

Human Development Report Office

OCCASIONAL PAPER

Background paper for HDR 2002

**Giving Voice to the Voiceless:
Good Governance, Human Development & Mass Communications**

Pippa Norris and Dieter Zinnbauer

2002/11



HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002

Giving Voice to the Voiceless

Good Governance, Human Development & Mass Communications

Pippa Norris and Dieter Zinnbauer



Giving Voice to the Voiceless

Good Governance, Human Development & Mass Communications

Pippa Norris and Dieter Zinnbauer

Shorenstein Center
John F. Kennedy School of Government

Harvard University
Cambridge, MA 02138
Pippa_Norris@Harvard.edu
www.pippanorris.com

Development Studies Institute
London School of Economics and
Political Science
Houghton Street
London WC2 2 AE
d.zinnbauer@lse.ac.uk

Synopsis: The growth in electoral democracies presents many potential opportunities for human development. Yet in practice transitional and consolidating democracies often remain fragile and incomplete, lacking strong institutions essential for effective voice and accountability, including freedom of expression and widespread opportunities for civic engagement. What can be done to strengthen democratic development and, in particular what is the role of the media in this process?

Part I suggests that the mass media will have a positive impact on good governance and human development if they function effectively as a watchdog holding the powerful to account and as a civic forum facilitating a diversity of voices in public debate. Yet in practice the press is often limited in these roles. Liberal theories have long stressed the importance of an independent fourth estate as a check on the abuse of power. The study theorizes that this is necessary but not sufficient, in particular media systems strengthen good governance and promote positive development outcomes most effectively under two conditions: (i) where there is an unfettered and independent free press, *and* (ii) where there is widespread access to mass communications. Part II operationalizes this typology then compares media systems around the world¹. Part III examines the cross-national evidence for the impact of these patterns.

The study confirms that media systems characterized by widespread mass access *and* by an independent press are most closely associated with systematic indicators of good governance and human development. In particular, nations with these types of media system experience less corruption, greater administrative efficiency, higher political stability, and more effective rule of law, as well as better development outcomes such as higher per capita income, greater literacy, less economic inequality, lower infant mortality rates, and greater public spending on health. Part IV provides detailed case studies illustrating this relationship in particular countries. The conclusion considers the policy implications, suggesting practical steps to strengthen the channels of mass communications in poorer societies lacking either widespread access or freedom of the press.

Chapter 5: For the UNDP *Human Development Report 2002: Voice, Power and Accountability for Human Development*.

The growth in electoral democracies presents many potential opportunities for human development. The last quarter of the twentieth century witnessed a dramatic expansion in political rights and civil liberties worldwide. Since the start of the 'third wave' of democratization, in 1974, the proportion of states that are electoral democracies has more than doubled, and the number of democratic governments in the world has tripled². Countries as diverse as the Czech Republic, Mexico and South Africa have experienced a radical transformation of their political systems through the establishment of more effective party competition, free and fair elections, and a more independent and pluralistic press. Many hoped that these developments would expand the voice of the disadvantaged and the accountability of governments, so that policymakers would become more responsive to human needs, and governments could be removed from power through the ballot box if citizens became dissatisfied by their performance.

Yet in practice, after the initial surge in the early 1990s, many electoral democracies in Latin America, Central Europe, and Sub-Saharan Africa remain fragile and only poorly consolidated, often divided by ethnic conflict and plagued by a faltering economic performance, with excessive executive power in the hands of one predominant party and a fragmented opposition³. The central danger, illustrated by the nations of the Andean region, lies in disillusionment with democracy, and even occasional reversals⁴. Achieving their full democratic potential depends on widening and deepening the institutions of voice and accountability, which commonly remain deeply flawed.

The key issues examined here are how channels of mass and interpersonal communications can contribute to strengthening voice and accountability and how their role can be made more effective. *Part I* suggests that the mass media will have a positive impact on democratization and human development if they function effectively as a watchdog holding the powerful to account and as a civic forum facilitating a diversity of voices in public debate. Yet in practice the press is often limited in these roles, and in many authoritarian regimes, far from serving the needs of the public, the channels of communication reinforce state control and the power of established interests. Liberal theories have long stressed the importance of an independent fourth estate as a check on the abuse of power. The study theorizes that this is necessary but not sufficient, in particular media systems strengthen good governance and promote positive development outcomes most effectively under two conditions: (i) where channels of mass communications are free and independent of established interests, and in addition (ii) where there is widespread diffusion and public access to these media. Both independence *and* access are required. Freedom of the press by itself is insufficient to guarantee development outcomes if poor people are excluded from media markets and the information resources provided by newspapers, radios, television, and now Internet technologies. Moreover media access is insufficient, if the press is subservient to established interests, uncritical of government failures, and fails to hold the powerful to account for their actions. *Part II* uses on this typology to classify and compare media systems around the world. *Part III* examines the cross-national evidence for the impact of these patterns. The study confirms that media systems characterized by widespread mass access *and* by an independent free press are most closely associated with systematic indicators of good governance and human development. In particular, nations with these types of media system experience less corruption, greater administrative efficiency, higher political stability, and more effective rule of law, as well as better social outcomes such as higher per capita income, greater literacy, lower economic inequality, lower infant mortality rates, and greater public spending on health. *Part IV* provides detailed case studies illustrating this relationship in particular countries. The *conclusion* considers the policy implications, suggesting practical steps to strengthen the channels of mass communication in poorer societies by promoting media access and independence.

I. Theories of the Role of Mass Communications

What is the role of mass communications in strengthening voice and accountability in good governance and human development⁵? A long tradition of liberal theorists from Milton through Locke and Madison to John Stuart Mill have argued that a free and independent press within each nation can play a vital role in the process of democratization by contributing towards the right of freedom of expression, thought and conscience, strengthening the responsiveness of governments to all citizens, and providing a pluralist platform of political expression for a multiplicity of groups⁶. Recent years have seen growing recognition that this process is not just valuable in itself, but that it is also vital to the human development. This perspective is exemplified by Amartya Sen's argument that political freedoms are linked to improved economic development outcomes and good governance in low-income countries, through their intrinsic value, their instrumental role in enhancing the voice of poor people, and their impact on generating informed choices about economic needs⁷. The guarantee of freedom of expression and information is regarded as a basic human right in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the UN in 1948, the European Convention on Human Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. In the words of the president of the World Bank, James D. Wolfensohn, "A free press is not a luxury. A free press is at the absolute core of equitable development, because if you cannot enfranchise poor people, if they do not have a right to expression, if there is no searchlight on corruption and inequitable practices, you cannot build the public consensus needed to bring about change."⁸

In modern societies, the availability of information is critical to the quality of decision making by citizens and policymakers. In economic markets, consumers need accurate and reliable information to compare and evaluate products and services. In the political sphere, electors need information to judge the record of government and to select among alternative candidates and parties. If citizens are poorly informed, if they lack practical knowledge, they may cast ballots that fail to reflect their real interests⁹. Moreover policymakers need accurate information about citizens, to respond to public concerns, to deliver effective services meeting real human needs and also, in democracies, to maximize popular electoral support to be returned to office. Information in the political marketplace comes from two primary sources. Personal interactions commonly include informal face-to-face political conversations with friends, family and colleagues, traditional campaign rallies, community forums, and grassroots meetings. These information resources remain important, especially for election campaigns in poorer democracies, and the growth of email and online discussion groups may revive the importance of personal political communications¹⁰. But these channels have been supplemented in modern campaigns by the mass media, including the printed press (newspapers and magazines), electronic broadcasts (radio and television news), and also more recently the bundle of technologies associated with the Internet (including political websites). The rise of the Internet may be a particularly important development for the process of democratization, due to the potential of this bundle of technologies for interactive, horizontal linkages breaking down the traditional boundaries of space and time, and facilitating oppositional voices, new social movements, and transnational advocacy networks, despite the highly uneven distribution of these technologies around the globe¹¹.

Classical liberal theories suggest that the free press serves to strengthen the process of democratization and human development in their '*watchdog*' role, where the channels of mass communications function to promote government transparency and public scrutiny of those in authority, highlighting policy failures, maladministration by public officials, corruption in the judiciary, and scandals in the corporate sector¹². Ever since Edmund Burke, the 'fourth estate' has traditionally been regarded as one of the classic checks and balances in the division of

powers¹³. Investigative journalism can open the government's record to external scrutiny and critical evaluation, and hold authorities accountable for their actions, whether public sector institutions, non-profit organizations, or private companies. Again Internet technologies hold the promise to greatly aid public scrutiny. Governments and private actors committed to enhance the transparency of their operations, find effective novel tools at their disposal. Vast amounts of information can be made available online at relatively low costs, putting public records and powerful *recherche* tools at the fingertips of anyone with Internet access rather than effectively hiding them away in archives for resource-rich experts. This viable new dimension of Internet-mediated transparency would not only strengthen the watchdog capabilities of media outlets, but also make it significantly easier for civil society organizations and individuals to scrutinize performance and the daily conduct of public affairs.

[Box A About Here?]

Equally vital, in their *civic forum* role, liberal theories argue that the free press can provide a public sphere, mediating between citizens and the state, facilitating informed debate about the major issues of the day¹⁴. If the channels of communication reflect the social and cultural diversity within each society, in a fair and impartial balance, then multiple interests and voices are heard in public deliberation. This role is particularly important during political campaigns. Fair access to the airwaves by opposition parties, candidates and groups is critical for competitive, free and fair elections. It is particularly important that state-owned or public television stations should be open to a plurality of political viewpoints and viewpoints during campaigns, without favoring the government. This principle has been recognized in jurisprudence from countries as varied as Ghana, Sri Lanka, Belize, India, Trinidad and Tobago, and Zambia¹⁵. The Internet could add to the diversity of voices, by providing public discussion spaces as well as inexpensive tools for publishing information or disseminating it to target audiences.

[Box B About Here?]

Early accounts assumed a fairly simple and straightforward relationship between the spread of modern forms of mass communications, socioeconomic development, and the process of democratization. Modernization theories, offered by Lerner, Lipset, Pye, Cutright and others in the late 1950s and early 1960s, suggested that the diffusion of mass communications represented one sequential step in the development process. In this account, urbanization and the spread of literacy lead to growing use of modern technologies such as telephones, newspapers, radios and television, and the diffusion of the mass media laid the basis for an informed citizenry able to participate in democratic life¹⁶. Based on simple correlation analysis, showing a strong connection between the spread of communications and political development, Daniel Lerner theorized: "The capacity to read, at first acquired by relatively few people, equips them to perform the varied tasks required in the modernizing society. Not until the third stage, when the elaborate technology of industrial development is fairly well advanced, does a society begin to produce newspapers, radio networks, and motion pictures on a massive scale. This, in turn, accelerates the spread of literacy. Out of this interaction develop those institutions of participation (e.g. voting) which we find in all advanced modern societies."¹⁷ Yet in the late 1960s and early 1970s the assumption that the modernization process involved a series of sequential steps gradually fell out of fashion. Skepticism grew, faced with the complexities of human development evident in different parts of the world, major setbacks for democracy with the 'second reverse wave' experienced in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia¹⁸, and growing recognition that control of newspapers and television broadcasting could be used effectively to prop up authoritarian regimes and reinforce the power of multinational corporations, as much as to advance human rights and provide a voice for the disadvantaged¹⁹.

Limits on the Free Press

Despite liberal ideals, and the potential of media systems for strengthening democracy, in practice channels of communication can and often do fail to fulfill these functions, for many reasons. Limitations on the role of the press include explicit attempts at government propaganda, official censorship, legal restrictions on freedom of expression and publication like stringent libel laws and official secrecy acts, partisan bias in campaign coverage, oligopolies in commercial ownership, and more subtle unfairness in the balance of interests and whose voices are commonly heard in the public sphere²⁰. There are multiple examples.

- State control of information, particularly via state regulation and ownership of radio and television broadcasting, can reinforce ideological hegemony for autocratic regimes, limiting social development²¹. In Malaysia and Singapore, for example, regimes have used the press to stifle internal dissent and forced journalists employed by the international press to modify or suppress news stories unflattering to the regime²².
- Governments in Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, among others, commonly place serious restrictions on press freedom through official regulations, legal restrictions and censorship²³. These practices remain more difficult in cyberspace but they are not impossible. The control mechanisms range from banning ownership of modems (Myanmar) or blocking access to websites (Vietnam), to monitoring of email traffic and discussion groups (China), and policing domestic online content. While highly skilled Internet users can circumvent some of these measures, they work quite effectively for the average Internet user.
- During elections, pro-government bias on television and radio has failed to provide a level playing field for all parties in many countries, exemplified by recent campaigns in Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Mozambique²⁴.
- Statistics collected by media freedom organizations show that each year dozens of media professionals are killed or injured in the course of their work. In many parts of the world, journalists face the daily threat of personal danger from wars, internal conflict, coups, terrorism and vendettas²⁵. In Colombia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Zimbabwe and Egypt many journalists, broadcasters and editors have experienced intimidation, harassment and imprisonment by the police and military.
- Media coverage of complex emergencies and ethnic conflict is a particular concern. For example, leaders in Yugoslavia used the state-controlled media to accentuate ethnic divisions and fuel hatred against other groups via TV and radio broadcast brimming with shallow cultural stereotypes and one-sided reports about the atrocities committed by the other side.²⁶ The role of radio propaganda in fueling the conflict between Tutsi and Hutu in Rwanda is equally well documented.²⁷
- Some express concern about concentration of ownership in the hands of major multinational corporations with multimedia empires around the globe. Well-known examples include AOL Time Warner and the Walt Disney Corporation in the United States, News International in Australia, Bertelsmann in Germany, Thomson in Canada, and Fininvest in Italy²⁸. It is feared that media mergers may have concentrated excessive control in the hands of a few multinational corporations, which remain unaccountable to the public, reducing media pluralism²⁹.
- Some emerging trends may exacerbate the global digital divide. The global gap in Internet access and skills is aggravated by the accelerating cycle of technological

upgrading. Rising computing power goes hand in hand with ever more complex software tools and resource hungry multimedia applications. Rapid obsolescence of ICT equipment makes it even more difficult for users in developing countries to keep up with the advancing online communication standards.

Therefore despite the liberal ideals of the free press, in practice far from strengthening the voice of marginalized and disadvantaged groups, and strengthening government accountability to citizens, the mass media may serve to reinforce the control of powerful interests and governing authorities. The long-term danger is that electoral democracies experience ineffective governance and growing disillusionment with representative institutions, hindering the process of democratization and human development, while communication channels may strengthen the control of governing parties and established elites in non-democratic states.

Problems of Voice and Accountability

The role of the free press as a channel of voice and accountability has become even more important in recent decades. Electoral democracies face serious challenges in deepening and widening avenues for expression and participation in the policymaking process. Limits on media pluralism in non-democratic states deny a platform for dissent, criticism and mobilization for groups and parties opposing the governing regime. The spread of electoral democracies, and rising levels of education in medium and low-income societies, have expanded the potential opportunities for political participation. During the post-war era, levels of electoral turnout have risen steadily and substantially in many Latin American and Asian nations, even though there is evidence of a fall during the 1990s in postindustrial states³⁰. Yet there is widespread concern that much of the public remains disengaged from many of the more demanding forms of civic activism beyond voting. It is feared that any erosion in participation will affect the marginalized sectors of society who are least involved in public life, including the poor, ethnic minorities, women, and the younger generation. Growing political inequality can affect whose voices are commonly heard, and whose voices are commonly silenced, in the public sphere. Observers point to a litany of civic ills suggesting that many traditional forms of political activities that were once common in older democracies have become less popular today. Studies of conventional political participation and civic engagement in established democracies provide evidence of eroding party membership and weakening partisan loyalties³¹. The shrinkage of manufacturing industry in developed economies has reduced the number of blue-collar workers who can join trade unions³², just as secularization has emptied church pews³³. The bonds of belonging to the plethora of traditional community associations, civic groups, and voluntary organizations appear more frayed and tattered than in the past³⁴. Although there continues to be conflicting evidence, many also believe that there is a rising tide of public cynicism about government and public affairs³⁵. If fewer disadvantaged and minority groups are engaged in public debate, this may reinforce existing social inequalities in the decision-making process, and government responsiveness to claims for human development.

Problems of electoral accountability have also increased. In traditional theories of representative democracy, citizens within the nation-state hold elected representatives and governments to account directly through the mechanism of regular elections, and indirectly in intra-electoral periods via the news media, parties, interest groups, NGOs and social movements in civil society. Accountability is essentially a relationship of responsibilities between agencies, and there are many types, such as from private companies to stockholders and employees, from physicians to professional medical bodies, from non-profit foundations to their boards, and from workers to managers. Government accountability rests on three underlying conditions:

- *Transparency of decision-making* in the policy process, including explicit rules and agreed procedures specifying who has authority and responsibility over what spheres of government decision-making;
- *Institutional mechanisms* for holding public officials responsible for their decisions and actions, including
 - The *administrative* accountability of the civil service, government departments and public sector agencies to Cabinet ministers;
 - The *legal* accountability of the executive and legislature to the courts; and
 - The *electoral* accountability of parliaments and elected heads of State to citizens; and,
- *Suitable sanctions* to enforce accountability, such as a vote of confidence in parliament, legal penalties by the courts, or removal from office by the electorate.

Within the government, parliaments function as the main forum for public scrutiny of ministers and departments, while the courts serve as the primary mechanism for legal redress. Elections provide the public with a direct voice in this process, allowing citizens to 'throw the rascals out' at regular intervals if dissatisfied by their performance. The news media are a central intermediary and lubricant in this process through their function as watchdog over the public interest, providing information that can then be acted upon by parliaments, the legal system, or the electorate. If all these mechanisms fail, then government accountability suffers and there can be abuses of the public purse and major administrative inefficiencies without recourse, such as failure to deliver basic human services like clean water, schools and local health clinics. Failures of accountability are exacerbated if media pluralism is restricted, if the policymaking process is opaque and secretive, if the mechanisms of responsibility break down because decisions are the joint product of complex negotiations and shared responsibilities between multiple overlapping agencies, and if sanctions are weak or non-existent.

Channels of political accountability have become more complex in recent decades due to a series of interrelated developments.

- Direct electoral accountability operates almost exclusively at the level of the nation state, yet the autonomy of the nation-state has eroded, with power flowing simultaneously upwards to international agencies through the forces of globalization, outwards to non-profit and private agencies, and downwards with moves towards devolution and decentralization³⁶.
- Globalization has increased the influence of international agencies and transnational organizations, like the World Trade Organization and the World Bank, where citizens have only an indirect voice, exercised through national delegates³⁷.
- The growth of transnational policy networks provides an alternative channel of influence for many NGOs, groups and social movements in a global public sphere, but this process bypasses the formal channels of electoral and administrative accountability within representative government³⁸.
- The 'shrinkage of the state' through initiatives such as privatization, marketization and de-regulation mean that decision-making has flowed away from public bodies and official government agencies that were directly accountable to elected representatives,

dispersing to a complex variety of non-profit and private agencies operating at local, national and international levels³⁹.

- The fragmentation of decision-making and policymaking bodies can widen the pluralistic range of entry-points for groups seeking to influence the policy process, but at the same time it can foster autonomous and fragmented 'iron triangles' (also described as 'policy subsystems', 'sub-governments' or 'closed networks') in different policy sectors linking technical specialists, administrators and political entrepreneurs, making it difficult to establish authoritative and coherent programs in government⁴⁰.

For all these reasons, it has become more difficult for citizens to use elections channels of accountability as a way of removing policymakers in power, reinforcing the need for alternative mechanisms to protect the public interest, including the role of an unfettered and independent press.

II: Comparing Media Systems

Therefore liberal theories have long stressed the importance of an independent journalism as a check on the abuse of power. The study theorizes that this is necessary but not sufficient, in particular media systems strengthen good governance and promote positive development outcomes most effectively under two conditions:

- In societies where channels of mass communications are free and independent of established interests; *and* in addition
- Where there is widespread public access to these media.

The reason is that freedom of the press by itself is insufficient to guarantee positive development outcomes if disadvantaged groups and marginalized communities are excluded from the information resources provided by the mass media. For example, the potential impact of the Internet on democracy and social progress will continue to be limited if there is no closure of the digital divide, and if online political resources, as well as access to basic information about jobs, educational opportunities, news, and social networks, are unavailable to many poorer populations in large swathes of Sub-Saharan Africa, South-East Asia and Latin America⁴¹. Yet access to communications is insufficient by itself, if the printed press remain subservient to established interests, if television news fails to report government policy failures, if radio broadcasters are unable to hold the powerful to account for their actions, and if there are relatively few websites reflecting the concerns of local groups and minority languages in poorer societies. For communication channels to function effectively in accordance with the hopes of liberal theory we can theorize that access and independence are required (see Figure 1).

[Figure 1 about here]

Levels of *access* influence the scope and reach of mediated channels of communication, how widely politicians can reach the public through the press, as well as how far citizens can use these channels to learn about public affairs. The wider the level of access to news from daily papers, radio, television and the Internet then, *ceteris paribus*, the greater the potential for media impact. Access to the mass communications most commonly includes the printed press (newspapers and magazines), the traditional electronic broadcast media (radio and television), and the new technologies associated with the Internet (including email and the World Wide Web). *Media access* can be measured by World Development Indicators monitoring the circulation of daily newspapers, and the distribution of radio receivers and television sets per 1000 population in 135 nations, the proportion of the population online population and the weighted distribution of Internet hosts (see Table A1)⁴². These indicators of media diffusion are strongly inter-related (all

correlations are strong and significant ($R=0.55$ and above Sig.01), although there are some societies which rely more heavily than average upon the printed press, such as South Korea, Norway, Romania and Israel, while other countries are more reliant upon television in patterns of media use, such as the United States, Portugal and El Salvador (see Appendix Figure 1). Given the strong correlations, access to all mass media were combined into a single scale, standardized to 100-points, including the per capita circulation of daily newspapers, the availability of radio receivers and television sets, and the proportion of the population that used the Internet and the distribution of Internet hosts. As the scale was heavily skewed towards richer nations, using a logged scale normalized the distribution.

Press freedom can be expected to influence whether the impact of the news media promotes pluralistic voice and government accountability, or how far it serves to reinforce the power of established interests and state control. Press freedom is far more complex and difficult to assess in any comprehensive fashion but the annual Freedom House Press Freedom Survey (2000) can be used as the standard cross-national indicator. Press Freedom is measured by how much the diversity of news content is influenced by the structure of the news industry, legal and administrative decisions, the degree of political influence or control, the economic influences exerted by the government or private entrepreneurs, and actual incidents violating press autonomy, including censorship, harassment and physical threats to journalists. The assessment of press freedom distinguishes between the broadcast and print media, and the resulting ratings are expressed as a 100-point scale for each country under comparison. Evaluations of press freedom in 186 nations were available in the 2000 Freedom House survey.

[Figure 2 about here]

The Map of Media Systems

Figure 2 shows the distribution of 135 nations across these dimensions. The scatter of societies in the top-right hand corner shows that in many older democracies, as well as some newer democracies such as the Czech Republic, Thailand, the Republic of Korea, Jamaica, and Venezuela, liberal patterns of press freedom are strongly related to widespread media access. Some of these societies are among the most affluent around the globe, yet only moderate levels of human development characterize others such as South Africa, El Salvador, and Poland. In contrast, in societies located in the top left-hand corner of the map, exemplified by Singapore, Belarus, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Russia, there is relatively widespread access to most modern forms of mass media like television and yet limited freedom of the press, suggesting the greatest potential for domestic news channels to be used by government, official agencies and established interests as an agency of partisan bias, or even state propaganda, with a scope which reaches large sectors of the population⁴³.

Media systems in countries like India, Botswana, Namibia and the Philippines, located in the bottom right-hand corner of the scatter plot, are characterized by a flourishing independent press and yet limited public access to newspapers, television, and the Internet, due to problems of literacy and poverty. In these countries, the media can be expected to have a positive impact on pluralism and government accountability, especially through competition among elites in civil society, but to exert only limited influence on the general population because of its limited reach. Lastly, most low-income nations are scattered in the bottom left-hand corner, such as Angola, Rwanda, Cambodia and Bangladesh, where there are major restrictions on the freedom of the press as a force capable of challenging government authorities, and yet the role of the media is also limited as a channel of state propaganda because of restricted levels of mass access to newspapers, television and the Internet. In these nations, traditional forms of campaign communication such as local rallies, posters and community meetings, and grassroots party

organizations, are likely to be more important in mobilizing political support than mediated channels.

III. The Impact of Media Systems on Human Development

What is the impact of this pattern on good governance and human development? Recent years have seen growing attempts to gauge and measure systematic, valid and reliable indicators of political development and the quality of democracy in a wide range of countries worldwide. We can draw on a recent study for the World Bank⁴⁴ that developed subjective perceptions of indicators of good governance, drawing on multiple surveys of experts, that assessed four dimensions based on the criteria of political stability, the rule of law, government efficiency and levels of corruption (see the Technical Appendix for details). Political stability is important as this reflects the regular rotation of government office, consolidation of the 'rules of the game', continuity in constitutional practices, and lack of political violence due to acts of terrorism. The rule of law concerns the independence and effectiveness of the judiciary and courts, perceptions of violent or non-violent crime, and the enforceability of contracts. Government efficiency is gauged by perceptions of the quality of the public service and the independence of the civic service from political pressures. Lastly perceptions of corruption reflect the success of a society in developing fair, transparent and predictable rules for social and economic interactions. Subjective judgments may prove unreliable for several reasons, including reliance upon a small number of national 'experts', the use of business leaders and academic scholars as the basis of the judgments, variations in country coverage by different indices, and possible bias towards more favorable evaluations of countries with good economic outcomes. Nevertheless in the absence of other reliable indicators covering a wide range of nations, such as surveys of public opinion, these measures provide one of the best available gauges of good governance⁴⁵. If widespread access to the free press plays an important role in promoting government accountability, then this should be evident in these indicators. Table 1 shows the simple correlations between these indicators without any controls. The results confirm that the indicators of media access, press freedom and the combined communications index were all strongly and significantly related to good governance. Countries much of the public has access to the free press have the greater political stability, rule of law, government efficiency in the policy process, and least corruption.

[Table 1 about here]

Liberal theories claim that in addition to promoting a more efficient public policy process, by publicizing social problems and articulating public concerns mass communications also function to make the authorities more responsive to basic human needs. Table 2 examines the correlations between the communication measures and several common indicators of human development. The results confirm that press freedom, access to the mass media, and the combined Communication Index are all strongly related to positive development outcomes, measured by the Human Development Index, income, economic equality, lower infant mortality, longer life expectancy, higher spending on public health, and greater adult literacy. These coefficients need to be interpreted with caution, as no controls are included, and the causal interpretation of these relationships is not unambiguous⁴⁶. In particular it could well be argued that greater levels of economic prosperity produced by development generate the underlying conditions for the purchase of household consumer durables like televisions, radios, and personal computers. The expansion of the middle class service sector in more developed economies is associated with greater affluence and growing leisure time, which are both strongly linked to use of the mass media. Use of newspapers and the Internet, in particular, require cognitive skills and knowledge that are strongly related to levels of education and literacy. Nevertheless, despite a process of interaction, the consistent and strong relationship across all the different indicators of human development and good governance is striking.

[Tables 2, 3 and 4 about here]

The relationship between the typology of media systems and these indicators are illustrated in Tables 3 and 4. The results confirm that the 52 societies with widespread access to the free press consistently scored far higher than all other media systems across all the indicators of good governance and human development: people living in these nations have more stable political systems, more efficient government processes and less corruption, as well as living longer, with greater affluence, and more economic equality. In sharp contrast, countries lacking an independent press and public access to mass communications scored consistently worst across all these indicators. Media matters, both for its own sake, and for development.

VI: Case Studies of the Role of Communications in Human Development

While vibrant media sectors and broad access generally go in hand with good governance, the relation between media development and the democratic quality of the polity is not fixed or inevitable. Media can evolve into a driver for greater openness even in an adverse political environment. The case of Ghana illustrates these issues.

[Box on Ghana about here]

Political will and a commitment to openness can make the media flourish even in the face of extreme poverty. Mali is a prime example.

[Box on Mali about here]

Both Mali and Ghana underscore the importance of radio for reaching illiterate groups. Both countries however, face persistent problems in expanding access. The urban-rural divide is of particular concern. Radio receivers are concentrated in urban areas. In Mali, only 54 in 1000 people own radio receivers and 95% of all receivers are concentrated in urban area, where only 26% of the population lives.

Funding is also a preeminent problem for rural stations. They often rely upon donor support or voluntary community input, since they cannot attract sufficient lucrative advertising like their urban counterparts that cater to more affluent audiences. Certain legislative provisions are also still hampering press freedom and repressive practices in both countries. Closure of radio stations or intimidation of journalists still occurs. Nevertheless, political organizations have helped institute independent journalism, such as the *Union of Free Radio and Television* in Mali or *Women in Broadcasting in Ghana*, and the Government of Mali has in the recent past taken further steps towards a conducive regulatory environment and liberalized libel laws.

In contrast, India adopted a different strategy to develop its media sector focusing on public broadcast TV as the prime medium to reach the rural population.

[Box on India about here]

Achievements in TV ownership in India appear moderate at first sight. Yet the access rates are quite remarkable considering low-income levels and the collective viewing arrangements that are not reflected in the basic numbers. Yet the diversity of programming available in rural areas remains limited. In addition, the state retains a monopoly on AM radio and has only very recently allowed private FM radio stations for entertainment but not political programming, foreclosing opportunities to increase plurality through private sector and community initiatives in this area.

As these case studies indicate, both commercial and public programming face considerable challenges in catering to remote areas and disadvantaged groups. Audiovisual programming is costly, while poorer groups make it difficult to attract sufficient advertising for a viable business model. The commercial broadcast sector therefore has the greatest incentive to target the urban middle classes. Scarce public resources limit how far public sector broadcasters can afford to produce content in local languages. Cable networks are mainly limited to urban areas. Rural Internet connectivity is also low. Compounding these problems, illiteracy rates among the rural poor often limit the reach of the print media. Also newspapers and magazines are often unaffordable for low-income groups: the high costs for imported newsprint in East Africa, for example, means that the price of one magazine exceeds the average daily income of urban workers, not to mention that of the rural population.⁴⁷

Intermediate technologies can go some way to fill these gaps for marginalized groups. Community radio, for example, has been a staple in South America, Africa and Asia for decades. Relative to other media it requires only moderate up-front investments, both for operators and the audience. It can reach illiterate groups, carry local programming, and has low operating costs, making sustainability feasible. Moreover, collective ownership of radio stations can provide strong accountability to the community.⁴⁸

[Box on intermediate technologies about here]

But community radio is not without its shortcomings. For one, it can fall prey to local rather than national elites, and replicate similar patterns of biased accountability and influence on the community level. Another problem is that community radio can create communication enclaves, articulating minority voices, but disconnected from the wider public. Under favorable conditions, with a co-operative local administration, community media can greatly enhance local governance. But where concerns touch on national policies, voices need to travel upstream. Community media can facilitate the first steps in this process, the formation of informed opinions, the aggregation of voices, and their transmission into concrete political claims. To make these voices heard more widely, community radio needs links with channels of mass communication.

[Box Audiovisual Community Media about here]

Conclusions: Strengthening Channels of Voice and Accountability

The lessons from this analysis suggest that strengthening the channels of communication is vital for voice and accountability, particularly for electoral democracies that are in the process of establishing more effective political and economic institutions. However, enabling equitable and inclusive access to information and channels of communication is a complex task. Different media exhibit different shortcomings that require committed action in a wide range of policy fields. The required activities fall under three interrelated categories:

- A rights-based policy framework that protects and promotes the fundamental freedoms of expression, association and information;
- Affirmative policies in the area of education, media competence, and access to media that help disenfranchised groups to utilize these freedoms; and,
- Statutory and regulatory provisions for a thriving media and communications sector.

A rights-based policy framework

Freedom of expression, association and information are the fundamental building blocs of voice and accountability. Being highly interrelated, they need to be addressed simultaneously. Freedom of expression, in order to be effective, requires freedom of association, the possibility to bundle

voices, mobilize and organize and thus turn individual grievance into vocal collective claims. At the same time, freedom of information, the right to transparent conduct of public affairs and access to information of public interest is a precondition for forming opinions and developing political engagement. As our examples have shown, these freedoms are under threat in many countries. Contrary to early optimistic hopes, novel information and communication technologies do not provide a magic bullet to circumvent these problems. In specific instances the Internet can weaken certain constraints, giving opportunities to strengthen voice and accountability, *provided* basic freedoms of expression, association, and information are in place.

The emergence of the Internet makes advocacy for these rights not less but even more urgent. Freedom of information, the right to access and inspect public records held by the state and other institutions of public interest, is one example. Making official information easily accessible in the public realm has become considerably cheaper and more effective with the rise of the Internet. This information need not be confined to policy outputs and thus ex-post accountability. Putting proceedings and minutes of meetings online opens transparency for the *decision-finding process* and helps the public fine-tune the attribution of responsibility for specific actions. Posting draft proposals on the Internet and soliciting comments online provides new avenues to get heard. It can make consultative processes, which are often confined to semi-public policy networks, more transparent and inclusive

All these opportunities however, depend on the information practices of governments and Internet access by the general public. The basic principles of freedom of information have been enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Incorporating the right of access to information into national legislation is not a luxury preserve for rich countries. South Africa for example has drawn up ambitious provisions for freedom of information.

[Box on South Africa about here]

Many other countries, including a large number of industrialized ones, have so far failed to enact effective legislation with statutory recognition of freedom of information, wide application to all entities of the state, only limited exceptions for reasons of security and privacy, and speedy provision of requested information at low costs.⁴⁹

The demand for transparency has been voiced on many levels. In India a right to information campaign by the Association for the Empowerment of Workers and Farmers has successfully demanded the release of public accounts. Expenditures are scrutinized in a public audits with the participation of the local community, often revealing considerable levels of misappropriation at the expense of the poor.⁵⁰

The Internet can also help apply pressure. Consider a recent example from international regime formation. In 1999 and 2000 negotiations towards the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) were mostly held behind closed doors. No drafts were made available for wider public consultation. In late 1999 an NGO coalition launched a “liberate the text” campaign to prompt the release of draft material for public scrutiny. Over 300 groups posted the petition on their websites, which received a favorable echo in the media, further embarrassing the participating governments over their non-transparent conduct. Eventually in April 2001 a leaked draft of the controversial investment chapter appeared on an NGO website and under increasing public pressure the entire official draft document was eventually made public in July 2001.⁵¹

International organizations committed to openness and promotion of the Internet as a tool for political empowerment is uniquely positioned to lead and showcase a new culture of transparency. Yet they also often fail to deliver.

[Report card on International organizations about here]

Affirmative policies for media competence and access

The guarantees for basic freedoms are insufficient by themselves. Media skills and access to communication channels are unequally distributed. Limited access is a function of poverty and education, but also language, gender, age, the urban-rural divide, and specific disenfranchised groups such as ethnic minorities. On the skill side, insufficient literacy and keyboard skills are some of the most pressing issues, although radio or TV can help overcome some of these problems. It helps if Internet content is relevant to local needs, such as information about jobs, education, and health, which means developing local skills in the creation and editing of community websites and developing servers as hosts.

On the access side, infrastructure policies need to consider the plight of under-served areas and user groups. While the liberalization of telecommunication markets promises significant overall cost savings, the commercial incentives to provide service to remote, sparsely populated areas and user groups with moderate purchasing power are often insufficient. Public policy provisions can help. Licenses for telecommunications operators can include specific obligations to extend service into commercially less viable segments and regions. These universal service provisions are well-established instruments of telecommunication policies, applied in industrialized and developing countries alike, and fully consistent with international obligations under the WTO.⁵²

Collective access can also help. Telecenters and Internet cafes, which provide a range of telecommunication services to an entire village, can provide a feasible alternative, funded by public, non-profit, or commercial services. Cheap mobile telephones and hand-held units are popular for text-messaging services. The creative combination of communication technologies can also help widen access to advanced communication technologies. In Sri Lanka for example, Radio Kothamale offers people the opportunity to phone in requests for information searches on the Internet.

Provisions for an independent, accountable, and inclusive media sector

What specific policy measures can best achieve accountability, independence and plurality in the media? Provisions for public service radio and television broadcasting include:

- A statutory funding mechanism, such as license fees, that does not depend on the general budget and thus cannot be easily exploited as mechanism for political interference. License fees can even serve as lever for direct popular accountability as several popular fee boycotts in South Korea have shown.⁵³
- An organizational structure that minimizes political appointments and institutionalizes internal plurality and balance through representation of a wide spectrum of social and political interest in bodies such as advisory committees or supervisory boards, thereby enhancing procedural accountability.
- A clear legal mandate that enshrines editorial independence and a democratic public service mission creating formal legal accountabilities.
- Institutionalized channels for public feedback, such as a complaints board.

In commercial broadcasting, plurality and democratic accountability can be strengthened through:

- Competition for broadcasting licenses.
- Quotas for minority stations in the allocation of scarce frequencies.
- Requirements for commercial operators to carry minority programming.
- Caps on concentration in ownership: this can take many forms such as limits on ownership of different media in one market, or limits on the overall ownership of a particular medium in the domestic market.
- Public subsidies and state support for minority media, such as specific print media (Sweden) or for community radio (Mexico).
- Advertising rules that require a clear separation between advertisement and editorial content.
- Transparency and disclosure provisions for media companies with regard to ownership structures (France) or revenue sources.
- Training of media professionals: this ranges from fundamental journalistic tasks to general management skills, and can also include a strong component on quality standards and professional ethics
- Donor support for independent media projects.

Yet content related provisions are a double-edged sword. They might be intended to safeguard specific public standards, but at the same time they can provide an inroad for political interference. Quality assurance might be better served through the promotion of self-regulatory efforts, such as codes of conduct and media councils that encourage peer-based scrutiny, instill accountability, and also provide channels for public complaints. Instituting a carefully crafted right-of-reply that minimizes interference with editorial freedom can also support fair reporting.

At the same time journalistic freedom and investigative journalism require protection from excessive liabilities for libel and defamation and a right to protect sources.

Additional Internet provisions

Maximizing the efficacy of the Internet for political empowerment also rests on a number of specific public policy provisions.

Limit the liability of Internet service provider for content

Making Internet service provider overly responsible for the content that customers send through their networks can have adverse effects, creating strong incentives to proactively police websites and remove controversial content that might provoke lawsuits. This can stifle open communication and the establishment of dissenting political websites. Classifying Internet service provider as conduits rather than content providers help limit these liabilities and remove incentives for censorship.

Grant equal rights for online journalists

Emerging media outlets on the Internet often do not enjoy the full rights and protections of established journalists. In Malaysia for example, journalists from the major online newspaper *Malaysiakini* have repeatedly been denied entry to official functions and press conferences.⁵⁴ Fair treatment of online journalism facilitates the evolution of this segment and promotes diversity and competition in the media sector.

Safeguard basic visibility online

Being online does not mean being visible. While resource-rich agents will always find it easier to buy space on prominent portal websites, a number of policy principles could help ensure more equal visibility for everyone. *Walled garden business models* are on the rise. In these schemes Internet service and content providers increasingly seek to keep users within the confines of their websites by reducing links to external sources and presenting their associates contents most prominently. Recent estimates, for example, indicate that US Internet users spend 60% of their online time with the content and products of only 14 conglomerates.⁵⁵ Explicit contractual obligations in online partnerships to limit links to external websites should be discouraged. Similarly, the workings of search engines, the pivotal navigation tools on the World Wide Web, raise doubts about non-discrimination and inclusiveness. Critics complain that paid-for placement is insufficiently distinguishable from other search results, while the specific criteria and methods used by search engines and directory services are rarely transparent.⁵⁶ Mandating more transparency and a clearer distinction between paid and unpaid content could help avoid some of the major distortions in online visibility.

Figure 1: Typology of Media Systems

		Press Freedom	
		Non-free	Free
Media Access	Widespread Access	E.g. Singapore, Belarus, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Russia	E.g. Argentina, Brazil, Estonia, Jamaica, Poland, UK, U.S.
	Limited Access	E.g. Bangladesh, Rwanda, Algeria, Yemen, Zimbabwe	E.g. Mali, Namibia, the Philippines, South Africa

Notes: Measures of media access and press freedom. See technical appendix for details.

Figure 2: Types of Media Systems




Table 1: Correlations between Media and Indicators of Good Governance

		Press Freedom (2000)	Media Access (Logged %Papers+ %TVs+ %Radio +%Online 1997-1999)	Communication Index
Political Stability/Violence	R	.633	.633	.727
	Sig.	.000	.000	.000
	N	140	119	120
Rule of Law	R	.644	.682	.763
	Sig.	.000	.000	.000
	N	151	124	125
Government Efficiency	R	.688	.649	.771
	Sig.	.000	.000	.000
	N	141	120	121
Corruption	R	.674	.652	.788
	Sig.	.000	.000	.000
	N	140	119	120

Notes: See technical appendix for details.

Table 2: Correlations between Media and Human Development Indicators

		Press Freedom (2000)	Media Access (Logged %Papers+ %TVs+ %Radio +%Online 1997-1999)	Communication Index
Human Development Index 1999 UNDP	R	.519	.879	.801
	Sig.	.000	.000	.000
	N	167	127	128
Income (Per Capita GDP in PPP US\$ 1997)	R	.508	.752	.793
	Sig.	.000	.000	.000
	N	167	127	128
Economic Equality (Reversed Gini Index)	R	.246	.401	.403
	Sig.	.009	.000	.000
	N	113	101	101
Lower Infant Mortality	R	.405	.813	.670
	Sig.	.000	.000	.000
	N	142	129	130
Public expenditure on health (% of GDP)	R	.475	.604	.659
	Sig.	.000	.000	.000
	N	140	127	128
Life Expectancy (yrs) UNDP 1999	R	.464	.803	.700
	Sig.	.000	.000	.000
	N	168	127	128
Adult literacy rate % 1997 UNDP	R	.404	.776	.673
	Sig.	.000	.000	.000
	N	167	127	128
% With secondary education 1999 UNDP	R	.459	.766	.731
	Sig.	.000	.000	.000
	N	125	100	101

Notes: See technical appendix for details.

Table 3: Mean scores on good governance indicators by type of media system

Type of Media System	N.	Political Stability	Rule of Law	Government Efficiency	Corruption
Limited access to non-free press	59	-.65	-.63	-.65	-.60
Limited access to free press	22	-.28	-.16	-.22	-.34
Wide access to non-free press	17	-.09	.02	-.11	-.22
<i>Wide access to free press</i>	53	.74	.80	.73	.80

Notes: See technical appendix for details.

Table 4: Mean scores on human development indicators by type of media system

Type of Media System	N.	Human Development Index 1999	Per Capita PPP GDP US\$ 1997	Gini Index 2001	Infant mortality per 1000 live births 1999	Public expenditure on health % of GDP	Adult literacy rate % 1997	% With Secondary education 1999
Limited access to non-free press	68	.560	3208	42.1	67.5	2.1	66.3	52.2
Limited access to free press	31	.619	3621	47.0	64.6	2.9	71.0	53.1
Wide access to non-free press	17	.759	7919	40.2	16.2	4.1	89.3	70.3
Wide access to free press	52	.843	14278	34.8	11.7	4.8	95.7	83.2
Total	167	.678	7183	39.7	42.1	3.4	78.5	65.6

Notes: See technical appendix for details.

Box A: Cases of the Impact of Investigative Journalism on Corruption

ADD BOXED CASE DEVELOPING THE FOLLOWING EXAMPLES...?

- In India, the Defense Minister, George Fernandes, was forced to resign in March 2001 as the most senior victim of the bribery scandal that footage implicating senior officials in corrupt arms deals.
- In Turkey, in September 2001 the Minister for Housing and Public Works, Koray Ardin, resigned after newspapers ran a series of allegations of corruption in the allocation of public works contracts for disaster relief.
- In an even more famous case, Peruvian cable television broadcast videos of bribery in vote buying, secretly video taped by the head of security, Vladimiro Montesinos, which led to the immediate resignation of President Alberto Fujimoro.
- In Germany, the role of the free press can be illustrated in terms of the Kohl election fund scandal.

Box B: Cases of the Failure of the Media as Civic Forum

ADD BOXED CASES ILLUSTRATING PROBLEMS OF ELECTORAL BALANCE/BIAS?

- Pro-government bias in Belarus media in the presidential election documented by the OSCE;
- Cambodian elections: The UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Abid Husse, reporting the principles that should operate in the 1999 Cambodian elections¹:
 - There should not be bias or discrimination in media coverage;
 - Censorship of election programs should not be allowed;
 - Media should be exempt from legal liability for provocative statements and a right of reply should be provided;
 - There should be a clear distinction between news coverage of functions of government office and functions as a party candidate;
 - Air time for direct access programs should be granted on a fair and non-discriminatory basis;
 - Programs should provide an opportunity for candidates to debate each other and for journalists to question them;
 - Media should engage in voter education;
 - Programs should target traditionally disadvantaged groups, which may include women and ethnic and religious minorities.

Box: Media Development in Mali⁵⁷

Mali has embarked on a promising process of democratization in 1991 with the ouster of long-term dictator Moussa Traoré and the shift to multi-party democracy. A nascent cluster of alternative media such as the newspaper *Les Echos* created in 1998 and the radio station *Radio Bamakan* have contributed to this process and successfully challenged the information monopoly of the old regime.

Institutionalizing media rights

Reforming media policies has been an integral part of the political transformation. The freedom of the press was instituted in 1991 by the then transitional government. While this stimulated the media sector in general it proved particularly fertile for the radio sector, triggering the emergence of several other independent radio stations. In a country with literacy rates of only 30% and almost 60% of people living below the poverty line, radio has evolved into the most inclusive and vibrant medium.

Towards a dynamic radio sector

The signing of the Bamako Declaration on Radio Pluralism by the new Mali president in 1993 further bolstered the sector and encouraged NGOs, rural association and other social groups to become involved. Mali even became the first African country with an all-women radio station. Today the media sphere in Mali boasts 40 independent newspapers and 60 radio stations. Importantly access to media for the 80% of the population living in rural areas has considerably increased. By 2000 77% of Mali citizens are within the reach of at least one community radio station, up from 64% two years earlier. While the state monopoly mainly broadcast in French, a language not spoken by the majority of the population, programming is now available in many local languages further augmenting accessibility. Education on political rights and civil liberties is an important component in programming and observers note the strong commitment of the radio community to the democratization process. Audience surveys identify the radio as predominant information source. For example 76% of men and 50% of women regard the radio as main source for information on HIV/Aids.

High-level support for new technologies

With the help of bilateral donors the Internet has made its debut in Mali in 1997. Enabling domestic measures for Internet development have included the establishment of a high-level directorate for information technologies within the Prime Minister's Office, the opening of the Internet service provider market to private competition and the reduction of customs duties for computer equipment. By 2001 eight Internet service providers have taken up business. A training academy for network professionals has been established with the help of a US equipment manufacturer.

Box: Democratization and Media in Ghana⁵⁸

From 1981 to 2000 Ghana has lived under the repressive regime of Jerry Rawlings. While political party competition was introduced in the early 1990s. However, Rawlings maintained an iron grip on the state controlled media, which helped him secure victory in the 1996 elections.

Despite manifold repressions, a nascent independent media sector gradually emerged and began to undermine the information monopoly of the state. Especially independent radio broadcasting developed in a dynamic way. Taking the lead was a university with early broadcasting experiments quickly followed by what was then an 'illegal' private radio station. The government finally responded to mounting pressure for access to the media sector with a carefully crafted licensing framework which restricted eligibility to Ghanaian citizens and corporations, prohibited the ownership of both a TV and radio station and sought to guarantee a non-discriminatory selection process. Political parties and religious organizations were prohibited from owning a station, but could appear as guests in talk shows.

By 1998 more than 45 FM applicants had been authorized. Far from relegating the audience to a passive role, the new stations include call-in shows into their regular schedules. These interactive shows turned out to be very popular. They provide a rather informal setting for the discussion of daily affairs and concerns. Callers need not speak English but are encouraged to use the vernacular they feel most familiar with. September 27, 2000 underscored impressively the vitality of the new sector. An open debate among presidential candidates was broadcast live on TV and radio at the eve of the general elections. Six out of seven candidates attended the debate. Question were filed by experienced journalists as well as a wide range of social groups, including students, unionists and women activists. Finally in the December 2000 elections Ghana made history when the ruling party was voted out of office after a more than 20 year long grip on power.

These successes notwithstanding, Ghana faces persistent challenges to extend radio services to rural areas and the poor. Many FM stations can only be received within urban areas and cater to the higher income urban middle class. Moreover, the poorest users are still excluded from this novel public discussion space since they cannot afford the phone call to participate in the call- in programs.

Box: Public Broadcast TV in India⁵⁹

Box: Community Radio⁶⁰

Starting as early as in the mid-40s with stations run for peasants and miners in remote areas in Latin America community radio has played a major role in strengthening the voices and communication channels in communities around the world. Today thousands broadcast all over the world, their exact numbers difficult to estimate, since many operate without license. Ownership structures vary. Not for profit stations, collectively owned or run by public interest groups are quite common in Latin America whereas private commercially oriented stations are predominant in West Africa. Programming typically evolves from music attuned to the local taste to providing a forum for announcements and dedications and eventually, with growing expertise and audience, to health, education and general news coverage. Thus community radio can help nurture local cultures, support social ties and communication networks as well as provide access to information relevant to daily affairs. The versatility of community radios can be put to use in many ways. Examples:

Crises management and peace-building

Radio Kwizera (Hope) is a donor funded radio project for the refugee camps at the Burundi/Rwandan border. Established to foster peace, reconciliation and public education its programme ranges from refugee-tracing services and health education (e.g. HIV awareness via soap operas) to greetings and music. Audience surveys have confirmed the popularity of *Radio Kwizera* and a performance evaluation has recommended to extend this model to other refugee camps.

Voice for rural populations

Radio Izcanal (El Salvador) was started by peasant refugees returning to their democratizing homeland and aims to provide a voice for the rural population in the Usulután region. The station is community owned and provides for extensive participation through local recruitment, community interviews or the relay of greeting messages. Funding comes from donors and through advertising revenue. *Radio Izcanal* is part of an community radio umbrella organization that has bought a FM frequency, which is made available to all participating stations.

Despite the promises of community radio, public funding is quite rare. Mexico is a notable exception. It supports indigenous community radio in more than 30 local languages catering to more than six million indigenous communities.

Box: Audiovisual Community Media⁶¹

Community TV broadcasts have proven less successful than radio, since production costs are considerably higher. Independent video productions however, remain an important medium for disenfranchised groups. The production process itself provides for a dialogue to reflect on community identity and problems. The output is a case for recognition and often a channel for political claims.

Early projects addressed agricultural training and peasant organization in countries like Peru, Mexico or Mali. In India *Video Sewa*, a group of women from varied background, many of them illiterate, have produced videos on many aspects of their lives. *Manek Chowk*, a documentary on female roadside vendors and their problems with policy harassment was successfully utilized in a campaign to issue licenses and grant legal protection.

The road to larger audiences can take many forms. Some documentaries by Video Sewa have found their way into TV broadcasts. *TV Viva* and *TV Maxambomba*, two video projects in Brazil for example work with video shows on big screens in streets and places.

Technological advances have significantly lowered production costs and the Internet holds out to further enhance production and distribution. However, funding often constitutes a major problem for video initiatives. Many are donor supported. And as with community radio the linkages to channels of mass communication are erratic at best.

Box: Freedom of Information: South Africa takes the lead

In early 2001 South Africa has passed a Promotion of Access to Information Act, which codifies access to information held by the government. In what can be considered a very forward-looking approach, the act also expands access rights also to information held by private third parties such as credit bureaus and medical institutions (full text of legislation available on the SA government website: <http://www.gov.za/gazette/acts/2000/a2-00.pdf>).

Technical Appendix:

Variable	Definition and source
MEDIA ACCESS	
Newspapers	Daily newspaper circulation (published at least 4 times a week) per 1000 people (1996) UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1999
TV Sets	Television sets in use per 1000 people, 1999. International Telecommunications Union World Telecommunications Indicators Database 2000.
Radio Receivers	Radio receivers in use per 1000 people, 1997. International Telecommunications Union World Telecommunications Indicators Database 2000.
Online Users	The percentage of online users in the adult population derived from national surveys asking respondents whether they use email or the world wide web. The figures represent the latest survey available in fall 2000. www.NUA.ie .
Hosts	Computers with active Internet Protocol (IP) addresses connected to the Internet, per 100 people, July 2000, www.Netcraft.com . Hosts without a country code identification were weighted and relocated. See Pippa Norris. 2001. Digital Divide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Press Freedom Scale	Diversity of news content is measured in the 2000 Freedom House annual survey of Press Freedom according to the structure of the news industry, legal and administrative decisions, the degree of political influence or control, the economic influences exerted by the government or private entrepreneurs, and actual incidents violating press autonomy, including censorship, harassment and physical threats to journalists. The 100-point scale combines the broadcasting and newspaper scores and the scale is reversed so that a higher score represents greater press freedom. www.FreedomHouse.org
Media Access	A summary logged standardized scale of the proportion of newspapers, TV Sets, Radio Receivers, Online Users and Internet Hosts.
Communication Index	This combines the Logged Media Access Scale and the Press Freedom Scale.
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS	
Human Development	The Human Development Index (1998) is based on longevity, as measured by life expectancy at birth; educational achievement; and standard of living, as measured by per capita GDP (PPP \$US). UNDP Human Development Report 2000.
Per Capita GDP	Measured in \$US in Purchasing Power Parity, 1998. UNDP Human Development Report 2000.
Economic Equality	The Gini Index measures the extent to which the distribution of income within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. The index has been reversed so that 1 represents perfect equality. World Development Indicators

	2001 World Bank.
Lower Infant Mortality	The number of infants dying before the age of one year, per 1000 live births, 1999. The indicator has been reversed so that a higher figure represents lower infant mortality. World Development Indicators 2001 World Bank
Public health expenditure	Public health expenditure consists of recurrent and capital spending from government budgets, external borrowings and grants as a percentage of GDP, 1997-99. World Development Indicators 2001 World Bank.
Life expectancy	Life expectancy at birth (years) 1995-2000. UNDP Human Development Report 2000.
Adult literacy rate	Literacy as a percentage of adults (15 and above) 1998. UNDP Human Development Report 2000.
% Secondary education	Secondary age group enrolment as a percentage of the relevant age group, 1997. UNDP Human Development Report 2000.
GOVERNANCE INDICATORS	
Political stability	An aggregated measure of political stability and violence based on expert assessments Daniel Kaufman, Aart Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton. 1999. 'Governance Matters.' World Bank Policy Research Paper 2196, Washington DC.
Rule of Law	An aggregated measure of rule of law based on expert assessments Daniel Kaufman, Aart Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton. 1999. 'Governance Matters.' World Bank Policy Research Paper 2196, Washington DC.
Government efficiency	An aggregated measure of government efficiency based on expert assessments Daniel Kaufman, Aart Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton. 1999. 'Governance Matters.' World Bank Policy Research Paper 2196, Washington DC.
Corruption	An aggregated measure of corruption based on expert assessments Daniel Kaufman, Aart Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton. 1999. 'Governance Matters.' World Bank Policy Research Paper 2196, Washington DC.

Table A1: Measures of Press Freedom, Media Access and the Communication Index

	Nation	Press Freedom 2000 (i)	Newspapers per 1000 1996 (ii)	Radios per 1000 1997 (iii)	TV sets per 1000 1999 (iv)	% Of pop. online 2000 (v)	Media Access (ii to v)	Communication Index (Freedom+ Access))
1	Afghanistan	10
2	Albania	44	36	217	113	.0	7	37.8
3	Algeria	17	38	241	107	.0	8	15.1
4	Angola	20	11	54	15	.1	2	4.1
5	Antigua and Barbuda	54	.	.	.	4.3	.	.
6	Argentina	59	123	681	293	1.0	22	79.4
7	Armenia	43	23	224	238	.1	9	41.7
8	Australia	90	293	1376	706	37.4	55	156.5
9	Austria	88	296	753	516	5.5	33	133.7
10	Azerbaijan	30	27	23	254	.0	6	23.5
11	Bahrain	25	.	.	.	5.4	.	.
12	Bangladesh	40	9	50	7	.0	1	4.6
13	Barbados	84	.	.	.	1.9	.	.
14	Belarus	20	174	296	322	.1	16	23.9
15	Belgium	91	160	793	523	19.8	34	139.2
16	Belize	75	.	.	.	4.3	.	.
17	Benin	70	2	108	11	.1	2	26.9
18	Bhutan	24
19	Bolivia	78	55	675	118	.1	17	95.9
20	Bosnia & Herzegovina	44	152	248	112	.0	9	41.6
21	Botswana	72	27	156	20	.2	4	44.3
22	Brazil	67	40	444	333	4.1	17	82.2
23	Brunei	26	.	.	.	3.1	.	.
24	Bulgaria	70	257	543	408	1.8	24	97.0
25	Burkina Faso	60	1	33	11	.0	1	-3.8
26	Burundi	17	3	71	15	.0	2	3.3
27	Cambodia	39	2	127	9	.0	5	27.4
28	Cameroon	23	7	163	34	.0	4	14.0
29	Canada	86	159	1077	715	41.9	49	145.0
30	Cape Verde	680	.	.

	Nation	Press Freedom 2000 (i)	Newspapers per 1000 1996 (ii)	Radios per 1000 1997 (iii)	TV sets per 1000 1999 (iv)	% Of pop. online 2000 (v)	Media Access (ii to v)	Communication Index (Freedom+ Access))
31	Central African Rep.	40	2	83	6	.0	2	10.2
32	Chad	28	0	242	1	.0	5	19.2
33	Chile	73	98	354	240	1.0	14	83.5
34	China	20	.	333	292	.7	.	.
35	Colombia	41	46	581	199	.9	17	50.5
36	Comoros	601	.	.
37	Congo, Dem. Rep.	23	8	375	2	.1	10	23.4
38	Costa Rica	84	94	271	229	.8	15	99.4
39	Cote D'Ivoire	26	17	164	70	.04	5	18.2
40	Croatia	37	115	336	279	2.22	15	43.5
41	Cuba	6	118	353	246	.22	14	6.9
42	Cyprus	84	.	.	.	4.35	.	.
43	Czech Republic	80	254	803	487	2.83	31	119.2
44	Denmark	91	309	1141	621	20.75	46	151.4
45	Djibouti	3715	.	.
46	Dominica	8431	.	.
47	Dominican Republic	70	52	178	96	.24	7	57.2
48	Ecuador	56	70	419	205	.04	16	66.9
49	Egypt	31	40	324	183	.62	10	30.8
50	El Salvador	60	48	464	191	.50	24	82.6
51	Equatorial Guinea	2201	.	.
52	Eritrea	32	.	91	16	.03	.	.
53	Estonia	80	174	693	555	10.86	30	117.6
54	Ethiopia	38	1	195	6	.01	4	23.0
55	Fiji	4263	.	.
56	Finland	85	455	1496	643	28.04	60	151.1
57	France	76	218	937	623	10.60	38	119.6
58	Gabon	45	29	183	251	.27	5	32.9
59	Gambia	30	2	169	3	.04	4	16.3
60	Georgia	53	.	555	474	.09	.	.
61	Germany	87	311	948	580	14.97	40	139.6
62	Ghana	39	13	238	115	.08	7	33.0
63	Greece	70	153	477	480	1.05	22	94.3
64	Grenada	80	.	.	.	2.00	.	.

	Nation	Press Freedom 2000 (i)	Newspapers per 1000 1996 (ii)	Radios per 1000 1997 (iii)	TV sets per 1000 1999 (iv)	% Of pop. online 2000 (v)	Media Access (ii to v)	Communication Index (Freedom+ Access))
65	Guatemala	46	33	79	61	.46	5	31.6
66	Guinea-Bissau	44	5	44	.	.04	.	.
67	Guinea	29	.	47	44	.22	.	.
68	Haiti	42	3	55	5	.03	1	4.3
69	Hondurus	52	55	386	95	.27	11	53.5
70	Hungary	70	186	689	448	4.96	27	100.7
71	Iceland	88	.	.	.	40.36	.	.
72	India	58	.	121	75	.08	.	.
73	Indonesia	51	24	156	143	.04	6	40.9
74	Iran	32	28	265	157	.15	9	30.6
75	Iraq	2	19	229	83	.	.	.
76	Ireland	79	150	699	406	12.00	28	114.0
77	Israel	70	290	520	328	10.17	25	97.5
78	Italy	73	104	878	488	15.68	33	110.6
79	Jamaica	89	62	480	189	1.97	15	104.4
80	Japan	81	578	955	719	15.48	48	136.4
81	Jordon	43	58	287	83	.82	8	39.1
82	Kazakhstan	32	.	384	238	.12	.	.
83	Kenya	30	9	104	22	.16	3	13.0
84	Kiribati	8338	.	.
85	Korea, Republic Of	73	393	1033	361	21.88	40	116.9
86	Kuwait	52	374	660	480	3.69	31	77.6
87	Kyrgyzstan	39	15	112	57	.05	3	21.0
88	Laos	34	4	143	10	.	.	.
89	Latvia	76	247	710	741	4.07	30	112.2
90	Lebanon	39	107	906	351	4.26	28	56.5
91	Lesotho	44	8	49	16	.03	2	9.5
92	Liberia	3301	.	.
93	Libya Arab Jamahiriyy	10	14	233	136	.	.	.
94	Lithuania	80	93	513	420	2.16	22	107.1
95	Luxembourg	90	.	.	.	11.90	.	.
96	Macedonia	58	21	200	250	1.00	10	57.1
97	Madagascar	68	5	192	22	.03	4	43.5
98	Malawi	48	3	249	3	.06	5	33.9


	Nation	Press Freedom 2000 (i)	Newspapers per 1000 1996 (ii)	Radios per 1000 1997 (iii)	TV sets per 1000 1999 (iv)	% Of pop. online 2000 (v)	Media Access (ii to v)	Communication Index (Freedom+ Access))
99	Malaysia	30	158	420	174	2.86	15	35.7
100	Maldives	3554	.	.
101	Mali	74	1	54	12	.01	1	9.5
102	Malta	83	.	.	.	5.26	.	.
103	Marshall Islands	92
104	Mauritania	33	0	151	96	.01	5	22.6
105	Mauritius	83	75	368	230	3.55	14	95.4
106	Mexico	50	97	325	267	.95	14	57.2
107	Micronesia, Fed Stat	7691	.	.
108	Moldova	42	60	740	297	.08	22	56.3
109	Mongolia	71	27	151	61	.05	5	48.6
110	Morocco	51	26	241	165	.45	9	47.7
111	Mozambique	52	3	40	5	.07	1	-.6
112	Myanmar	0	10	95	7	.	.	.0
113	Namibia	66	19	144	38	.56	4	40.7
114	Nepal	41	11	38	7	.06	1	1.9
115	Netherlands	86	306	978	600	24.36	42	139.9
116	New Zealand	92	216	990	518	14.77	39	146.0
117	Nicaragua	60	30	285	69	.34	10	60.4
118	Niger	38	0	69	27	.01	2	10.8
119	Nigeria	47	24	223	68	.01	6	37.4
120	Norway	95	588	915	648	41.59	52	162.8
121	Oman	29	29	598	575	1.74	25	40.4
122	Pakistan	36	23	98	119	.04	4	22.4
123	Panama Canal Zone	70	62	299	192	1.08	11	73.4
124	Papua New Guinea	72	15	97	13	.00	3	31.3
125	Paraguay	49	43	182	205	.02	7	39.9
126	Peru	33	84	273	147	.08	10	33.1
127	Philippines	70	79	159	110	.45	7	59.2
128	Poland	81	113	523	387	5.17	22	108.9
129	Portugal	83	75	304	560	2.02	19	106.2
130	Quatar	38	.	.	.	4.58	.	.
131	Romania	56	300	319	312	.67	17	69.2
132	Russian Federation	40	105	418	421	3.66	20	51.7

	Nation	Press Freedom 2000 (i)	Newspapers per 1000 1996 (ii)	Radios per 1000 1997 (iii)	TV sets per 1000 1999 (iv)	% Of pop. online 2000 (v)	Media Access (ii to v)	Communication Index (Freedom+ Access))
133	Rwanda	28	0	102	0	.01	2	8.7
134	Saint Lucia	87	.	.	.	1.33	.	.
135	Sao Tome & Principe	7329	.	.
136	Saudi Arabia	10	57	321	263	.58	13	11.1
137	Senegal	67	5	142	41	.09	4	38.7
138	Seychelles	50	.	.	.	3.00	.	.
139	Sierra Leone	15	4	253	13	.01	5	11.0
140	Singapore	34	360	822	308	14.71	34	52.2
141	Slovakia	70	185	580	417	9.44	25	98.2
142	Slovenia	73	199	406	356	23.00	24	100.8
143	Solomon Islands	8248	.	.
144	Somalia	12
145	South Africa	75	32	317	129	4.18	10	76.0
146	Spain	82	100	333	547	7.85	21	107.7
147	Sri Lanka	30	29	209	102	.08	7	24.6
148	St. Kitts & Nevis	82	.	.	.	3.75	.	.
149	St. Vincent & Grenadine	84	.	.	.	1.82	.	.
150	Sudan	15	27	271	173	.00	8	13.3
151	Suriname	69	.	.	.	1.64	.	.
152	Swaziland	2330	.	.
153	Sweden	89	445	932	531	44.38	48	149.9
154	Switzerland	92	337	1000	518	16.44	42	148.9
155	Syrian Arab Republic	27	20	278	66	.07	7	23.4
156	Taiwan	79	.	.	.	21.84	.	.
157	Tajikstan	6	20	142	328	.	.	.
158	Tanzania	51	4	279	21	.02	6	40.0
159	Thailand	70	63	232	289	.22	11	72.0
160	Togo	26	4	218	22	.12	5	17.8
161	Trinidad & Tobago	72	123	534	337	1.56	20	93.9
162	Tunisia	26	31	223	190	.52	9	25.0
163	Turkey	42	111	180	332	.95	12	45.0
164	Turkmenistan	14	.	276	201	.	.	.
165	Uganda	60	2	128	28	.05	3	29.9

	Nation	Press Freedom 2000 (i)	Newspapers per 1000 1996 (ii)	Radios per 1000 1997 (iii)	TV sets per 1000 1999 (iv)	% Of pop. online 2000 (v)	Media Access (ii to v)	Communication Index (Freedom+ Access))
166	Ukraine	40	54	884	413	.29	29	58.3
167	United Arab Emirates	24	156	345	252	8.88	18	30.0
168	United Kingdom	80	329	1436	652	23.90	54	138.4
169	United States	87	215	2146	844	39.11	73	161.9
170	Uruguay	71	293	607	531	2.73	24	97.4
171	Uzbekistan	17	3	465	276	.04	15	19.9
172	Vanuatu	5606	.	.
173	Venezuela	66	206	468	185	.35	17	81.6
174	Viet Nam	25	4	107	184	.02	3	12.5
175	Western Samoa	6624	.	.
176	Yemen	32	15	64	286	.04	2	10.8
177	Yugoslavia	19	107	297	273	.94	13	21.5
178	Zambia	38	12	121	145	.10	5	27.9
179	Zimbabwe	33	19	93	180	.27	3	15.2
Total	179	179	136	143	142	169	130	131

Notes: See technical appendix for details.

Appendix Figure 1: Correlations between access to newspapers and television



¹ It should be noted that this current draft is based on preliminary data analysis, as further data for the full range of indicators is in the process of being added to compare 179 nation states worldwide (see Appendix Table 1).

² See Larry Diamond. 2001. 'Consolidating Democracies.' In *Comparing Democracies 2: Elections and Voting in Global Perspective*. Eds. Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi and Pippa Norris. London: Sage. Freedom House estimates that in 2000-2001 there were 120 electoral democracies around the world, and the highest proportion of people (40.7%) living under freedom since the survey started in 1980. See *Freedom Around the World, 2000-2001*. www.freedomhouse.org.

³ See Juan Linz and Alfred Stephan. 1996. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*. Washington DC: Johns Hopkins Press.

⁴ For trends in public opinion see Pippa Norris. Ed. 1999. *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Susan Pharr and Robert Putnam. Eds. 2000. *Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Marta Lagos. 2001. 'Between stability and crisis in Latin America.' *Journal of Democracy* 12(1). For the issue of reversal see Marc Plattner and Larry Diamond. 2001. 'High anxiety in the Andes.' *Journal of Democracy* 12(2) (Special Issue).

⁵ For a bibliographic guide to the literature on the media and development see Clement E. Asante. *Press Freedom and Development: A Research Guide and Selected Bibliography*. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press. For a discussion of how alternative theories have evolved in the normative debate see H. Shah. 1996. 'Modernization, marginalization and emancipation: Toward a normative model of journalism and national development.' *Communication Theory*. 6(2); Denis McQuail. 2001. *Political Communication Theory*. London: Sage.

⁶ Amartya Sen. 1999. *Development as Freedom*. New York: Anchor Books.

⁷ Amartya Sen. 1999. *Development as Freedom*. New York: Anchor Books; T. Besley and R. Burgess. 2001. 'Political agency, government responsiveness and the role of the media.' *European Economic Review*. 45(4-6): 629-640.

⁸ James D. Wolfenson. "Voices of the Poor," *Washington Post*, 10 November 1999, A39.

⁹ Arthur Lupia and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1998. *The Democratic Dilemma*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

¹⁰ Pippa Norris. 2000. *A Virtuous Circle: Political Communications in Post-Industrial Societies*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

¹¹ For a fuller discussion of this viewpoint see Chapter 1 in Pippa Norris. 2001. *Digital Divide: Civic Engagement, Information Poverty and the Internet Worldwide*. NY: Cambridge University Press.

¹² George A. Donohue, Philip Tichenor et al. 1995. 'A Guard Dog Perspective on the Role of the Media.' *Journal of Communication*. 45(2): 115-128.

¹³ Renate Kocher. 1986. 'Bloodhounds or Missionaries: Role Definitions of German and British Journalists.' *European Journal of Communication*. 1: 43-64.

¹⁴ See Peter Dahlgren and Colin Sparks. 1995. *Communication and Citizenship*. London: Routledge; Peter Dahlgren. 1995. *Television and the Public Sphere*. London: Sage.

¹⁵ ACE Project. <http://www.aceproject.org/main/english/me/mea01b.htm>

¹⁶ For the classics in this account see Daniel Lerner. 1958. *The Passing of Traditional Society*. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press; Lucian W. Pye. 1963. *Communications and Political Development*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Seymour Martin Lipset. 1959. 'Some social prerequisites of democracy: Economic development and political legitimacy.' *American Political Science Review* 53: 69-105; Donald J. McCrone and Charles F. Cnudde. 1967. 'Toward a communication theory of democratic political development: A Causal model.' *American Political Science Review* 61(1): 72-79.

¹⁷ Daniel Lerner. 1958. *The Passing of Traditional Society*. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press p.60.

¹⁸ Samuel Huntington. 1993. *The Third Wave*. Oklahoma: The University of Oklahoma Press.

¹⁹ For a discussion of the criticisms of the older literature and heated debates about the role of the media in development that arose in the late 1970s and early 1980s see Hamid Mowlana. 1985. *International Flow of Information: A Global Report and Analysis* Paris, UNESCO; Annabelle Sreberny-Mohammadi et al. 1984. *Foreign News in the Media: International Reporting in Twenty-Nine Countries*. Reports and Papers on Mass Communication, 93. Paris, UNESCO; Robert L. Stevenson and Donald Lewis Shaw (eds). 1984. *Foreign News and the New World Information Order* Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press; K. Kyloong Hur. 1984. 'A Critical Analysis of International News Flow Research.' *Critical Studies in Mass Communication* 1: 365-378; William Preston, Edwards S. Herman and Herbert I. Schiller. 1989. *Hope and Folly: The United States and UNESCO 1945-1985* Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press.

²⁰ Leonard R. Sussman. 2001. *Press Freedom in Our Genes*. Reston, VA: World Press Freedom Committee.

²¹ See Simeon Djankov, Caralee McLiesh, Tatiana Nenova and Andrei Shleifer. 2001. 'Who owns the media?' Paper presented at the World Bank meeting *The Role of the Media in Development*. April.

²² Garry Rodan. 1998. 'Asia and the International Press: The Political Significance of Expanding Markets.' *Democratization* 5: 125-54.

²³ See for example cases documented by the Index on Censorship <http://www.indexoncensorship.org/>, The World Press Freedom Council www.wpfc.org, and the International Press Institute <http://www.freemedia.at>. See also Louis Edward Inglehart. 1998. *Press and Speech Freedoms in the World, from Antiquity until 1998: A Chronology*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

²⁴ See, for example, the Report by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe on the October 2000 parliamentary elections in Belarus available at http://www.osce.org/odihr/documents/reports/election_reports/by/bel200fin.pdf.

²⁵ See for example the International Federation of Journalists. <http://www.ifj.org/> and the Human Rights Watch. <http://www.hrw.org/>

²⁶ See Maureen Taylor and Michael L. Kent. 2001. 'Media Transitions in Bosnia.' In: *Gazette* Vol. 62 No. 5:355-378.

²⁷ See Frank Chalk. 1997. 'Radio Propaganda and Genocide' Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies Occasional Paper Series.

²⁸ See Jeremy Tunstall and Michael Palmer. 1991. *Media Moguls*. London: Routledge; Anthony Smith. 1991. *The Age of Behemoths: The Globalization of Mass Media Firms*. New York: Priority Press; Alfonso Sanchez-Tabernero. 1993. *Media Concentration in Europe: Commercial Enterprises and the Public Interest*. London: John Libbey.

- ²⁹ Ben Bagdikian. 1997. *The Media Monopoly*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press; Leo Bogart. 1995. *Commercial Culture*; Robert McChesney. 1999. *Rich media, poor democracy: communication politics in dubious times*. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press; Robert G. Picard. 1988. *Press Concentration and Monopoly: New Perspectives on Newspaper Ownership and Operation*. Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corp.
- ³⁰ Pippa Norris. 2002. *Count Every Voice: Political Participation Worldwide*. NY: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 3; Mark Gray and Miki Caul. 2000. 'Declining Voter Turnout in Advanced Industrial Democracies, 1950 to 1997.' *Comparative Political Studies* 33(9): 1091-1122.
- ³¹ See Peter Mair. 2001. 'Party membership in twenty European democracies 1980-2000.' *Party Politics*. 7(1): 5-22; Susan Scarrow. 2001. 'Parties without Members?' In *Parties without Partisans*. Ed. Russell J. Dalton and Martin Wattenberg. New York: Oxford University Press. On partisan dealignment see Russell Dalton. 2001. In *Parties without Partisans*. Ed. Russell J. Dalton and Martin Wattenberg. New York: Oxford University Press.
- ³² L. Griffin, H. McCammon, and C. Bosko. 1990. 'The unmaking of a movement? The crisis of U.S. trade unions in comparative perspective.' In *Changes in Societal Institutions*. Eds. M. Hallinan, D. Klein and J. Glass. New York: Plenum; B. Ebbinghaus and J. Visser. 1999. 'When institutions matter: Union growth and decline in Western Europe, 1950-1995.' *European Sociological Review*. 15(2):135-158; S. Blashke. 2000. 'Union density and European integration: Diverging convergence.' *European Journal of Industrial Relations*. 6(2): 217-236.
- ³³ L. Voye. 1999. 'Secularization in a context of advanced modernity.' *Sociology of Religion*. 60(3): 275-288. Although for a strong counterpoint challenge to this thesis see Rodney Stark. 1999. 'Secularization, RIP.' *Sociology of Religion*. 60(3): 249-273.
- ³⁴ See Robert Putnam. Ed. 2002. *The Dynamics of Social Capital*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Jan Willem Van Deth. Ed. 1997. *Private Groups and Public Life: Social Participation, Voluntary Associations and Political Involvement in Representative Democracies*. London: Routledge; J.E. Curtis, E.G. Grabb and D.E. Baer. 1992. 'Voluntary association membership in 15 countries – a comparative analysis.' *American Sociological Review* 57(2): 139-152.
- ³⁵ On trust in American government see Joseph S. Nye. 1997. 'Introduction: The Decline Of Confidence In Government.' In *Why People Don't Trust Government*, Eds. Joseph S. Nye, Philip D. Zelikow, and David C. King. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. For a global comparison of trends see Pippa Norris. Ed. 2000. *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- ³⁶ For a discussion see David Held. 1999. *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture*. London: Polity Press; Joseph S. Nye and John Donahue. 2001. *Governance in a Globalizing World*. Eds. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- ³⁷ Daniele Archibugi, David Held and Martin Kohler. 1998. *Re-imagining Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- ³⁸ Michael Edwards and John Gaventa. Eds. 2001. *Global Citizen Action*. Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- ³⁹ Harvey B. Feigenbaum, J. Henig and C. Hamnett. 1998. *Shrinking the State: The Political Underpinnings of Privatization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- ⁴⁰ Jack L. Walker, Jr. 1991. *Mobilizing Interest Groups in America*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

-
- ⁴¹ Pippa Norris. 2001. *Digital Divide*. NY: Cambridge University Press.
- ⁴² The data for daily newspapers and radios are originally derived from UNESCO, and the information about television sets, personal computers and Internet hosts from the ITU.
- ⁴³ W.A. Hachten. 1989. 'Media development without press freedom – Lee Kuan Yew's Singapore.' *Journalism Quarterly* 1989. 66(4): 822-827.
- ⁴⁴ Daniel Kaufman, Aart Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton. 1999. 'Governance Matters.' *World Bank Policy Research Paper 2196*. Washington DC: World Bank. www.worldbank.org.
- ⁴⁵ It should be noted that none of the indicators that were selected included measures of freedom of the press or media access.
- ⁴⁶ Multivariate OLS regression models are in the process of being tested, including the communications index and logged per capita GDP regressed on the indicators of good governance and human development, but the multicollinearity statistics (measured by Tolerance and the Variance Inflation Factor) suggest that the results still need to be treated with caution, as there is a strong linear relationship among the independent variables, until this model can be developed further.
- ⁴⁷ E. K. Adagala. 1994. 'Women's Access to Decision Making in and Through the Media with Particular Reference to the East African Situation.' Nairobi: Women in Communication Trust; quoted in: Wisdom Tettey. 2001. 'The Media and Democratization in Africa: Contributions, Constraints and Concerns of the Private Press.' In: *Media, Culture & Society*. 23(1): 5-31.
- ⁴⁸ The entire section is mainly based on Alfonso Dagron. 2001. *Making Waves: Stories of Participatory Communication for Social Change*. New York: Rockefeller Foundation.
- ⁴⁹ For an overview of international FOI legislation see the website of the Freedom of Information Center at the University of Missouri (<http://web.missouri.edu/~foiwww/index.html>).
- ⁵⁰ See Anne-Marie Goetz and Rob Jenkins. 1999. 'Accounts and Accountability: Theoretical Implications of the Right-to-Information Movement in India'. *Third World Quarterly* 20 (3): 603-22.
- ⁵¹ Jeffrey Ayres. 2001. 'Transnational Activism in the Americas: The Internet and Mobilizing Against the FTAA' Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco August 29 – September 2, 2001.
- ⁵² See G. Johnson. 1999. 'Mechanisms for Promoting Teledensity in Liberalised Emerging Markets' Paper presented at ITU conference Telecom 99.
- ⁵³ Young-han Kim. 2001. 'The Broadcasting Audience Movement in Korea'. In: *Media, Culture & Society* 23(1): 91-108.
- ⁵⁴ See Associated Press. 'Malaysia Bans News Site'. Feb. 5, 2001.
- ⁵⁵ See Gerry McGovern. 'Nua New Thinking'. 6(23). June 11, 2001.
- ⁵⁶ See H. Nissenbaum and L. Introna. 1999. 'Sustaining the Public Good Vision of the Internet: The Politics of Search Engines.' Center for the Arts and Cultural Policy Studies, Working Paper #9, 1999. Princeton University.
- ⁵⁷ See Freedom House. 2001. 'Freedom in the World 2000-2001 Survey'; Freedom House. 2001. 'Press Freedom Survey 2001'; USAid 2001. 'Activity Data Sheet Mali No. [688-004](http://www.usaid.gov/country/afr/ml/688-004)' (<http://www.usaid.gov/country/afr/ml/688-004.html>); Mark Meyers. 2000. 'Community Radio & Development: Issues and Examples from Francophone West Africa'. In: Richard Fardon and Graham

Furniss. Eds. *African Broadcast Cultures: Radio in Transition*. Westport CT: Praeger Publishers: 90-101; Mary Myers. 1998. 'The Promotion of Democracy at the Grass-roots: The Example of Radio in Mali.' In: Vicky Randall. Ed. *Democratization and the Media*. London: Frank Cass: 200-216; World Bank. 2000. *World Development Report 2001*. Washington: World Bank.

⁵⁸ See Carla W. Heath. 1999. 'Negotiating Broadcasting Policy: Civic Society and Civic Discourse in Ghana' In: *Gazette* Vol. 61. No. 6: 511-521; Daniel Brown. 2000. 'A Landmark for African Democracy'. *International Herald Tribune*. November 21, 2000; Freedom House. 2001. 'Freedom in the World 2000-2001 Survey'.

⁵⁹ Kirk Johnson. 2001. 'Media and the Social Change: The Modernizing Influences of Television in Rural India'. In: *Media Culture & Society*. Vol. 23 No. 2: 147-169.

⁶⁰ Alfonso Dagron. 2001. *Making Waves: Stories of Participatory Communication for Social Change*. New York: Rockefeller Foundation.

⁶¹ Alfonso Dagron. 2001. *Making Waves: Stories of Participatory Communication for Social Change*. New York: Rockefeller Foundation.