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Civil Society and Accountability

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Introduction

It is a paradox of the contemporary period that, at a time, when more and more states all over the world have adopted democratic forms and procedures, there is decreasing trust in elected officials and politicians. This lack of trust is reflected in growing political apathy, declining membership in political parties, and low voter turn out in elections. At the same time, however, there appears to be more trust in civil society groups, which are often, wrongly in my view, equated with Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). These groups, which are supposedly independent of the state and of big companies, are not elected; they are voluntary groups composed of committed individuals. They have become much more publicly prominent in the last decade and are often seen as the expression of public morality.

This paper is about whether this trust is justified in relation to the world's poorest people. I shall use the term *moral accountability* to refer to the responsibility of civil society groups and individuals, concerned with relief and development, towards the people they are trying to help. This sort of accountability is sometimes described as *political responsibility* (Jordan and Tuijl) or as *external accountability* (Anheier). By *procedural accountability*, I mean the formal mechanisms adopted by civil society groups for management purposes. This kind of accountability involves responsibility towards stakeholders - donors, boards or trustees, members or supporters, staff, as well as clients. Thus moral accountability is roughly equated with political and external accountability, while procedural accountability can be equated with management or internal accountability.

It is often said that civil society groups have a 'voice not a vote' (Edwards 2000). They are not representative and do not claim to be representative. Their internal forms of

management are irrelevant to their role in the public arena since what matters is what they have to say not whether they are internally democratic or representative. The problem arises, however, when there are conflicts between internal and external accountability, political and management imperatives. There are cases, in the humanitarian field, for example, or in the case of biotechnology, where NGOs have used their 'voice' to convey misleading information, which has the effect of mobilising political and indeed financial support. There are other cases where groups claim to represent the very poor in order to raise funds from outside donors. In this paper, I shall investigate the relation between moral and procedural accountability for different types of civil society groups and what this means in terms of improving the ways in which the needs and concerns of poor people are expressed.

In the first part of the paper, I shall provide a brief historical overview of the concept of civil society and the relevance of different meanings to the notion of 'voice' as it relates to poor people. In the second part, I shall outline a typology of civil society actors that might be helpful in clarifying different forms of accountability. And in the last section, I will draw some conclusions and policy recommendations about the accountability of different types of civil society groups.

What is Civil Society?

The contemporary term 'civil society' has its origins in the early modern period, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The term, of course, had appeared earlier. Like all Western political concepts, it can be traced back to Greek political philosophy. Aristotle talked about *politike koinona* (political community/society) to refer to a rule-governed society in which the ruler puts the public good before his (not usually her) private interest. The term was translated into Latin as *Societas Civilis*.

The renaissance of the concept in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was inextricably linked to theories of individual rights and the idea of a social contract. What was new about the early modern usage of the term was the assumption of human equality,

drawn from Christianity. A civil society was a society where individuals come to together to make a social contract and the outcome of that contract is expressed in the rule of law and the existence of a state, which is also subject to the law. Juridical equality applied both to rulers and the ruled. ‘When a King has dethroned himself and put himself in a state of war with his people,’ wrote John Locke ‘what shall hinder them from prosecuting him who is King, as they would any other man, who has put himself in a state of war with them?’ (quoted in Goldwin, 1987, p 507)

At that time, there was no distinction between civil society and the state. A civil society was more or less the same thing as a political society. Civil society was contrasted not with the state but with other kinds of society –despotic empires, for example, or the state of nature. In particular, a civil society was a peaceful society, a society in which people treated strangers with civility, in contrast to other violent and ‘rude’ societies.

The Scottish enlightenment thinkers were to augment the concept with their emphasis on the importance of commercial society. They saw the market as the condition for individualism and the existence of a civil society. But they still understood civil society in much the same terms as a rule-governed society based on the consent of individuals in contrast to the state of nature, where there were no rules, or with despotic systems where rules were imposed through coercion. (See Ferguson)

It was Hegel who was first to use the term as something distinct from the state. Hegel, who was strongly influenced by the Scottish political economists, defined civil society as ‘the realm of difference, intermediate between the family and the state.’(Hegel 1996 p.185-6). In other words, civil society was equated with the economy. Hegel used the term ‘bourgeois society’ (*Bürgerliche Gesellschaft*) and this was the definition to be taken up by Marx and later nineteenth century thinkers. For Hegel famously, civil society was ‘the achievement of the modern world.... the territory of mediation where there is free play for every idiosyncrasy, every talent, every accident of birth and fortune, and where waves of passion gush forth, regulated only by reason, glinting through

them.’(Hegel, pp) Thus the state was viewed as a mediator, resolving the conflicts of civil society; the civil servants were the ‘universal class’ acting in the public interest.

Although de Tocqueville used the term civil society in an eighteenth century sense to refer to a rule-governed society, his contribution needs to be mentioned because of the importance he attributed to associationalism and self-organisation, which informs so much of contemporary thinking, especially in the United States. In his study of democracy in America, he was greatly impressed by the extent of associations in civil life and put forward the argument those active associations were a condition for freedom and equality. As the state takes over more and more functions of daily life, as the division of labour becomes more complex and as demands for the redistribution of wealth increase, an active voluntary sector is necessary to provide a check on state power. ‘As soon as several inhabitants of the United States have taken up an opinion or a feeling they wish to promote in the world, they look for mutual assistance; and as soon as they have found one another out, they combine. From that moment they are no longer isolated men, but a power seen from afar, whose actions serve for example and whose language is listened to...Among the laws that rule human societies, there is one which seems to be more precise and clear than all the others. If men are to remain civilised or to become so, the art of associating together must grow and improve in the same ratio as the equality of conditions is increased.’(Tocqueville, p.114)

For Marx and Engels, political associations were a reflection of material conditions. They were to take up the Hegelian concept of *Bürgerliche Gesellschaft* and to emphasise the role of the economy. According to Marx, the ‘material conditions of life are summed up by Hegel after the fashion of the English and the French of the eighteenth century under the name “civil society”; the anatomy of civil society is to be sought in political economy.’(Quoted in Bobbio, p78) Unlike Hegel, however, Marx and Engels argued that the state was subordinate to civil society; they saw the state as an instrument or apparatus in the hands of the dominant classes. Civil society was the ‘theatre of history...Civil Society embraces all the material relations of individuals within a definite stage of the development of productive forces. It embraces the whole commercial and industrial life

of a given stage and, hence, transcends the State and the nation, though, on the other hand again, it must assert itself in its foreign relations as nationality and inwardly must organise itself as state.’(quoted in Bobbio, p.82)

In the twentieth century, the content of the concept has been further narrowed to forms of social interaction that are distinct from both the state and the market. Writing in prison, the Italian Marxist, Gramsci called into question the economism of the Marxist definition of civil society. According to Gramsci, it is not ‘economic structure’ as such that governs political action but the ‘interpretation of it.’ Thus the ‘theatre of history’ is not the story of economic development but of ideological and cultural struggles. Gramsci drew an important distinction between coercion and consent, domination and hegemony. Bourgeois society had established a powerful set of norms and institutions to sustain the hegemony of bourgeois rule based on the consent of the working classes. Whereas capitalism was overthrown in Russia through the capture of the state, this was not possible in the west where ‘there was a proper relation between state and civil society, and when the state trembled, a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed.’ (Quoted in Ehrenberg, p.209) Hence, he was to emphasize the need for political activism in the realms of education, media and other institutions of civil society.

In contemporary usage, it is possible broadly to distinguish three different versions of usages of the term:

The first version is what I call the ‘activist’ version. This is the version that initiated the contemporary revival of the term in both Latin America and Eastern Europe. The term emerged simultaneously in the 1970s and 1980s, and as far as I know without any communication, in these two regions as a way of describing the efforts to create autonomous public spaces in the context of authoritarian states –military dictatorships in Latin America and totalitarian Communist regimes in Eastern Europe. In Latin America, the intellectuals who used the term were strongly influenced both by Gramsci (via the Spanish and Italian Communist parties) and by the ideas of liberation theology –the notion of the conscientisation of the poor, overcoming the ‘culture of silence’ (Howell

and Pearce, Lewis). In Eastern Europe, the term arose out of the failure of the Prague spring and the loss of faith that any change could come ‘from above’ or through overthrow of the regime. The idea was that instead of trying to change the state, it was important to change the relation between state and society, to create self-organised institutions, independent of the state that could challenge the reach of the state (Michnik). Terms like ‘antipolitics’ (Havel and Konrad) or ‘living in truth’ (Havel) expressed the same idea. In both Latin America and Eastern Europe, these new autonomous spaces depended on transnational links, and this was even before the advent of Internet. It was both the existence of formal international instruments like the Conventions on Human Rights or the Helsinki Agreement and the links with peace and human rights groups in Western countries that helped to open up spaces in these countries (Keck and Sikkink, Kaldor 1991).

This understanding of civil society was to be taken up by intellectuals in Europe and the United States, as well as other parts of the world especially India, to mean the ‘new politics’ (Arato and Cohen, Kothari). It referred to the idea of a realm outside political parties where individuals and groups aimed to democratise the state, to redistribute power, rather than to capture power in a traditional sense. It was associated with the so-called new social movements that emerged after 1968, concerned with peace the environment, women, human rights and so on. It involved an effort to create a public space where individuals can act and communicate freely, independent of both the state and capitalism. According to the German philosopher, Jürgen Habermas:

‘The expression “civil society” has in the meantime taken on a meaning different from that of the “bourgeois society” of the liberal tradition, which Hegel conceptualised as the “system of needs”, that is, as a market system involving social labour and commodity exchange. What is meant by “civil society” today, in contrast to its usage in the Marxist tradition, no longer includes the economy as constituted by private law and steered through markets in labour, capital and commodities. Rather, its institutional core comprises those non-governmental and non-economic connections and voluntary associations that anchor the communication structures of the public sphere in the society component of the life-world. Civil society is composed of those more or less

spontaneously emergent associations, organisations, and movements that, attuned to how societal problems resonate in private life spheres, distil and transmit such reactions to the public sphere. The core of civil society comprises a network of associations that institutionalises problem-solving discourses of general interest inside the framework of organised public spheres. These "discursive designs" have an egalitarian, open form of organisation that mirrors essential features of the kind of communication around which they crystallise and to which they lend continuity and permanence.'(Quoted in Ehrenberg, p.222-3).

The second version of the term 'civil society' can be described as the 'neo-liberal' version. This version is much associated with ideas about the 'third sector' or the 'non-profit sector' that developed in the United States in the 1970s and 1980s. (Etzioni, Levitt, Anheier and Salamon). The idea is that, in the United States, there is a group of organisations that are neither controlled by the state nor the market, but which play an essential role in facilitating the operation of both. This concept owes much to the Tocquevillian emphasis on associationalism and is linked to neo-liberal ideas about minimising the role of the state. NGOs, NPOs (non-profit organisations), charities and voluntary associations are more flexible and innovative than the state. They can substitute for the state, in providing social services for example; they can check abuses of the state and poor governmental practises; and they can call corporations to account. The ideas of Robert Putnam about social capital and Francis Fukuyama about trust are in line with this version of civil society – the notion that trust and social interaction are essential ingredients of good governance and properly functioning markets.

It is argued by civil society theorists like Ernest Gellner that it is this version that was taken up by Western donors in the early 1990s. Civil society was needed as a cushion against the shocks associated with structural adjustment, to provide a social safety net, for example, at a time when public services were being cut, and to foster good governance. Market failures and economic crises like those in Asia, were attributed to failures of governance, especially corruption. Civil society, it was hoped, could correct this.

A third version of civil society is the 'post-modern' version. The revival of the term civil society has been criticised by anthropologists from a relativist position. Both activist and neo-liberal versions, it is contended, are a western discourse. Comaroff and Comaroff talk about the way civil society has become a 'neo-modern' myth, with its own legitimising narrative. They talk about the 'archaeology' of civil society 'usually told, layer upon layer, as a chronological epic of ideas and authors' starting with an 'origin story' in the late 1700s. Outside Western Europe and North America, it is contended, civil society, in the sense of individual rights and voluntary associations never extended much beyond a few capital cities (Mamdani, Koonings and Krujit, Hann and Dunn). Yet there exist various traditional and neo-traditional organisations, based on kinship or religion that remain autonomous from the state and offer alternative sites of power or autonomous spaces. In Iran, for example, 'various religious and bazaar institutions and groupings, under powerful molla patrons, and the duality of state power between the presidency and the spiritual leadership, constitute some plurality of power as compared with neighbouring states.' (Zubaida, p.244)

It is usually argued that these groups cannot be included in the concept of civil society because they may be compulsory associations and they are often mechanisms for social control, especially the oppression of women. But the post-modernists suggest that there cannot be an arbitrary division between 'good' westernised civil society and 'bad' traditional uncivil society.

Thus the post-modern version of civil society would argue for a more culturally sensitive concept, which involves various national and religious groupings and a contestation of narratives. The Turkish Islamicist Ali Bulac, for example, promotes the idea of a civil society characterised by self-governing communities based on religion, with a minimalist state. This idea, which has parallels with the Ottoman millet system, involves tolerance of different religions and indeed secularism but at the same time, but it lacks the individualism of Western models of civil society since the individual is bound by his or her community. As Zubaida points out, this notion represents an 'odd mixture of communitarian corporatism and libertarianism'. (Zubaida, p.238).

Underlying these different meanings, both historically and in the contemporary period, there is, I would contend, a common core of meaning. Civil society always meant a rule governed society based on the consent of individuals. In the early versions, the term referred to the whole of society including the state. Different meanings of civil society, I would argue, reflect the different ways in which consent was negotiated and reproduced. Civil society could be described as those organisations, groups and movements who are engaged in this process of negotiation and debate about the character of the rules – it is the process of expressing ‘voice’. In the nineteenth century, it was the ‘voice’ of the bourgeoisie that was shaping the liberal state; hence the identification of civil society as bourgeois society. With the rise of labour movements, the terrain shifted to struggles of worker organisations in relation both to the state and to capital; at that time, political parties could also be viewed as part of civil society. By joining a trades union or a political party, the ‘voices’ of individual workers could be heard.

To-day, civil society is transnational engaged in a process of debate and negotiation with governments, companies and international organisations. Moreover, the groups involved have extended beyond urban elites to include women, indigenous groups and other excluded people. The differing contemporary meanings, I would argue, reflect different political perspectives about the goals of the process of negotiation. For the neo-liberals, the goal is to export the Western, or even more specifically the American model of governance. For the activist, the goal is emancipation, a radical extension of democracy in the West as well as the South, a goal that is linked to notions of global justice. The post-modernists are sceptical about the goal-oriented nature of modernity; they would see the contestation that is currently taking place on a global scale as a way of breaking with grand narratives, teleological political projects that were associated with nation states. The rise of the Internet allows for a riot of virtuality and for a denial of the existence of something called the real.

In my view, civil society has to include all the groupings that are included in the different versions – the relatively passive ‘third sector’ of the neo-liberal version, the social

movements of the activist version, as well as the neo-traditional groupings of the post-modern version. It is true that the neo-traditional formation may not provide a voice for individuals because of their communitarian nature and, indeed may engage in various forms of coercion and violence. But actually existing civil society has to contend with these troublesome and contradictory issues; if it is to be an inclusive concept, it has to include the exclusive. For the purposes of this report, the goal is closest to the activist version –the emancipation of the poorest people. But the degree to which civil society expresses this goal, that is to say, constitutes a voice for the poorest people, can only be investigated by including all these various groupings. What James Putzel calls the ‘dark side of social capital’ has to be incorporated as well.

The Actors of Civil Society

There is, to day, a proliferation of language used to describe the non-state actors in global politics: social movements; NGOs and NPOs; advocacy networks; civil society organisations; public policy or epistemic networks; to name but a few. In what follows, I shall distinguish four ideal types, in a Weberian sense. They are not actually distinct types since they overlap with each other. But they are useful for thinking about different forms of accountability. Table 1 illustrates these four types.

Table 1

	Social Movements	NGOs	Social Organisations	Nationalist and Religious Groups
Mission	Emancipation of the poor and excluded	Development and Humanitarian Relief	Protection and Promotion of Members Interests	Empowerment of national and religious groups
Activities	Protests, demonstrations, mediatic events	Service Provision and Advocacy	Service provision, Lobbying	Mobilisation through media, religious organisations, and sometimes violence
Social Composition	Activists, Committed individuals, students	Professional Staff	Workers, farmers, employers, local communities, displaced persons	Newly urbanised groups, peasants.
Forms of Organisation	Loose horizontal coalitions, network	Ranges from bureaucratic and corporate to small-scale and informal	Ranges from vertical and hierarchical to informal networks.	Vertical and hierarchical though can involve networks of tightly organised cells, charismatic leadership
Source of Funds	Individual donations, fundraising events like concerts	Foundations, governments, corporations, as well as individual members and supporters	Membership	Diaspora, criminal links

The first type of civil society actor is social movements. Like civil society, there is a range of definitions of social movements but it is generally agreed that social movements are organisations, groups of people, individuals, who act together to bring about transformation in society. They are contrasted with, for example, more tightly organised NGOs or political parties. The social movement theorist, Sydney Tarrow says that social movements are an ‘invention of the modern age and an accompaniment to the rise of the modern state.’ At the base of all social movements are what he calls ‘contentious politics’ – action, which is ‘used by people who lack regular access to institutions, who act in the name of new or unaccepted claims and who behave in ways that fundamentally challenge others or authorities.’ (Tarrow, p.3)

Social movements rise and fall. Their success depends both on their capacity to mobilise and on the responsiveness of authorities. To the extent that authorities facilitate protest,

then social movements are ‘tamed’, integrated into the political process and institutionalised. ‘Taming’ is not just about access; it is about adaptation on both sides. The authorities accept part of the agenda of protest; the movements modify their demands and become respectable. To the extent that authorities repress protest and reject demands, social movements are marginalised and may turn to violence. Tarrow talks about cycles of contention; although the endings may differ, social movements do always come to an end:

‘Each time they appear, the world seems to be turning upside down. But just as regularly, the erosion of mobilisation, the polarisation between sectors of the movements, the splits between institutionalisation and violence, and elites selective use of incentives and repression combine to bring the cycle to an end. At its height, the movement is electric and seems irresistible, but it is eroded and integrated through the political process.’(Tarrow, p.175)

In the twentieth century, it is possible to talk about three waves of social movements. The first wave was labour and self-determination or anti-colonial movements. The second wave was what theorists of social movements call ‘new’ social movements. These are the movements that emerged after 1968 and were contrasted with the first wave of ‘old’ movements. The third wave is the most recent and is often described as the ‘anti-globalisation’ movement, even though only a minority of activists actually want to reverse globalisation.

The ‘new’ movements after 1968 were concerned with new issues –human rights, gender, third world solidarity, the environment or peace. In Europe and North America, they were less concerned with social justice than ‘old’ movements although this was not true of movements in the South where concerns about the environment or the position of women were directly related to development issues. They expressed the political frustrations of a new educated middle class or brain workers – ICT specialists or the caring professions (doctors, lecturers, social workers) generated by post-industrialism and the welfare state (Touraine). In contrast to the hierarchical mass membership organisations, which were characteristic of ‘old’ movements, they pioneered new forms of horizontal organisation

and new forms of protest, making use of the media, especially television. Whereas the 'old' movements aimed at persuading states to act and in the process helped to strengthen them, the 'new' movements are much more concerned about individual autonomy, about resisting the state's intrusion into everyday life (Melucci 1988 and 1996). Claus Offe has argued that the 'new' movements represent a demand for radical democracy. 'Among the principal innovations of the new movements of the new movements, in contrast with the workers' movement, are a critical ideology in relation to modernism and progress; decentralised and participatory organisational structures; defence of interpersonal solidarity against the great bureaucracies; and the reclamation of autonomous spaces rather than material advantages.' (Quoted in Della Porta and Diani, p.12)

It is sometimes also argued that the 'old' movements are 'national' in contrast to the cosmopolitan character of the 'new' social movements. But the 'old' movements were not originally national. The labour movement was always an international movement. The first international of labour was held in 1864; workers travelled to different countries to express solidarity with their fellow workers from the late nineteenth century onwards; the International Federation of Trades Unions was founded in 1901. Self-determination or anti-colonial movements always appealed to universalistic conceptions of rights. The identification of 'old' movements as national is the consequence of the cycle of contention. 'Old' movements did primarily address the state, although not exclusively, but it was through the state that 'old' movements were 'tamed'. These movements were transformed into political parties and, in the case of trades unions, into negotiating partners for states and employers at a national level. The mass character of the 'old' movements, their vertical and hierarchical forms of organisation, are all perhaps explainable in terms of the organisational norms of industrial, bureaucratic and military society.

It can be argued that the growth of NGOs in the 1990s in part reflected the 'taming' of the new social movements. In contrast to 'old' social movements, they were 'tamed' not within a national framework but within the framework of global governance, as I shall argue below. The third wave of social movements that emerged at the very end of the

century can be viewed as a reaction to the ‘taming’ of the second wave. It involves a revival of the preoccupations with social justice characteristic of the first wave but makes use of many of the methods of the second wave. It brings together elements of the ‘new’ social movements and their ‘tamed’ successors, NGOs, concerned with women’s issues, development or the environment. It involves students and brainworkers, like the second wave movements. But it also embraces landless peasant movements, as in Brazil, and indigenous people’s movements like the Zapatistas, or the tribal people in India, as well as what might be called the ‘new’ labour movement. The ‘new’ labour movement includes: international trade union federations, who have been forced to reform after the Cold War when their activities were hamstrung by ideological divisions; new social movement unions in Brazil, South Africa or Korea; new forms of labour organisations like homeworkers in India or African township traders; as well as labour oriented grass roots groups and NGO’s in various parts of the world. There is beginning to be a sea change in labour movement attitudes; the functions of unions are being reconceptualised away from an economistic preoccupation with wages towards new notions of labour rights; and methods of organising are becoming more like ‘new’ social movements.

The second ideal type are NGOs. NGOs are often known as the ‘non-profit sector’ in the United States or Japan or as charities and voluntary associations in Britain. Anheier says that NGOs are organisations that are organised, private, non-profit distributing, self-governing and voluntary. The growth of NGOs has been described by Lester Salamon as the ‘global associational revolution’. The Johns Hopkins Survey of the non-profit sector in 22 countries showed that this sector had contributed significantly to employment growth in the 1980s and 1990s. The sector accounts for some 5.1% of total employment in the countries surveyed and some 10.4million volunteers, bringing the total to 7.1% of total employment. (Anheier) NGOs vary from large-scale NGOs organised both on corporate lines and on bureaucratic lines, to small-scale local NGOs. Some of the biggest NGOs are in the development and relief field, where there are some eight market leaders, each with a budget of roughly \$500 million a year; they include famous names like Oxfam, Médecins Sans Frontières, Save the Children or CARE (Hulme and Edwards).

The term NGO has an international connotation. The term was first used in Article 71 of the UN Charter, where the Economic and Social Committee is empowered 'to make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organisations which are concerned with matters in its competence.' (Gordenker and Weiss, p.22) Already, international NGOs (INGOs) were established in the nineteenth century. The most famous examples are probably the Anti-Slavery Society (1839) and the International Red Cross (1864). By 1874, there were 32 registered INGOs and this had increased to 1083 by 1914 although not all survived (Chatfield). INGOs were instrumental in setting up international institutions, during this period, many of which began as non-governmental institutions (Charnowitz). They also influenced treaty making, particularly in the case of anti-slavery and many of the techniques that INGOs use today were pioneered during this period, particularly parallel fora at inter-governmental conferences.

In the inter-war period, INGOs were very active in the League of Nations up to 1935 and in the International Labour Organisation, which even today includes delegates from trades unions, employer organisations and women's groups in its formal structures, alongside governmental organisations. According to Charnowitz, the two most influential groups were the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), founded in World War I, which moved its headquarters to Geneva, and the International Chamber of Commerce.

The number of INGOs increased during the post-war period not only under the stimulation of new social movements but also as former missionaries and colonial administrators sought new occupations. In the 1950's and 1960's, however, their influence was constrained by the Cold War and the statist character of many of the post-war international institutions. It was not until the 1970's that the opening up of access for 'new' social movements to local and international institutions led to the proliferation of both NGOs in general and INGOs in particular. Initially, this opening up applied mainly to 'soft' issues that did not seem to engage directly with the ideological conflict, mainly the environment and women. The Rio Conference on Environment and Development in 1972 marked the beginning of the parallel summit as a way of organising global civil

society organisations on particular issues. Likewise, a series of world conferences on women helped to galvanise women's groups – Mexico City 1975, Copenhagen 1980, Nairobi 1985 and Beijing 1995 (Chen 1997). By the 1980's, development and humanitarian NGOs also began to be seen as partners for governments and international institutions for a variety of reasons; their local knowledge, the need to bypass ineffective or authoritarian governments, and the need to find ways to implement structural adjustment packages.

The end of the Cold War accelerated these tendencies. It was no longer possible to ally with authoritarian governments in the context of a wave of support for democratisation and human rights. As the ideological conflict dissolved, governments and international institutions became more responsive to peace and human rights groups. In the second half of the 1990's, 'third way' politicians came to power in Western Europe, who accepted the neo-liberal orthodoxy, but nevertheless had learned their politics through the experience of new social movements and were ready to pursue new issues and to open up the corridors of power to 'tamed' social movements. Finally, in the late 1990s, even the international financial institutions, like the World Bank, the WTO or the IMF, but especially the World Bank began a dialogue with INGOs (O'Brien et al).

These openings have encouraged institutionalisation and professionalisation, the transformation of social movements into NGOs or INGOs. During the 1990s, registered INGOS increased by one third, from 10,292 to 13,206 and their memberships increased from 155,000 to 263,000 over the same period (Global Civil Society 2001). Funding by official agencies and private foundations have led to the development of a market for NGOs, in which donors influence the culture and management style of NGOs and successful NGOs transform themselves into a kind of oligopoly. OECD figures show that, by the end of the 1990s, some 5% of all official aid is channelled through NGOs, with differing shares for different countries. Some 85% of Swedish aid is channelled through NGOs and some 10% of UK aid.

NGOs are both service providers and advocacy groups. Services include relief in emergencies, primary health care, non-formal education, housing and legal services, and provision of micro-credit as well as training to other service providers. Korten suggests that NGOs follow a typical cycle, moving from concern with immediate relief, to projects concerned with local development, to advocacy relating to the wider institutional and policy context. But others have argued that the cycle may work the other way round as 'new' social movements acting primarily as advocates transform themselves into service providers to gain credibility among local populations or as a way of ensuring their survival (See Lewis).

NGOs, as a consequence both of their 'tamed' character and of their experience as service providers are able to act as interlocutors on issues with which new social movements are concerned. In addition, many have built up expert knowledge on particular policy areas, which enables them to challenge the official experts. This is why think tanks and international Commissions should be included in this category. Like many of the NGOs, think tanks are a source of alternative expert knowledge.

International Commissions are another 'taming' device in which independent groups of prominent individuals and experts are brought together to produce reports on issues of global significance. The Brandt and Brundlandt Commissions pioneered this approach on development and the environment respectively. In the 1990s, this type of commission has proliferated – for example, the World Commission on Dams (WCD).

It is sometimes argued that NGOs and think tanks are predominantly Western. It is certainly true that the culture and organisation of NGOs has been influenced by Western models and that much funding is Western. But it is also the case that NGOs are a worldwide phenomenon and some of the largest NGOs, like the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) are to be found in the South. In the 1990s, a new phenomenon has been the emergence of global networks, which involve NGOs, social movements, as well as grass roots groups coming together to campaign around particular issues, like land mines or HIV/AIDS.

The third type of civil society actor are what I call social organisations. Properly speaking, they should be included in the category NGOs. They conform to the description given by Anheier. But I have counted them as a separate category because their aims, internal organisation and funding differs from what we typically consider to be NGOs. By social organisations, I mean organisations representing particular sectors of society defined in social terms rather than in cultural or religious terms. Thus this category typically includes professional organisations – societies of lawyers, doctors, employers, trades unions or farmers- community groups of women or youth, for example, as well as groups of disabled people, displaced persons and refugees, homeless people, land less labourers or groups of tribespersons. These organisations rarely receive outside funding and are largely dependent on the resources of members. Many of these groups represent poor people and, thus, their goals are similar to those of the development and relief NGOs. But the goals are concrete, expressed in terms of the interests of members, rather than abstract. Social organisations are not new even in the South; they can be traced back to the guilds and trade associations of the middle ages, which existed in urban areas in the Middle East and Asia as well as Europe even if their voluntary nature was less assured.

This type of organisation is an expression of the structure of society and it changes as society changes. The period of the 1990s has been a period of rapid structural changes both because of globalisation and IMF policies, and because of rapid technological change especially the introduction of ICT. Many of the traditional social organisations have been eroded and their political links broken; this is especially true of trades unions and farmers organisations. On the other hand, new organisations have been developing to defend the rights of the victims of rapid structural change, although these, of course, are as yet weak. Such groups include movements of people in areas threatened by dam construction, like the Narmada valley, new organisations of informal workers as described above, organisations of refugees and displaced persons like the Srebrenica women.

The fourth and final category is national or religious groups. These are organisations based on particular sections of society, defined in terms of culture, kin or religion.

Although numbers are not available, these groups and movements have increased dramatically during the 1990s and in many countries they have reached positions of power. They are sometimes described as neo-traditional groups although they have generally been reconstructed in the context of globalisation and with the use of Internet and other new technologies. In some respects, these movements are similar to 'old' social movements, in that they are often mass movements, which include workers and peasants as well as the middle classes; and they are organised in traditional hierarchical ways, often with charismatic leaders. But they differ from 'old' nationalist movements, movements for self-determination, in certain important ways. First, they tend to be either movements based on exclusive identity politics, that is to say, they are claims to political power on the basis of a label, generally ethnic, which excludes and is indeed hostile towards others with a different label. Or they are movements based on exclusive missionary politics, that is to say, claims to political power on the basis of religious practise, which also excludes others with different or non-religious practises. Self-determination movements were about democracy, participation and rights not about ethnicity or religion, about inclusion within the framework of a nation-state. The 'new' nationalist movements tend to be authoritarian and backward looking, a reaction against modernity, as opposed to 'old' nationalist movements that saw themselves as agents of progress, building the modern state. Indeed, the new nationalism and religious fundamentalism are ways of mobilising *against* democracy and openness.

There are, of course, exceptions; nationalist movements in places like Scotland or Transylvania aim to decentralise democracy, they are organised in a much more participatory way and are much more inclusive, although they have their fundamentalist wings. Or there are groups, like in Turkey and indeed Bosnia, who do not necessarily claim political power but want to organise society along communal lines

These groups differ from 'old' nationalist movements in other respects as well. In some cases, like Al-Qaeda, they are organised as horizontal networks rather than vertical mass movements, with tightly organised cells. Moreover, they have adapted some of the methods of the 'new' social movements. In particular, they make use of the media,

particularly television, radio, and videos. Videocassettes are a particularly important form of dissemination; cassettes of Bin Laden's speeches circulate throughout the Middle East. And they organise transnationally; powerful Diaspora groups often lobby on their behalf in centres of power, both national and international.

Religious and national groups tend to be populist and they succeed in reaching out to poor people in a way, that neither the 'new' social movements nor the NGOs have been able to do. Nationalist movements were always middle class movements, especially in the nineteenth century. As yet insufficient research has been undertaken on the new movements, but it seems clear that membership tends to be composed of newly urbanised middle classes, fearful of losing the gains that have come with economic growth in recent years. A particularly important group of adherents are young men, students or unemployed frustrated by the lack of opportunities and the exclusions of a globalised world. Nevertheless, it does seem also that, in many places, these groups and movements have succeeded in relaying a populist message and reaching out particularly to the countryside. Television, videos and radio have been particularly important in this respect in mobilizing a rural population unused to reading. These groups provide a sense of ontological security in a society that is rapidly changing although it is a form of security based on belief and fear rather than material conditions.

As for human development goals, these neo-traditional groups are mixed. Many nationalist or communalist movements are neo-liberal. This is true of the BJP in India, Jorg Haidar in Austria or the Northern League in Italy. Many, particularly Islamic groups provide social services and humanitarian relief and indeed dependence on these organisations is also a method of recruitment. Many are linked to criminal activities of various kinds and their socio-economic strategies are indefinable.

Moral and Procedural Accountability of Civil Society Actors

Broadly speaking, moral accountability arises from the mission of the civil society actor. Who is responsible for ensuring that the activities are designed to fulfil the mission? Most

civil society actors have some sort of procedural accountability, which depends on the social composition of the group, forms of funding and the type of organisation. To what extent do mechanisms of procedural accountability help to ensure moral accountability? All of the civil society actors described above are engaged in a debate about how to help the poor and deprived; in that sense they constitute or they claim to constitute a voice for the poor and deprived. But the balance of these two types of accountability varies for each of the different types and this has implications for the balance of different voices.

The ‘anti-globalisation’ movement is the main contemporary social movement. It is composed of a range of groups, social organisations, NGOs, and committed individuals. It involves many different voices, ranging from far-reaching radicals, who propose the abolition of global institutions or, more positively, the free movement of labour, to reformists campaigning about third world debt or in favour of a Tobin tax. The shared mission is global solidarity, justice for the world’s poor, though there are many differences about this is to be achieved. Although individual bits of the movement may have their own procedural accountability mechanisms, the main procedural mechanism is rough and ready, as with all social movements – the capacity to mobilise. The movement depends on its capacity to mobilise, that is, on the extent, it is seen to be fulfilling its mission. Since the movement depends largely on the voluntary energies of those engaged in the movement, these can easily be withdrawn.

It is often argued that the ‘anti-globalisation’ movement is largely composed of middle class Northern groups, whose ideas do not necessarily accord with those in the South. After Seattle, for example, it was said that the protestors were opposing free trade, which benefits the third world. It is certainly true that many of the protesters were insisting that labour and environmental standards should be incorporated into trade agreements. American trades unions were objecting to the import of products made by child labour or in sweatshops. Some protesters were dressed as turtles to symbolize the plight of sea turtles, an endangered species, killed to meet the developed countries’ rapacious demand for shrimp; poor countries like India and Malaysia do not have the technology to protect sea turtles while fishing for shrimp. However, as both third world governments and

NGOs pointed out, this linkage between trade and labour and environmental standards does tend to penalize the poor countries, who cannot afford to meet the social and environmental standards of rich countries. (What if Bangladesh were to refuse products from developed countries on account of their responsibility for global warming, one third world commentator asked?) A member of the Indian delegation to Seattle suggested that the protesters were hand in glove with President Bill Clinton who was keen to torpedo the next round of trade, which would have benefited developing countries and hurt traditional Democrat supporters. Clinton, it was argued, was playing to a popular coalition of US labour unions and environmentalists who are crucial to the Gore campaign. (See Agarwal)

But it is also the case that only a few of the protesters were actually against globalisation. Although it is true that the majority of the protesters in Seattle came from developed countries, there was a significant third world NGO presence. Moreover, many more were reached by Internet; a petition issued on the first day of the talks to protest the way the talks were conducted mobilized support from 1,700 NGOs mostly in the third world within 24 hours. (See Khor, 1999)

It is, in fact, the case that most of the participants in parallel summits are from industrialised countries (Global Civil Society 2001). It is also the case that the participation of groups through Internet only reaches a small minority since the poorest people, by and large, do not have access to Internet. One reason for the dominance of industrialised countries is that the majority of summits are held in Europe. Another reason is that the participants are the people who can afford to travel and who are able to obtain visas. After Genoa, an Indian writer from Tamil Naidu, wrote: 'The fact is, if the G8 had been meeting in New Delhi or Africa, it's possible there would have been a million black faces instead of 200,000 white ones. Speaking as an Indian, I am grateful to the young white people who represented us.'(Mai Marcel Thekaera 'The route from Genoa' *Guardian* July 25 2001)

Moreover, it is parallel summits that are visible because of the presence of political leaders and of TV cameras. But demonstrations on issues of social justice –in Argentina against structural adjustment packages, for example, in India or the Philippines about dams – are just as large and even more frequent in the South. (See chronology in *Global Civil Society 2001*)

The accountability of NGOs is more problematic. Of their nature, NGOs are self-selected and self-appointed. As I have used the term in this paper, they are organisations, dependent on outside funding, whose members are committed individuals, often from the middle classes. They do not represent the poor and the deprived although their staff and members care about the poor and the deprived. A lot has been written about the problems of NGO management and internal accountability (Anheier, Lewis, Fowler). There are wide difference among NGOs concerning their forms of organisation – formal versus informal, hierarchy versus participation, networks versus federations, centralised versus decentralisation, not to mention differences of organisational culture. Some NGOs are membership organisations; others are governed by boards or trustees. Moreover, the meaning of membership varies. In Amnesty International, for example, the members are the ‘owners’ of the organisation and determine its decision-making. By contrast, the members of Greenpeace are more like supporters passively donating money and numbers.

In my view, funding is critical in determining accountability. For NGOs, which may be very large but do not depend like social movements on spontaneous mobilisation, sustainability is critical. This may mean adapting to the requirements of official or corporate donors, modifying political positions and/or becoming more bureaucratic and professional. Or it may mean sustaining a public presence as a way of generating individual donations; on the whole this is positive for an advocacy NGO but there may be occasions when emergencies are exaggerated, as in the case of Greenpeace and Brent Spar, or in the crisis in Eastern Zaire in order to mobilise public interest. A particular problem that arises from the financial imperative is the competitive nature of NGOs, the need to identify a market niche, and to distinguish the NGOs brand name from others.

This contradicts the co-operative practises, which ought to and often do take place as a consequence of the normative character of the mission. As David Lewis puts it:

‘To survive, to-day’s NGO has been forced to become more corporation-like and less church-like. Its primary concern, though rhetorically still to actualise social visions, is also to cater to a marketplace (of ideas, funders, backers, and supporters).’ (Lewis, p.199)

These are some of the reasons for the growing criticism and suspicion of NGOs especially in Southern countries. At one extreme, it is argued that NGOs are merely the ‘handmaidens of capitalist change’. They are seen as the ‘modernisers and destroyers of local economies’, introducing Western values and bringing about ‘economicide’. (For a discussion of this perspective, see Lewis, p.32). It is also argued that by substituting for state activity, NGOs bypass formal mechanisms of accountability and reduce the power of citizens. Bangladesh, where NGOs have become such important actors, is sometimes described as a ‘franchise state’ (Wood 1997). Others suggest that NGOs sometimes displace local organisations, diverting funding, and introducing inappropriate poverty alleviation strategies (Arllano-Lopez and Petras 1994).

While there is undoubtedly substance to some of these criticisms, it is also important to recognise that they only apply to a subgroup of NGOs. There is a wide variety of NGOs and a wide diversity of donors. The behaviour of the big institutional donors is not the same as, say, Scandinavian governmental donors or private foundations. There are many NGOs, especially in the South that have introduced innovative approaches to local development, that have helped to empower grass roots groups, or that campaign as part of the ‘anti-globalisation’ movement.

The third type of actor is social organisations. These are membership organisations and, in so far, as they are concerned about issues of social justice, these coincide with the concerns of their members. Thus, for this type of organisations, there is a clear correspondence between procedural and moral accountability. Obviously, these organisations are sectoral and their concern is with their members not all members of the community. Hence their behaviour will depend on the type of group they represent, the

coalitions in which they engage, and the dialogue and discussions both externally and internally that help to change strategy. The organisation representing the women of Srebrenica is interesting in this respect. Initially, it was strongly influenced by the Islamic nationalist party, who tried to use the women for propaganda purposes. But over time, the organisation has come to recognise that the best interests of its members is served through co-operation with other displaced groups, even if they come from different nationalities (Freizer and Kaldor, 2001).

The fourth actor is national and religious groups. Of course, there are religious groups like Christian Aid or the Aga Khan Foundation, whose behaviour is not different from other NGOs. But my concern is with so-called neo-traditional groups, even though these are not really traditional; they are often groups that have reconstructed tradition in the context of globalisation. The mission of these groups is national or spiritual and presumably, this reflects the concerns of its members. But forms of procedural accountability are murky. Typically, these are vertically organised, under the leadership of individuals, spiritual and/or charismatic leaders. These are communitarian movements, where the community comes before the individual and where there is not much space for individual influence in determining the overall interests of the community. Particularly, in the case of religious groups, these interests depend on scriptural interpretations of priests and mullahs. In addition, funding imperatives may allow for disproportionate influence from particular groups, in the Diaspora, for example, or for the justification of action that may not seem to accord with the mission –drug trading, for example, or loot and pillage.

It can be argued that during the 1990s, NGOs and national and religious movements were the strongest actors in civil society. The anti-globalisation movement only became significant towards the end of the decade. Social organisations were weakened by structural change. Both the growth of NGOs and the growth of national and religious groups have to be understood as one component of the process of globalisation. NGOs were actively encouraged by global institutions as a way of coping with the process of structural change. The growth of national and religious movements can be understood as

a reaction to the insecurities that accompanied structural change as well as the failure and decline of earlier emancipatory project that appealed to ordinary people like socialism or post-colonial nationalism. However, as I have argued, these two types of civil society actors are the least accountable to the poorest people.

What then can be done to increase the accountability of civil society actors to the poorest people, to enhance the 'voice' of poor people in the global public sphere? Some preliminary ideas are suggested by this survey of civil society.

First it is important for global institutions, international institutions and governments, not to privilege NGOs in debates about social justice. NGOs are the respectable end of civil society; they can engage in the institutional discourse and indeed can contribute knowledge and ideas. Dialogue with social movements and social organisations is a way to increase the voice of poor people, even though such a dialogue is more difficult and contentious. NGOs find it much easier to use the discourse of the institutions and, for this reason, are able to act as interlocutors for other civil society actors but they should not be privileged. This difficult dialogue with the anti-globalisation movement was beginning after Genoa but has been halted in the wake of September 11; it needs to be revived.

There have been plenty of proposals for a 'structured voice' for civil society groups. In my view, what is important is not so much the particular forum for dialogue but rather the culture of and political commitment to such a dialogue. There is a tendency not to take seriously the difficult and radical groups. But it is they who have to be brought in to the dialogue even if it involves confrontation rather than civilised conversation.

There is always a problem about who to involve in such a dialogue. But there could be mechanisms developed through which the various civil society groups decide themselves who should 'represent' them, rather than having the institutions pick and choose. This does not preclude handpicked participants at seminars or workshops designed for particular purposes. But it would mean that the core of the dialogue would be initiated through a bottom-up rather top-down process.

Secondly, national and religious groups should not be excluded. They have to be involved in a dialogue both with the institutions and with other civil society actors. There is a dialogue among social movements, NGOs and social organisations but the national and religious groups tend not to be part of this dialogue. How should the neo-traditional groups be included? One problem is that their concerns are with religious and national goals not with human development. Herein lies a dilemma. What if it turns out that the poor want Islamic rule, say, rather than human development? That viewpoint has to have space to be expressed. Those of us who have faith in reason, would argue that, given a free communicative space, a conclusion would be reached favourable to human development. However excluding that viewpoint could lead to its opposite –the spread of oppressive national and religious regimes.

The other problem about including the neo-traditional groups is the absence of internal democracy. If the neo-traditional groups are asked to choose who speaks on their behalf, it will be the ‘reliable’ people in leadership positions not those who might be swayed by discussion. This is why it is so important that a dialogue among civil society groups take place, since these groups are more able to engage the grass roots than governmental institutions.

Thirdly, mechanisms need to be developed to regulate the activities of NGOs. NGOs do have important skills and experience to offer and it would be a pity if disenchantment with the accountability process reduced their role in development and relief. There have already been many proposals in this vein in the NGO management literature. Michael Edwards, in particular, makes useful suggestions for self-regulation, while Anheier emphasises the importance of developing grievance mechanisms.

One important way to increase the accountability of NGOs is through the funding process. Would it not be possible to go beyond dialogue and involve poor people directly in the funding process? Porto Alegre in Brazil offers an interesting example of ways in which community groups can be brought into the budgetary process, not as a substitute

but as a supplement to formal processes. One way to reconcile the moral and procedural accountability of NGOs is to involve the people they are trying to help directly in the funding process. As stated above, diversity of funding is important; the individual donor who finds an innovative project must not be discouraged. But big institutional funders could try to develop ways in which part of the money they disburse is controlled by the people they are supposed to help. How this would be done and how the people would be chosen could be part of the dialogue.

Thirdly, social organisations representing poor people need to be strengthened. This is not necessarily a matter of funding but rather of empowerment both through increased dialogue and through helping to extend membership through enabling mechanisms, like, for example, the spread of Internet access.

Finally, the issue of violence needs to be addressed. Violence is unfortunately a form of voice. It is also a way of suppressing voice. In Seattle, Prague and Genoa, violence catapulted the anti-globalisation protests into the public eye and acted as a kind of shock tactic to donors and corporations. There are plenty of similar examples elsewhere. In Kosovo and Macedonia, for example, the issue of Albanian rights was not taken seriously until guerrilla groups appeared on the scene. Since September 11, much more attention has been paid to Islamic grievances. On the other hand, violence discredits moderate voices. Violence is polarising and squeezes those who seek more democratic ways of expressing discontent. Violence has to be dealt with not just through criminal procedures but also through strengthening non-violent forms of voice. How this can be done needs to be part of in the dialogue.

One of the reasons that there is less trust in politicians and elected officials is that debates at a national level no longer determine policy, that important decisions that affect every day life are taken at both global and local levels. How is it possible to develop mechanisms through which the poorest people feel they have a say in how these decisions are taken? Civil society is not a substitute for formal democratic processes; rather it is a way of strengthening the substantive character of democracy. It involves the construction

of a political culture at a global, as well as national and local levels, through which those who are formally responsible for making decisions are more sensitive and responsive to the needs and concerns of the poorest people.

Civil society has become the buzzword of the 1990s but it has tended to be equated with NGOs. I have tried to argue that other types of civil society groups and other understandings of civil society need to be taken seriously as well. In the wake of September 11, this is no longer just a goal to be pursued by those who care about the poor; it is an imperative if we are to live in a relatively non-violent world.

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