.56	0.15	0.08	0.23	2.50	1.50	4.00
Secondary	0.20	0.08	0.29	0.07	0.04	0.11	1.60	0.08	2.40
Hr. Education	0.031	0.01	0.042	0.01	0.004	0.01	0.31	0.16	0.47

Source: *Report of the Ministry of Human Resource Development, 1995*

Reproduced from *Advocacy Update*, January-March, No. 15, p. 5, published by National Centre for Advocacy Studies, Pune, India.

Table 8: Percent SC and ST Students Enrolled in Different Faculties of Higher Education in 1992-1993

Faculty	SC	ST	SC and ST
Arts	8.0	3.9	11.9
Science	5.8	2.1	7.9
Engg./Tech	8.1	2.1	10.2
Medicine	11.9	4.4	16.3
Agriculture	10.7	5.4	16.1
Law	11.7	2.7	14.4

Note: Enrolment facultywise includes levels ranging from undergraduate to research plus diploma/certificate course.

Source: UGC, 'Representation of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in Enrolment, Teaching and Non-Teaching Staff/University Colleges', p. 5.

Reproduced from Verginius Xaxa, "Protective Discrimination: Why Scheduled Tribes Lag Behind Scheduled Castes", *Economic and Political Weekly*, July 21, 2001.

Table 9: Admission of Scheduled Caste/Tribe Students in IIT-Kanpur (1967-78)

Year	No. of Candidates Applied for JEE			No. of Candidates in Merit and Called for Interview		No. of Candidates Offered Admissions		No. of Candidates Actually Admitted		
	Total	SC	ST	SC	ST	SC	ST	SC	ST	Total
1967-68	62	47	15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1968-69	47	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-
1969-79	35	29	6	7	1	7	1	7	1	3
1970-71	28	-	-	6	1	6	1	6	1	7
1971-72	35	-	-	1	-	1	-	1	-	1
1972-73	79	-	-	1	-	1	-	1	-	1
1973-74	98	86	12	42	6	42	6	-	-	46

Source*:* K.N. Sharma, *et. al.* (1974): 'Educational Arithmetic of Social Inequality', A Study of Admission and Adjustment of IIT, Kanpur Students (Mimeographed).

PART IV: (Tables 1 to 2) IMPACT ON UNEMPLOYMENT

Part IV—Table 1: **Total and SC, ST Job Seekers (Unemployed) from 1995 to 2000 as shown on the Live Register of Employment Exchange (In Thousand)**

Year	Scheduled Castes		Scheduled Tribes		Total Number
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	
1995	5095.0	13.9	1409.4	3.8	36742.2
1996	5208.9	13.9	1467.3	3.9	37429.6
1997	5626.0	14.4	1586.7	4.1	39139.9
1998	5799.4	14.5	1694.6	4.2	40089.6
1999	5948.0	14.7	1762.4	4.4	40371.4
2000	6135.3	14.8	1860.1	4.5	41343.6

Source: "Employment Exchange Statistics", Directorate General of Employment and Training, Ministry of Labour, Government of India, New Delhi.

Part IV—Table 2: Total and SC, ST Educated Job Seekers (Unemployed) from 1995 to 2000 as shown on Live Register of Employment Exchanges (In Thousands)

Year	Scheduled Castes Unemployed		Scheduled Tribes Unemployed		Total Educated Unemployed
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	
1996	3134.4	12.4	876.1	3.4	25265.3
1997	3539.7	13.0	958.1	3.5	27282.0
1998	3858.5	13.9	1005.4	3.6	27788.9
1999	3961.6	13.8	1209.7	4.2	28660.3
2000	4068.6	13.8	1455.3	4.9	29548.8

Note: Definition of Educated – a job seeker who is having qualification of the level of Matriculation and above.

Source: "Employment Exchange Statistics", Directorate General of Employment and Training, Ministry of Labour, Government of India, New Delhi.

PART V: (Tables 1 to 9) IMPACT ON POVERTY

Part V—Table 1: Percentage of Population Living Below Poverty Line

Category	1984-84	1993-94	Percentage Decrease
General	44.48	35.97	(-) 8.51
SCs	57.60	48.37	(-) 9.23
STs	63.14	51.14	(-) 12.00

Source: Perspective Planning Division, Planning Commission, New Delhi

Note: The aggregate poverty ratio of SC and ST population 1983-84 has been worked out as a weighted average of rural and urban poverty ratio using 1981 Census population of the respective Groups in rural and urban areas as weights. In a similar way, 1991 Census population is used to obtain aggregate poverty ratio for these two groups in 1993-94

Reproduced from Ninth Five Year Plan, 1997-2002, Planning Commission, Government of India (p. 361).

[**Part V- Tables 2 to 9:** The following section presents tables showing extent of poverty reduction among Dalits (SCs) and Tribals (STs), using three poverty measures, between 1993-94 and 1999-2000 as well as the findings based on these and other data (not presented here). The tables and findings at the end of the tables are excerpted from K. Sundaram and Suresh D. Tendulkar, "Poverty among Social and Economic Groups", *Economic and Political Weekly*, December 13, 2003, pp. 5263-76.]

Part V—Table 2: Composition of Total and Poor Population Located in Households Classified by Social–Group Affiliation: All India Rural 1993–94—1999–2000

Category	1993–94			1999–2000		
	Percentage Share of the Household Type in			Percentage Share of the Household Type in		
	Total Rural Population	Rural Poor Population	HCR	Total Rural Population	Rural Poor Population	HCR*
Social Groups						
Scheduled castes	21.10	28.19	45.69	20.43	27.10	38.38
Scheduled tribes	10.83	15.46	48.81	10.49	17.41	48.02
Others	68.07	56.35	28.30	69.08	55.49	23.23
All households	100.00 (659,025)	100.00 (225,392)	34.20	100.00 (727,611)	100.00 (210,498)	28.93

* **Notes**: HCR: (Head Count Ratio) is the commonly used measure of poverty estimating size (proportion) of poor in a population.

Part V—Table 3: Composition of Total and Poor Population Located in Households Classified by Social–Group Affiliation: All India Urban 1993–94—1999–2000

Category	1993–94			1999–2000		
	Percentage Share of the Household Type in			Percentage Share of the Household Type in		
	Total Urban Population	Urban Poor Population	HCR	Total Urban Population	Urban Poor Population	HCR*
Social Groups						
Scheduled castes	13.85	22.48	42.85	14.38	23.57	37.84
Scheduled tribes	3.21	4.09	33.63	3.40	5.18	35.15
Others	82.94	73.43	23.39	82.22	71.26	20.01
All households	100.00 (234,981)	100.00 (67,675)	26.41	100.00 (276,425)	100.00 (63,827)	23.09

* **Notes**: HCR: (Head Count Ratio) is the commonly used measure of poverty estimating size (proportion) of poor in a population.

Part V—Table 4: Poverty Measures for Population Located in Households Classified by Social Groups, All–India: Rural: 1993–94—1999–2000

Category	1993–94				1999–2000			
	HCR (Per Cent)	No. of Poor (000)	PGI	FGT	HCR (Per Cent)	No. of Poor (000)	PGI*	FGT+
Scheduled castes	45.69	63,558	0.10369	0.033435	38.38	57,036	0.07920	0.02407
Scheduled tribes	48.81	34,883	0.11780	0.044072	48.02	36,651	0.11451	0.03842
Others	28.30	126,941	0.05603	0.01692	23.23	116,762	0.04298	0.01211
OBCs in others)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(29.04)	(66,369)	(0.05475)	(0.01560)

Note: *PGI (Poverty Gap Index), is constructed and used as indicator of the depth of poverty.

+ FGT (Square Poverty Gap) is constructed and used as a measure reflecting severity of poverty. For explication and discussion of the measures see Sundaram and Tendulkar, cited at the beginning of these tables.

Part V—Table 5: Poverty Measures for Population Located in Households Classified by Social Groups, All–India: Urban: 1993–94—1999–2000

Category	1993–94				1999–2000			
	HCR (Per Cent)	No. of Poor (000)	PGI	FGT	HCR (Per Cent)	No. of Poor (000)	PGI	FGT
Scheduled castes	42.85	13,956	0.10778	0.03876	37.84	15,041	0.08766	0.02894
Scheduled tribes	33.63	2,537	0.08353	0.02975	35.15	3,304	0.08980	0.03350
Others	23.39	45,580	0.05110	0.01673	20.01	45,482	0.04209	0.01298

Note: *PGI (Poverty Gap Index), is constructed and used as indicator of the depth of poverty.

+ FGT (Square Poverty Gap) is constructed and used as a measure reflecting severity of poverty. For detailed explication and discussion of the measures see Sundaram and Tendulkar, cited at the beginning of these tables.

Part V—Table 6: Percentage Change (1993-94 and 1999-2000) in Poverty Indicators by Socio-Economic Categories of All-India Rural Population

Socio-Economic Category	HCR	PGI	FGT*
Scheduled castes			
1. Self-employed agricultural	-14.80	-25.97	-35.09
2. Self-employed non-agricultural	-7.95	-11.78	-16.72
3. Agricultural labour	-18.98	-27.50	-34.04
4. Other labour	-14.40	-5.89	-3.20
5. Others	-31.93	-44.90	-50.68
All scheduled castes	-16.00	-23.62	-29.93
Scheduled tribes			
1. Self-employed agricultural	-7.69	-10.95	-15.48
2. Self-employed non-agricultural	-10.80	-12.62	-21.92
3. Agricultural labour	1.98	0.94	-1.56
4. Other labour	-4.39	-6.73	-11.66
5. Others	-30.49	-30.74	-22.72
All scheduled tribes	-1.62	-2.79	-5.64
Others			
1. Self-employed agricultural	-19.78	-26.13	-32.37
2. Self-employed non-agricultural	-20.74	-22.85	-28.97
3. Agricultural labour	-18.26	-26.43	-32.41
4. Other labour	-29.38	-27.86	-30.45
5. Others	-26.20	-35.29	-36.91
Social groups others	-17.92	-23.29	-28.42
MoL category, all social groups			
MoL category, all social groups	-17.10	-22.98	-28.77
Self-employed agricultural	-17.44	-20.01	-26.25
Agricultural labour	-15.73	-22.66	-28.00
Other labour	-22.42	-19.54	-20.92
Others	-31.17	-40.49	-42.33
All households	-15.38	-20.47	-25.43

Part V—Table 7: Percentage Change (1993-94—1999-2000) in Poverty Indicators by Socio-Economic Categories of All-India Urban Population

Socio-Economic Category	HCR	PGI	FGT
Scheduled castes			
Self-employed	-2.50	-11.99	-15.83
Wage/salaried earner	-33.16	-37.75	-46.09
Casual labour	-9.23	-16.96	-23.83
Others	-11.14	-32.80	-48.46
All scheduled castes	-11.69	-13.67	-25.34
Scheduled tribes			
Self-employed	-6.95	-9.51	-9.15
Wage/salary earner	-8.65	-6.46	6.81
Casual labour	12.38	7.67	-0.60
Others	-3.22	47.25	158.53
All scheduled tribes	4.52	7.51	12.61
Others			
Self-employed	-10.30	-12.52	-18.91
Wage/salary earner	-26.86	-28.55	-35.21
Casual labour	-16.84	-20.94	-23.86
Others	-22.71	-31.23	-42.50
Social groups others	-14.45	-17.63	-22.41
MoL category, all social groups			
Self-employed	-8.39	-12.94	-17.36
Wage/salary earner	-27.27	-29.43	-35.33
Casual labour	-12.75	-17.94	-22.18
Others	-19.95	-28.89	-38.94
All households	-12.57	-16.00	-20.79

Part V—Table 8: Percentage Change between 1994 and 2000 in Total Population, Poor Population and Other Poverty Indicators: All–India Rural Population Located in Households Classified by Social Groups

(Percentage Change between 1993–94 and 1999–2000)

Household Category	Total Rural Population	Rural Poor Population	HCR	PGI	FGT
Social Groups					
Scheduled castes	6.83	–10.26	–16.07	–23.62	–29.93
Scheduled tribes	6.99	5.06	–1.68	–2.79	–5.65
Others	12.05	–7.98	–17.92	–23.29	–28.43
All households	10.41	–6.57	–15.38	–20.47	–25.43

Part V—Table 9: Percentage Change between 1994 and 2000 in Total Population, Poor Population and Other Poverty Indicators: All–India Urban Population by Household Type and Social Group

(Percentage Change between 1993–94 and 1999–2000)

Household Category	Total Rural Population	Rural Poor Population	HCR	PGI	FGT
Social Groups					
Scheduled castes	22.12	7.77	–11.69	–18.67	–25.34
Scheduled tribes	24.59	30.23	4.52	7.51	12.61
Others	16.62	–0.22	–14.45	–17.63	–22.41
All households	17.64	2.85	–12.57	–16.00	–20.79

Findings/Comments

Among the social groups, the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes population report levels of poverty well above average on all three indicators of prevalence, depth and severity of poverty in both years and in both rural and urban areas of the country. The other backward castes too suffer from above average levels of poverty, which are, nevertheless, much lower than the poverty levels among the SC and the ST population.

The double disadvantage, of being an assetless casual wage labour household in the socially disadvantaged social groups of the scheduled castes or the scheduled tribes, accentuates the prevalence, depth and severity of poverty. Thus, agricultural labour households in the ST population have the highest headcount ratio (close to or above 60 per cent) in both years studied in rural India. Similarly, casual labour households in the SC population in 1993-94 and in the ST population in 1999-2000 reported the highest HCR of 64 per cent in urban India.

Given rural and urban poverty lines, rural poverty rates are, in general, higher than their comparable urban counterparts. Exceptions to this pattern are provided by casual labour households in all the social groups and by the self-employed among scheduled castes and in the (residual non-SC/ST) social group of others.

In terms of the rates of reduction of poverty indicators between 1993-94 and 1999-2000, among social groups, they were the lowest for the scheduled tribe population in rural India. In urban India however, this social group experienced a rise in all three poverty indicators. Our more disaggregated analysis by MoL categories, within each social group, helped us pinpoint the rise in poverty in the assetless (casual) wage-labour dependent households among the scheduled tribe population as the principal factor underlying a clearly worse-than-average performance in terms of poverty-reduction. It therefore also indicated a clear worsening of the relative poverty situation of the scheduled tribe population in rural India, and even more so, in urban India.

In contrast to the ST population, scheduled caste households generally matched or even bettered the average rural/urban household in terms of percentage reduction in all three poverty indicators between 1993-94 and 1999-2000. In a large measure, this was facilitated by a better-than-average performance of agricultural labour households among them in rural India, and of the regular wage/salary earner households in the groups in urban India. (K. Sundaram & S. Tendulkar)

PART VI: (Table 1 to 10) CRIME AND VIOLENCE (ATROCITIES) AGAINST SCs & STs

Part VI—Table 1: Crimes Against SCs and STs during 1994 to 1996

(Figures in '000)

Year	Total Crime in India	Crimes Against Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes					
		SCs		STs		Total	
		S.L.	Total*	S.L.	Total*	S.L. (Col.3+5)	Total* (Col.4+6)
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
1994	5510	16.67	33.91 (0.62)	1.38	5.02 (0.09)	18.05	38.93 (0.71)
1995	6000	15.45	33.00 (0.55)	1.55	5.50 (0.09)	17.00	38.50 (0.64)
1996 (Prov.)	5630	11.04	31.44 (0.56)	0.83	4.97 (0.09)	11.87	36.41 (0.64)

Source: The Crime in India: 1994 and 1995; 1996: Provisional National Crime Records Bureau, Govt. of India, New Delhi.

(Prov.): Provisional

S.L: Refers to crimes registered under the Special Laws (SL), viz. PCR (Protection of Civil Rights) Act, 1955 and the SC and ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989

* Figures in parenthesis (Co.4, 6 and 8) indicate the percentage of total crime against SCs and STs in the total number of crimes in India (Col.2).

Reproduced from Ninth Five Year Plan Vol. 2, p. 365.

Part VI—Table 2: Atrocities against Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes

Crime-Wise Classification of the number of atrocity cases during 1990, 1991 and 1992

Type of cases	Number of cases reported during								
	1990			1991			1992		
	SC	ST	Total	SC	ST	Total	SC	ST	Total
Murder	584	124	708	610	146	756	693	118	811
Grievous Hurt	1691	259	1950	1706	320	2026	1619	232	1851
Rape	885	339	1224	784	334	1118	835	383	1218
Arson	599	59	658	602	70	672	619	61	680
Other IPC Offences	13908	2797	16705	13994	3908	17852	14574	2915	17489
Total	17667	3578	21245	17646	4778	22424	18340	3709	22049

Source: Official Website of the Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of India at http://shikshanic.nic.in/cd50years/g/S/I6/toc.htm)

Part VI—Table 3: Crime and Violence Against Dalits, 1993–95

No.	Crime–heads	1993	1994	1995
1	Murder	510	546	571
2	Dacoity	102	78	70
3	Robbery	197	258	218
4	Arson	369	533	500
5	Kidnapping and Abduction	246	251	276
6	Rape	798	992	873
7	Violation of PCR Act*	2,531	1,731	1,528
8	Hurt/Injuiries	–	4,542	4,544
9	Violation of SC/ST Atrocities Act 1989	–	14,938	13,925
10	Others	20,220	10,038	10,492
	Total	**24,973**	**33,908**	**32,997**

*PCR: Protection of Civil Rights Act of 1955.

Source: *Government of India: 1997, Crime in India 1995*, National Crime Records Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs, p. 260.

Part VI—Table 4

Cases registered with the police of crimes and atrocities against Dalits: 1996, 1997

Nature of crime	**1996**	**1997**	**Total**
Murder	543	503	1617
Injuries	4585	3462	12591
Rape	949	1002	2824
Kidnaping and Abduction	281	242	799
Robbery	213	157	588
Arson	464	384	1348
Other Offences	13278	11693	35463
Total	20313	17443	55230

Source : 'Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and all Forms of Discrimination', Written Statement submitted by the Robert F Kennedy Memorial to the Commission on Human Rights, Economic and Social Council, United Nations

Part VI—Table 5: State-wise Incidence of Crime and Violence against Dalits (SCs): 1989

State/Union Territories		
Andhra Pradesh	465	(Barring October)
Arunachal Pradesh	–	
Assam	17	
Bihar	997	(till November 1989)
Goa	2	
Gujarat	593	
Haryana	77	
Himachal Pradesh	70	(till Barring June)
Jammu & Kashmir	155	
Karnataka	490	(till August 1989)
Kerala	456	(till September 1989)
Madhtya Pradesh	3878	(till November 1989)
Maharashtra	329	(till November 1989)
Manipur	–	
Meghalaya	–	
Mizoram	–	
Nagaland	–	
Orissa	318	(till November 1989)
Punjab	21	
Rajasthan	1588	
Sikkim	3	
Tamil Nadu	409	(till October 1989)
Uttar Pradesh	3945	(till September 1989)
West Bengal	12	
Andaman & Nicobar Islands	–	
Chandigarh	–	
Dadra & Nagar Haveli	–	
Delhi	5	
Goa, Daman & Diu	–	
Lakshadweep	–	
Pondicherry	1	
Total:	13031	

Source: Home Ministry Report, 1989-90. Reproduced from Mohandas Nemishrai (ed.), *Lokayan Bulletin*, No. 4 (Special Number), Delhi: 1989-90.

Part VI—Table 6: State-wise number of atrocities reported against SC and STs during 1992

State/Union Territory	Number of cases of atrocities		
	SC	ST	Total
Andhra Pradesh	724	123	847
Bihar	926	5	931
Goa	3	-	3
Gujarat	1560	304	1864
Haryana	86	-	86
Himachal Pradesh	39	-	39
Jammu and Kashmir	25	-	25
Karnataka	720	27	747
Kerala	703	157	860
Madhya Pradesh	4571	1957	6528
Maharashtra	751	331	1082
Manipur	-	1	1
Orissa	383	129	512
Punjab	18	-	18
Rajasthan	2204	636	2840
Sikkim	21	20	41
Tamil Nadu	677	-	677
Uttar Pradesh	4891	-	4891
West Bengal	15	14	29
Chandigarh	20	-	20
Dadra & Nagar Haveli	-	5	5
Delhi	2	-	2
Pondicherry	1	1	1
Total	18340	3709	22049

Source: Official Website of the Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of India at http://shikshanic.nic.in/cd50years/g/S/I6/toc.htm)

PART VI—Table 7: Atrocities against Scheduled Castes:1984-1995

	1984	1989-90	1995
Uttar Pradesh	4,200	1,067	14,966
Madhya Pradesh	5,537	5,592	2,717
Rajasthan	1,648	1,501	5,204
Bihar	1,845	434	NA
Gujarat	582	710	NA
Tamil Nadu	689	334	NA
Maharashtra	570	426	NA

Sources: For 1984, V. Tatu, *Politics of Ethnic Nepotism*, New Delhi: Sterling Publishers United, 1991, p. 131; for 1989-90, *Lok Sabha Debates*, Vol. 8, No. 2, 8 August 1990, pp. 622-30; and for 1995, H. Hanumanthappa, 'Dalits in India: A Status Report', Dalit-International Newsletter, Vol. 2, No. 2, June 1997, p. 9.

Reproduced from Christophe Jaffrelot, *India's Silent Revolution: The Rise of Lower Castes in India* (London: 2003).

Part VI—Table 8: Ranking of states in terms of incidence of crimes against Scheduled Castes persons during 1992

Serial Number	State/Union Territory	Number of cases per one lakh SC population
1	Sikkim	87.19
2	Gujarat	50.97
3	Madhya Pradesh	47.48
4	Rajasthan	28.97
5	Kerala	24.35
6	Chandigarh	18.87
7	Uttar Pradesh	16.71
	All India	**13.27**
8	Goa	12.31
9	Karnataka	9.77
10	Maharashtra	8.58
11	Orissa	7.47
12	Bihar	7.37
13	Andhra Pradesh	6.84
14	Tamil Nadu	6.32
15	Himachal Pradesh	2.98
16	Haryana	2.65
17	Pondicherry	0.76
18	Punjab	0.31
19	Delhi	0.11
20	West Bengal	0.09

Source: Official Website of the Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of India at http://shikshanic.nic.in/cd50years/g/S/I6/toc.htm)

Part VI—Table 9: Ranking of states in terms of incidence of crimes and violence against Scheduled Tribes persons during 1992

Serial Number	State/Union Territory	Number of cases per one lakh ST population
1	Kerala	48.91
2	Sikkim	22.00
3	Madhya Pradesh	12.71
4	Rajasthan	11.62
	All India	**5.47**
5	Gujarat	4.93
6	Dadra & Nagar Haveli	4.57
7	Maharashtra	4.52
8	Andhra Pradesh	2.93
9	Orissa	1.83
10	Karnataka	1.41
11	West Bengal	0.37
12	Manipur	0.16
13	Bihar	0.08

Source: Official Website of the Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of India at http://shikshanic.nic.in/cd50years/g/S/I6/toc.htm)

Part VI—Table 10: Statement showing offence-wise distribution of cases of atrocities on the Scheduled Castes during 1992

State/Union Territory	Nature of crime and number of cases reported					
	Murder	Grievous Hurt	Rape	Arson	Other IPC Offences	Total
Andhra Pradesh	39	225	49	8	403	724
Bihar	36	49	48	44	749	926
Goa	1	-	-	-	-	1
Gujarat	29	72	10	17	1432	1560
Haryana	5	5	24	-	52	86
Himachal Pradesh	1	7	5	-	26	39
Jammu and Kashmir	-	3	2	4	16	25
Karnataka	21	25	17	26	631	720
Kerala	10	19	39	21	614	703
Madhya Pradesh	97	236	287	70	3881	4571
Maharashtra	15	35	36	22	643	751
Orissa	11	16	17	25	314	383
Punjab	7	5	4	-	2	18
Rajasthan	63	148	114	79	1800	2204
Sikkim	-	-	-	-	21	21
Tamil Nadu	12	9	2	14	640	677
Uttar Pradesh	343	762	174	289	3323	4891
West Bengal	1	1	3	-	10	15
Chandigarh	1	2	4	-	13	20
Delhi	1	-	-	-	1	2
Pondicherry	-	-	-	-	1	1
Total	693	1619	835	619	14574	18340

Source: Official Website of the Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of India at http://shikshanic.nic.in/cd50years/g/S/I6/toc.htm)

Part VI—Table 11: Summary of Digest of Newspaper-reported Atrocities against Dalits
July-December 2002

Atrocity	Date	Place	No. Dalits affected	Information on Incident
Lynching / Murder	8 August	Arora, Bhojpur dist, Bihar	3 dalits from 1 family shot dead	Unknown killers
	12 August	Meerut	one	Higher caste suspected of murder - Dalits block highway with body in protest
	22 August	Balsingh Khera, Nagram, UP	3 fishermen killed incl. a 12 yr-old boy	Killed with sharp-edged weapons
	27 August	Heend, Muzaffarnagar, UP	a 19 year-old Dalit gang-raped and killed	Woman gang-raped and hacked to death while collecting animal fodder
	3 September	Ramnagar in Satna district, Bhopal	a dalit youth found hanging	Government doctor refused to conduct post-mortem for 2 days
	5 October	Bhawaniapur Banghusari, Bahraich	a Dalit lynched	Villagers killed the leather-worker for poisoning a buffalo
	15 October	Jhajjar dist, Haryana	5 Dalit men lynched	Police mistakenly arrested the leather-workers for killing a cow. The cow was already dead, but the news spread from the police to surrounding villages, the youths were pulled out of the police station and beaten to death outside the police post. Two were torched.
	19 October	Dongra village, Narnaul, Haryana	a six-year old girl raped and killed	She was abducted while sleeping with her grandmother by unidentified persons, raped and died before being taken to hospital
	5 November	Burgijoi, Jehanabad	2 women killed, 2 more missing from same family	Bodies of two Dalit women from among four abducted on November 1 were found packed in gunny sacks in a pond.
	15 November	Aatgaon, UP	3 beaten (young couple and a friend) and burnt alive	After an upper caste young woman eloped with a young Dalit man, the two of them and the man's friend who helped them marry were beaten then burnt alive by the bride's family. Their charred remains were recovered from a nearby pond.
	1 December	Bhilai, Raipur	a 17 year-old Dalit lynched	The boy was lynched because of his affair with a Muslim girl - his body was found hanging in an externally locked cattle shed.
	21 December	Doddathagalli, Bangalore	Dalit farmer burnt alive	Returning home after selling potatoes, the assailants poured kerosene on the Dalit and set him on fire, robbing him of 30 Rupees.
Rape	15 July	Hazaribagh, Jharkhand	2 dalit women	Gang-raped, stripped naked, paraded, faces smeared with lime and cow dung
	23 August	Behta Bujurg, Kanpur	a 14 year-old dalit girl	Gang-raped by four persons - police refused to register case
	27 August	Heend, Muzaffarnagar, UP	a 19 year-old Dalit gang-raped and killed	Woman gang-raped and hacked to death while collecting animal fodder
	12 September	Aujula village, Kapurthala	a Dalit girl raped repeatedly	Editor of a monthly journal repeatedly raped the girl after convincing her to go to his house in order to secure a govt job for her parents
	19 October	Dongra village, Narnaul, Haryana	a six-year old girl raped and killed	She was abducted while sleeping with her grandmother by unidentified persons, raped and died before being taken to hospital
	31 October	Chaia, Ghatampur, UP	a Dalit midwife gang-raped	She was brought by a man to assist in his wife's delivery, and was gang-raped by the man and two associates in the fields on the way to the birth

	7 November	Shna, Gugaon	Attempted rape at knife-point of Dalit girl	An attempted rape of a Dalit girl at knife-point was prevented by a passerby. The girl's mother was attacked with the knife herself when she confronted the young man who attempted the rape.
	10 November	Ara, Bihar	Wife of Dalit labourer raped by upper caste landlord	The landlord mistakenly claimed that the labourer had not repaid a loan, and as punishment he raped the man's wife.
	10 December	Mirwapur, Basti	10 year-old Dalit girl raped	The girl was raped while returning home from school
Beatings / Physical Injuries	7 July	Brahmagiri, Puri dist, Orissa	3 dalits admitted to hospital, more injured	Dalits victims arrested, upper caste perpetrators free
	24 August	Vijay Nagar, Ghaziabad	3 Dalits from one family	6 trade tax officials investigated for abusive caste language, beating, and stealing family's property
	14 September	Kayundanpatti, Dindigul dist, TN	a Dalit farm labourer	Beaten, insulted, forced to drink urine after contesting a land dispute with caste Hindu
	21 September	Chakwara, Rajasthan	All Dalits of the village, numbering hundreds	Dalits tried to access village pond and temple - path blocked by police and 7,000 upper castes. Clash with police resulted in injuries to 15 police and 17 Dalits
	20 September	Kaimur dist, Bihar	3 Dalit labourers	Hospitalised with serious injuries after being beaten by upper castes for sheltering from rain in a temple
	29 October	Sivaganga dist	1 Dalit man	Beaten with wooden logs by caste Hindus for objecting to the use of machinery instead of village labour for a de-silting project
	12 November	Bhagwatipur, Rohtak	6 Dalit male youths beaten and one woman beaten. Another Dalit woman's clothes torn	For three hours, the youths were beaten with sharp sticks by upper caste youths because they disliked the manner in which one of the Dalit youths wore his shirt. They were admitted to hospital. A woman was also beaten while trying to help a Dalit woman whose clothes were torn by the attackers.
	15 December	Nawada Aar, Haryana	5 Dalits injured	Attacked by persons hired by upper caste, the second time the families had been attacked within a month.
	22 December	Hindu College, Delhi University	3 Dalit students suffered leg, face, back and finger fractures and bruises	Students locked in a room and beaten for hours by 15 persons over 'caste issues'
	30 December	Villupuram dist	Attack on 350 Dalits attending a cultural event	Caste Hindu armed gang assaulted the crowd with sickles and iron bars.
	31 December	Karnepally mandal, Khammam	Dalit woman, a meal volunteer, beaten by upper castes	Two upper caste persons objected to a Dalit helping to prepare food, and threatened and attacked her.
Parading naked	15 July	Hazaribagh, Jharkhand	2 Dalit women	Gang-raped, stripped naked, paraded, faces smeared with lime and cow dung
	21 September	Pratapgarh dist, UP	1 Dalit woman	Police and tehsil employees allegedly paraded the woman naked before locking her up for the night
	28 September	Burmamines Harijan bustee, Jamshedpur	1 Dalit woman	She was beaten up, her hair forcibly cut and paraded half naked with a garland of shoes around her neck by her husband and others after she was found talking to another man.
	30 September	Sultanwind, Punjab	1 Dalit woman	After a petty dispute with a man, he and his supported tore off her clothes in public and beat her

	29 October	Sivaganga dist	1 Dalit man	Beaten and paraded half-naked by caste Hindus for objecting to the use of machinery instead of village labour for a de-silting project
	17 November	Dharmganj, Kishanganj	1 woman assaulted and paraded half-naked	The Dalit woman testified that 8 persons forcibly entered her home, abused and assaulted her and paraded her in public wearing only her petticoat over a long-running land dispute.
	20 December	Vishnupur, Golpalganj dist, Bihar	Dalit paraded naked and face blackened with paint	He was humiliated because he went to fetch his higher caste daughter-in-law from her home village
Verbal insults	24 August	Vijay Nagar, Ghaziabad	3 Dalits from one family	6 trade tax officials investigated for abusive caste language, beating, and stealing family's property
Untouchability practices	28 July	Chennai, Tamil Nadu	Numerous	2/3-tumbler system - 1 shop-owner arrested
	10 September	Arra dist, Patna	Numerous	100 Ranvir Sena (upper caste private army) prisoners refuse to share kitchen with Dalit prisoners
Forced to consume noxious substances	2 August	Thinniyam, Tiruchi dist	2 Dalit men	Forced to 'feed each other' faeces after complaining of upper caste swindle
	14 September	Kayundanpatti, Dindigul dist, TN	a Dalit farm labourer	Beaten, insulted, forced to drink urine after contesting a land dispute with caste Hindu
	26 December	Kolar, Karnataka	Dalit youth beaten and forced to drink urine	After brutally assaulting the Dalit auto driver, and hearing the Dalits pleas for water, the assailant instead forced him to drink urine.
Social / Economic Boycott	2 August	Thinniyam, Tiruchi dist	25 men and their families	Denied farm work after giving information for arrest of 9 people from upper caste
	20 August	Mittamanupalle, Mydukur mandal, AP	120 families	10 villages deny work after charges pressed for burning hutments
	2 September	Moondkheri, Patiala	15 escaped bonded labourers and families	banned from buying even milk and sugar
	21 September	Chakwara, Rajasthan	All Dalits of the village, numbering hundreds	subjected to socio-economic boycott for attempting to access village pond and temple
	20 December	Vaghrota, Prantij taluka, Ahmedabad	Socio-economic boycott of local Dalits - numerous families	Boycott, including preventing purchase of essential commodities, was implemented because the Dalits refused to give their traditional burial ground to the upper castes.
	30 December	Villupuram dist	About 350 Dalits	Social boycott implemented after Dalits pressed charges for a violent attack on them by caste Hindus. Boycott prevented the Dalits' cattle from grazing in the village, as well as preventing the purchase of items in shops.
Debt Bondage	13 August	Hassan Bhatti, Faridkot	6 - one family	Beaten after injury prevented him doing bonded labour, family denied food
	20 August	Mojo Khurd, Mansa	one bonded labourer	Escaped after landlord beat him with a spade
	2 September	Moondkheri, Patiala	15 bonded labourers and families	Subjected to economic boycott after escape
Denial of food / water / housing	4 September	Mehru, Jalandhar	50 Dalit families	Driven out of public homes by panchayat for voting for opposition
	21 September	Chakwara, Rajasthan	All Dalits of the village, numbering hundreds	Denied access to village pond and temple

	17 October	Baran, Rajasthan	At least 12, most children of babies die of starvation / malnutrition	Panchayat corruption diverted emergency food away from lowest caste, who were then forced to eat grass and other inedible plants, resulting in starvation, malnutrition and digestive sickness
Destruction of houses / property	12 July	Bhagalpur, Banka dist.	Six families	Six Dalit houses burnt by 20 armed upper caste persons
	16 July	Raigopalpur, Kanpur	2 - Dalit woman and daughter	House and property burnt by woman's 'opponent's
	23 July	Mittamanupalle, Mydukur mandal, AP	Numerous families	Hutments burnt by upper caste persons
Land-grabbing	7 July	Brahmagiri, Puri dist, Orissa	Whole village of prawn-farmers	Resentment of dalit economic success
Torture	16 July	Kodagu dist, Bangalore	2 - young cricketer (admitted to hospital; assaulted on genitalia) and his brother	Sub-Insp. Police suspended for torture
	7 July	Ulagampatti, Sivaganga	a 27 year old Dalit woman	She was beaten inside the house by 4 plainclothes police, dragged outside and beaten with a log till she lost consciousness. She awoke in Ulagampatti police station. Sustained multiple thigh and back injuries.

Some Totals:

- 63 Atrocities
- 23 murders
- 9 rapes including at least 3 Dalit minors, one attempted rape
- 26 Dalits assaulted, plus large sections of 2 Dalit villages
- 8 Dalits paraded naked or semi-naked
- 4 Dalits forced to consume urine or faeces
- 6 cases of socio-economic boycott, affecting over a thousand Dalits
- Hundreds of Dalits excluded from food, water or housing
- 3 Dalits tortured by the police
- 1368 individuals plus 8 whole villages immediately affected

Source: Digest of Atrocities/Violence/Killings against Dalits, India Committee of the Netherlands—April 2, 2003.
http:/www.india.net.nl/atroc1.htm

PART VII: (Tables 1 to 2) IMPACT: SOCIAL-STRUCTURAL CHANGE

Part VII—Table 1: Showing representation of social formations of castes and communities in different middle class locations: 1996 National Survey

Social Formation & Percentage in Sample	Education above High School	Occupation White Collar	Housing Brick & Cement	Own Land above 5 acres	Own other Assets	Middle Class Identification
Upper Caste (24.8)	1057 (44.1)	873 (53.3)	1369 (45.2)	642 (36.8)	1112 (49.6)	1229 (43.8)
Backward Caste (39.3)	829 (34.6)	435 (26.6)	946 (31.3)	694 (39.8)	719 (32.0)	1001 (35.7)
Ex-untouchables (19.7)	281 (11.7)	151 (9.2)	373 (12.3)	168 (9.6)	196 (8.7)	254 (9.0)
Tribals (9.7)	95 (4.0)	56 (3.4)	158 (5.2)	160 (9.2)	91 (4.1)	146 (5.2)
Muslims (6.5)	134 (5.6)	123 (7.5)	181 (6.0)	79 (4.5)	126 (5.6)	177 (6.3)
Total	**2396 (100.0)**	**1638 (100.0)**	**3027 (100.0)**	**1743 (100.0)**	**2244 (100.0)**	**2807 (100.0)**

Source*:* The CSDS Data Unit National Elections Survey (1996).

Notes:

1. The survey, based on a stratified random sample (probability proportionate to size) of 9457 Indian citizens drawn from all the Indian states, excluding the state of Jammu and Kashmir, was conducted by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi, in June-July 1996.

2. The sample population classfied into five social transformations:
    1. ***Upper castes***: This social formation comprises castes with high ritual status (*dwija*) in the *varna* hierarchy as well as some upwardly mobile dominant castes of rich farmers, traditionally identified with a low *varna* status i.e., Sudra. The castes included in this category are not entitled to benefits of affirmation action (24.8 per cent in the sample).
    2. ***Backward castes***: These include Hindu castes of lower peasantry and of artisans traditionally identified with the lowest varna category of Sudras as well as the lower peasant and artisan communities belonging to other non-Hindu religious groups (non-Hindus also have caste-like formations). Castes and communities comprising this category are entitled to the benefits of affirmative action (39.3 per cent in the sample).
    3. ***Dalits***: These include castes and communities of ex-untouchables belonging to different religious groups, receiving benefits of affirmative action (19.7 per cent in the sample).
    4. ***Tribals***: These tribal communities belonging to different, religious faiths, tribal and the mainstream, but entitled to affirmative action benefits (9.7 per cent in the sample).

5. ***Muslims***: This category excludes those Muslim communities that are classified as backward and as such are included among backward castes. This category only includes the upper strata of Muslims not entitled to affirmative action benefits (6.5 per cent in the sample).

3. The table shows distribution of the above five social formations in different middle class positions. Five separate indicators are used for identifying middle class positions: (a) education: those with education above the high-school level; (b) ownership of assets: those owning three or more assets among the following: (i) a car/jeep/tractor, (ii) a scooter/motorbike, (iii) water-pumping set, (iv) house/flat, (v) television; (5) self-identification as members of the 'middle class': i.e., respondents who reject working class identity and choose for themselves the middle class identity.

Part VII—Table 2: Caste and Occupation

Occupation/Landholding	Castes/Communities								
	Brahmin	**Rajput**	**Other upper castes**	**Peasant middle castes**	**Peasant OBCs**	**Other OBCs**	**SCs**	**STs**	**Other mino–rities**
Higher professional[1]	3.8	0.6	3.5	0.7	0.5	0.8	0.3	0.5	3.8
White collar employees[2]	34.7	21.3	21.2	14.4	7.5	9.0	10.0	7.2	14.6
Large business	3.6	2.0	10.1	2.0	0.9	1.6	0.2	1.6	2.8
Petty business[3]	13.4	7.0	25.8	6.3	5.8	10.0	5.3	12.5	14.6
Artisan/Blue collar workers/Service providers	9.0	8.7	9.5	13.6	14.6	34.1	25.5	23.7	20.5

Source: National Election Study, 1999, Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi.

The Survey canvassed a total of 9418 respondents drawn by stratified ramdom sample, probability proportionate to size (PPS).

Notes: 1. High professionals include medical doctors, engineers, lawyers, chartered accountants, university and college teachers.

2. White–collar employees include government and non–government officers, teachers, clerks, and managers.

3. Petty business includes small shop–owners, hawkers, salespersons, shop assistants, etc.

PART VIII: (Table 1 to 6) AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN PAKISTAN

Part VIII—Table 1: Quota System—1948

Region / Province	Quota	Population %
	%	
East Bengal	42	56.75
(West) Punjab	24	28.00
Karachi	2	1.50
All other provinces and princely states of West Pakistan	17	13.75
Potential migrants from India	15	(9.80) (Included in the above)

Part VIII—Table 2: Quota System—1949

Category	Quota %
Merit	20
East Bengal	40
Punjab (including Bahawalpur)	23
Karachi	2
All other provinces and princely states	15

Part VIII—Table 3: Quota: The 1973 Constitution

Category	Quota %
Merit	10
Punjab	50
Sindh	19 (Rural 11.4, Urban 7.6)
NWFP	11.5
Baluchistan	3.5
Northern Areas and FATA	4
Azad Kashmir	2

Part VIII—Table 4: Pakistan: Ethnic Representation in Federal Bureaucracy, 1973 – 86

Ethnic Group	1973		1983		1986	
	All	Senior	All	Senior	All	Senior
Punjabi	49.3	53.5	54.9	55.8	55.3	57.7
Pathan	10.5	7.0	13.4	11.6	12.6	12.1
Sindhi	3.1	2.7	5.4	5.1	7.2	6.7
Mohajir	30.1	33.5	17.4	20.2	18.2	18.3
NA	2.6	1.3	3.6	3.4	1.4	1.5
AJK	1.8	0.5	1.9	0.9	1.7	0.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Charles H. Kennedy, 'Managing Ethnic Conflict: The Case of Pakistan', *Regional Politics and Policy*, Spring 1993, No. 1, p 138.

Part VIII—Table 5: **Regional Representation in Officer Grades: 1993**

Region	Ratio of Jobs (%)	Quota (%)
Punjab	62.36	50.0
Sindh (Urban)	9.51	7.5
Sindh (Rural)	7.63	11.4
NWFP	12.41	11.5
Baluchistan	3.01	3.5
NA/FATA	3.69	4.0
AJK	1.29	2.0

Source: Establishment Division, Federal Secretariat, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, Civil Servants (BPS 1 to BPS 22), Regional/Provincial Representation: as on 1 January 1993.

Part VIII—Table 6: Representation in Autonomous Bodies/Public Corporations: 1993

Province	Number	Percentage	Prescribed Quota
Punjab	25,772	49.94	50.0
Sindh (Urban)	13,815	26.77	7.6
Sindh (Rural)	4,213	8.16	11.4
NWFP	5,249	10.17	11.5
Baluchistan	1,255	2.43	3.5
NA	–	–	–
FATA	638	1.24	4.0
AJK	664	1.29	2.0

Source: Establishment Division, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, Statement showing Number of Employees, Province and Grade–wise, in BPS 17 and above working in the Autonomous/Semi–Autonomous Bodies/Corporations of the Federal Government, 1 January 1993.

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