

Human Development Report Office

OCCASIONAL PAPER

Background paper for HDR 2004

**SOCIO-ECONOMIC DOMINANCE OF ETHNIC
AND RACIAL GROUPS – THE AFRICAN EXPERIENCE**

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2004/8



HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2004

Final Draft

SOCIO-ECONOMIC DOMINANCE OF ETHNIC AND RACIAL GROUPS – THE AFRICAN EXPERIENCE¹

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2 December 2003

¹ Paper prepared for United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report Office

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1.0 Introduction and Methodology

This paper is one of many contributions commissioned by the UNDP's HDR report office. The objective of the paper is to examine the nature and extent of socio-economic dominance and exclusion in Africa, including efforts to redress inequities. The specific objectives are to develop a conceptual framework examining ethnic and racial socio-economic dominance in Africa; identify the historical and specifically colonial roots of ethnicity and socio-economic disparities; assess contemporary empirical patterns of socio-economic disparities along ethnic and racial lines, based upon key selected variables; analyze the strategies used to mobilize ethnicity and race towards the accumulation of power and economic resources; and to examine public policies and civic strategies aimed at redressing ethnic and racial resource imbalances.

The study is based upon an assessment of existing secondary sources of empirical data and the literature on ethnic and racial economic dominance in Africa. It does not attempt to do primary empirical research. To examine the relationship between ethnic and racial identity, and socio-economic dominance, the second and third section of the paper identify existing ethnic and racial population groupings in Africa, both in terms of their historical (and colonial) construction and of their contemporary articulation. Although currently documented ethnographic categorizations are contested and changing in form, the study uses them with caution, bearing in mind that many ethnic categories were contrived in colonial and recent times, and that the ethnicisation of identity is a maturing phenomenon.

The study of patterns and processes of socio-economic dominance and exclusion on the basis of ethnic and racial identity needs to be informed by the specific economic and social development patterns and contexts of various regions in the world. Variations in national levels of development, wealth and the predominance of particular economic activities, shape the context of and content of accumulation strategies and resources around which various ethnic or racial groupings compete. Because the African economy continues to depend on primary production (especially agriculture and mining) dominated by traditional exports with limited overall employment capacities in the secondary economic sectors, competition tends to be focused on the scarce education and employment opportunities, and for natural resources, primarily land. It is important to recognise the central role that land and natural resources distribution plays in sustaining basic livelihoods and its relatively critical role in struggles for political control and wealth.

The methodology adopted to examine socio-economic dominance of the groupings is built around three interrelated pillars of analysis: historical sources of socio-economic dominance; contemporary empirical

patterns of socio-economic dominance and strategies used to gain dominance. Section 4 attempts to decipher patterns and processes of contemporary socio-economic dominance on ethnic grounds. Section 5 surveys the strategies used by the state and, political and civic organizations to gain such dominance. Strategies used to mobilize socio-economic dominance which are examined include overtly political processes used to obtain and maintain political power as the key to preferential or discriminatory allocation of socio-economic resources, as well as other socio-economic processes which are mobilized to dominate access to education, employment, social services and national resources. Attempts to redress conflicts and imbalances which arise from ethnic and racial dominance are examined in brief in section 6.

2.0 Conceptualizing ethnicity and current ethnographic patterns

This section discusses the overall conceptual framework of ethnicity and provides different perspectives of ethnicity in Africa. A broad definition of the ethnicity and race question and its understanding is presented. The section then provides a brief synthesis of the literature on the ethnic distribution and forms of conflicts that arise from these.

2.1 Construction and fostering of ethnicity

The literature reflects a variety of contested definitions of ethnicity in Africa. The family social formation in Africa has tended to be organized around groups of people claiming common ancestry, in terms of reproductive stock and language (Van Binsbergen, 1997). Thus according to Van Binsbergen:

“An ethnic group is an explicitly named set of people, specific ethnic boundary markers, including ethno language, historic forms of leadership, modes of production, selected other cultural traits, sometimes also selected somatic characteristics such as skin color, hair texture, facial characteristics, deliberate human interference with the body’s appearance- both reversible (e.g. scarification).”

Members of a “tribe” were seldom members of the same political unit and very seldom indeed did they all share common social purposes in terms of activities of the members of different ethnic communities. But ethnicity is in reality socially constructed and political mobilized as has been observed. “However the key concept of ethnicity revolves on how the wider social field is economically, politically and culturally structured in terms of a multiplicity of such ethnic groups in interaction. Any one of the fields can be mobilized into developed forms of advocacy, in which the notion of ethnicity also implies some form of “identity or self image, which members of any social category construct on the basis of identification and stereotyping both among themselves and among outsiders” (Ibid).

Moreover critical ethnicity is a dynamic and transforming process:

“Identity tends to be situational, multiple (since every social field consists of many intersecting social categories), strategic and subject to historical change. This applies to various identities including gender, class, professional, religious, and other identities. Socializing early in life, as well as social control, propaganda, taking consciousness

later on, may cause a specific identity to become so deeply entrenched in the personality as to produce a fixed, self-evident vision of reality, no longer consciously negotiated in social contexts” (Ibid).

Thus ethnicization is a process in which ethnic identity is mobilized into a militant political idiom taking precedence over an individual’s other identities, and thus becomes a basis for political action. Yet the literature has tended to treat ethnicity as organic and primordial. For decades, the notion of ethnic (tribal) difference dominated most attempts to explain violent conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa. By pairing the rich spectrum of ethnic diversity found in the continent with the culture of competition induced by a harsh environment and restricted access to natural and social resources, ethnic violence came to be regarded as the natural state of affairs (Fukui and Turton, 1979 cited by Osaghae, 1998). In this view, ethnic conflict is part of the historical baggage that modernizing states have been saddled with, as both product and indicator of the cultural conservatism and traditionalism found among the rural population.

This standard interpretation of African ethnicity as primordial hangover attracted criticism from anthropologists since the 1960s who question assumptions about ethnicity as a quasi-ontological base of human identity, with reference to such phenomena as cultural conversion, situational identity, the uneven distribution of cultural properties and the invention of tradition (Barth, 1969 cited by Osaghae, 1998; Ranger and Hobsbawm, 1983; Holy, 1973 cited by Osaghae, 1998; Eriksen, 1993 cited by Osaghae, 1998). Ethnicity, far from presenting a historical leftover, has been recast as a modern phenomenon, with people re-tribalising in the face of pressure, so that ethnicity is no longer seen as a cause, but rather as a consequence of war, (Fukui and Markakis, 1994; Gurr and Harff, 1994 cited by Osaghae, 1998). However, with the passage of time an inversion of ethnicity from being an effect into being a cause is indeed possible (Osaghae, 1998).

Ethnicity connotes a group’s antipathy against others, including suspicion, hatred and envy. It is not a neutral concept merely depicting and signifying the act of inter ethnic relations that are expected to take place in a multi-ethnic society. “To speak of ethnicity is to speak of inter-group interactive situations characterized by rivalry, competition and often conflict”. Tribalism is a “special” relationship, one in which people identify other exploited people as the source of their insecurity and frustration rather than their common exploiters, (Ley, 1975 cited by Osaghae, 1998). Some have characterised ethnicity as an urban phenomenon as opposed to tribalism viewed as a rural one (Ley, 1971 cited by Osaghae, 1998). Ethnicity can be structured by settlerism or immigrancy (Americo-Liberians) or state policy such as in South Africa, through the former governing and independent states where the mindset was geographically demarcated (Osaghae, 1998).

The ethnic situation of a country refers to the number and character of ethnic groups, the conflict among them, as well as their class regional, racial, religious or other correlates which serve to reinforce these conflicts. It can be implied that from the above discussion definition that pure ethnicity is rare.

2.2 Ethnographic categorization in Africa

Notwithstanding the conceptual contestations of ethnicity, extensive reference to ethnic groups and, official and informal categorization of ethnic groups is replete in the literature and in practice. There are over 600 ethnic groups in Africa (Table 2-1), and the number of ethnic groups per country ranges from 1 to 250. The countries with the largest number of ethnic groups are the DRC, Ghana, Kenya, and Ivory Coast, while those with the least are Lesotho, Swaziland and Rwanda.

The migration patterns influenced ethnic composition, largely because colonial/post colonial boundaries tended to containerize ethnic groups within boundaries, where such geographic fixation of ethnicity did not exist. Ghana for instance consists of both autochthonous and migrant peoples (Osei-Kwamw, 1980 cited by Twagiramutara, 1998; Agyeman, 1987 cited by Twagiramutara,1998), The Guan are said to be autochthonous. The Ewes are known to have migrated from the east through Dahomey (Benin) to Togo and from Togo to Ghana. The Ga-Adangbe too are said to have migrated westward from the east. The rest namely the Asante, Brong, Denkyira and the Northern ethnic groups migrated southward from the Sahara Desert, probably somewhere north of the desert town of Gao (Agyman, 1998).

Ethnicity has tended to be accentuated, such as in the case of the Tutsis, the Hutus and the Twa, through missionary ethnography which dwelt on physical difference. Father Menard (1907-08:22) cited by Twagiramutara, (1998) wrote:

“The Batutsi race is undoubtedly one of the most handsome and interesting races of equatorial Africa. Physically, the Mututsi are perfectly built .Their physique is more like that of the Whites than that of Negroes to the extent that one could say without exaggeration that they are Europeans in black skin. Ryckmans described the Tutsi as reminiscent of the physique of the mummy of Ramses II”

Yet socially and economically, ethnicity is perceived through the fact that the Tutsi dominated the Hutu. (Louis, 1963 cited by Twagiramutara, 1998), and the Tutsi who owned large herds of cattle were the more ‘Lords’ who had enslaved the Hutu who were more of agriculturists.

Ethnicity has for long been contested around the fact of minority settler dominance such as in the cases of Sierra Leone and Liberia where repatriated freed black slaves (creoles) who constitute less than 10% of population as well as post colonial migrations of different races. Thus Sierra Leone the indigenous population is made up of 18 ethnic groups, with the Temne in the north and the Mende in the South

Table 2.1: Populations of selected by ethnic groups

Country	Population	Land Area Sq km	N ^o of Ethnic group	Dominant Ethnic Groups			Minority Group
				1 st	2 nd	3 rd	
Angola	10,766,471	1,246,700	6	Ovimbundu 37%	Kimbundu 25%	Bakongo 13%	Other
Botswana	1,573,267	581,730	3+	Tswana (79%)	Kalanga (11%)	Basarwa (3%)	Other
Burundi	6,096,156	27,830	3	Hutu 85 %	Tutsi 14%	Twa 1%	
Cameroon	15 million	475,000	8	Highlanders (31%)	Equatorial Bantu (19%)	Kindi (11%)	Others
Chad	7 million	1,284,000	200	Arabs	Gorane	Zaghawa	Others
Congo	2,785,000	342,000		Kongos 51.5%	Tekes 17.3%	Mboshis 11.5%	Other
Cote d'Ivoire	14,292,000	322,000	70	Sènoufo (9.7%)	Malinkè (8.5%)	Baoulè (6.6%)	Other
DRC (Zaire)	49,139,000	2,345,000	250	Luba 18%	Mongo 17%	Kongo 12%	
Ethiopia	63 million	1,104,000	10	Oromo 40%	Amhara and Tigre 32%	Bakongo 13%	European 1%
Eritrea	4 million	118,000	6	Tigrinya 50%	Tigre and Kunama 40%	Saho 3%	Other 3%
Gabon	1,167,000		8	Fang (32%)	Mpongwè (15%)	Mbèbè (14%)	Pygmées
Ghana	19,162,000	239,000	70	Akan (52.4%)	Mossi (15.8%)	Ewe (11.9%)	Other (7.5%)
Kenya	30,8 million	580,000	70	Kikuyu (20.7%)	Luyia (14.3%)	Luo (12.3%)	Dasnachi-Shangil (0.00%)
Lesotho	2 million	30,350	4	Sotho 99.7%	Europeans	Asians	Others
Liberia	3,317,176	111,370	18	Indigenous African tribes 95%	Americo-Liberians 2.5%	Congo people 2.5%	
Malawi	11 million	118,000	3	11	Nyanja	Tumbuka	Chewa
Mali	11,626,219	1.24 million	6	Mande 50%	Peul 17%	Voltaic 12%	Other
Mozambique	17 million	799,380	4	Indigenous African tribes 99.66%	Euro-Africans 0.2%	Indians 0.008%	Europeans 0.06%
Namibia	2 million	824,290	9	Ovambo	Karanga	Herero	White Europeans
Nigeria	106,409,000		8	Yorouba (19%)	Haoussa (18%)	Ibo (17%)	Et ebira (1%)
Rwanda	8 million		6	Hutu 84%	Tutsi 15%	Twa (Pygmy) 1%	
Sierra Leone	5 million		18	Temne	Mende	Krios	other
Somalia	2,673,000	637 660	6	Somali 85%	Bantu	Arabs	
South Africa	42 million	1,221,040	13	Zulu 22.4%	Xhosa 17.5%	Afrikaans 15.8%	
Sudan	38,114,160	2,505,810	5	Black 52%	Arab 39%	Beja 6%	Other
Swaziland		17,200		African 97%	European 3%		
Tanzania	33 million	945,090		Bantu 99%			
Uganda	21 million		15	Baganda	Ankole	Basoga	other
Zambia	10 million	752,610	15	Bemba (2,200 000	Nyanja 1,000,000	Tonga 1,000,000	Mashi 25 000
Zimbabwe	12 million	390,580	6	Shona 71 %	Ndebele 16 %	Other 11%	Mixed and Asian 1 %

Source: (Ethno-Net Africa Database 2003; CIA World Factbook, 1995)

being the largest by far, while the immigrants comprise about 60,000 Krios and about 4,000 Lebanese, 500 Indians, and 2,000 Europeans. The immigrants are considered economically dominant, and the fulcrum of political contestations (Sepdata, 2002).

2.3 Race in Africa

Various sub-Saharan countries have a variety of races including the four major groupings: blacks, whites, Arabs and Asians (Table 2-2). While 15 countries have significantly racial mixes in their populations, only 6 countries have substantial non-black race populations. However many of the countries (10) have substantial populations of mixed race blood, referred to variously as “metis”, “coloured” and “obrownie.”

The Arab content of race distribution varies from north to south of sub-Saharan Africa, wherein race and ethnicity interfaces are perceived in both biological and social constructions. For example in Sudan race concepts based on “Arab” content have been elaborated. `Thus, Ibrahim (1984) cited by Suliman, (1997), distinguishes between four groups using a more culture-oriented classification:

“... the Arabs, the fully Arabised, the partly Arabised, and the non-Arabised. The Arabs, according to him, are the native Arabic speakers: the Rezeigat, the Zeiydiya, Beni Hussein, and the Djawama nomads who, as a result of intermarriage with the indigenous Darfurians, look much darker than non-Sudanese Arabs. The fully Arabised group refers to those locals who have lost their native languages to Arabic. The Berti and the Tungur belong to this group. The third group - the partly Arabised - consists of those who have retained their native languages, but also speak Arabic fluently. Among these the author lists the Fur, the Zaghawa, and the Meidob. The last group in this classification is the non-Arabised tribes who speak very little Arabic, for example, the Massalit, some sections of the Zaghawa, the Bergid, the Mima, the Tama, and the Kenana.”

O'Fahey (1980) cited by Suliman, (1997) however challenges this ethnographic classification of the Arab/non-Arab divide as being ambiguous and rendering the genealogical approach unworkable. The structure suggested by O'Fahey relates migration, linguistic and occupational factors in identifying the ethnic structure of Darfur. In this approach he identifies, the first group as nomadic camel and cattle herders, who identify themselves as Arabs, with nomadic self-esteem and, a feeling of superiority. For them, the second group, sedentary farmers and other rural groups are perceived as inferior, not only ethnically but also culturally by virtue of occupation, and considered to be “kitchen” based. Like their European counterparts, these herder/soldier groups neither refrained nor disdained from raiding and robbing the despised farmers, especially in times of scarcity. Armed raids against other groups, mainly in rich agricultural areas, constitute an important anti-destitute strategy in times of major natural calamities.

Although traditionally inclined to peaceful life, the Fur sedentary farmers are often engaged in skirmishes with cattle and camel nomads over animal intrusion in their farms. As a result of these frequent clashes and in spite of economic interdependence and cooperation, both groups harbour a degree of mutual animosity and mistrust.

Table 2.2: Population of selected Sub Sahara African Countries by Race

Country	Population	% of Population			
		Whites	Asians	African	Coloureds
Angola	10,069,501	1	22	75	2
Botswana	1,392,414	1		99	
Burundi	6,262,429	0.05	0.0003	99.95	
Cameroon	13,521,000	<1		86	13
Chad	5,586,505	<2.69		97.3	
Congo Republic	2,504,996	0.34	2.66	97	
Cote d'Ivoire	14,791,257	12.72		87.28	
DRC	44,060,636			100	
Eritrea					
Ethiopia	55,979,018	1		99	
Gabon	1,155,749	8.65		91.4	
Ghana	17,763,138	0.2		99.8	
Kenya	28,817,227	1		84	15
Lesotho	1,992,960	0.08	0.04	99.7	
Liberia	3,073,245			95	5
Malawi	9,808,384			97.5%	2.5%
Mali	9,375,132	5		95	
Mozambique	18,115,250	0.06	0.08	99.7	0.19
Mauritius	1,127,068				100
Namibia	1,651,545	6.6		86	7.4
Nigeria	101,232,251	0.24		64.8	35
Rwanda	8,605,307			100	
Sierra Leone	4,753,120	1		99	
Somalia	7,347,554		15	85	
South Africa	45,095,459	13.6	2.6	75.2	8.6
Sudan					
Swaziland					
Tanzania	28,701,077	1		99	
Uganda	19,573,262	1		76	23
Zambia	9,445,723	1.1		98.7	0.2
Zimbabwe	11,139,961	1%	<1%	98%	<1%

Source (Ethno-Net Africa Database; CIA World Factbook, 1995)

To these two groups is added a third culture area/occupational group which consists of traders, government officials, absentee landlords and urban-based professionals. Unlike the other two groups who have limited political influence, this third group plays an important role in the political life of the region.

As Abdul-Galil (1984) cited by Suliman, (1997) notes, ethnic identification along the four criteria of territory, linguistics, occupation and genealogy is a situational phenomenon, and that even the apparently solid ethnic boundaries of the dominant tribal entities of the Fur, the Arab and the Zaghawa were in actual fact porous and responsive to change. However, with the escalation of the conflict, the ethnic divide began to harden as people became more aware of their ethnic affiliation, and their former political party and religious sect loyalty began to wither away (Suliman, 1997).

2.4 Religious affiliation

Religious affiliation in sub-Saharan Africa has also tended to be a source of division, socio-economic dominance and conflicts. There are generally 3 predominant groups of religions: Catholics, Protestants are newer Christian groups, Muslims and the more organic African religious systems (Table 2-3). While the data is weak, the trend of religious affiliation is dominated by Christianity, although most Africans practice both their indigenous religions alongside the “imported” religions.

3.0 Role of colonial powers in constructing ethnic identity and conflict

Contemporary patterns and processes of socio-economic dominance along ethnic and racial grounds are partly derived from the legacy of colonial divide and rule policies based upon ethnic identity creation and unequal resource distributions. These have in some cases led to long term conflict.

But this is not to suggest that ethnicisation does not precede colonialisation. For example, “the Luvale, Lunda, Luchazi and Mbunda-speaking peoples of the Upper Zambezi area certainly had a developed ethnic self-awareness prior to either their contact with mercantile capital through participation in the trans-Atlantic slave trade in the early nineteenth century, or their experience as colonized peoples between 1906 and 1964. What changed so dramatically from the mid-nineteenth century onwards was that a previously slowly evolving, fluid ethnic self-awareness was transformed into a new, harder 'tribal' structure to the extent that 'tribalism' was stronger and more politically relevant in 1981 than it was in 1881” (Papstein, 1989). Various processes fomented this. Missionaries of the fundamentalist Christian Mission in Marylands (Plymouth Brethren) were of critical importance in the development of tribalism amongst the Luvale and Lunda. Labour migrancy gave the Luvale and Lunda their first urban experience, and those who migrated to the Copperbelt were shocked to learn that they were regarded as social inferiors by the more numerous Bemba and, of course, the Lozi. The Balovale people spoke unfamiliar and difficult languages.

Colonial administrations universally created administrative and political districts around tribal chiefdoms, which in many cases contrived regional centres of ethnically based chief authority of groups which were in fact autonomous. In Zambia for example, the MacDonnel Commission testimonies to the Commission and who, in the preparation of masses in the 1930's was set "... to demonstrate the separate and independent origins and development of the Lunda and Luvale tribes and their autonomy from the Lozi ... It sustained both Luvale and Lunda claims to autonomy and the government responded by creating Balovale District and separate Luvale and Lunda Native Authorities. As the Luvale and Lunda saw it, they had saved themselves from Lozi over lordship after a generation of struggle" (Ibid).

Table 2.3: Populations of selected countries by religious groups [incomplete]

Country	Population	Religious groups					
		Christians	Catholic	Protestants	African religion	Muslims	Other religions
Angola	10,766,471		38%	15%	47%		
Botswana	1,573,267	15%			85%		
Burundi	6,096,156		62%	5%	23%	10%	
Cameroon	15 million						
Chad	7 million						
Congo Republic	2,785,000						
Cote d'Ivoire	14,292,000		22%	5.5%	17%	38%	17%
DRC	49,139,000		40%	35%	10%	9%	
Ethiopia	63 million						
Eritrea	4 million						
Gabon	1,167,000	12.1%	65.2%	18.8%	2.9%	0.8%	
Gabon	19,162,000						
Ghana	30,8 million	~63% (Catholics, Anglicans, Methodists, Presbyterians)			>20%	~16%	
Kenya	2 million	66%			26%	6%	
Lesotho	3,317,176						
Liberia	11 million	40%			40%	20%	
Malawi							
Mali	11,626,219	1%			9%	90%	
Mauritius	17 million						
Mozambique	2 million						
Namibia	106,409,000						
Nigeria	8 million	About 30%	10%		5%	About 50%	
Rwanda	5 million						
Sierra Leone	2,673,000						
Somalia	42 million						
South Africa	38,114,160						
Sudan		5%			25%	70%	
Swaziland	33 million						
Tanzania	21 million						
Uganda	10 million						
Zambia	12 million	Other/ nominal -20.2% Evangelical-12.5%	32%	27%	31%	1%	Atheist/non-religious 0.5%
Zimbabwe	10,766,471	25%			24%	1%	50% synergetic

Source: Ethno Net Database, 2003; CIA World Factbook, 1995

The creation of Native Authorities, which gave in theory but rarely in practice the “tribes” a “modern” administrative structure, was moderately useful in carrying out indirect rule. Yet the term coined was something of a misnomer; perhaps 'Native Responsibilities' would be more descriptive of their functions as they never had serious authority in making policy. “... their creation encouraged, or indeed forced, people to seek solutions to local problems through the newly formulated tribal structure” (Ibid).

Ethnic politics was also fomented when colonial governments pronounced that government-sponsored primary school education should teach in local languages. Over time tribalism in such native authorities matured through various mechanisms: for instance, the

“... Lunda boycotted Luvale traders and vice versa. Travel in one another's territory was unsafe ... Couples who had married across ethnic lines found themselves ridiculed by both sides and, at times, even forced by their families to divorce” (Ibid).

3.1 Identity construction and ethnicity under colonialism

According to (Twagiramutara, 1998), the establishment of the colonial state in Africa generally enhanced the ethnicisation of politics and administration, in terms of ethnic belonging gradually eclipsing clan identity as the main basis for the social and administrative identification of peoples. For example, during 1926-1929, the colonial state was preoccupied with the systematic classification of the various social and ethnic groups living in Rwanda in a manner that aligned them to their perceived ethnic category of the Bantou, Hamite and Pygmy races, and their functional utility with the colonial state, and to shape their desired power structures (Twagiramutara, 1998).

The elimination by the Belgian colonial administration and by the missionaries of the last Hutu chiefs and auxiliary chiefs from their posts, functions and their influence, in the newly conquered regions and their replacement by ruling social fractions recruited and selected on the basis of criteria including that of being Tutsi familihood, lineage and ethnicity led to the abrogation of merit and, competence in appointments and recognition. This practice significantly led to the belief in the practice of exclusion and rejection meted against the Hutu and the Twa ethnic categories and fostered the emergence of an ethnic-based class awareness (Ibid).

Specifically ethnic administration practices were based in colonial policies, which required all natives to carry identity cards and taxpaying booklets, bearing references to their ethnic group, and during the 1930, and 1952 population censuses, ethnic classification was attended by a socially unchanging identity. But spurious methods were used to define ethnicity in Rwanda: for example,

“Whoever, at the time owned at least ten heads of cattle was automatically identified in his taxpayer’s booklet as Tutsi. Whosoever owned no cattle was tagged and labelled as belonging to the Hutu ethnic group” (Ibid).

However, colonial ethnic fostering policy was contradictory and changing opportunistically, for example in Rwanda during 1962 to 1973 there was a complete change of ethnic policies by the colonial administration and church due to the intervention of Colonel Logiest, the Special Resident who changed the colonial policy of traditional alliances preferred by the Belgians and the power balance between the local protagonists. He dethroned various Tutsi chiefs and sub-chiefs for various reasons and systematically replaced them with Hutus in key political and administrative posts and other functions of influence. This laid the basis for the coup d’e’tat (Hattier, 1988) cited by Twagiramutara (1998), which brought the Hutu to power and established republican institutions. Ethnicism was then systematically maintained as a means of controlling the opposition and the conflicts that emerged among social actors with multiple and diverse interests derived from the regime in power and those that saw themselves as disadvantaged by various mechanisms and, practices used to control the differential distribution of authority in the political and/or economic spheres.

Similarly when the British destroyed the Asante imperial power by 1902, using superior arms and a large army recruited from among the coastal ethnic groups in Ghana (Agyeman, 1993), this exacerbated inter-ethnic hostilities between the coastal people and the people inland, wherein the Asante allied themselves with the peoples who now occupy Northern Ghana who were equally fearful of British colonial domination (Ibid).

Colonial state formation was a process which attempted to forge nations from a conglomeration of diverse ethnic groups some of which were decided unwillingly partners in the union (Agyeman, 1998). But this was resisted and created a framework for ethnic tensions. For instance, in 1956, the people of British Togoland, the Ewes refused in a referendum supervised by the United Nations to join Ghana (the then Gold Coast) and preferred to continue as a British Trusteeship, although other ethnic groups in the area approved the inclusion of British Togoland into Ghana. From then on, the Ewes made several attempts to secede from Ghana and form a united Ewe state which embraces all Ewes in British and French Togoland (Ibid).

Colonial land alienation processes fractured pre-colonial economies and inter-ethnic relations. In Kenya, the Bantu speaking Luhya and Kisii and the Nilotic speaker who had mixed economies, pursued trading strategies which linked them to the Maasai in a regional system, with the ethnic relations that were mutually beneficial and helped to neutralize potential rivalry and conflict. Colonial policies created a common politico- administrative centre, which had the effect of bringing together all “tribes” under one authority but saw the division of the state into ethnic administrative enclaves, and the confinement of the “natives” to their reserves. The colonial alienation of land in Nakuru, Laikipia, Nyandarua, Uasin Gishu and Trans- Nozia in what was traditionally Maasiland robbed the Maasi of grazing land thereby constraining their economic activities. Large scale land alienation in Kikuyuland engendered squatter farming among the Kikuyu, especially in white settled areas in the Rift Valley. By 1918, 10% of the Kikuyu had become squatters. The Anti-Kikuyu crusade between the Kalenjin and the Maasai in contemporary Kenya has to be explained largely by this colonial heritage (Oyugi, 1998).

In Burundi the colonial resident governor Ryckmans recruited local collaborators among the Tutsi chiefs in 1932 arguing that the Batutsi were born to rule, that their mere appearance gave them considerable prestige over the inferior races that surrounded them, and their qualities and even their flaw dignify them even more (Ryckmans, 1933 cited by Twagiramutara, 1998). Thus power struggles under Belgian trusteeship were not merely between the Tutsi and Hutu ethnic groups as was the case in Rwanda, but between groups of princes (Ganwa) and those most identified both with the royal tradition and popular sentiment (Rutake and Gahama, 1998).

Contemporary ethnic conflicts in Africa therefore arise from a crisis of legitimacy of the state, its institutions and their political incumbents, which resulted from the way the African state was constructed through European expansionist violence, manipulation of pre-existing differences, administrative policies of divide and rule and economic policies that further fractured the colonial entity. These policies in Uganda not only undermined the legitimacy of the state, but also impeded the emergence of nationalism and generated ethnic, religious and regional divisions that were to contribute in later years to instability and political violence (Otunnu and Laloyo).

In colonial times, another significant source of division in Africa was the manipulation of religious affiliation since the arrival of Islam, Protestantism and Catholicism. In Uganda for instance, these religious groups engaged in ferocious conflicts for dominance, and the Protestant faction emerged victorious after the Imperial British East Africa Company intervened in their favour. Anglicans were too

late to dominate the top positions in the civil service, and this structural inequality was maintained after the colonial era. Thus religious beliefs and political party affiliations became entangled (Ibid).

Religious and ethnic coincidences were manipulated during the various colonial processes which sought hegemony using these differences. In the Sudan for example, the Mahdi declared a jihad and set out to spread Islam not only in the north but also as in the south, aggravating southern tribes who were mainly animist and did not embrace Islam. Consequently, the southern tribes supported the British against the Mahdists in the battle of Omdurman in 1898. In 1899 Britain and Egypt established a joint condominium regime as part of an effort to divide the north from strengthened south. The southern region also promulgated a 'Permit to Trade Order' which sought to exclude the Egyptian, northern Sudanese and other Muslims from trading in and with the southerners, but encouraged southerner's to trade with the East Africans and Christian traders from Greece and Syria. In 1947, the British proposed a legislative assembly to unify the north and the south, based on the perception of an absence of political structures in the south and the need to secure the rights of the south to manage their affairs and resources. Similarly, the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement in 1953 that granted self-government to Sudan did not include participation by the south. Marginalization of the south in the independence process thus continued (Suliman, 1997).

Ethnic conflicts in the Ugandan colonial state were also exacerbated by the partition of the country into economic zones. For example, while a large portion of the territory south of Lake Kyoga was designated as cash crop growing and industrial zones, the territory north of Lake Kyoga was designated as a labour reserve. This partition, which was not dictated by development potentials, led to economic disparities between the south and the north. The fragmentation of the society was compounded by the economic-cum-administrative policy that left the civil service largely in the hands of Baganda and the army largely in the hands of the Acholi and other northern ethnic groups. These policies also widened the gulf between the socio-political south and the socio-political north. This was further sustained by the administrative policy that relied on the Baganda as colonial agents in other parts of the country. The policy of divide and rule, which rested on so-called 'indirect rule', led to widespread anti-Buganda sentiment (Otunnu and Laloyo).

In general the ethnic policy of the colonial administration, consisted of assigning groups to territories within rigid borders, on the basis of the so called ethnic-maps; accentuating cleavages and other minor differences between various cultural entities, and creating antagonism between the African communities

of diverse origins (Ibid) just as between the indigenous and the recent arrivals, agents or otherwise of the colonial administration.

Colonial authorities in Africa resisted in many instances the introduction of lingua francae based on given dominant languages as they feared this would counter their divide and rule tactic. For example in Malawi, in 1918 an ideological core of history and chiefly authority, partially coalesced into a regional movement that was defined administration's junior officers resurrected the old idea that Nyanja should be made the official language of the country and taught in all its schools.

“... since ... Nyanja, or its dialectal variants, Mang'anja and Chewa, were spoken by a majority of the country's people governor, Sir George Smith, rejected this because it would tend to merge the various tribes in the Protectorate at a greater rate than at present, and this was undesirable. One of the chief safeguards against any combined rising is the individualism of the various tribes, and with a small and scattered white population. Instead: ... The north, the language that was granted official status was Tumbuka, and school texts issued were in the Tumbuka language, even though, for the Ngoni, it was their adopted language (Vail and White, 1989).

One critical area of colonial fostering of ethnic and race identity and conflict arose from the emergence of mixed race Africans, whose attributes were manipulated by white settlers and immigrants.

“For over a hundred years attempts have been made to engineer socially a Coloured political alliance with the ruling white parties. For instance, the Constitutional proposals which South African whites adopted in 1983 attempted to reconstitute a distinct 'Coloured' identity in South Africa, fuelling intense ideological and political conflict over the content of Coloured identity. Attempts by the state and ruling class in South Africa to sponsor the development of a client Coloured class have their origin in the endeavours of the colonial administrations to deflect opposition based on mass resistance by the colonized people” (Goldin, 1989).

3.2 Colonial legacy: Indirect rule and settlerism

In some countries physical spatial re-ordering of villages and family was used by the colonialists to consolidate ethnic power structures of their choice, and a framework within which taxes could be collected, migration regulated and supported land allocation strategies which suited their interests. In Malawi for example, during the 1910 period,

“.... 'Villages' for Yao headmen had to be created from the ethnic soup ... [this because]... houses were 'scattered in twos and threes all about the place', making it difficult to collect taxes and to keep good order generally. The British ordered that houses be 'concentrated' into groups of no fewer than twenty. Many thousands of people had to be relocated, and it was impossible to join four adjacent settlements and appoint a headman without political trouble. The majority of those most directly affected by hut concentration were Nguru, for the power of the newly appointed Yao village headmen to allocate land put all immigrants firmly in their power.” (Vail and White, 1989).

Chiefly control over land effectively made Nguru labour available to the Yao chiefs and headmen on *akapolo* ('slave') terms, just as it had been made available to the European planters through the *thangata* system. This government-sponsored political differentiation between Yao chiefs and Nguru commoners also had a clear economic parallel. By April 1916, exactly one year after village consolidation had begun; tobacco was being cultivated as a cash crop (Vail and White, 1989).

Without schools to propagate notions of ethnic identity among the young at the village level, ethnic ideologies remained weak, largely restricted to the chiefly elite and their supporters and possessing little popular force. Yet colonial education in mission schools fomented resistance to these colonial policies, among the educated, who felt they were blocked from opportunities, which their education had prepared them for, and they demanded the rapid Africanization of the bureaucracy to pay-off the years of educational investment (Ibid). However, in Malawi for example, the majority of people in the south used politics to end the hated *thangata* system (forced labour) and unequal access to land.

As we discuss later these colonial ethnic policies and the evolution of political and socio-economic dominance by some races and ethnic groups, was reinforced and exacerbated during the post colonial era, leading to extreme cases of conflict, notably included Kenya, Guinea-Bissau, Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa where anti-colonial armed conflict was intense.

4.0 Identity and socio-economic dominance: Trends and strategies

This section identifies the way in which dominant ethnic groups organize themselves and mobilize identity towards accumulating power and resources. It assesses the strategies used to gain and defend dominance while maintaining the marginalisation and acquiescence of the weaker groups. The various dimensions used to mobilize dominance include gaining state power, resource accumulation and external frameworks of resource and power building. The chapter assesses the existing literature to examine how ethnic and racial mobilization has been undertaken in a selected group of case study countries, focusing on the accumulation of power and socio-economic resources.

The analysis is shaped by our view that the African state has played an important role in shaping “primitive accumulation” in general and access to socio-economic resources in particular, and that access to political power is key to dominance given the prior absence of an existing bourgeoisie less dependent on state resources. Such a view of the state is situated within the context of colonial and neo-colonial class formation processes and extroverted economic structures. The role of internal and external sources of power and resource accumulation will thus also be treated brief as essential to our attempt to explain processes of building socio-economic dominance.

Effort was made to present and analyze the patterns of selected resource distributions within sub-Saharan Africa so as to explore their co-incidence with ethnicity and race using data collated from numerous sources. Such data included: resource and power differential indices, critical to socio-economic dominance, such as land and natural resource endowments/allocations, employment and

educational status and political position. Numerous sources of data on these indicators of ethnic and race shares of socio-economic resources were sought, but data tends to be incomplete for many countries and inconsistencies abound, and most data is not systematically disaggregated on ethnic or race lines. Scattered references to the resource dominance of particular ethnic groups are found in varied sources, and these are collated and used to discern patterns of dominance. This suggests that only a few case studies of extreme cases of ethnic/race political and socio-economic dominance, and related conflicts can be used (for now) to develop the core arguments of this paper.

4.1 Strategies for accumulation of power

The strategies used in Africa over time to mobilise state power as a tool of patronage or resource allocation for socio-economic dominance, or to countervail this have been varied and changing. In many cases a combination of these were used overtime. These range from the creation of one party systems, contrived multi-partyism, federalism or provincialism, military rule, regional associations of various focus, and direct violence to eliminate opponents. Some case examples of this are discussed below.

For about four decades since the 1950's, the predominant political framework which was utilized in Africa to mobilize the concentration of power on ethnic lines, as well as in some cases to create scope for ethnic balancing, was the *de facto* and *de jure* creation of the one party political system. Most countries adopted this approach, while a few used variants of it, such as the "no party" system (e.g. Uganda, Swaziland), or the military regime which is somewhat of a no political organisation system. One of the pioneers in these trends was Ghana, where:

“... Kwame Nkrumah and his party Convention Peoples Party Government ... discouraged ethnic and regional party politics in favour of national integration and nationalism mainly through the strategy of one party state governance from 1964 (Agyman, 1998).

This approach however could not contain ethnic politics, even though the distribution of cabinet positions between 1952 and 1965 had produced a fair balance of ethnic representation in the national political leadership (Table 4-1). Instead the Asante and Ewe leadership accused Nkrumah of being "tribalistic" and demanded either federalism (the Asante) or Secession (Agyman, 1998).

Table 4-1: Ethnic Composition of Nkrumah's Cabinet: 1952-1965

	Fanti	Nzima	Ashanti	Other Akans	Ewe	Ga	Guan	North groups
1952	1	1	1	0	1	2	2	1
1954	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1
1956	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	2
1965	2	3	3	3	0	1	2	3

Source: Smock D. Rand Smock A.C, 1974, The Politics of Pluralism: Comparative Study of Lebanon and Ghana, Elsevier

The dismantling of regional assemblies which Nkrumah saw as fostering ethnic conflicts, was intended to compel national integration, but instead led to Nkrumah's overthrow in 1966 by the military. This brought an alliance of the Ewes and Akans into power, leading to a cycle of ethnic competition for state power through the military, based on further coups and counter *coups*. For instance:

“the Ewe/Akan alliance in the military collapsed when General Kotoka, an Ewe in the military regime was killed in a coup led by young Akan officers, paving the way for Ashante hegemony through Lt. General Afrifa who headed the regime until 1969, leading to election of an Ashanti/Brong Ahafo based political party led by Busia. In practice the creation of an overtly ethnically based government led to significantly increased ethnic animosity between Akans (especially Ashanti/Brong Ahafo) on the one hand and Ewes on the other. Thus the NAL the opposition party workers and supporters, who invariably were Ewes, in the Akan areas were regularly harassed” (Agyman, 1998).

According to Kofi Nyidevu Awoonor, (1990),

“This was the first time the political divide had surfaced on rigid lines of ethnic origin” and consequently, whatever ideological differences or similarities existed between the parties before, now became blurred and submerged in the ethnic divide (Ibid).

In the case of Ivory Coast, the ruling party (PDCI) used

“... ethnicity to consolidate its base and foundation, [although] there was no explicit and official ethnic policy [the] political discourse and ... composition of political institutions shows that ethnicity has been critical, and [as] the composition off the government since about 1980 seems to be guided by the concern for ethnic and regional balance” (Goninn, 1998).

Given that the post-colonial regime inherited in Africa has tended to be a fractured state, various attempts have been made to build inter-party alliances as a means of manipulating power. In Uganda at independence for instance Milton Obote responded to this crisis of legitimacy by forming an alliance between his political party, the Uganda People's Congress (UPC) and the Buganda monarchy party (Kabaka Yekka), with him becoming the Executive Prime Minister and Kabaka Mutesa II as the President and Head of State (Otunnu and Laloyo). However, the alliance collapsed over a conflict over land (the ‘lost counties’) between the Bunyoro and Buganda, and thus led to widespread violence in Buganda, the detention of five government ministers from the Bantu region, dismissal of the President and Vice President, the exiling of Mutesa and suspension of the 1962 constitution and the imposition of a state of emergency in Buganda, etc (Ibid). In the end, some Bantu-speaking groups perceived this struggle for legitimacy and power as a conflict between the Bantu in the south and the non-Bantu (Nilotic) in the north (Ibid). The cycle of authoritarian ethnically structured rule escalated in 1971, when Amin seized power, disarmed the Acholi and Langi soldiers who constituted the backbone of the army and subsequently killed many of them, including many highly educated and influential members of other ethnic groups. To protect his regime in a new ethnic balancing tactic, Amin recruited new soldiers from West Nile and appointed prominent Bantu to important positions in his government, and largely

maintained the dominance of southerners in the civil service and commerce, while the northerners largely controlled the government and army (Otunnu and Laloyo).

When political organisation on ethnic lines is taken to the extreme, the unit of mobilisation can become focused on the clan. This was evident in Somali where all clans are involved in the Somali conflict (the Hawiye, Darod, Isaq, Dir, Rahanweyn and the others) including almost all the minority groups, each with its own faction or as part of a coalition of factions (Farah; Hussein and Lind, 2002). Some clan groups have dominated the others, forcing the oppressed to look for and use any other means to survive in lawless Somalia, thus making each and every clan an actor in the conflict (Ibid).

Since the transition to independence, the politicization of ethnicity and struggles for state power in Africa by various ethnic polities has been based on the interchanging demands for the centralization and decentralization of state structures and power, including demands for succession. Decentralization demands took various forms, from demands for federalism and the devolution of power to regional authorities, to the extreme cases of demands for secession (e.g. Biafra in Nigeria, Katanga in DRC).

For example, competing demands made by KANU and other political parties, many of which had clear ethno-regional dimensions, were for centralization and decentralization respectively to be specified in the independence constitution. This reflected differences of interest between the “majority” and ‘minority’ tribes. From then on general election results in Kenya reveal ethnically determined voting, with blatant ethno-regionally patterns, albeit coloured by some divisions among minority groups which could not unite against the ruling party (Oyugi, 1998). For example, in 1992

“... Kikuyu-led parties which fielded credible presidential candidates (FORD Asili and the democratic party) swept all seats in Kikuyu land, while the Luo led party dominated in Luoland; the Kalenjin led KANU swept all the seats in Kalenji land” (Ibid).

The over centralization of state power to counteract the dispersal of state resources to various ethnic groups via decentralized local government has become a key mobilisation strategy over time. For example in Liberia, when the government of president Tubman

“... set out in 1944 to integrate the administration of the core (African-Liberian) and peripheral (indigenous) parts of Liberia by extending the county system to replace the erstwhile indirect provincial administration in the hinterland territories, which involved the expansion of infrastructural and educational facilities, the indigenous people began to question the right of a minority to monopolize power and to challenge Americo-Liberians’ claims to power” (Osaghe, 1998).

Federalism and Regional autonomy

A critical question therefore is the extent to which decolonization and the belated emergence of democratic movements, in the context of constitutionalism and multi-party elections have encouraged nation-state governance systems that are inclusive and allow for power-sharing in the multi-ethnic and regionally differentiated African states. Indeed it has been argued that in Africa today, the trend towards political democracy has had the unexpected consequence of heightening ethnic and other forms of social tensions, especially in countries, such as Ethiopia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where tensions have easily spilled over into neighboring states (Keller, 2002). Why for instance has federalism or improved regional autonomy and decentralized governance not been adopted in the new democratization processes?

Instead it has been argued that in the “New World Order” era there has been a resurgence of nationalism among large ethnic groups which are incorporated into multi-ethnic states (Keller and Rothchild, 1996; Lake and Rothchild, 1998 cited by Keller, 2002). Even where the intensity of ethnic nationalism may be low (e.g. Kenya), ethnicity has tended to displace certain ethnic groups from the state or other groups have tended to purge them from regions they have inhabited for generations (Ibid). Thus the assimilation approach has not to work in situations where integration means hegemonic control according to the cultural preferences of the ruling ethnic group (Ibid), especially in countries such as Sudan and Ethiopia. The other option for addressing ethnic differences in governance systems such as partition or secession have also been unsuccessful but are actively considered in Somalia (Ogaden 1977-78); the Oromo in Ethiopia today; in Sudan (north-south).

Lake and Rothchild (1998) cited by Keller (2002) identify four main trust-building options for national leaders: 1) demonstration of respect for all groups and their cultures; 2) formal or informal power sharing; 3) elections according to rules that insure either power sharing or the minimal representation of all ethnic groups in national politics; and 4) federalism or regional autonomy. African leaders are increasingly using these strategies, as opposed to hegemonic control, for long-term ethnic conflict management strategy (Ibid). Power sharing strategies are said to becoming increasingly popular in Africa (Keller, 2002), with the most recent experiments being in Burundi, Djibouti, and South Africa, where according to (Shezi, 1995 cited by Keller, 2002), conscious attempts were made to assure some ethnic groups that they had group representation at the level of national government.

However most political leaders in Africa exhibit only tentative commitment to power sharing through concern for social equity among different ethnic groups. In Ethiopia, for example, while the government

has policies which respect all the country's nationalities and the constitution calls for the creation of ethnically based states that possess considerable autonomy, actual politics is structured such that the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front dominates at all levels (Keller, 2002). South Africa, where all-race, multi-party elections obtain, using proportional representation rules, so far does not have one party with an absolute majority (Reynolds, 1994 cited by Keller, 2002), and has shared executive power by the appointment of the leaders of other parties who did well in the elections to significant cabinet posts.

Federation and regional autonomy approaches to building trust among ethnic groups have not been adopted as the preference is for strong provincial government. In Sudan regional autonomy strategy failed because of the hegemonic project of the Islamic fundamentalists. Nigeria has been relatively more successful at making federalism work in the wake of the Biafran Civil War since 1979, and today Nigeria has thirty-one states, intended to avoid future ethno-regional conflict (Keller, 2002). So far there have been no further serious threats to the maintenance of Nigeria's national boundaries (Ibid), perhaps because of the commitment of its leadership and a relatively transparent federal system of allocation.

Thus only when the indigenes became Liberian and citizens did they protest the injustices of their exclusion from state power and sought redress (Ibid).

Ethnic mobilisation through political organisations tends to be systematically structured around the horizontal and vertical (and spatial) units of political parties. In Cote d'Ivoire political organisation focuses on

“... basic cells that are the district committees ... which were indeed a paradox compared to the ideal of the single party, [and] the building of national unity. In the cities the party was organized on ethnic and tribal bases, thus reproducing the different ethnic components of the country at the level of the cities. In the cities, the mayors always call individuals on the basis of tribe to tribe, to collect their voters cards. Although this system was criticized by many militants as encouraging tribalism to the detriment of national integration, the ethnic structure was maintained up to 1986. ... Ethnic reflexes still persist as the new political elite play the ethnic trump card to the fullest for their own benefit” (Goninn, 1998).

Another common framework used for mobilizing ethnicity, within a multi-party system besides formal political parties, are ethno-regional civic associations or organisations, which claim to promote local development and/or resistance to inequity, or to promote the interests of professionals and the elite. In Ivory Coast for instance, due to the open policy of the French Popular Front Government, several regional associations of a truly political nature came into being (Ibid). These regionalist tendencies however also demonstrated the will of urbanites to transcend ethnic cleavages sponsored by the colonial

administration (Ibid). For, other class and market based process of social differentiation, sometimes deliberately manipulated by colonial and settler regimes, erected regional disparities which became mobilised to evoke ethnic sentiment.

Perhaps one of the most extreme cases of the use of ethno-regional associations to mobilize power can be found in the long drawn experience of the Zulu in South Africa.

“The significance of Zulu ethnic associations and cultural nationalism was that it diffused class-based organization and fractured national movements ...” Factionalism has characterized Natal political organization, where there were two branches of the African National Congress, one belonging to the national organization, and the other a virtually autonomous Natal variant Similarly, the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union Yase Natal was one of the first of many fragments to break off from the national Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU), and from the outset its activities were distinguished by the strong infusion of Zulu ethnic consciousness. In the 1920s the creation of the first Inkatha movement was explicitly seen as a counter to more radical tendencies and was envisaged by both the South African state and the black middle class as a counter to the ICU and to 'Bolshevik' propaganda in the countryside. It was also hoped that the Natal offshoot of the Natal Bantu Teachers' Organization, the Zulu Cultural Society, would play a similar conservative role in the 1930s and 1940s. More recently, the second Inkatha movement has been seen by many whites as the answer to more radical forms of politics, whether nationalist or more overtly class-based” (Marks, 1989).

Yet, the

“Zulu ethnic movement ... [was] a response to the immense social dislocations which resulted from capitalist development in South Africa. As increasing numbers of people were pushed into the towns in search of work, social relations in the countryside were transformed and whole communities disrupted. The cheap labour system and the racist ideology which accompanied South Africa's industrialization exacerbated the tensions” (Ibid).

One political strategy frequently used to obtain and maintain political power on the basis of ethnicisation has been to declare the authenticity of the culture of the country as being derived from the culture of the ethnic group in power, and to use its language and culture, as well as education to reinforce its hegemony. This happened in Malawi where the Chewa in the 1970's were anointed the “original” ethnic group (Vail and White, 1989), and using this ideological tool as justification, leadership purges in the state and the ruling party followed. This post colonial ethnic mobilisation effort was in fact mainly built around language policy, which had been earlier used in reverse to foment ethnic division to maintain colonial political power. For example,

“... in mid-1968, Tumbuka [language], the symbol of northern regionalism since the early 1930s, was abolished as an official language and Chewa was made the sole national language. No longer could Tumbuka be used in the press or on the radio, [leading to] ... resentment [in] the Northern Region. The Parliamentary Secretary for Education announced that all school-children who failed their examination in the now-required courses in Chewa would have to re-sit all their examinations” (Ibid).

The use of ethnic and race based political parties has been common in Africa. The growth of race based political parties was for long the main strategy used to mobilize political and socio-economic dominance or preferential access to privileges and power, in southern Africa. For example in South Africa, when

“... coloureds, who had been led to believe that by disassociating themselves from the African population and [that] by supporting white parties they would be spared the political and economic humiliation that Africans were suffering, did not receive the [expected scope of] benefits equal to whites, their intellectuals abandoned white politics and formed specifically coloured political organizations” (Goldin, 1989).

The formation and maintenance of ethnic identity and cohesion in furtherance of the concentration of power, has also been pursued through various social and symbolic processes. For example,

“in Liberia the Americo-Liberians tended to paper over their differences in pursuance of collective security, and not only sought to monopolize power, but also to project a ‘superior’ class symbol: big luxurious cars and houses western dressing, education, Christianity, Masonic fraternities and Anglo-Saxon names” (Jones, 1962).

Where possible, they segregated themselves from the natives in churches, urban neighbourhoods and meetings (Ibid).

Where non-violent means failed to mobilise power violence was frequently the resort. The mobilisation of ethnically structured violence to win elections, prevent voting, weak political parties and even to decimate opponents (through their killing and exiling into refuge) has been used in many African countries.

For example, the 1992 Kenya elections outcome was grounded in violent strategies of maintaining power in which politicians manipulated long-standing, but latent, inter-ethnic disputes over land, towards physical fight (see box 4-1). In the second multiparty elections in Kenya a new, more complex and catastrophic wave of ethnic violence evolved around agitation for a comprehensive constitutional review process in 1997. When non-ruling constituencies posed the clarion call "No reforms, No Elections," which the threatened ruling party, KANU reacted by using state power and vigilante groups, whose violence rocked Kenya's urban areas as well as the countryside. KANU again won the second multi-party general elections of December 1997, but these clashes continue (Ibid).

Box 4-1:

In 1991, “ethnic/land” clashes, which at their peak affected three of the eight provinces (Rift Valley, Nyanza, Western) and twenty out of the sixty-two Kenya's districts, erupted in Mteitei farm, Nandi district, Rift Valley Province. By November 1993, over 1,500 people had been killed and more than 300,000 displaced. Thousands of people were displaced thus not able to cast their ballot. Violence continued after elections in such districts that were known to be pro-opposition as Nandi, Kericho, West Pokot, Trans-Nzioa, Kisumu, Kakamega, Bungoma, Nakuru and Uashin Gishu. The clashes served to frighten and intimidate non-Kalenjin ethnic groups (that presented a greater threat to the ruling elite of losing parliamentary seats and subsequent control of parliament and state power). Large numbers of Non-Kalenjin ethnic groups were displaced from the Rift Valley before the elections.

The military coup (violent or “bloodless”) and armed action have also been a key instrument for mobilizing ethnic dominance and ethnic balancing at the take over of power. For instance, in Burundi after independence in 1965, a political crisis emerged after the assassination of the Hutu leader, Pierre Ngendandumwe, turbulent legislative elections and an abortive coup against the monarchy by Hutu officers of the army and gendarmerie. This together with the devaluation of the Burundi Franc in 1964 and the disruption of the Economic Community with Rwanda generated a cycle of violent ‘ethnic’ conflict, which was generally latent. This was escalated when several organizations of Hutu people formed in 1980, aware of their numerical superiority, perpetuated the cycle of attacking and killing Tutsis, with the army composed mainly of Tutsis since 1972, intervening and repressing Hutus (Rutake and Gahama, 1998). The massacre of Tutsi by Hutu, who were armed with machetes, together with the blind repression meted out by the army to the insurgents gave rise to a hecatomb that was described by many as Hutu genocide. The tragic events of 1969 and 1972 occurred during a period which was characterized by a political regime weakened by intrigue and the monopolization of power by a group of individuals from the same Tutsi group and from the same region of Burundi. The inability of the legal system to conclusively investigate and punish perpetrators found guilty of the violence strengthened the feeling that there was a plot to eliminate the Hutu and to protect the Tutsi (Ibid).

While, the Hutu outnumber the Tutsi (six to one), the Tutsis have a significant fear of their safety if the Hutus take power, while the Hutus, who have historically been oppressed politically, socially, and even academically, want their fair share of the power. In June of 1993 in the Burundi election for instance, there were charges of ethnically-biased voting, but Ndadaye, the first civilian Hutu president dismissed these charges with reference to the demographic make up. On July 10, 1993, Ndadaye, on assuming the presidency, appointed to his administration members of his party, (Frodo), as well as members of the previous ruling party (UPRONA), and his prime minister was a female Tutsi, in search of ethnic balancing. This electoral approach to power was cut short by the Tutsi majority army led coup, which generated 700,000 refugees, and the sealing of the borders (Nomura, Davnie, Formari, Hasler and Nomura, 1996). Various power sharing accords have failed since then and the Hutus have felt that they weren't getting a fair share of power, while the Tutsis who felt that their traditional power base was threatened, and continue to dominant the army and politics, while discouraging active Hutu involvement in government (Nomura; Davnie; Formari and Hasler 1996).

The use of violence and the related exiling of opponents has also been an important strategy used to exclude some groups on ethnic and racial grounds in Rwanda. For example, since 1991, civil war between the government and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) has resulted in tens of thousands of

deaths and the displacement of more than 2 million people (well over one-third of the population), many of whom are refugees in neighbouring countries. The announced restrictions on the people of Tutsi descent—who had lived in the neighbouring DRC for generations—acted as a major trigger and provided the opportunity to recruit an armed rebel movement that galvanized the Tutsis and other groups in opposition to Mobutu’s unpopular government in Kinshasa (Moyroud and Katunga, 2002).

The “scapegoating” and targeting of particular ethnic groups in times of political conflict or competition has not been uncommon. In Rwanda for instance

“... each time certain groups of individuals or agents of certain social fractions developed different mechanisms to challenge government, the Tutsi minority, in accordance with the models and practices culturally considered as principal references (as in 1963, 1966, 1973, 1990-93) and the tendencies geopolitically imposed by the dominant fraction of politicians that have ruled since independence, served as targets of retaliation and played the role of scapegoats” (Twagiramutara, 1998).

The mobilisation of ethnicity to gain power in post-colonial times has tended to find infinitesimal opportunity as multiple differences of dialect beyond established ethnic categorisations gain currency as tools of political manipulation. In Zimbabwe for example, the white ruling class had first tried to

“... divide the Ndebeles and Shonas by inciting tribalism and magnify[ing] their tribal differences [and then] to divide the Shonas themselves [by] break[ing] them into constituent clans—the Manyikas, Makaranga, Mazezuru, Makorekore, etc. It was then feared that for instance by “The *Zimbabwe Star* feared good-for-nothing megalomaniac so-called [sic African] leaders who cannot impress anybody [sic-would] resort to tribalism as an instrument for manufacturing support” (Ranger, 1989).

In this way, ethnic competition for state power in Africa during the 20th century has been the principal means for building socio-economic dominance.

4.2 Ethnicity as vehicle for accumulation of wealth

Besides the direct control of political power, socio-economic dominance has arisen from wider political economic processes in which ethnicity has tended to be co-opted, if not institutionalised. A major fulcrum around which most strategies to mobilize ethnic socio-economic and race dominance have been based in Africa has been around attempts to resolve Africa’s agrarian question. The dilemma of transforming (read “modernizing”) agriculture and expanding the related productive base of the economy is historically traceable to the inability of colonial capitalism to transform pre-capitalist relations of production, and the adoption of a development strategy which increasingly sought to bypass the African peasantry (Beckman, 1984). This strategy informed class formation processes focused on developing indigenous agrarian and commercial capitalists at the expense of the peasantry in general, through harnessing alliances of state and capital (domestic and foreign).

For instance, efforts to transform agriculture in Nigeria since the mid 1970s, in collaboration with the World Bank using Agricultural Development Projects (Egwu, 1998) focused on pockets of the elite in various regional enclaves, to the exclusion of some ethno-regional populations in particular, and the remote peasant social formations in general. Regional variations in natural resource and land endowments accompanied by the regional concentration of infrastructures and social services fermented an unequal ethnic distribution of socio-economic opportunity and exclusion. This provided ideological grounds for the evoking of ethnic motivations and deterministic thought in explaining these patterns of inclusion and exclusion, and the ethnicisation of inequalities which to a larger degree are based upon mainly local class based interest in alliance with external capital.

Initial structural shifts in the livelihoods and occupations of Africans, generated both during colonial and post-colonial periods, arose from fundamental economic and resource policy interventions centred on land expropriation, the enclosure of mining and regional enclaves and the creation of corridors of transport infrastructures, which had regional dimensions that served to segment opportunity along the geographic distribution of ethnic groups.

For a long time most of the ethnic groupings in Africa had remained relatively introverted around their own economic, sociological and political systems, albeit interacting through long distance trade (Agyman, 1998). The expansion of colonial era trade however led to attempts by coastal inhabitants in West Africa in particular to mobilize themselves as privileged intermediaries between the Europeans and the African clientele of the hinterland (Ibid). This led to a social differentiation of an ethno-regional character and to conflict between the ethnic communities in towns where individuals of different origins met, as well as between coastal and northern regions. Thus the West African coast divided the southern groups from northern savanna/pastoralist social formations. In Kenya where colonial land alienation deprived mainly the Kikuyu, some of them instead of opting for squatter settlement, became petty traders, and seeking new and better markets, spread throughout the country, especially in new urban centres and along the railway lines. This ethnic dispersal into business influence attracted resentment from local communities leading to the crystallisation of ethnicity (Peacenet-Kenya, 2001).

Racially based differentiation of economic power has coupled or inter-mixed with such ethno-regional wealth differentiation to promote socio-economic dominance and conflict. For example, in 1969 the Asian population in Uganda of about 70,000, (officially considered foreigners despite the fact that more

than 50% of them had been born in Uganda) had gained control of the retail and wholesale trade, cotton ginning, coffee and sugar processing, and other segments of commerce. President Amin deported most Asians in 1972 and only a few returned to Uganda in the 1980s to claim compensation for their expropriated land, buildings, factories, and estates. In 1989 the Asian population in Uganda was estimated at only about 10,000 (Otunnu and Laloyo).

4.2.1 Education, employment and capital formation

Access to education became a focus of ethnic based struggles for mobility, and competition for jobs on ethnic lines was aggravated by the education policies of colonial authorities. Missionary education was largely concentrated among the sedentary agricultural societies, which focused opportunity mainly on the Kikuyu, Luo, and Luhya lands, to the exclusion of pastoralists, notably the Maasai. Since formal education became the main basis of access to white-collar jobs, the historically favoured ethnic groups had mobilized better social capital to compete in the job market, well beyond the colonial period and in those urban centres dominated by some ethnic groups (Ibid).

Education

Education has been systematically mobilized in some countries to allocate advantage to dominant ethnic groups. An extreme example of this was in Malawi, where:

“... the establishment of the Malawi Examinations Board to replace the Cambridge Overseas Examination was followed by a change in examination grading policy which required both northerners and southerners to obtain considerably higher grades in their school-leaving examinations than those in the Central Region if they were to qualify for places in the secondary schools. While economic opportunities were channelled to the people of the Central Region, school fees throughout the country were raised considerably, making access to education in the north and the south comparatively more difficult. The University of Malawi, the source of future bureaucrats and teachers, was systematically purged of its non-Chewa administrators and faculty in the early 1970s as part of an attempt to make it a secure seat for the elaboration of a Chewa ethos by loyal Chewa-speakers. Finally, to remove non-Chewa officers from the civil service, a mandatory retirement age of fifty was imposed and large numbers of northerners and southerners thereby retired. Non-Chewa-speaking northerners and southerners were also removed from other positions of authority through widespread and arbitrary detentions, especially between 1973 and 1976” (Vail and White, 1989).

Ethno-regional inequality in educational services provision has had far reaching socio-economic effects in Africa. For instance in the southern regions of Malawi, where the migrant labour system was imposed, fewer schools were developed, while the north had more access to missionary education. This “...curtail[ed]... opportunities for raising capital through labour migrancy abroad [and] locked southerners firmly into continuing abject poverty. School fees are beyond the means of most villagers, and they ... abandoned the belief in education as a route [out of] poverty” (Vail and White, 1989).

In South Africa apartheid policy relegated the education of Coloured children

“... to missionaries and other private benefactors. In 1883 the enrolment at mission schools was 38,000, of whom fewer than 6000 were white. Their ...restriction to the inferior mission schools ... contributed to the forging of Coloured identity, as pupils and teachers came to recognize their common exclusion and mobilized to increase their claim on the state system” (Goldin, 1989).

Systematic discrimination by race in education provision in settler Africa, was guided by separate African education policy, which was

“... based on trusteeship and segregation. [and] was not supposed to drain government resources away from white education. The number of schools for blacks increased during the 1960s, but their curriculum was designed to prepare children for menial jobs. Per-capita government spending on black education slipped to one-tenth of spending on whites in the 1970s. Black schools had inferior facilities, teachers, and textbooks” (I upinfo, 2000).

However when the South African government in the mid-1970's enforced its most extreme discriminatory Bantu education system, and the

“... regulation requiring that one-half of all high-school classes must be taught in Afrikaans” (Ibid), student demonstrations led to the deaths of 575 people, 134 of whom were under eighteen, and the abandonment of schools by many (Ibid).

The result of racial discrimination in South Africa as (1 upinfo, 2000) the quote shows:

“Teacher: pupil ratios in primary schools averaged 1:18 in white schools, 1:24 in Asian schools, and 1:27 in coloured schools, and 1:39 in black schools. Moreover, whereas 96 percent of all teachers in white schools had teaching certificates, only 15 percent of teachers in black schools were certified. Secondary-school pass rates for black pupils in the nationwide, standardized high-school graduation exams were less than one-half the pass rate for whites.”

In absolute terms educational discrimination by race in South Africa was by 1995 as follows:

“The number of teachers in the regular primary and secondary schools was 344,083 of whom 226,900 were black. Of the white teachers, more than 60 percent were Afrikaners. Men teachers were paid substantially more than women; women's salaries averaged 83 percent of men's salaries for the same job with equal qualifications” (Ibid).

But even in independent Africa unequal access to education on ethnic grounds had emerged. The provincial distribution of schools in most countries is frequently skewed in favour of urban centers, which in turn may be predominantly populated by given ethnic groups, leading to specific patterns of socio-economic dominance to access and lead to knock on effect such as differential access to employment. In Zimbabwe this is the effect of the pull around Harare, which other ethnic groups (Karanga and Ndebele) have alleged to be a deliberate state policy of ethnic dominance building (Table 4-2).

Employment and occupational differentiation

One of the mechanisms through which ethnicity becomes an instrument of dominance and exclusion, is the generation of perceived inferiority stereotypes which reinforce occupational segregation. For instance in Zambia,

“The Luvale in particular ... developed an urban reputation as night soil carriers and menial workers, [as they gained]... very lowly ethnic identifications in town. [This]... ethnic identification was ... an idiom used in the

broader political economy of the urban centres in the competition for better jobs... That perceived low ethnic status was a hindrance to finding jobs ...” (Papstein, 1989).

On the other hand

“... by 1964, the time of Zambian independence, certain ethnically defined groups had come to dominate the choice positions within certain sectors of the economy. The Bemba, for example, had achieved this in the mining sector ... For decades such preferences were 'justified' or accepted... [While]... most Upper Zambebian people held relatively unskilled positions, [and] the possibilities for rising in the system were limited. [Meanwhile]... within contemporary Zambian society certain ethnic groups or 'tribes' have larger representation in certain government departments or parastatals than their absolute numbers would permit in a random selection of qualified personnel” (Papstein, 1989).

Table 4-2: Zimbabwe Number of Primary and Secondary Schools by Region, 2001

Region	Govt primary	Non-Govt primary	Govt secondary	Non-Govt secondary	Primary Total	Secondary Total
Manicaland	16	769	18	233	785	251
Mashonaland Central	6	363	11	101	369	112
Mashonaland East	11	569	13	229	580	242
Mashonaland West	32	449	18	146	481	164
Matabeleland North	71	501	39	99	572	138
Matabeleland South	10	430	10	107	440	117
Midlands	29	620	29	201	649	230
Masvingo	6	673	16	223	679	239
Harare	110	93	54	23	199	77
Total 2001	291	4467	208	1362	4 758	1 570

Source: Central Statistical Office, 2003

The manipulation of ethnicity around discriminatory employment opportunity has always been based on the foundation of the “tribe” and the use of rural areas as the filter for preferential allocation of resources and opportunity in urban areas as well.

“The colonial state [in Zambia, for instance] had encouraged the creation of tribal groups in the rural areas and [used] these identities ... within the urban industrial economy as well, reinforcing the rural [ethnic] perceptions. [While]... rural peoples had to identify themselves with a 'tribe' in order to 'fit in' and enjoy official legal recognition in their local district, ... the Pass System ... [was used to] ... allow only so many tribesmen to migrate to town... to identify and tacitly to separate workers according to their presumed abilities into such categories as the 'clever' Bemba or Lozi and the 'backward and wild' Luvale or Lamba” (Ibid).

This approach had also been elaborated on racial grounds in southern Africa, where discrimination against “Coloureds” did not mean that they lost their employment and wealth privileges over blacks.

Thus:

“At the same time the increasing distinction drawn between Coloureds and Africans and the exemption of Coloureds from certain of the restrictions endured by Africans undermined possible black ethnic solidarity. For many Coloured men and women there was simply too much to lose through identification with Africans” (Vail and White, 1989).

By 1902 occupational segregation by race shaped the development of coloured politics leading to the formation of the African Peoples' Organization (APO), who's founding President sought to extend Coloured education as a means to advance the participation of Coloureds in the ruling polity. This “... reflected their determination ... to secure for it's more skilled and petty bourgeois constituents some political and economic benefit.” However such race mobilisations was proscribed by class differences. “... unskilled (Coloured) men and women were not similarly motivated by a desire to challenge the

increasing racial exclusiveness of white trade unionists.” In recent times, the “... continued campaign for the advance of Coloured rights, using the tactics of discretionary collaboration ...” was challenged by some, “... especially the socialists committed to a non-racial society” (Ibid).

Moreover colonial authorities fostered ethnicity, through preferential and stereotypical job recruitment policies which favoured some ethnic groups for some occupations over others. For instance the recruitment of the armed forces, in Kenya, favoured the Kamba and the Kalenjin. Since the British considered, these ‘martial tribes’ (Oyugi, 1998). The Luo on the other hand enjoyed disproportionate representation in some state corporations, such as, the railways, and once dominant in given employment sectors nepotism expanded and perpetuated unequal employment opportunity for decades after independence (Ibid).

Socio-economic dominance and exclusion by ethnic grouping tends to be fostered by the exclusive control of virtually all economic privileges and opportunities by government, and more specifically by executive presidents, though patronage systems of power, which Sawyer (Osaghae, 1998) characterizes as ‘proprietaryship’, as well as the personalized nature of group struggles for power. In Liberia for example, personal rule was the mainstay of power right down to the Doe years (Ibid). All executive appointments, including those of the University of Liberia, were at the president’s disposal. There was no ‘formal distinction between political and non-political appointments, nor (was) there any formal provision for recruitment and promotion within government departments (Clapham, 1976) cited by Osaghae, (1998). This validates the thesis of Sklar (1967) that ethnicity becomes a mask for class privilege (ibid), a process where the selfish designs of members of the privileged class are couched in ethnic terms.

The struggle for state power breeds conflicts and exclusionary processes in precisely the sectors which directly contribute to the capacities of competing groups in this struggle, especially in fields such as education, commerce, employment, the armed forces and party politics. While the inherent dangers of ruling group monopoly over all privileges and benefits, have at times been addressed by ethnic balancing attempts in these sectors, in the medium term persistent inequalities sustain allegations of the domination of some ethnic groups, such as those levelled against the Krahn under Doe and certainly the Americo-Liberians before 1980 (Ibid).

The practice of “colour bar” or privilege in employment opportunity in Africa was most developed to its extreme of employment segregation in the settler colonies (South Africa, Rhodesia, Angola, and Namibia), leading to long term racially grounded bitterness and the search for radical approaches to its reversal. “The strategy not only favoured whites but those of mixed race (‘Coloureds’), the majority of whom were channelled into formal wage labour” (Ibid). Some ethnic groups were favoured as adjuncts of white rule. Those whom the settlers in South Africa for example termed 'Hottentots', were mostly absorbed into colonial service and tended to be considered 'the most efficient troops for dealing with the Kaffirs’ (Giliomme, 1989). Thus the “Khoi and other 'Hottentots' people were offered some protection in employment and civil society, placing them in a position which was relatively superior to that of the Bantu-speaking peoples.” This strategy was extended to the differential enfranchisement of “coloured” people, because as the Cape Attorney-General, William Porter argued:

“I would rather meet the Hottentots at the hustings voting for his representative than meet the Hottentots in the wilds with a gun on his shoulder. is it not better to disarm them by letting them participate in the privileges of the constitution than by refusing them those long expected privileges to drive them into laager.”

However preferential allocation of employment to the working classes were complicated in most regions by state policies which encouraged more settler immigrants and imported migrant labour, especially in southern Africa. For instance, the arrival between 1857 and 1883 in Cape Town of nearly thirty thousand immigrants, many of whom were experienced in artisan and craft occupations, led to increased competition for scarce jobs within the coloured working class at the Cape, and threatened the Cape Malay monopoly over many crafts (Giliomee, 1989).

Race based employment discrimination has also been mobilized through unions and various guilds in the crafts. In South Africa for instance

“... the increasingly discriminatory tactics of white trade unionists in 1900 saw the white stonemasons' society preventing Coloured stonemasons from working on public buildings, [while] ... the Plasterers' Union barred Coloured labour and forbade its members to work 'on a scaffold with a Coloured or Malay under pain of a fine'. Coloured craftsmen were excluded from big projects such as the construction of the University of Cape Town. Such prejudice became articulated through industrial legislation, such as by the 1906 amendments to the Mines Act which reserved many of the skilled, supervisory and managerial jobs for whites” (Goldin, 1989).

These restrictions on upward mobility (and miscegenation) encouraged the development of a distinct Coloured identity, given that at some point the state also blocked the strategy used by light skinned skilled and petty bourgeois Coloured people of attempting to 'pass for white'. Thus, fewer “... light-skinned petty bourgeois and the more skilled and educated members of the colonized class were now able to gain admission to the ruling class in the Cape” (Ibid).

Overtime, racial discrimination in South Africa employment had been reinforced to such extreme levels as shown below (Table 4-3).

Table 4-3: Percentage of Economically active Population According to Occupation, 1991 (Excluding TBVC)

Occupation	Whites	Coloured	Asians	Blacks
Professional, semi-professional and technical	81	4	5	9
Nursing	35	14	3	49
Education and Related	29	12	4	55
Managerial, executive and administrative	79	4	68	9,6
Clerical and Sales	49	11	7,7	32
Transport, delivery and Communication	11	8	2,7	78
Service	11	11	1,0	78
Farming and Related	7	17	0,25	76
Artisans, apprentice and related	36	14	4,7	45
Production supervisor, miner and quarry	6	14	3,0	78
Not Specified	6	10	2,5	81
Total	21	12	3,3	64

Source: Central Statistical Services, 1993

The most recent legislative and policy reforms to counter racial and ethnic socio-economic dominance of South Africa, are noteworthy, although they appear fragile and achievable only in the long term (over 15 years), if at all. For example the South African public sector is formally multicultural given that the state is multi-plural in respect to language, culture, traditions, norms and values of society, unlike the previous racial segregationist policies. Since 1994 a climate conducive for nation building and reconciliation among various ethnic groups prevails, and race based elections and ethnic conflicts fomented particularly in the former “Black homelands” or “Self-governing states, have been outlawed. However, the vestiges of apartheid and separate development are still prevalent in all structures of governance, including in the pattern of ethnic group dominance of certain positions in government, and in the existing xenophobia among the diverse ethnic groups within the South African public sector (Mail & Guardian, 2001). Indeed ethnicity and conflict in the South African public sector threatens negatively the sustainable delivery of public services (Ibid). Apparently racial groups that were oppressed in the past are continuously mobilizing themselves, because the constitution provides them the scope to seek opportunity, and the ruling elite is not acting swiftly and proactively enough to deal with resilient ethnic conflicts particularly in the workplace (Eller and Coughlan, 1993).

Since Government is the largest employer it oversees a multi-ethnic and diverse multi-cultural labour force of the interdependent groups, where cohesion and new norms and values are being built for sound mutual race relations among the employees (Ibid). Good work relations in the public sector require a change of attitude and behaviour of both the management and employees, and race relations need to be treated with sensitivity and passion (Nieuwmeijer and du Toit, 1994). The resultant unchanged attitudes is that black South Africans are

“... treated in a manner that is unacceptable, because if you go to any public domain you get a poor service but a white person is better preferred ... a white person does not do this to another white person but black persons ... do so because of the inferiority complex inculcated to the minds of the African people. What makes things worse is the language that one speaks determines to a larger extent whether you'll get the service ... [especially if one] speaks the language of the attendant. Therefore to try to address the imbalances of legacy of the past the government of the day one cannot use race neutral policies.” (Mail & Guardian, 2001).

Thus ... rising careerism and opportunist leadership have been created after the establishment of a democratic system of government in South Africa, as notions of self-interest and personal advancement override the interests of the taxpayers, professionalism and effectual managerial abilities. However, while formal race and ethnic differences have become blurred, nominally white top managers are reluctant to transform and change their attitudes toward other ethnic groups (Ibid).

Magasela argues that the most dangerous ethnic conflict in the public sector is among blacks, where for instance if you apply for a job in a Xhosa or Sesotho dominated region and you do not know people there or their languages, there is a high probability that you might not get the job. Someone who speaks the language would be favoured, that is ethnic discrimination and if your last name is not known to the panel members and one has not established his/her name in the corporate world. The extreme cases ... are [in] the ethnic composition of the state departments in each of the nine provinces (Magasela, 2001).

4.2.2 Land, natural resources and minerals: Differential access by identity

Many ethnic conflicts over socio-economic dominance in Africa are structured by dominance over land and national resources, which are the key source of livelihood and wealth, and sources of the means to pay for education and hence to attain non-agricultural employment. The degree of such conflicts however varies by region depending on specific histories of land concentration, the farming systems and political economic structures that sustain resource inequalities.

The land question as a source of ethnic and racial differences and dominance has tended to be underplayed in sub-Saharan Africa outside of former settler colonies (Zimbabwe, RSA, Namibia), even though it tends to be a common problem in many countries, including in relatively stable economies and democracies. For example in Botswana a land problem with ethnic dimensions exists. Official post-cold war discourses on land are however tampered by the neo-liberal paradigm which has assumed a hegemonic position, such that it appears that there are no substantive differences between opposition parties and the ruling party in Botswana on fundamental questions relating to class based ownership of the means of production, and elites mainly quarrel over how to share national resources (Molomo, 2003). Yet a few civil society organisations, which are moving beyond the neo-liberal model of democracy (e.g. the enjoyment of basic freedoms, civil liberties and regular free and fair elections), are increasingly calling for economic empowerment and social justice over land and natural resources

allocations, if Botswana is to avoid future conflict (Ibid). Thus, in spite of the predominantly middle class social base of NGO's which dominate the "visible" debate within the current power structure and distribution of economic resources, and their external donor driven linkages (Ibid), there is an incipient struggle over the land question.

Increasingly the land struggles in Botswana involve ethnic minorities challenging the dominant paradigm of the nation-state and nation building, which is constructed through the diffusion of the values of the majority culture of the dominant Tswana groups (Ibid). For example, the minority *Basarwa*, often referred to as remote area dwellers, in terms of their spatial position and political power, have historically been a servile underclass exploited by dominant Tswana groups, and other so-called minority groups as cattle herders and labourers (Molomo, 2003). Removed from the major urban centres and, gaining limited government rural development and infrastructural facilities, they were recently moved out of the large area in northern Botswana called Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR), in a manner which subverted their land rights and natural resources based livelihoods, in order to expand the national tourist industry. Also large tracts of land have over the last 30 years been parcelled out of "customary lands" and given to over 1,000 indigenous elites, who now comprise a dominant land controlling class with access to state support for livestock farming, at the expense of small scale pastoralists and agriculturists. Whereas this land expropriation has been done in accordance with the "rule of law," and in an orderly and gradual manner, it does not obviate the long term dangers of land concentration and currently scattered protests over land.

In Ivory Coast conflicts over land, especially in the South (between long term migrants from the North and from neighbouring countries in the north), are an underlying source of the current political conflict and armed rebellion. Land conflicts emerged when political (electoral) competition led to the questioning of the citizenship (hence voting) rights of immigrant, in relation to their land and residency rights in the south and west. Attempts to introduce new land tenure and citizenship laws in the late 1990's gave an impetus to land conflicts. Land conflicts revolved around differences over policy changes which led to decentralized management of land and natural resources in order to restore decision-making powers to local communities and legislative reforms which promoted the privatization of land through land registration in open recognition of local rights (Delville, 1999). Ivory Coast's Rural Land Plan (RLP) pilot project (from 1999-2000) sought to map all existing rights in order to give them legal status. This triggered the questioning of the land rights of long term immigrants, and led to ethnic divisions alongside the north-south divide of ethnicity and religious difference.

Data from the RLP registration showed that the nature of land tenure arrangements was often unclear in many areas, and in particular that they were not perceived in the same way by the indigenous people and the migrants (Zalo, 2001). Given that official documents such as the land certificate and their legal consequences were not adequately disseminated to people, there was uniformed renegotiation of previously conceded land rights (Zalo, 2001). Since land is scarce and, is a limiting factor for socio-economic development because the size of family agricultural plots are small, the roots of land conflict in Ivory Coast can be more widespread than is understood, given that land distribution is uneven. There are 3,744 traditional large farms and 1,076 modern farms and a number of agro-industrial plantations (palm-tree oil, hévéa, sugarcane and pineapple-banana plantations), but traditional owners of the land are not beneficiaries of the exported products, and do not have access to various goods and services (Zalo, 2001). Because in the customary system, the value of agricultural land is measured in terms of its development and seldom according to its intrinsic value, (i.e. it is not an officially exchangeable good), land cannot be offered as a guarantee to creditors for loans necessary for intensive development, and it is difficult to rent or sell land at good prices, poverty persists among most of the rural populations, in contrast to the minority of “modern” farms (Ibid).

According to government statistics, migrants in the Ivory Coast who because of the lack of proof of their citizenship and land tenure status can be refused formal land certificates, represent 11 to 45% of the population, while the non-Ivorian growers who can expect, at best, the right to rent land, represent between 22% and 43% of the population. This has diminished the sense of land security among “successful farmers” in the more productive areas of Ivory Coast, particularly in the Southwest, where young orchards are still maturing, migrant and “foreign” operators are aggrieved by the new land law (Zalo, 2001). The new land law also affects the incomes of the indigenous people, who find themselves holders of land title documents that have been withheld from the migrants, and whose production capacities are limited by various technical and financial constraints. This raises the risk of increased inequality emerging within the indigenous populations since holding land title does not automatically lead to increased output and agricultural stability. Furthermore, individual land ownership or access among young operators is currently difficult, especially in western Ivory Coast, and will probably be affected by the new laws (at the cost of intra-family tensions), if land is monopolized, as it seems to be, by elders, given that the new law reinforces gerontocratic parameters of land rights bidding (Ibid).

Land conflicts in Ivory Coast are not new, as they have existed since 1950, but have however, taken a more violent form over the past ten years (1990s), with the disappearance of the forest, the scarcity of available land for a new generation of growers, and the drastic reduction of the incomes drawn from the

urban activities for the large majority of the population originally from rural areas, especially the youth (Zalo, 2001). The initial and direct origin of these conflicts is not always a conflict about access to and use of land, but in certain cases it stems from the questioning by the indigenous people of land use rights acquired by the migrants, especially in recent years (Zalo, 2001). Consequently, the land question remains a crucial concern for the future.

Conflict between different ethnic groups within Ethiopia is common, for example, between pastoralist groups in competition for the control of grazing lands and water supplies. These conflicts increase during droughts (Flintan and Tamrat, 2002). The nature of communal conflict in Ethiopia took new forms following the demarcation of boundaries which fragmented groups and impeded cross border movements essential to the viability of customary land and resource-use systems (Ibid). The Haud pastures found in the Ogaden region, for example, were for long a source of conflict between the Ogaden and the Ishaq Somali clan's, and earlier competition to control the Haud pastures rarely entailed large loss of life (Ibid). Following the colonial scramble for the control of the horn of Africa, conflicts took a more political nature. The Ogaden, where the Haud pastures are situated, came under Ethiopian territory under the 1887 Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement. Since the Ishaq were under British administered Somaliland and outside Ethiopian territory, the claim to the Haud pastures between the Ogaden and Ishaq clans became a territorial dispute (Ibid). These ethnic conflicts stem from the marginalization of some groups by a state that monopolizes the control of the production and distribution of resources .By holding such power over resources, the state has the ability to favour one group, particularly the highland of Amhara and Tigray ruling elites in Ethiopia, while discriminating against other groups such as the Oromo or Somali in the south and east (Flintan and Tamrat, 2002).

The experience of post independence Nigeria's agrarian development strategy and land policy has for instance had the effect of promoting pervasive co-modification of land which hitherto was regarded as communal property. The attendant land grabbing has led to a decline in the proportion of land available to the smallholding peasantry (See box 4-2). Indeed, it has led to peasants being manipulated by urban and local 'big wigs' pitted against one another in struggles for land (Egwu, 1998). Thus the rising spectre of violent conflicts in Nigeria's rural setting lends to credence to the argument that ethnic identity is always mobilized in causes whose real utility can only be conceived in class terms (Darrow, 1974 cited by Oyugi, 1998; Sklar, 1967 cited by Osaghae, 1998).

In Kenya colonial land injustices and contemporary land policies have had far-reaching and varying effects on the control and access to land by the majority of the people. Increasingly land ownership patterns are derived from endowments arising from class differentiation strategies which emerged in the colonial era (Lumumba and Kanyinga, 2003), and have led to growing landlessness. Thus 20% of the

Box 4-2

Case study of the Mambila plateau

The Mambila plateau is naturally endowed; and has attracted both agriculturists and pastoralist (George 1990), and accounts for its mixed ethnic configuration. Ethnic groups include Mambila (believed to be the first settlers), Kaka, Kamba and Bansa, as well as Fulani pastoralists and settled Hausa communities. Significantly is occupationally differentiated along ethnic lines. The Mambila's are predominantly peasant farmers, the Fulbe pastoralists, while the Bansa and Kamba control commerce. The most significant way in which the socio-economic system influences the emergence of interethnic violence, since the 1980s revolves around management of the land.

The ecological depletion of the plateau due to widespread sheet erosion and reinforces the dilemma facing the farmers. Thus the changing patterns in land use, occupational differentiation along ethnic lines and demographic change lead to a distinct pattern of social differentiation. Increasing landlessness marginalized the Mambila peasant farmers, vis-à-vis the more prosperous Fulani grazers and the commercially inclined Bansa and Kamba. Where the Mambila pursue court adjudication over the conflicts related to land, the pastoralists use their economic power to pervert the course of justice. Ethnic clashes between the Mambilas and other communal groups in the 1980s and the continued tension on the plateau is thus squarely rooted in agrarian matters. The Mambilas have used varied strategies to address their plight, including becoming tenant farmers or migrating to Cameroon or resisting oppression. However most Mambilas have expressed their resistance to oppression and exploitation by violent means, directed to all those perceived as 'strangers' rather than the grazers and urban elite who pose immediate threat to land.' The Mambila political leaders promise their vote use their positions to change in the status quo by redistributing land to the Mambila whose birth right had been denied by aliens'.

While the land mass has remained static, the cattle and human populations have increased exponentially, peaking in the 1970s and leading to increased land conflicts and heightened overgrazing with the direct consequences on local economy performance and inter-ethnic relations, as ethnic and occupational boundaries overlap. Landholding on the plateau is heavily skewed against the smallholders who constitute 98% of the population (table 2), while the grazers and large estates that account for 1,1%of the population control most of the land. Between 1979 and 1989 about 115 individuals and companies had acquired 14,655hectares of land through the land and Survey Ministry in Yola, an average of 122 hectares per person. Similarly, within the same period, the Sandauna Local Government made a total allocation covering 8,815 hectares an average of 93 hectares per person.

Table 1: Summary of statistics on cattle and human population on the Mambila plateau

Periods	Cattle number	Human population	Land area (Ha)	No of Divided area	Towns and villages
1930	18,181	-	-	-	-
1949	120,000	-	-	-	-
1963	234,980	95,148	498-500	32	290
1979	450,000	134,256	-	-	-
1989	617,643	169,872	-	-	-

Source: Gembu Tax Office

Table 2: Land use categories on the Plateau, 1976-1990

Type of holding	No of holders	% Of Total population	Total average covered (ha)	% Of total covered	Ave Holding (ha)
Small scale holding	51,389	98,90	28,000	7,1	0,53
Grazing land holding	360	0,70	304,500	76,4	890,3
Large estate	210	0,40	23,500	5,9	111,3
Built up area	-	-	250	0,1	-
Degraded area	-	-	37,750	9,4	-
Natural Forests	-	-	4,500	1,1	-
Total	51,959	100,00	398,500	100,00	-

Source: Gembu Tax Office, Ministry of land Survey Office, Gembu

Kenyan population own over 50% of the arable land, while the rest own an average of one acre, and 13% are landless, or do not have any protectable right over land, and are referred to as “squatters,” “trespassers” or “adverse possessors” (Ibid). The colonial Swynnerton land tenure reform plan led to a markedly skewed distribution of land, with chiefs, loyalists, and the wealthy acquiring more land than others while the lower social groups lost considerable amounts of land, especially where they had not participated in this colonial adjudication of land rights (Lumumba and Kanyinga, 2003). This has generated continued post-colonial land disputes based on decreased tenure security amongst the majority (Haugerud, 1983, 1989, 1992; Shipton, 1988; Fleuret, 1988; Mackenzie, 1990), and has led to open abuse of land allocations by those involved in defining the existing structure of land rights.

Because Kenya’s land law grants enormous powers of control of land to the President who holds land in trust for the state, the President tends to grant land to a few individuals and corporate interests. This concentration of power over land in the Presidency and the central government has undermined the pressure for the democratisation of land ownership, and has eroded the social bases of popular institutions for regulating land allocations, due to individualization of much of the land. This process has affected the majority of the lands utilized by pastoralists who occupy and use over two thirds of Kenya landmass (Ibid).

From the early 1990s, pressures for political liberalization led to the appropriation of government land by political elites at an even a faster pace, as Moi struggled to retain a clientele of loyalists (Ibid). Thus elites appropriated the land in question for their political project against the multi-partyist opposition and resurrected the *Majimbo* land demand to deflect the multiparty debates. This reactivated demands for territory in the Rift Valley and on the coast (as happened in the 1960s) and led to ethnic land clashes between members of former KADU groups and the immigrant population in the Rift Valley, and later on in the coast, between the Mijikenda and upcountry Kikuyu and Luo immigrants. Large groups of Kikuyu families were evicted from the Rift Valley, their titles to land notwithstanding (Lumumba and Kanyinga, 2003).

Even in Uganda, post-colonial land reforms led to the accumulation of huge tracts of land in the hands of the politically powerful elite at the expense of the peasantry, all institutions of land governance were later taken over by the state in 1991, leading to the distortion of land distribution by *ad hoc* land allocation practises and conflict (Lumumba and Kanyinga, 2003).

This trend of growing land concentration is quite common throughout Africa. For example, increased privatisation of state lands in Mozambique, as part of the foreign investment drive has crowded out the poor onto the worst lands. This has created grounds for incipient racial animosity, as foreigners and white South Africans tend to dominate this investment. The emigration of white Zimbabweans who “lost” their land to Mozambique exacerbates these land inequalities (Moyo, 2003).

However in general, land based ethnic conflicts in much of Africa, particularly in West Africa, are derived from the conflictual relationship over the power of the state vis-à-vis that of customary law authorities (Mathieu, 1996) to allocate land. In formal law (e.g. in Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso) where the “traditional chiefs” are granted the right to mediate “customary rights,” this is most often limited solely to the right to cultivate (Delville, 1999). This contradicts fundamental aspects of customary land tenure regimes, wherein the authorities responsible for land allocation also play a role in regulating local land-use systems (Delville, 1999). But although the state has taken over the absolute right of land allocation, these local authorities usually remain legitimate in the eyes of the community and continue to enjoy considerable political power (Ibid) over land management systems. The right of eminent domain and the power to allocate land rights are fundamental to customary systems and the power of local authorities, hence pre-colonial states using their right of conquest, tended to allocate land to their clients or servants (Ibid).

State control over land allocation and concession procedures by both the colonial and independent African governments, tends to however be delegated to elected rural councils (e.g. in Senegal), through various forms of land allocation procedures (Delville, 1999); leading to conflicts between formal law and customary land rights. This has especially afflicted French-speaking West Africa. Since the territorial distribution of local “traditional” authorities are generally based upon lineage/clan social structures with particular ethnic identities, such land conflicts tend therefore to assume an explicit or implicit ethnic character.

For instance territorially based ethnic clashes over land are common in Kenya. As the Kalenjin and the Maasai were condemning especially the Kikuyu settlement of their land, the latter were also asserting their right to such land (cited by Lumumba, Ibid from East Africa Standard 1 September 1992). This situation was occasioned by the preferential settlement of the landless Kikuyu under the Land Transfer Scheme started by the colonial government on the eve of independence (Haberson, 1973 cited by Oyugi, 1998). The government ignored protests over this leading, the Kalenjin to organize resistance to further settlement, and thereafter resulting, culminating in the Nandi-Luhya clashes of the 1980’s (Oyugi,

1998). It is thus evident that ethnic feelings about ancestral land ownership generate violent conflict (Ibid).

But land conflicts reflect wider resource based conflicts, including competition for grazing and water resources, as well as disputes over community territorial land and district borders, especially because in large parts of Africa land use is dominated by pastoralism which is the only economic and social livelihood in various countries. For example in Kenya, physical confrontations have assumed well-organized military tactics including: killing people, destroying property and burning houses. Animals are raided in large numbers, of even up to over 1,000 livestock in a single raid (Peacenet-Kenya, 2001). The political motivation of such violent land conflicts is a common phenomenon, given the tendency for politicians to manipulate them. For example, in the Rift Valley region of Kenya, (covering Trans-mara, Narok, Kajiado, Usin Gishu and Elgeyo Marakwet, Pokot, TransaNzoia, Laikipia and Nakuru North Rift) political violence is associated with the fact that residents are dissatisfied by the existing land tenure policies and the general legal regime responsible for land because it does not clearly address their land rights and land leases (Ibid). Yet at another level, there is evidence of rampant crop theft and crop destruction instigated and executed by rival communities (Ibid).

Thus the general the causes of land conflict in non- settler Africa include: the grabbing and sale of communal land and favouritism in its allocation; partisan roles of security agents in mediating conflicts; the squatting in communal land; the commercialization of cattle rustling and competition over natural resources such as pastures, water and livestock; human and wildlife land use conflicts. In many areas political intimidation including the use of illegal firearms has become common.

Historical colonial alliances over the control of land explain some of these conflicts The alliance between the British administrators and the Yao elite in Malawi for example, deepened when the latter were chosen as the instrument for indirect rule:

“... with loyal Yao chiefs ruling over docile Nguru workers to further the successes of the European plantation economy and to maintain order. The Yao chiefs ... in so doing ... were promoting their own personal and economic power rather than any broadly conceptualized notion of Yao unity or identity. The great majority of Yao-speakers remained Muslim and hence were hostile to the establishment of the sort of Christian schools” (Vai and White, 1989).

But the legacy of settler colonial land expropriation remains the source of the extreme land conflicts in Africa. Racial inequality in the control of or access to land in Africa has been most extreme in the former settler colonies, such as Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa and Kenya. Indeed this led to radical

land reforms in Mozambique (1976) and Zimbabwe (since 2000). The proportions of land held by racial minorities ranged from 87% in South Africa by 1994 to 50% and 30% in Zimbabwe by 1980 and 1999. The genesis and mobilisation of race and ethnicity over land distribution has been a complex socio-political process of conflicts filled with numerous contradictions arising from various factors. For example in South Africa there were various:

“... stumbling blocks to a developed ethnic consciousness ... based on internal class conflict in Dutch-Afrikaner society, decentralized power structures, and regional rivalries. Power in both the Free State and the Transvaal was effectively in the hands of the large landholders, sometimes called patriarchs, who established patron-client relationships with both their family dependants and *bygoners*, or landless Afrikaners. By the 1870s the Doppers, among them Paul Kruger, had become known as a group imbued with an acute ethnic consciousness, strongly anti-British, and keen to develop a distinct political, economic and social life along their own lines. From the 1850s onwards, the Dutch-Afrikaners in the Cape faced a twin assault on their cultural and spiritual values in the forms of the so-called 'liberal tendency' and intensified British cultural imperialism. Severe barriers also faced Dutch-Afrikaners who contemplated entering central and local government which by 1875 employed some 4500 people in the colony. Every candidate had to be fluent in English, the only official language, and the informal system of patronage was dominated by English-speakers who virtually monopolized the senior ranks. Against this general economic background, Dutch-Afrikaners began to agitate for protectionist policies to aid farmers, a national bank to counter the imperial banks, and equal status for the Dutch language (Giliomee, 1989).

Mobilising race for land based wealth dominance has been a long drawn century old process changing with development and political awareness. Thus “... accelerated economic development ... widened the class cleavages within Dutch-Afrikaner society. At the top were the large landholders and commercializing farmers and the Cape Dutch in the towns, who prospered as financial agents and auctioneers; then came a large number of middling farmers who managed to make ends meet; and finally, at the bottom, there were the small farmers and *bywoners*. From the 1870s on a large class of poor and often destitute small farmers began to form. They were unable and unwilling to do anything but farm ...” (Ibid). Some of the most desperate of these small farmers began to migrate to the towns where they found casual employment, but others resorted to vagrancy, begging and crime. A “... major development stimulating growing ethnic awareness was the rise of Dutch-Afrikaner farmers' associations (*boeren vereenigingen*). During the 1870s several were formed in the north-eastern and eastern part of the colony. Like their English counterparts, they began as agricultural organizations but soon began to speak out on political issues. ... Political expression of ethnic awareness was also fostered by the constitutions which Britain granted first to the self-governing Transvaal colony and then to the Union of South Africa. White manhood suffrage meant that it was in the interest of the Dutch-Afrikaner leaders to mobilize the *bywoners* behind them. And the exclusion of Africans from the franchise effectively ended the white landlord-African tenant and other cross-racial linkages that had grown up in the decade or so before the war” (Giliomee, 1989).

Access to land even in settler colonial Africa has also become mobilized around “traditional” ethnic structures, including by urbanites not resident in the jurisdiction in which such land rights are claimed,

due to racial discrimination over land. Nicholas Cope (**date**) argues that the “... formation of Inkatha by the Northern Natal petty bourgeoisie was [intended] to enable them to cooperate with rural chiefs in the purchase and development of land: 'Inkatha was seen as a means through which commercial agriculture could be set underway on land purchased ostensibly by a "tribe", since non-tribal land-buying syndicates had been practically outlawed following the 1913 (Natives Land) Act.' Albert Luthuli purportedly revived the Groutville Cane Growers' Association and founded the Natal and Zululand Bantu Cane Growers' Association, to foster the interests of the small-scale African sugar growers and negotiate on their behalf with millers (Marks, 1989). In 1942, when he stood for election to the Native Representative Council with Zulu Society support, his platform included a request to the government for 'more help to the rural community in their farming operations'; the establishment of 'a Land Bank for Bantus'; improvements in the general status of chiefs and chiefs' courts; the acquisition of land by the government for Africans; local government or councils in 'advanced communities' such as Edendale; the extension of education in rural areas; and 'more civilized salaries for black teachers” (Ibid).

Countries such as South Africa and Namibia remain confronted with unequal land holdings especially because titled land, which is protected from expropriation by their liberal democratic post-independence constitutions, is mainly in the hands of a few white commercial farmers (table 4-4). In South Africa 60,000 white farmers, who make up only 5% of the white population, own almost 87% (85,5 million) of the land, while only 20,000 of them produce 80% of the gross agricultural product (Moyo, 2003). A further 40,000, including some 2,000 black farmers, produce 15%, of output while 500,000 families living in the former homelands produce an estimated 5%. At least 12 million blacks inhabit 17.1 million hectares of land and no more than 15 % (or 2.6 million hectares) of this land is potentially arable. Thus whites own 6 times more land in terms of the quantity of land available and its quality (Ibid). In Namibia, where white settlers comprise about 8% of the total population, commercial land under freehold title comprises approximately 6,300 farms, which belong to 4,128 white farmers. This freehold title land covers 44% of available land and 70% of the most productive agricultural land, while only 2.2 million hectares of the commercial farmlands belong to black farmers. By contrast, communal lands comprise 138,000 households with an area of 33.5 million hectares, which is only 41% of the land available.

In Zimbabwe, before the fast track land reform programme, most of the freehold lands were in the hands of 4,500 whites (comprising 0.03% of the population) and located in the most fertile parts of the country, with the most favourable climatic conditions and water resources. White farmers controlled 31% of the

country's freehold land or about 42% of the agricultural land including 75% of prime lands, while 1.2 million black families subsisted on 41% of the country's area of 39 million hectares (Ibid). After 16 years of pursuing a market –based (willing-seller willing –buyer) approach to land, which redistributed less than 25% of white controlled land (including the more marginal lands they held) at high prices, the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) resorted to compulsory land acquisition methods in 1997 using new expropriation laws. The contestation of compulsory land acquisition laws by large white land owners and the failure of the GoZ to adopt effective legal procedures for land expropriation, as well as its failure to get British finance (on grounds of colonial responsibility) for speedier land acquisition, led the GoZ to adopt a more radical approach to land transfer. In a context of economic and political crisis, from 2000 a “fast track” land transfer programme involving extensive land occupations by thousands of people alongside legally based compulsory acquisition was instituted.

Table 4-4: Land and Population in Southern Africa

Country	Land Area (000 ha)	Potential Agric. Area (000 ha)	Population Density (persons/1000 ha)	Total Population	Whites (%)
Angola	12 4670.0	31167.5	81	10 145 267	1
Botswana	60 037.0	28217.39	26	1 576 470	4 est. (White & Kgalagadi = 7%)
D.R. of Congo	234 541.0	23454.1	222	51 964 999	9
Lesotho	3 035.5	2337.34	706	2 143 141	0.3
Malawi	9 400.0	6 400.0	1 104	10 385 849	0.06
Mauritius	186.0	102.3.0	6 341	1 179 368	Indo, Sino & Franco - Mauritian
Mozambique	79 938.0	41 056.89	201	17 700 000	0.06 Euro, 0.08 Indians
Namibia	82 541.8	38 794.65	21	1 771 327	6
South Africa	121 991.2	95 153.14	356	43 421 021	13.6 W, 2.6 Indian
Swaziland	1 736.3	1 267.5	624	1 083 289	3
Seychelles	45.5.0	6.83	1 743	79 326	Seychellois (mix of African, Euro, Asians)
Tanzania	94 508.7	48 710.0	374	35 306 126	1
Zambia	75 261.4	35 372.86	127	9 582 418	1.1
Zimbabwe	39 058.0	32027.56	290	11 342 521	0.8
Totals	926 950.4	117 313.0		197 681 122	

Sources: CIA, the World Factbook, 2001; U.S. Bureau of the Census, International Data Base 2001

This led to the GoZ take over of 90% of the white lands and their allocation to over 135,000 households. The process was accompanied by violence and the reduction of agricultural production by over 30% of normal output. Zimbabwe's economy thus deteriorated further and the country remains isolated by the international community on grounds of both its land reform approach and negative governance practises associated with the land reform and electoral competition since 2000. Secondary land conflicts, including the exclusion of some and land hoarding have since emerged, promising more conflict in future.

According to Sihlongonyane (2003), in spite of an orderly official land redistribution process in South Africa, on the other hand, land policy and conflict over land have been driven since the late 1980s by illegal land occupation which affected all its major cities and has involved close to 3 million squatters in shanty peri-urban township. Interestingly some scholars argue that in South Africa women benefited most from land occupations, especially in the rural areas (Cross, 1999), because their subordinate position within traditional structures of chiefdom inhibits their access to land and its natural resources.

Indeed between 1994 and 2000, South Africa's official market friendly land redistribution approach had only transferred 780,407 hectares to 55,383 disadvantaged households, some 14% of which were women (Sihlongonyane, 2003), and by 2003 redistributed land amounted to less than 2% of the agricultural land. The official Integrated Program of Land Redistribution and Agricultural Development (IPLRAD) now aims to transfer 30% of 'medium and high quality agricultural land to blacks over 15 years (Ibid). The extent of such a slow redistributive process can be sustained by South Africa, in a context where unemployment is close to 40% and GDP growth (and industrial progress) averages below 3%, is yet to be seen.

The Zimbabwe lesson of the inefficacy of market based approaches and the protection of inherited legacies of racially unequal land distribution, as well as the negative effects of the "fast track" approach, suggest the need for rethinking the South African and Namibian land reform strategies.

Gender discrimination in land rights is another source of land conflict typical in most of Africa. Though women constitute the majority of the population in most countries (e.g. in East Africa -Kenya 50.5%, Tanzania 51% and Uganda 52%) and women are critical to the agricultural economy, they enjoy limited land rights (Lumumba, 2003). For instance in Kenya less than 4% of women have title deeds to land registered in their names compared to 7% in Uganda and 10% in Tanzania (Ibid). And, according to May *et al.* (1995), women ... in South Africa ... [face the most severe]... spatial and economic marginalization [among] rural African women... [because] ... women, who have the primary responsibility for household reproduction, ... have limited direct title or control of land. "Such access to land rights is only through their husbands or families. Cross (1999) argues that 'land access is closely defended by power structures and is key to the institutional processes that determine what women can and cannot do with resources in the support of their households, [while] customary tenure systems are ... deteriorating, as corrupt administrators and developers, on the one hand, and widening divisions within communities, on the other, fail to enforce accountable land rights" (Cross, 1997; Cross *et al.* 1996). In this context, access to land by unauthorized occupations provides women with the opportunity

to meet a variety of household needs, including those that are socially identified as being the responsibility of women (Bryceson, 1995). This gender based land grievance demonstrates how deeply rooted land conflicts can be, even if the land question tends to be manipulated by male politicians.

Socio-economic dominance around commerce and minerals

The ethnic and racial basis of socio-economic dominance and conflict in Africa stretches beyond its primary land resource and resource and social mobility through jobs and education to the control of minerals and commerce in Africa's uneven enclave economy. In general Africa has witnessed much more broadly based struggles between "foreign" and indigenous elites and business people for wealth accumulation and dominance, through competition for land, minerals and commercial activity, during and after colonialisation. For instance, "... early tolerance in the Belgian Congo of the small mercantile careers of 'foreigners' by the dominant political powers provided opportunities for their growth, as did also the preference of western big businesses for 'foreigners' as their local agents (Jewssiewicki, 1989). This early attitude, "... underpinned by fears of the development of a local national black bourgeoisie, was transformed during the industrialization of the 1920s ... by nearly open hostilities ... [and]... a rise in popular resentment of 'the exploiters' and by the fragmentation of these 'exploiters' into smaller groups, who pursued the only avenue open to outcasts, small businesses began after Independence (in 1960) offered marginalized businessmen the opportunities of a huge market, which, they rapidly monopolized (Ibid), using ethnic mobilisation strategies. For example:

"Small businessmen, grouped in ethnic communities or family arrangements, replaced the more formal credit institutions and the supply systems which were previously inaccessible. Because of their unique position as the sole people 'institutionally' equipped to confront the collapse of the country's economic system and to tackle the reeling state apparatus, they reaped profits. But they also paid dearly for it later, when they were caught between growing popular resentment, which was fed by the economic crisis of the 1970s, and the mounting hostility manifested towards them by the state's bureaucrats who themselves were hoping to invest in commercial activities. Altogether removed from political circles, and thus possessing no political influence, they were relatively easily eliminated from the national scene in the 1970s, expelled gradually as 'undesirables'" Jewssiewicki, 1989.

The struggle to control commerce in Africa has for long been predominantly a racially shaped conflict as indigenes compete with Asians, Lebanese, Whites and Arabs. The notable cases of such include, former settler colonies, Tanzania, Sierra Leone, Sudan etc. This has led to extreme measures to bring balance.

However reverse racially based discrimination based upon a broad concept of affirmative action has been experienced in Africa. For example, Malawi practices racial discrimination since discrimination against Malawi's Asian population is enshrined in legislation. Malawi has 5,000 Asians, who are mainly engaged in the import and export and retail trade.

"By law Asian residents and citizens can only own property in the four towns of Lilongwe, Blantyre, Zomba, and Mzuzu. In 1986 changes in the citizenship law meant that holders of foreign passports could no longer live

indefinitely in Malawi –a measure particularly aimed against Asians, many of whom hold British passports. Asians have been particular targets of forfeiture Act, which allows the government to seize the property of anyone, suspected of economic crimes. This is an executive action with no right of appeal to a judicial authority-not a sentence imposed by the court. Apart from being an extraordinary severe penalty, its imposition is contrary to international standards, as well being almost invariably applied in a racially discriminatory manner” (Where Silence Rules The Suppression of Dissent in Malawi human Rights Watch, 1990).

In a variety of African countries state based control and distribution of mineral resources and related rents and services have been a major strategy used to mobilize socio-economic and political dominance, and a key source of ethno-regional wealth differentials and struggles over resource control. Various countries most affected by this include Nigeria, Cameroon, Angola, Sudan, DRC, South Africa, etc.

For example, the discovery of oil and its subsequent exploitation became the major source of post-independence conflict in Sudan with the government annexing oil bearing lands to the north of Sudan within a Unitary state created against southerners (Goldsmith, Abura and Switzer, 2002). Thus while the government of Sudan considers oil as a national (state) resource the southerners consider the oil a southern resource, and access to and control of petroleum wealth is critical to the sustained Sudanese civil war, and in maintaining the control and resources enjoyed by the government and residents in the north (Ibid). Moreover environmental impacts of oil exploration and production have grown with serious social consequences (Ibid) for the poorest mainly of rural and southern stock, thus emphasizing how both ethnic and racial difference have been mobilized in southern and northern Sudan towards socio-economic dominance and exclusion largely against the south, and that external foreign interest have abetted this process and pattern.

However the worst ethnic conflicts over socio-economic dominance seems to occur in those African countries and within those regions of high mineral potential. For example, the best soils and minerals resources of the DRC tend to be located in peripherimeter of the country, hence the distribution of population and conflict in these border zones. For instance the Kivu provinces, “... which have been under rebel control during 1998-2002, ranks among the most productive regions in Africa. The region is indeed a critical supplier of water, energy, food and arable land. Most farmers can yield up to three harvests a year ... [and] would ... probably be in a better shape had it not been known for its minerals (including coltan), as it has now become the target of extensive, though illegal, natural resource exploitation within the framework of a wider conflict system involving a myriad of actors and interest” (Moyroud and Katanga, 2002). Ethnic and inter-state conflicts and war dominate this region.

Sierra Leone, which in addition to having diamonds worth over US\$200 million output per year, has rutile, (a titanium ore) used for paint pigment and welding rod coatings, which has been mined since

1979 by Sierra Rutile Limited (Sepdata, 2002). This is wholly owned by Nord Resources of the United States, which began commercial mining operations near Bonthe in early 1979 being the largest non-petroleum U.S. investment in West, Africa) and exports 88,000 tons valued at US\$75 million in 1990. Rutile and bauxite mining operations were suspended when rebels invaded the mining sites in 1995 but negotiations for the reactivation of rutile and bauxite mining are in progress, although the U.S. interest in the company has been reduced to 25% (Ibid). Sierra Leone however relies heavily on significant amounts of foreign assistance, including the United States, Italy, and Germany, the largest being the United Kingdom and the European Union, and multilateral agencies (Ibid).

The complex manner in which national and international alliances over resource control gains dramatic expression in ethnic exclusion and dominance is best illustrated by the Nigerian delta region and the control of oil and related resources (Box 4-3). Neither federalism nor ethnic balancing of resources has been able to avert ethnic conflict and poverty. The limited effort by international capital and “northern” governments to redress these conflicts is critical in any discourse on African ethnic conflict.

Box 4-3

LAGOS, Nigeria Ethnic clashes in an oil-rich area of Nigeria have left eight people dead, including an employee of Chevron Texaco, officials said Tuesday. The clashes between ethnic Ijaws and Itsekiris came as the country prepared for presidential elections. The campaign for the vote, set for next month, has already been marred by political violence. Ijaw official Alhaji Dokubo-Asari said Tuesday Ijaws were increasingly angry at the government and Itsekiris, accusing the two groups of working together to create voting boundaries that are unfavorable to the Ijaws. The Ijaws, with 8 million people, are the largest ethnic group in the oil-rich Niger Delta. They accuse Nigeria and multinational companies of unfairly favoring smaller, rival tribes with lucrative contracts and development projects. The latest violence started when Ijaws raided two Itsekiri villages Monday, torching homes. Most of those killed were women and children who were unable to flee, resident Tuoyo Ineh said by telephone. An unidentified catering worker for Chevron Texaco was hit by a stray bullet and died Tuesday, company executive Sola Omole said in a statement. Another Chevron Texaco worker was injured, the statement said. One Shell contract worker was missing and feared dead, a Shell official said, speaking on condition of anonymity. A Shell spokesman said he could not immediately confirm the account. On March 12, Ijaw militants traded fire with government troops in a village near the oil port of Warri, where several oil multinationals are based. Seven people, including five civilians and two soldiers, were killed in that clash. The latest casualties bring to at least 15 the number of people killed since the fighting erupted last week. Chevron was not a direct target of the bloodletting, Omole said, describing the dispute as a "political protest" that "degenerated into inter-ethnic feuding." Boatloads of Nigerian troops and armored vehicles were seen heading for the conflict-torn area Tuesday. On Monday, Shell shut down three oil pipeline stations, bringing to five the number of facilities closed. Chevron Texaco said its production was not affected by the violence. A number of civilians fleeing fighting had taken refuge at Chevron Texaco's main Escravos export terminal, the company said. "We have begun to evacuate the displaced people ... to a more conducive location, where their immediate needs can be better addressed," the company statement said. The previous decade has seen an upsurge of violence in the Niger Delta, a desperately poor region of swamps and rivers, where nearly all the country's oil is drilled. With production of 2 million barrels of crude a day, Nigeria is the world's sixth-largest oil producer and fifth-largest supplier to the United States. (Source: Associated Press Wednesday, March 19, 2003)

4.2.3 Access to Social Services

The mobilisation of ethnicity and race for socio-economic dominance through the control of jobs, education, land, minerals and commerce, has led to differential shares of various social services. Access to social services in Africa tends to be ethno-regionally differentiated by culture and language as instruments of ethnic identity.

Language has always been a critical instrument for mobilizing socio-economic dominance, via education, job opportunity and market incorporation and as a tool to enforce political dominance via notions of the originality of given groups. In the DRC for example:

“...beginning with the schooling of catechists and the fixing of a written language, originally for purposes of evangelization, a conceptualized model of a Luba 'language' was established with Catholic and Protestant missionaries creating two different standards of its written form. At the same time, a new Luba culture was created through the process of selection of various local, cultural elements as appropriate. This process was encouraged by the fact that... in Christianized villages, where the socialization and cultural conditioning processes which accompanied the creation of a wage-earning class were strongly felt, the Kasai region as a whole continued to be prey to black and white predators alike until the 1920s. For the 'protected' people the way was thus paved for future receptivity, by both individuals and the collectivity, to the wage system, agricultural production for the market and formal schooling, together with the conversion of the children to Christianity and values associated with it. ... Thus the Luba, who already were seen as stout, hard-working and intelligent collaborators, found themselves being offered, rather forcefully perhaps, three quite 'untraditional, opportunities: (1) wage-remunerated work in the mining region, at a time, during the 1920s, when working conditions in Industrial Upper Katanga (Haut-Katanga Industries) were improving considerably; (2) cash-crop agriculture in the new villages lining the Bukama-Port Franqui railway; and (3) school education in the missionary-codified written Luba language” (Roberts, 1989).

A complex array of dominance producing factors and varied ethnic distributional action resulted from the ethno-regional development focus which hung on language policy and schooling (Roberts, 1989). It is thus crucial to recognise that the mobilisation of dominance has mostly been constructed within spatial framework in which social and economic policy is used to construct political organisation based on ethnic identity and unequal opportunity. In the DRC, regionalism as a political force grew before 1930 and became a specifically Katangese collective identity because of the policies of the white Katanga society and through the manipulation of African resentment-in large part that of the Lunda-over the successes of the Luba in being integrated into colonial structures (Jewssiewicki, 1989). This means that

“... regionalism is a form of political articulation of collective identities in societies where national integration in the form of the complete mobility of the workforce and of capital is only a gradually realized event. Ethnic identification and awareness would then be a type of political framework belonging to societies where wage-remunerated migrant labour and non-economic management of the workforce and the means of production are dominant. It would, in this view, be a form of white political management, but it would be a form of African internal control over the city-country space for as long as the social autonomy of the cities and the capitalization of agriculture had yet to be accomplished.” (Jewssiewicki, 1989)

It has been argued that the specifically ethnic politicization of social change in Africa since the 1950s and its continuation afterwards may be explained by several factors:

“(1) the authoritarian nature of the colonial state and its absence from any local social involvement; (2) the fundamental racial division underlying colonial society and the existence in the Congo of a political culture of race; (3) the fundamentally uneven growth of the colonial economy which was intensified in the 1950s; (4) the internal necessity for the dominant groups within African society of containing the economic emancipation of women and youth that was based on the increasing monetization of society; and (5) a tentative and ambiguous convergence of the interests of the 'traditional' rural elite and 'modern' urban elites.” (Jewssiewicki, 1989).

This trend has tended to be institutionalized among the African elite by the growth of “modern” forms of civic organisations, such as “... the growing political role of associations of graduates and former students from which the future political leaders sprang” (Jewssiewicki, 1989), emphasized which had specific ethno-regional dimensions. The expression of this in the regionally uneven access to social services (health; literacy; social welfare; potable water; food support etc) is a recurrent cause for ethnic based struggles for state resources and services redistribution. [More]

Unequal access to social services and infrastructure in South Africa is grossly inequitable, since the former apartheid government prioritized facility provision for the white population at the expense of black communities confined to ‘homelands’ and townships (Country profile, South Africa). Black people at 75% of the population, still receive only 35% of national income, while fifty-seven per cent of black people live below the poverty line, compared with only 2.1% of white people (Ibid).

While the data is weak on social access differentials, the access to health services in Kenya on a provincial basis tend to imply that some ethnic groups in given provinces generally attain socio-economic dominance (Table 4-5).

Table 4-5: Health Institutions by Province Kenya, 1990

Province	Hospitals	Health Centers	Health sub-centers and Dispensaries
Nairobi	31	18	139
Coast	26	32	162
Eastern	42	43	223
North-Eastern	3	6	31
Central	44	46	234
Rift Valley	61	65	357
Nyanza	42	49	254
Western	19	40	64
Total, 1989	268	299	1,564
Total, 1988	264	294	1,555

Source: Economic Survey, 1991

While statistics on ethnic shares of social service access are limited, data on the provincial distribution of health services is frequently aligned somewhat with ethnicity (Table 4-6) in Zimbabwe.

4.3 External (international) dimensions of accumulation, power and resources control

The fact that colonial governance systems and policies promoted ethnic and racial socio-economic dominance through specific models of structuring state power, ethnic identity and resources allocations has been established. The continued importance of external neo-colonial forces in fostering ethnic and race based socio-economic dominance, exclusion and conflict tends however to be underplay by dominant discourses which instead focus on “internalist” perspectives which argue that African ethnic

primordial tendencies are central to the socio-political implosion and conflict in Africa, whose weak governance systems are essentialised as having atomistic tendencies. While internal mobilisation of ethnicity for socio-economic dominance has been critical, external factors remain critical.

Table 4-6: Medical Institution by Province, 1999

Region	Hospitals	Clinic	Total
Manicaland	56	206	262
Mashonaland Central	26	103	129
Mashonaland East	34	160	194
Mashonaland West	33	129	162
Matebeleland North	26	73	99
Matebeleland South	29	84	113
Midlands	57	177	234
Masvingo	43	133	176
Harare	2	52	54
Chitungwiza	1	4	5
Bulawayo	3	18	21
Total 2001	310	1139	1449

The external forces of concern in the genesis and reproduction of socio-economic dominance can be found in both “northern” state governance interventions and economic interactions with Africa as well as in Africa sub-regional or neighbouring states interventions in various African states. The latter process is most prominent in some countries such as the DRC, Liberia, Rhodesia, Nigeria, Mozambique, Angola etc where inter-state conflict has been extreme, while the former is more generalized in Africa, albeit more prominent in the mineral resource rich African states. But different sets of issues, interest and events define the incidence and character of the external forces which shape the problems of ethnic dominance, exclusion and conflict.

For example, whereas ethnic clashes were not new to the Kivus region of the DRC, sub-regional or neighbouring state interventions have attempted to shape ethnic dominance patterns there through regional armed conflict for long (Moyroud and Katanga, 2002). Thus “... during the early 1990s a number of clashes had occurred along the eastern border between Zaire, Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda, primarily between communities of Tutsi origin (Banyamulenge) resident in the DRC and local communities of other ethnic origins but the DRC internal conflict dynamics were reinforced by the influx of the large number of Rwandan refugees and armed Hutus, exacerbating tension between Hutus and Tutsis of south of Kivu” (Ibid). Many localized conflicts between various communities (such as Hema/Lendu/Ngiti in the Orientale province) also emerged, and the announced restrictions on the people of Tutsi descent-who had lived in the DRC for generations –acted as a major triggering event and provided the opportunity to recruit an armed rebel movement that galvanized the Tutsis and other groups

in opposition to Mobutu's unpopular government in Kinshasa (Ibid). Rwandan military forces prominently provided aid and direction to the rebellion that included Tutsis and other discontent groups, given that its primary objective was to enter the eastern DRC and eliminate Interharamwe and ex-FAR forces (Ibid). While the conflict in the DRC was originally focused on the east, it developed into a national war which overthrew Mobutu and then in 1998 to fighting in the northern, eastern and western parts of the DRC, between the Congolese forces under Laurent Kabila and several rebel factions (Ibid).

This escalation and regionalization of conflict and polarization in the central Africa region became a source of ethnic and inter-state mobilisation of dominance over access and use of mineral and other resources. The rebels' stated case was corruption, cronyism and nepotism in Kabila's regime, but the relation between Kabila and the governments of Rwanda and Uganda had turned sour over the ostensible persistence of Interharamwe rebel movements in the eastern Congo, and the loss of entrenched resource exploitation opportunities by these neighbours and foreign northern governments. By the late 1990, the DRC however had acquired a new balance of power divided into zones of external in military control and resource exploitations. (Ibid). Countries which supported the DRC (Angola and Zimbabwe in particular) became part of this national partition. This strategy of internal-external alliances provided a framework for a socio-economic dominance structure founded on ethno-regional politicization and foreign resource extraction and trade. The sources of the overall Great Lakes conflict are structural and relate to external interests.

In particular the external demand for, coltan a combination of Columbium- tantalite 80% of the reserves of which are found in the DRC (which forms of the basis of high-tech global commodity chain) has become one of the driving forces behind the war in the DRC and the presence of rival militias (Moyroud and Katanga, 2002).

Countries such as Angola, Sierra Leone and Liberia have seen the mobilisation by ethnically based groups of rebellions, which have been financed by mineral and resources exploitation (diamonds, timber etc), and in which international trade has been critical. [More]

4.4 Some Gender dimensions

The results of ethnic and racial mobilisation for dominance in Africa have distinctly gendered patterns, which are not well documented, largely because the discourse on ethnic and racial socio-economic dominance tends to be weak on the gender dimensions of the inequalities and repression that accompany

ethnic and race differentiation processes. As it is, "... ethnicity has been implicitly recognized until now as strictly a matter involving men, because, according to the patriarchal model, men transmitted only identity to their offspring (Jewssiewicki, 1989). This was apparently so because the indigène in colonial society was excluded from the Napoleonic Code and could legally convey no property to his descendants (Ibid). A more accurate hypothesis would suggest, however, that men, as the only recognized wage-earners in colonial society, transmitted class position to other men (Ibid) As, despite massive evidence demonstrating it, the real proletarianization of women was never recognized by either colonial legislation or historians (Ibid). African women transmitted a legal status of 'native', the basis of which lay in race.

Yet gender has been a major instrument used to mobilise dominance seeking actions. Cultural identity and language are critical to the whole process of African socialization, and have been "... transmitted by women and peer groups (children and adolescents of the streets, neighbourhoods and compounds) which formed according to principles we have not yet learned and whose impact on the reproduction of the expressed identity we are unable to determine" (Jewssiewicki, 1989). Schools mobilised "wage-class socialization and status-related (racial) identity", among natives, and most schools were located in the church (Ibid). This type of socialization (underpinned by patriarchal values) has been central to the reproduction of the political system, as well as for the political culture of ethnicity" (Ibid), using motherhood as the central channel. Yet women suffer the brunt of such differential dominance.

Employment discrimination by race in South Africa affected blacks and 'coloureds' women in ways which entrenched gendered inequity. For instance, when women "... increasingly entered farm wage labour in their own rights, they did so mainly as irregular or casual agricultural workers. [However]... labour laws had excluded these two main sectors of African women's activity from legal organisation and bargaining, protective legislation, workmen's compensation etc reinforced women's vulnerability and powerlessness. [Thus] "... domestic services and farm labour ... employed significant numbers of 'Coloured' women in the Cape (Table 4-6) [such that] in 1970 they constituted almost 70% [and] between 10.2-11.2% of this total sector in the Cape and the country [respectively]. Conditions of service were ... extremely poor and wages extremely low. [Moreover] ... employers and/or the system ... often used measures to divide the two blacks and coloureds] groups, [including the dichotomies of rural (illegal)/urban, African/Coloured, in their deliberate choices of domestic workers as a strategy to divide and rule and hence control these workers at the individual level" (Casaburri, 1989). Racial discrimination in employment along gender lines was most apparent in South Africa, where statistical evidence is most available (Table 4-7).

Table 4-7: Percentage of domestic servants by race and sex in eleven principal urban areas in South Africa

Urban area	African		White		Coloured		Asian	
	female	male	female	male	female	male	female	male
Cape Town	20.3	4.2			68.5	4.2		
Port Elizabeth	72.8	5.3			20.9	0.8		
East London	89	8.3			2.5	0.3		
Kimberly	70.4	12.4			14.9	2.3		
Natal					0.3	0.3		
Pietmaritzburg	65.8	33						
Durban	59.5	38.8						
Transval								
Pretoria	77.1	20.3			2.3	0.3		
Bloemfontein	80.8	14.8			3.7	0.7		
Vaal Triangle	84.3	13.5			2.2			
OFS Goldfields	85.6	11.7			1.8	0.9		

Source: South African Department of Statistics

Gender discrimination on racial grounds was also institutionalised in the manufacturing sector in South Africa where “... female employment in the manufacturing sector remained constant at 15-16% between 1946 and 1960 and it had increased... by 1976 to 21%. [there was] decline in the occupation of white females and the relative constancy of coloured females” (Casaburri, 1989). Since these jobs were the more menial types.

Table 4-8: Female wage employees in manufacturing

Year	1946		1951		1960		1976	
	a	b	a	b	a	b	a	b
Asians	1	0	2	0	3	1	10	2
Africans	5	1	8	1	17	2	36	8
coloured	36	1	39	6	40	6	34	4
whites	58	9	51	8	40	6	20	4
Total	100	16	100	15	100	15	100	21

NB: column b indicate female employment as a % of total manufacturing

Source: Based on Occupational Census 1936, in U.G. November 12, 1942

Domestic work was thus reserved for blacks and coloureds while the whites and Asians had greater access to secretarial and clerical work in various institutions, reinforcing the hierarchy of gender and class discrimination through education and employment.

The racial and gender differential in employment of senior levels (Director General to Government Administrator and related managerial categories) demonstrates the top end of such discrimination (Table 4-9).

These differential patterns of socio-economic dominance appear over time to have exacerbated major Africa conflicts as we briefly discuss next.

Table 4-9: Racial and Gender Breakdown of Senior Positions, 1991

Gender	White	Colored	Indian	Black	Total
Male	6641 (91, 5%)	45	43	185	6914
Female	323 9 (4, 45%)	2	9	10	344 (4, 74%)
Total	6964 (95, 9%)	47	52	195	7258 (100%)

Source: Business Day, Wednesday, November 6, 1991. (Mokgoro, 1994)

4.5 Resource conflicts, ethnicity and race

Having assessed the ethnic/racial socio-economic dominance patterns in Africa, an attempt is made to “correlate” ethnicity with some of the key conflicts. The aim is decipher whether socio-economic dominance, associated with the control of key resources, explains such conflicts. This analysis is limited to those countries where “visible” conflicts have emerged, given the limitations of existing data on conflicts and resource shares.

At least 15 sub-Saharan African countries have experienced major resource based conflicts with an ethnic dimension to it as shown below (Chart 4-1). By far the greatest number of these conflicts entail struggles over high value minerals (diamonds, oil, gold etc), while land countries feature in many other countries.

As mentioned earlier most of the conflicts are regionally focused given the site-specific endowment of mineral resources, as well as the competition for specific arable lands located in particular regions of these countries. In general inward migration to such zones for agricultural settlement, employment or mineral resource extraction has tended to escalate competition for the scarce resource or for the relatively small share of the benefits allocated to local communities. Where a sharp ethnic divide exists, ethnicity has been mobilized in related resource conflicts, while the major share of benefits tend to be exported.

5.0 Policy responses to Socio-economic Dominance and Exclusion

Having examined the patterns of ethnic and racial socio-economic dominance and conflicts this section provides a brief assessment of selected public (state) policies and non-state actions, which have been adopted to redress ethnic and racial socio-economic inequalities. We discuss these experiences in 2 sub-

sections beginning first with a review of the broad conceptual and contextual framework within which such interventions have tended to be applied, and then by present case studies of the interventions, and then summarise the lessons.

5.1 Framework and context of responses

African experiences with redressing the political and socio-economic imbalances arising from ethnic and racial dominance and exclusion are varied in terms of the problem definition, approaches used to deliver redress, the nature of institutions and participants involved in the responses, the results achieved and the context within which responses are crafted or emerge.

Chart 4-1: Major Conflicts in Africa: Resources and Ethnicity

Country	Presence of conflict (Yes/No)	Level	Resource Conflict	Ethnic Conflict
Angola	Yes	National	Minerals	Yes
Burundi	Yes	National	Land/(Power)	Yes
Chad	Yes	Local	Minerals	?
Condo Republic	No	National	Oil	?
Cote d'Ivoire	Yes	National	Land	Yes
DRC	Yes	Regional	Minerals	Yes
Eritrea	Yes	Regional	Border dispute/ Land	Yes
Ethiopia	Yes	Regional	Border/ Land	Yes
Kenya	Yes	Regional	Land/ Power	Yes
Liberia	Yes	National	Minerals	Yes
Nigeria	Yes	Regional	Mineral/ Land	Yes
Rwanda	Yes	National	Land/ Power	Yes
Sierra Leone	Yes	National	Mineral/ Power	Yes
Somalia	Yes	National	Mineral/ Power	Yes
Sudan	Yes	National	Mineral/ power	Yes (race/ ethnic)
Uganda	Yes	Regional	Land/ Power	Yes
Zimbabwe	Yes	National	Land	Race

An important observation to be made about the search for lessons to be learnt and strategies that can be promoted to address problems of ethnic socio-economic dominance is the weakness of the conceptual and contextual framework of intervention discourse. Generally much of this discourse is focused on visible or notable country level cases where conflicts have matured and extreme violent conflict has emerged. Generally such that the focus of debate becomes pre-occupied with armed struggle related conflict management and peace-building. This pre-occupation while warranted by the dire need to resolve the attendant humanitarian, economic and political crises that arise in such high profile cases, tends to overlook the ubiquitous low profile incipient and simmering, and in many cases intra-country sub-regional or local level cases of conflict over dominance and exclusion. Moreover the literature while replete with evidence of such low profile conflicts-in-the-making has tended to underplay their long term implications for ethnic exclusionary processes. In this vein not only are such weak analyses and

intervention approaches usually a bit too little and late, but they tend to be diverted to focus on issues of the wider fallout of conflict and to underplay subtle processes through which dominance is built.

Another preoccupation of the literature and policy on redressing African ethnic conflict is that related peace building interventions tend to focus on more global and systemic strategies of change centred on neo-liberal approaches to “governance” reforms. The recent 1990’s governance reform experience in Africa for instance tended to place ordinate faith in short term prescriptive efforts to “democratize” nations quickly, by establishing liberal political institutions such as new constitutions and multi-partyism, without due regard for the social and economic content of the African crises. Such efforts have misplaced their confidence in the feasibility of political change over short time periods and /or seen the replication of ethnic dominance building strategies by new “pro-democracy” regimes.

Frustrations with the poor results of systemic governance reforms in Africa as a tool for addressing extreme forms of dominance and exclusion has thus given greater currency to the higher risk political intervention strategies seeking rapid regime change through military intervention or armed insurrection, some of which is intentionally suppressed, as well as through the use of international sanctions and isolation as means of redress. These strategies have tended to turn most African conflict situations into quagmires of armed and violent political confrontation, given that the root causes of internal and external struggles for the control of mineral resources, land and access to limited social services and employment are not addressed.

Thus, these approaches to redressing conflicts over socio-economic dominance, have tended to avoid tackling the fundamental and long term failures of economic policies and the political systems to accommodate and balance ethnic and racial difference and competitive resource demands. The literature has in this context failed to learn from those countries which have over the long past term adapted their political systems and economic policies towards containing or balancing ethnic socio-economic dominance and exclusion (e.g. Botswana, Senegal), while underplaying the importance of recognizing the wide array of strategies and mechanisms that can or have been used to redress such imbalances. Our concern therefore in this section is to go beyond the insurrectionary and ambitious systemic governance and regime change approaches to redress, and to provide a few examples of how some of the more “reformist” responses to dominance and exclusion have fared in Africa, so as to elucidate their potentials and to learn from their flaws.

The major challenge however in discussing responses to dominance and exclusion phenomenon is the inter-subjectivity that informs the definition of the nature and causes of the phenomenon itself. Where the problem has been defined and is perceived by the actors as an organic question of tribalism *per se* or is reduced to simple formulae of ethnicisation processes of political and socio-economic dominance and exclusion, the tendency has been to focus on simplistic sociological panacea to the neglect of the more complex array of political and socio-economic factors. Thus, economic inputs into dominance patterns such as the effects of economic structural shifts, the inadequacy of the growing marketisation process to achieve resources allocation that yield equity and efficiency and the effects of negative global economic process (e.g. prices, market access and competitiveness) on African development and resources distribution tend to be underplayed. Rather the focus on the politics of ethnicity itself and political governance reforms take centre stage. While these are important in the arsenal of measures to respond to ethnic and racial dominance, it is necessary to examine a variety of policies and strategies of redress which go beyond ethnic or racial re-engineering in a sociological and multi-partyist sense.

Our discussion below thus focuses on selected experiences with strategies or measures used to redress ethnic and racial imbalances such as: the role that constitutionalism in the context of multi-partyism has been used to address ethnic grievances; how negotiated settlements based on reconciliation and accommodation have been a growing mechanism for redress; how political power sharing processes through various mechanisms such as federalism, regional government and decentralization have been used to create a framework for resources distribution; specific measures of ethnic balancing used as a means to attain balanced allocation of resources quotas in aspects such as jobs, political position, education, state contracts and natural resources (including land); specific resources redistribution programmes such as land redistribution; and the use of indigenisation and affirmative action programmes, which in the African context are intended to empower mainly the majority indigenous business interests vis-à-vis minority control of wealth by white settlers and foreign multinational firms.

In discussing strategies and mechanisms of redress it is critical to note that a variety of types of institutions or organisations have tended to be involved. These range from formal national state or government structures to international or multi-lateral inter-governmental interventions and local and national multi-stakeholder and non-state (e.g. NGOs, local peace committees) interventions. In addition responses to ethnic socio-economic imbalance include formal policy advocacy activities by a variety of institutions (community, NGO, multi-lateral etc) as well as non-formal and even illegal self provisioning tactics (land occupation, resource poaching, the market exit option/parallel markets), including also legal confrontational tactics (mass-action, boycotts etc). In general a combination of these forces, together at

times with the effects of armed insurrection, have tended to contribute towards the creation of an environment conducive to the adoption of the various responses discussed next.

5.2 Strategies used to redress ethnic and racial imbalances

5.2.1 Constitutionalism and multiparty electoral change

In general the majority of African states since the 1990's have attempted to use constitutional reforms in a context of multiparty elections to redress imbalances which have ethnic roots. These efforts have tended to be bedevilled by the opportunism of new regimes steeped in the logic of quick resource accumulation by new ruling elites. These transitions have been more difficult in countries with histories of extreme ethnic conflict.

Rwanda's present democratic transition toward a multi-party state for example remains fragile, as many elements continue to enhance extremist attitudes including various behavioural acts of hatred and opposition and confrontation, not only between the members of different ethnic groups, but also between members of the same party with divergent or contradictory ambitions (Twagiramutara, 1998). In this context, to talk about democracy, partnership, distributive and retributive justice, equity for all Rwandans and self-sustained and participatory development involving all the members of the Rwandan community and all its national sensitivities is unrealistic (Ibid). The main gap is the absence of transparency within all sections of the population and the limited individual and collective freedom of press and association, and of mechanisms to safeguard the chances of the disadvantaged gaining access to opportunities (jobs, etc). Constitutionalism has not developed adequate individual and collective measures to prevent the institutionalisation of privilege and to encourage open competition based on talent, competence and ability (Ibid). In this respect ideologies, policies and practices that contribute to encouraging, maintaining and strengthening tendencies of exclusion and, discrimination between people of different ethnicity and region have not been eschewed (Ibid).

The use of constitutional reforms as a framework for addressing ethnic and racial imbalance, through the protection of specific rights and inherited unequal property, and measures against discrimination has perhaps been best tried in South Africa. The approach which focuses on regulating public institutions is notable as they "... are legally required in terms of the Constitution of the Republic South Africa Act (Act 108 of 1996) to enhance and promote effective and efficient management of resources through cost-effective and sustainable delivery of services to all South Africans irrespective of their ethnic or cultural backgrounds. A series of legislative measures promulgated since the introduction of the 1993

Interim Constitution attempt to deal with potential and anticipated ethnic conflicts in both the public and private domains. For example, the Employment Equity Act, (Act 55 of 1998), Skills Development Act, (Act 32 of 2000) and White Paper on Transformation of the Public Sector of 1995. The most profound implications of these Acts is at the implementation phase whereby policy implementers are reluctant to give effect to these policies. Ethnic conflicts in the public sector are sometimes unbearable and therefore forces government to intervene because some managers are deliberately ignoring the implementation of government policies (Giliomme, 1998).

5.2.2 Negotiated settlements: reconciliation and accommodation

The search for negotiated settlements as a means of resolving conflicts steeped in racial and ethno-regional conflict has been increasing in the last decade since the successful political transitions experienced in Namibia, South Africa, Mozambique and others. The experience of these efforts have been...

Attempts at national reconciliation across racial, tribal and regional lines were first really seen in Zimbabwe, where in 1980 Mugabe's government pronounced:

“I urge you, whether you are black or white, to join me in a new pledge, forget our grim past, forgive others and forget, join hands in a new amity, and together, as Zimbabweans, trample upon racialism, tribalism and regionalism and work to reconstruct and rehabilitate our economic machinery”.

This reconciliation approach lasted for 20 years, while black-black conflict grew. Later, some attempt at ethnic balancing in political position was after unity between rival ethnic parties in 1989 (Table 4-10), but this has not diminished allegations of ethnic resource mobilisation since then. Instead the conflict shifted to white-black struggles over land, and continued allegations of Shona dominance in the socio-economy.

Attempts to use negotiated settlement in recent times have occurred at the regional level in the DRC, Sierra Leone, etc. Following over six years of armed conflict in the DRC for example the central African region is characterised by the lack of effective regional conflict resolution mechanisms. Various ad hoc and informal diplomatic mediation initiatives to end what had become an unprecedented regional conflict had emerged (Moyroud and Katanga, 2002). In 1998 a peace initiatives aimed to establish a ceasefire came directly from outside central Africa from such diverse actors as the OAU, Libya, or the NGO Sant'Egidio and the SADC. In July 1999, the Congolese government, rebel groups and the states, which had been supporting the various Congolese sides, signed the SADC, led Lusaka Accords. This

agreement was followed by 18 months of deadlock and continued armed engagement between its signatories, which came to an end with the assassination of Kabila on 16 January 2001 (Ibid). The international community immediately adopted the strategy that recognized the new president, and invited him to break with the policies of his father and to implement the Lusaka Accords, and to join the inter-Congolese dialogue facilitated by Sir Ketumile Masire, former president of Botswana, as well as to accommodate the deployment of UN military observers' mission for the DRC (MONUC) (Ibid). Only once Thabo Mbeki of South Africa secured an agreement on 20 July 2002 between Kabila and Rwandan leader Paul Kagame did the Lusaka Accords resurrect to pave the way for an inclusive negotiated settlement, (Moyroud and Katanga, 2002) which by now coordinated the inputs of all national, African and international efforts to mediate.

Table 4-10: the top ten leaders of the new ZANU (PF)

Position	Name	Ethnic Group	Former Party
President	Robert Mugabe	Shona (Zezuru)	ZANU
CO-Vice President	Simon Muzenda	Shona (Karanga)	ZANU
CO-Vice President	Joshua Nkomo	Ndebele(Kalanga)	ZAPU
National Chairman	Joseph Msika	Ndebele (Kalanga)	ZAPU
Admin Secretary	Didymus Mutasa	Shona (Ndau)	ZANU
Info. Secretary	Nathan Shamuyaria	Shona (Zezuru)	ZANU
Legal Secretary	Edson Zvobgo	Shona (Karanga)	ZANU
Labor Secretary	John Nkomo	Ndebele (Kalanga)	ZAPU
Security Secretary	Sidney Sekeremayi	Shona (Manyika)	ZANU
Political Commissar	Morven Mahachi	Shona (Manyika)	ZANU
External Secretary	Emerson Munangagwa	Shona (Karanga)	ZANU
Production Secretary	Dumiso Dabengwa	Ndebele (Kalanga)	ZAPU

Source: Sithole, 1998

Sub-national or local level non-state efforts to mediate ethnic resource based conflicts, in the wake of the failure of national level governance reforms through constitutional and electoral change, are also a growing response in Africa. In Kenya for example, the mediation of local conflicts in an area most affected by tribal clashes and cattle rustling and land ownership, where the peace processes had not enjoyed the support of the Government nor of local politicians, was led by a non-state multi-actor forum, and remarkable efforts to restore peace were experienced in the Rift valley region (Peacenet-Kenya, 2001). A sizable number of relief, advocacy and development agencies which work in this region, including the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCKK), the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission (CJPC), provincial administration, NPI/Roman Catholic, ECJP, Clean, GTZ, PACVAC,

SACDEP, OXFAM the media and the donors (Ibid), collaborated to resolve the problems (Ibid). Their approach entailed the local level analysis of the situation in affected areas and various methodologies of reconciling warring groups, including: the formation of self help groups, organization of mediation workshops, relief food programmes, formation of peace building committees (PBC), civic education, and the establishment of a case monitor (Ibid). Various activities were adopted to promote inter-ethnic interactions including: good neighbourhood groups, seminars, ball games, youth festivities, rehabilitating social structures (e.g. schools police posts) and emergency interactions such as the provision of food, resettlement facilities and, farm inputs, and the economic empowerment; women and youth, backed by awareness creation through posters and information updates (Ibid). However, some of the shortcomings of the initiative arose as a result of: limited resources (human and financial), weak coordination among the actors and mistrust between and among the affected people, peace workers and leaders mainly due to lack of accountability and transparency.

Some international community or multilateral efforts at producing negotiated settlement have tended to fail because of their focus on super structural issues of political accommodation at the level of leadership to the neglect of the underlying but growing local level grievances and conflict over land and natural resources. For example, the United Nations, the EC and the Djibouti government facilitated a number of peace and reconciliation efforts in Somalia, these failed to take root, even though some of them had positive impacts (Farah, Hussein and Lind, 2002). The UN tried official diplomacy by targeting directly the warring groups, mainly the warlords, while the EC and the Djibouti government tried unofficial diplomacy by targeting members of civil society (Ibid). But critically none of these initiatives considered the importance of land issues in the conflict or the relationship between deegan and political strength, resulting in continued local level conflict.

The tactic of using national level judicial enquiries or commissions to mediate ethnic and race conflicts is perhaps the most “tried and tested” approach so far used to address ethnic and racial. But it has tended to have limited effect. Land commissions, chieftaincy commissions and other commissions abound. For example, “... a Judicial Commission of inquiry noted that the Fulani cattle grazers used their economic might in getting official support of the cause (Farah, Hussein and Lind, 2002). Another interesting case is the Zambian Luvale and Lunda case (Ibid) where judicial enquiry led to the creation of new ethnic districts which in the subsequent years resulted in enter-ethnic conflict between two districts.

But the design of efforts to resolve ethno-regional resource based conflicts which involve sub-regional neighbouring countries has perhaps been the most complex, and one in which the experience obtained has been limited as was seen in the DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Mozambique cases. The most striking experience is that of Liberia, whose crisis is entangled with the Sierra Leone crisis, where the application of contradictory conflict management mechanisms emerged. While Liberia agreed to a negotiated settlement involving the exiling of its president Charles Taylor aided and abetted by Nigeria, Sierra Leone followed a judicial retributive approach, aided and abetted by the international court of justice system. After eight years of civil strife ended in 1997 free and open presidential and legislative election were held. In 2001 the UN imposed sanctions on Liberian diamonds, along with an arms embargo and a travel ban on government officials, for Liberia's support of the rebel insurgency in Sierra Leone. Renewed rebel activity has further eroded stability and economic activity. A regional peace initiative commenced in the spring of 2003 but was disrupted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) indictment of President Taylor on war crime charges (Sepdata, 2002).

Negotiated settlements thus face the dilemma of retribution and reconciliation. The emphasis on conflict management efforts which entail ethnic balancing while punishing miscreants in public position, has had limited success in relative terms, when compared to the emergent approaches focused on "truth and reconciliation". For example in Burundi, the law on public order and security was applied to arrest and try those members of the armed force that were charged with arbitrary repression (Davnier, Hasler and Spencer, 1996). This created a climate of understanding, and collaboration between the gendarmerie and the people to the extent that suspicion and hatred were soon to be replaced by mutual confidence. But in the wake of entrenched ethnic hatred and the search for full retribution extremist groups of Tutsi origin accused the government of setting up government with important posts given to the perceived perpetrator group, such as that of Prime Minister a Hutu, and some military officers attempted a coup which but failed (Ibid). This led to continued further ethnic conflict (Ibid).

5.2.3 Power-sharing strategies: federalism, regional autonomy and ethnic balancing

Most political measures used to de-escalate ethnicity and the ethnic conflict paradoxically emphasize the very ethnic and regional diversity. The most important tool which so far been used with relative success is the adoption of federalism and other consociational model of conflict resolution (Osaghae, 1992 cited by Oyugi, 1998). In this context, for example, various mechanisms of ethnic balancing such as the use of the ethnic quota allocation principle (budgets, jobs, etc), the creation of more state and local government authorities to represent sub-ethnic groups and other constitutional provisions that encourage cross-cultural networks have been used to address the ethnic question in Nigeria (Ibid). However, this

approach to ethnic balancing in public policy so far has reflected more the desires of the ethnic fractions of the ruling class which compete for privilege, and not the regulation of political conflict in a harmonious political community (Nnoli, 1989 cited by Oyugi, 1998; Egwu, 1998).

But federalism has at times been rejected at great cost in Africa. For example, the threat of demands for federalism and secessionism led Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana to make some concessions to other pro-federalist and pro-secessionist parties by creating regional assemblies, which were given limited autonomy with respect to local government, within a unitary state (Oyugi, 1998). However he soon abolished the Regional Assemblies on the ground that they were too expensive to run and that they had tended to breed disunity among people (Ibid). In the process he also promulgated several other Acts of Parliament in a bid to cripple all forms of opposition, which he thought, tended to promote ethnic conflicts. Nkrumah was able to suppress or hold in abeyance all forms of opposition and ethnic conflicts, which had threatened his ideology, and policy of national building (Ibid) but eventually fell to a military coup, which nonetheless retained the unitary state resulting in frequently changing balances of ethnic control.

The motivation to address ethnic tensions in various ethno-regional contexts has increasingly been led by elites seeking to attract state investment into their rural districts of origin. One author (Papstein, 1989) suggests for example that: “Luvale and Lunda intellectuals and civil servants, some of whom now hold important national positions,attribute ...the lack of 'development' in [their] potentially rich agricultural area [to] tribal strife and antagonism which lead the central government [limit its]... investment of resources in an area where localism [can] hinder.. [such investment]. The major locally perceived reason why the [ethnic conflict] issue must be settled is that this would be a first step towards economic development, better school and medical services, and the creation of an infrastructure which would allow local farmers and fishermen greater participation in the national economy” (Ibid).

Attempts at ethnic and racial balancing at the level of political position and power in order to redress socio-economic imbalances have been the most frequently tried but unsuccessful response to dominance, exclusion and resultant conflicts. This is the case especially where this has been tried in a top-down approach and selective manner by apex leadership such as presidents and kings, who are interested parties, to the exclusion of the victims in the agreements.

5.2.4 Resource redistributive reforms

Few efforts at radical redistribution of resources such as land which have been held along racial or ethnic lines have been attempted in Africa. The notable experiences include land nationalisation and allocation to indigenous peoples (in Zambia, Angola, Tanzania, Mozambique, Algeria), partial land redistribution processes using market based land acquisition procedures (in Kenya, Zimbabwe in the 1980's, South Africa, Namibia, Swaziland, Botswana) and direct comprehensive land repossession using land occupations and legal expropriation instruments (in Zimbabwe since 2000). Some of these experiences were preceded by protracted armed struggle (Kenya, Mozambique, Angola, Algeria and Zimbabwe), while others were derived from negotiated independence settlements (Zambia, Swaziland). The major tension with resource redistribution strategies has tended to be the relative efficiency of market procedures as a means of redistributing land held in speculative monopolies vis-à-vis the nature of reallocated resources within the constraints imposed by liberal political constitutions and law. In the context of extreme racial enmity and the absence of state finances to peacefully acquire lands, during political and economic crisis periods, it is not unusual that communities have been mobilised to physically occupy land by diverse political interests, (South Africa, Kenya, etc), and even co-opted by the ruling parties or state (e.g. in Zimbabwe since 2000).

Other methods of resource redistribution which have been attempted in Africa during the 1960s and 1970s, include the nationalisation of large industries, banks and commercial enterprises and their conversion into parastatals for the general public benefit. This mechanism soon ran into the problem of inefficient management of patronage distribution, frequently on ethnic grounds. In the wake of the privatisation of such parastatals, the key problems have been their cheap sale to foreign interests and allegations that the new indigenous owners tend also to be corruptly selected, at times through ethnic patronage processes.

5.2.5 Affirmative action: indigenisation and empowerment initiatives

The reversal of past race based discrimination has perhaps been best attempted in the social sphere. For instance, education has been rigorously addressed in former settler colonial Africa, where blacks increasingly have the upper hand. For example in South Africa, “the change from apartheid to a democratic South Africa has brought about the transition from a racial and elite education to mass higher education in South Africa” (Kaya, 2000). [There is] ... an increasing number of students in higher educational institutions, especially black students in the historically white universities. This is a challenge to the professoriate in these institutions because traditional curriculum frameworks must be adopted to serve a more comprehensive cohort of students with a wider set of concerns, to which some

universities are responding faster than others. The challenge of past neglect is found mostly "... in the historically black universities who ... had either no exposure to the use of computer facilities or due to financial constraints have no access to these facilities. In the historically white universities where students have access to internet facilities, the advent of Global Information challenges the traditional notions of teaching space by reducing the need for lecture halls and other infrastructure of the traditional university" (Ibid).

Similarly the mining sector and large businesses have since 1994 been persuaded to allocate shares to indigenous blacks as a means of redressing racial imbalances in economic wealth. While a few large black corporations have emerged out of affirmative action equity transfer in South Africa (e.g. NAIL, etc), these initiatives remain limited and the racial structures of wealth control and employment remains skewed. In recent times a new comprehensive programme of Black economic Employment (BEE) based upon equity sharing, race employment, gender and the allocation of state licenses, contracts and concessions has been launched in South Africa. This approach represents an attempted negotiated accommodation of the majoritarian elite interests by dominant white minority interests. Its results are yet to be seen.

In addition to these two redistributive approaches, milder forms of resource reallocations have been attempted through affirmative action programmes. The most recent at this are found in South Africa. Black economic empowerment (BEE) in South Africa is a joint effort by the government and private companies to restructure apartheid's unjust economic and resource control legacy. BEE represents one of the largest efforts of affirmative action intended to voluntarily shift asset holdings in modern history, which builds on the South African government's demonstrated skill of "... striking a balance between promoting social engineering and heeding the legitimate concerns of business" (Financial Times, 2003). It entails "broad-based women's empowerment" and affirming the "historically disadvantaged individuals" of black, mixed-race coloured and Indian descent. Cyril Ramaphosa (Financial Times, 2003) calls BEE "another revolution" following the negotiated political transition process that ended apartheid. "It's not grab and run – it's taking place in as orderly a way as our political transformation," says Cyril Ramaphosa (Ibid). Given South Africa's highly unequal income, wealth and assets distribution, and the social exclusion, which it brings, social and economic inclusion of black people in the mainstream economy is intended to promote faster economic growth and enhanced political stability, and to pre-empt the perceived potential for populist redistribution, that Zimbabwe's land reform tinged by racial divisions took since 2000.

Black empowerment has however many contradictions, especially the creation of a few black economic oligarchs. The “BEE tycoons,” which entail about 10 men are favoured by white –owned businesses, are rapidly building up stakes in the mining, media and other industrial sectors (Ibid) and they exhibit monopolistic tendencies. But some critics suggest that BEE charters and related rules may over-regulate the economy and deter investment (Financial Times, 2003). For instance Sasol, (the chemicals and fuels group) cited BEE as a risk factor in its reports at the New York stock exchange (Ibid). South Africa's established industrial magnates however seek greater tax incentives to effect racial wealth transformation. Indeed the Democratic Alliance, a largely white-supported opposition party, has demanded that 2010 be set as the deadline for the BEE, while suggesting that: “BEE has lent itself to manipulation and abuse by well connected ANC cronies" (Ibid). Moelesti Mbeki argues that BEE enriches a few black people rather than South Africa's economically disenfranchised masses, and accuses white- controlled companies of taking the path of least resistance on BEE by swapping equity control or board seats for political connections. “The oligarchies are now trying to deracialise their club by buying black members into their oligarchies,” ... (Financial Times, 2003).

BEE reverses South Africa's former apartheid regime's affirmative action aimed at increasing the economic participation of poor white Afrikaners. The new black-led government after 1994 introduced empowerment legislation such as procurement rules favouring black suppliers (Ibid). Many policy makers feel that the BEE processes have not gone far enough, although since 2000, South Africa saw its first “voluntary” sectoral BEE charter, (in the liquid fuels industry), in which companies, including foreigners, have to transfer at least 25 % of their equity to black owners within 10 years. The BEE charter for the mining sector, which was approved in 2003, requires companies to cede 15 per cent of ownership to “historically disadvantaged” South Africans within five years and 26 per cent within 10 years. Some investors see this as a gradual nationalization process, there has been a tendency for shares to be sold in a panic, leading to share declines as companies scramble to meet the requirements (Financial Times, 2003).

The moral and the economic rationale behind BEE is that it brings more black people into the formal economy and can as leads to a bigger consumer market, more jobs and investment. Its critics say BEE encourages tokenism and suppresses genuine entrepreneurship, while keeping the bulk of South Africa's economy in white hands. White's still dominate most companies' senior management and black-controlled companies account for only about 3 per cent of the JSE Securities Exchange's capitalization (Ibid). According to the BusinessMap Foundation, a Johannesburg Research Institute “It is quite easy for

any white company to abide by the legislation and still not comply with the spirit of BEE.” (Financial Times, 2003)

South Africa’s black “new rich” are however insignificant compared to the white industrial elites since according to Mr. Macozoma (Financial Times, 2003) only five black people in the country have assets worth more than R100 million. Yet BEE supporters argue that it was not designed for poverty-relief scheme, and that South Africa’s government is addressing unemployment, hunger, poverty and unequal access to education through other programmes. While BEE focuses on black equity control and encourages preferential procurement measures which involve many black people, it seeks to increase black managers in business and promotes training and the provision of services to poorer communities. The BEE policy is also backed by other policies such as the employment equity regulations (Kemp, 2002), which govern, employers with 50% or more employees; Employers with a turnover threshold as stipulated in schedule 4 of the employment Equity Act; Municipalities and organs of state and any employer bound by a collective agreement in terms of 23 and 31 of the Labour Relations Act. Companies with more than 150 employees are required to submit annual empowerment equity reports each year and those with less than 150 employees submit a report every 2 years (Kemp, 2002).

The weakest link for BEE is that whites hold 75% of South Africa's top management positions, compared to 8% for blacks, 13% for the "coloureds" and 4% for Indians. Added to this blacks do not have capital to engage in BEE "deals". Doing empowerment deals is complicated according to Manning (Ibid): “often the people who come into the deals do not have the capital that they need, or the skills necessary." Low levels of black education means that there are not enough highly skilled black people to fill all the empowerment positions. The full effects of BEE are yet to be seen.

6.0 Conclusions: summary of findings and lessons

This paper has argued that socio-economic dominance based on ethnic and race factors has become a long standing phenomena in Africa, which was instigated by colonial rule and perpetuated by elite interests in capital accumulation and political power during the post-colonial era. Weak economic performance in general, dependence on the state for basic social and economic resource accumulation and social services, the over-reliance on agricultural resources (land, water, etc) for livelihoods, and negative external transfers, have tended to focus ethnic dominance building strategies on limited resources, restricting the scope for resource sharing and improving livelihoods. Political power through the state has been a key instrument of exclusion, and its maintenance has been sought through extreme

measures, including war. External interests have fomented these dominance building process. Limited success has been achieved in redressing imbalances.

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8.0 Annexes

Annex 1: Social services (Safe, water, sanitation, school enrolment, and literacy)

Country	Population with access to safe water (%)			Population with access to sanitation (%)			Net primary school enrolment (%)		Net secondary school enrolment (%)		Gross tertiary school enrolment		Adult literacy rate (%)			
	Rural 1990-97	Urban 1990-97	Total 1990-97	Rural 1990-97	Urban 1990-97	Total 1990-97	Female 1996-97	Male 1996-97	Female 1996-97	Male 1996-97	Total (%) 1996-97	Females (%) of total 1996-97	Female		Male	
													1985	1995	1985	1995
Angola	22	46	31	27	62	40	34	25	28	34	1					
Botswana	88	100	90	41	91	55	83	78	91	86	6	47	68	78	64	73
Burundi	49	92	52	50	60	51	33	38	14	20	1		25	38	49	55
Cameroon	43	57	50	36	64	50	59	64	35	45	4		50	67	70	80
Chad	17	48	24	7	73	21	35	61	10	26	1		17	31	34	49
Congo	7	53	34			69	76	81	74	94	8		54	72	75	86
DRC	26	89	42	6	53	18	48	69	29	46	2		31	47	59	71
Cote d'Ivoire	32	56	42	17	71	39	50	66	24	45	5		21	36	41	53
Eritrea	8	60	22	0	48	13	28	31	34	41	1	13	26	38	57	66
Ethiopia	19	91	25	7	97	19	27	44	18	32	1	20	18	31	34	42
Ghana	52	88	65	44	62	55					1		44	60	68	79
Kenya	49	67	53	81	69	77	67	63	57	65	2		57	74	79	88
Lesotho	57	91	62	35	56	38	74	63	80	66	2	54	88	93	64	71
Liberia	13	79	46	4	56	30					3		25	34	55	67
Malawi	40	95	47	1	18	3	100	97	54	91	1		36	44	68	73
Mali	55	87	66	3	12	6	31	45	13	23	1	20	17	31	30	46
Mozambique			63			54	34	45	17	28	1	24	16	27	47	58
Namibia	71	100	83	20	93	62	94	89	84	77	9		71	80	76	82
Nigeria	40	58	49	32	50	41					4		35	53	57	70
Rwanda	79			85							1		44	57	63	72
Senegal	44	90	63	15	71	39	54	65	16	24	3		17	26	37	45
Sierra Leone	21	58	34	8	17	11					2					
Somalia			26								2					
South Africa	70	99	87	80	92	87	100	100	97	93			79	84	81	85
Sudan			73			51					4		29	43	59	68
Tanzania	58	92	66	83	98	86	49	48			1	20	48	64	75	83
Uganda	41	77	46	55	75	57					2	33	41	54	68	76
Zambia	10	84	38	57	94	71	72	73	35	49	3		56	69	77	84
Zimbabwe	69	99	79	32	96	52	92	94	56	62	7	36	73	83	85	92

Source: World resource Institute, 2000-2001

Annex 2: Ethnic populations by incomes, wealth and GDP breakdowns

Country	Refugees by country of asylum (1, 000s) 1996	Real GDP per capita (PPPs)		% of population below income poverty line		% of population below 2/3 of national income per capita		Gini coefficients 1980-98	% of households' income spent on food 1991-95
		Poorest 20 % 1980-94	Richest 20 % 1980-94	US\$1 a day (1993 PPP\$1) 1989-98)	National poverty line 1987-97	Urban	Rural		
Angola	9.4	0.54	..
Botswana	0.2	33.3	47.0	0.54	..
DRC	676.0
Lesotho	..	137	2,945	50.4	26.0	0.57	..
Malawi	1.3	42.1	54.0	0.62	..
Mali									
Mauritius	10.6	0.52	..
Mozambique	0.2
Namibia	2.2	0.70	..
South Africa	22.6	516	9,897	11.5	..	82	..	0.59	48
Swaziland	0.6	66.0	0.51	..
Tanzania	498.7	217	1,430	19.9	51.1	52	52	0.38	70
Zambia	131.1	216	2,797	72.6	86.0	75	75	0.50	75
Zimbabwe	0.6	420	6,542	36.0	74.0	0.63	63

Source:

Annex 3: Ethnic populations by incomes, wealth and GDP breakdowns

Country	National poverty lines						International poverty lines						
	Survey year	Population below the poverty line (%)			Survey year	Population below the poverty line (%)			Survey year	Population below \$1 a day %	Poverty gap at \$1 a day (%)	Population below \$2 a day %	Poverty gap at \$2 a day %
		Rural	Urban	National		Rural	Urban	National					
Angola	1991	25.5	1993			17.6					
Botswana									1985-86	33.3	12.5	61.4	30.7
Burundi	1990			36.2									
Cameroon	1984	32.4	44.4	40.0									
Chad	1995-96	67.0	63.0	64.0									
Congo Republic													
Cote d'Ivoire									1995	12.3	2.4	49.4	16.8
DRC													
Eritrea													
Ethiopia									1995	31.3	8.0	76.4	32.9
Gabon													
Ghana	1992	34.3	26.7	31.4									
Kenya	1992	46.4	29.3	42.0					1994	26.5	9.0	62.3	27.5
Lesotho	1993	53.9	27.8	49.2					1993	43.1	20.3	65.7	38.1
Liberia													
Malawi	1990-91			54.0									
Mali									1994	72.8	37.4	90.6	60.5
Mauritius													
Mozambique									1996	37.9	12.0	18.4	36.8
Namibia									1993	34.9	14.0	55.8	30.4
Nigeria	1985	49.5	31.7	43.0	1992-93	36.4	30.4	34.1	1997	70.2	34.9	90.8	59.0
Rwanda	1993			51.2					1983-85	35.1	7.7	84.6	36.7
Sierra Leone	1989	76.0	53.0	68.0					1989	57.0	39.5	74.5	51.8
Somalia													
South Africa									1993	11.5	1.8	35.8	13.4
Sudan													
Swaziland													
Tanzania													
Uganda													
Zambia	1991	88.0	46.0	68.0	1993		86.0		1996	72.6	37.7	91.7	61.2
Zimbabwe	1990-91	31.0	10.0	25.5					1990-91	36.0	9.6	64.2	29.4

Source: African Economic outlook, 2002.

Annex 4: Ethnic populations by incomes, wealth and GDP breakdowns

Country	Gross domestic product (current prices, \$ million)	GDP per capita (current prices, \$)	National poverty line Population below the poverty line (%) National	International poverty line Population below the poverty line (%) Below 1\$	Gini Coefficient	Share of consumption (%) Lowest 10 % Highest 10 %	Exports (%)*
Angola							
Botswana	5,293	3,434	45.3	33.3			56.0
Burundi							
Cameroon	8,879	597	64		42		16.1
Chad	1,393	177	33.6				46.8
Congo Republic							
Cote d'Ivoire	9,372	585	33.6	12.3	36.7	3.1 28.8	
DRC							
Eritrea							
Ethiopia	6,303	100	45	31.3	40	3 33.7	16.7
Gabon	5,025	4,085	62	23			64.7
Ghana	5,102	264	42.6	38.8	39.6	2.4 29.5	60.9
Kenya	10,372	338	52	26.5	44.5	1.8 34.9	26.5
Lesotho							
Liberia							
Malawi							
Mali							
Mauritius	4,629	3,987					60.8
Mozambique	3,812	208	69.4		39.6	2.5 31.7	13.1
Namibia	3,435	1,955		34.9	70		50.0
Nigeria	40,742	358	34.1	70.2	50.6	1.6 40.8	52.6
Rwanda							29.1
Sierra Leone							
Somalia							
South Africa	125,887	2907		11.5	59.3	1.1 45.9	
Sudan							
Swaziland							
Tanzania	9,074	258	51.5	19.9	38.2	2.8 30.1	14.1
Uganda	6,206	266	35.2		37.4	3 29.8	10.1
Zambia							
Zimbabwe	7,408	587	75.6	36	56.8	1.8 46.9	30.0

*Demand composition, 2000 as a percentage of GDP

Annex 5: Land and natural resources (water, forest, minerals) ownership and ethnicity

Country	Land Area sq km	Arable area- Overall Area (% of total land)	Irrigated Area Sq km	Forest Areas (% of total land)	Grazing Lands (% of total land)
Angola	1,246,700	2	..	43	23
Botswana	600,370	2	20	2	75
Burundi	27,830	43	720	2	35
Cameroon	475,440	13	280	54	18
Chad	1,284,000	2	100	11	36
Congo Republic	342,000	2	40	62	29
Cote d'Ivoire	322,460	9	620	26	9
DRC	2,345,410	3	100	78	4
Ethiopia	1,119,683	12	1,620	24	41
Eritrea					
Gabon	257,670	1	na	78	18
Ghana	230,020	5	80	37	15
Kenya	569,250	3	520	4	7
Lesotho	30,350	10	na	0	66
Liberia	96,320	1	20	39	2
Malawi	94,080	25	200	50	20
Mali	1.22 million	2	50	7	25
Mauritius	1,850	54	170	31	4
Mozambique	784,090	4	1,150	20	56
Namibia	825,418	1	40	22	64
Nigeria	910,770	31	8,650	15	23
Rwanda	24,950	29	40	10	18
Sierra Leone	71,620	25	340	29	31
Somalia	627,340	2	1,600	14	46
South Africa	1,219,912	10	11,280	3	65
Sudan					
Swaziland					
Tanzania	886,040	5	1,530	47	40
Uganda	199,710	23	90	30	25
Zambia	740,720	7	320	27	47
Zimbabwe	386,670	7,25	2,250	49	12,5

Source: The World Factbook, CIA, 1995

Annex 6: Land and natural resources (water, forests, minerals) ownership and ethnicity

Country	Land Area (1,000 ha)	Arable area		Irrigated Area (1000 ha)	Forest Areas Sq km	Grazing Lands Sq km
		Overall Area (1,000 ha)	Per Capita Area (ha)			
Angola	124,670	3,000	0.25	75	1,170,651	
Botswana	56,673	370	0.22	1	525,600	
Burundi	2,568	900		74		
Cameroon	46,540	5,960		33		
Chad	125,920	3,600		20		
Congo Republic	34,150	175		1		
Cote d'Ivoire	31,800	3,100		73		
DRC	226,705	6,700	0.14	11		
Ethiopia	100,000	10,712		190		
Eritrea	10,100	500		21		
Gabon	25,767	325		15		
Ghana	22,754	3,700		11		
Kenya	56,914	4,600		87		
Lesotho	3,035	330	0.16	1	160	
Malawi	9,408	2,200	0.18	30	46,510	
Mali	122,019	4,660		138		
Mauritius	203	100	0.08	22		
Mozambique	78,409	4,000	0.17	107	581,350	
Namibia	82,329	816	0.47	7	560,650	
Nigeria	91,077	28,500		233		
Rwanda	2,467	1,000		5		
Somalia	62,734	1,045		200		
South Africa	121,991.2		0.28		45,150	
Sudan	237,600	16,233		1,950		
Swaziland	1,720	178	0.18	70	5,996	
Tanzania	88,359	4,000	0.12	170	599,400	
Uganda	19,710	5,100		9		
Zambia	74,339	5,260	0.55	46	676,067	
Zimbabwe	38,685	3,220	0.24	117	233,900	48,333.75

Sources: FAOSTAT 2003

Annex 7: Land and natural resources (water, forests, minerals)

Country	Resources	Export
Angola	Oil, Diamonds, Petroleum, Iron ore, Phosphates, Copper, Feldspar, Gold, Bauxite, Uranium	Crude oil, Diamonds, Refined petroleum products, Gas, Coffee, Sisal, Fish, Fish products, Timber, Cotton
Botswana	Diamonds, Copper, Nickel, Soda ash, Meat, Textiles	Diamonds, Copper, Nickel, Soda ash, Meat, Textiles
Burundi	Nickel, Uranium, Rare earth oxides, Peat, Cobalt, Copper, Platinum, Vanadium, Arable land, Hydropower	Coffee, Tea, Sugar, Cotton, Hides
Cameroon	Oil, Bauxite, Iron ore, Timber, Hydropower	Petroleum products, Lumber, Cocoa beans, Aluminium, Coffee, Cotton
Chad	Oil, Uranium, Natrona, Kaolin, Fish	Cotton, cattle, Textiles, Fish
Congo Republic	Oil, Timber, Potash, Lead, Zinc, Uranium, Copper, Phosphates, Natural gas	Crude oil, Lumber, Plywood, Sugar, Cocoa, Coffee, Diamonds
Cote d'Ivoire	Oil, Diamonds, Manganese, Iron ore, Cobalt, Bauxite, copper	Cocoa, Coffee, Tropical woods, Cotton Petroleum,, Banana, Pine apples, Palm oil
DRC	Diamonds, Cobalt, Copper, Cadmium, Oil, Industrial and gem diamonds, Gold, Silver, Zinc, Manganese, Tin, Fermium, Uranium, Bauxite, Iron ore, Coal, Hydropower	Diamonds, Copper, Coffee, Cobalt, Crude oil
Eritrea		
Ethiopia	Gold, Platinum, Copper, Potash	Coffee, Leather products, Gold
Gabon	Oil, Manganese, Uranium, Gold, Timber, Iron ore	Crude oil, Timber, Manganese, Uranium
Ghana	Gold, Timber, Industrial diamonds, Bauxite, Manganese, Fish, Rubber	Cocoa, Gold, Timber, Tuna, Bauxite, Uranium
Kenya	Oil, Gold, Limestone, Soda ash, Salt barytes, Rubies, Flourspar, Garnets, Wildlife	Tea, Coffee, Petroleum products
Lesotho	Water, Agricultural and grazing land, Diamonds, other minerals	Wool, Mohair, Wheat, Cattle, Peas, Beans, Corn, Hides, Skins, Baskets
Liberia	Iron ore, Timber, Diamonds, Gold, Hydropower	Rubber, Timber, Iron, Diamonds, Cocoa, Coffee
Malawi	Limestone, Uranium, Coal, Bauxite	Tobacco, Tea, Sugar, Coffee, Peanuts, Wood products
Mali	Gold, Phosphates, Kaolin, Salt, Limestone, Uranium, Hydropower, Bauxite, Iron, ore, Manganese, Tin, Copper	Gold, Livestock, Cotton
Mauritius	Arable land, Fish	Textiles, Sugar, Light manufactures
Mozambique	Coal, Titanium	Shrimp, Cashew, cotton, Sugar, Copra, Citrus
Namibia	Diamonds, Copper, Uranium, Gold, Lead, Tin, Lithium, Cadmium, Zinc, Salt, Vanadium, Natural gas, Fish, suspected deposits of oil, natural gas, coal, iron ore	Diamonds, Copper, Gold, Zinc, Lead, Uranium, Cattle, Processed fish, Karakul skins
Nigeria	Oil, Tin, Columbite, Iron ore, Coal, Limestone, Lead, Zinc, Natural gas	Oil, Cocoa, Rubber
Rwanda	Gold, Cassiterite (tin ore), Wolframite (Tungsten ore), Natural gas, Hydropower	Coffee, Tea, Cassiterite, Wolframite, Pyrethrum
Sierra Leone	Diamonds, Titanium ore, Bauxite, Iron ore, Chromite	Rutile, Bauxite, Diamonds, Coffee, Cocoa, Fish
Somalia	Uranium, Iron ore, Tin, Gypsum, Bauxite, Copper, Salt	Bananas, Animals, Fish, Hides
South Africa	Diamonds, Gold, Chromium, Antimony, Coal, Iron ore, Manganese, Nickel, Phosphates, Tin, Uranium, Platinum, Copper, Vanadium, Salt, Natural gas	Diamonds, Gold, other minerals and metals, chemicals, food
Sudan	Petroleum, Iron ore, Copper, Chromium ore, Zinc, Tungsten, Mica, Silver, Gold, Hydropower	Oil and petroleum products, Cotton, Sesame, Livestock, Groundnuts, Gum Arabic sugar
Tanzania	Hydropower, Tin, Phosphates, Iron ore, Coal, Diamonds, Gemstones, Gold, Natural gas, Nickel	Coffee, Tea, Cotton, Tobacco, Cashew nuts, Sisal
Uganda	Copper, Cobalt, Limestone, Salt	Coffee, Tea, Cotton
Zambia	Copper, Gold, Cobalt, Zinc, Lead, Coal, Emeralds, Silver, Uranium, Hydropower	Copper, Zinc, Cobalt, Lead, Tobacco
Zimbabwe	Coal, Gold, Tin, Chromium ore, Copper, Iron ore, Vanadium, Lithium, Platinum, nickel, Phosphates, Asbestos,	Gold, Platinum, ferrochrome, tobacco, textiles,

Source: CIA World Factbook, 1995