
Philippine Human Development Report
2005
2nd Edition

The design for this year's PHDR is a shadow play of fingers mimicking the images of guns. But the shadows also represent the finger-pointing among members of society based on prejudice, ignorance, and misrepresentation that often give rise to violence and armed conflict.

Philippine Human Development Report 2005

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Philippine Human Development Report 2005

Peace, Human Security and Human Development in the Philippines

2nd Edition

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and

New Zealand Agency for International Development (NZAID)

Foreword 1

My congratulations to the Philippine Human Development Network (HDN) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) on the completion of the 5th Philippine Human Development Report (PHDR) on Peace, Human Security and Human Development. Indeed, this is a very timely report for the Philippines as it continues to face the many challenges of the peace process.

The Report's analysis of the human security and human development dimensions of protracted armed conflict should lead to a clearer understanding and identification of the interventions and policies necessary to address its root causes.

Since 1997, the New Zealand Agency for International Development (NZAID) has been a consistent supporter of peace and development efforts in Mindanao. Our partnership with UNDP and HDN on the development and publication of the 5th PHDR stems from NZAID's commitment to contribute to conflict resolution and peace building throughout the entire Philippines.

The 5th PHDR comes at a propitious time when the Philippines steps up its efforts to fully implement its existing peace accord with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), pursue the signing of a peace agreement with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and engage with the National Democratic Front (NDF).

The Report's findings and recommendations will help provide the Government of the Philippines (GOP), as well as relevant stakeholders, with a solid basis on which to pursue lasting peace, human security and development. NZAID is proud to be associated with this 5th PHDR and will continue to remain committed to helping the Philippines achieve a safe and secure future for its people.

H.E. Robert Carey Moore-Jones
Ambassador
Embassy of New Zealand

...towards a safe and just world

nzaid
New Zealand's International Aid & Development Agency

Foreword 2

Since the early 1990s the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has been supporting the preparation of National Human Development Reports (NHDRs) worldwide as a tool for policy advocacy among major stakeholders to trigger action for human development. The global HDR's analytical framework and inclusive approach are carried over into regional and national HDRs.

In the Philippines, the institutionalization of the Human Development Network Foundation Inc. (HDN) has ensured independence, ownership and a productive record of Philippine Human Development Reports (PHDRs). This is the 5th PHDR prepared by the HDN since 1994 after a group of development practitioners from various disciplines got together to discuss how best to apply the major findings and conclusions of the HDR in a Philippine setting.

This 5th PHDR strives to provide relevant policy directions linking peace and security to political reforms for a substantive democracy and for stability in governance through identifying legislative action for reforms in order to strengthen civil governance.

UNDP commends this Report as a positive step towards establishing long-lasting peace and security in the Philippines, which in-turn mean positive steps towards poverty reduction and human development. These positive measures will translate into reaching the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

I would like to thank the New Zealand Agency for International Development (NZAID) for its support in the preparation of this PHDR on *"Peace, human security and human development in the Philippines."* And to the HDN my congratulations for another job well done!

Kyo Naka
Resident Representative a.i.
United Nations Development Programme

UNDP Philippines

Foreword 3

In this 5th issue of the Philippine Human Development Report, the Human Development Network (HDN) breaks out from its comfort zone of basic economic issues and addresses one that is at core a political one: ideology-based armed conflicts. The theme was motivated by the observation that some of the most conflict-ridden provinces are also among the bottom-10 provinces for almost every dimension of human development, yet the link between human insecurity and human development had yet to be explored; that the Philippines is home to two of the world's longest-running armed conflicts, yet a credible accounting of their human and economic costs is not available; and that insurgency, indeed terrorism, is often casually attributed to income poverty and inequality, yet too many counter examples (of poor communities not participating, much less condoning violence) could be cited. Why, after so many years of counterinsurgency policies and anti-poverty strategies, have resolutions to the conflicts been so elusive?

The Report examines the causes and costs of the communist and Moro insurgencies, asks why and how government "counterinsurgency" policies and other institutions have fallen short, and tries to suggest how current peace efforts can be recast or reinforced. It proceeds from and with a human development frame, that is, an understanding that human security is not just freedom from *fear*, a defensive concept, but also freedom from *want* and *humiliation*; that the insecurity of one is the insecurity of all, and, most important, that human security is a *right* in itself.

More than ever before, this edition of the Report required an inclusive approach. Focus areas and hypothesis were generated and refined during a well-attended Inception workshop in July 2004, after which experts from various fields—political science, public administration, law, sociology, peace studies, and economics—were commissioned to review existing literature, undertake provincial and community-level case studies, assess the responses of both government and non-government institutions, and provide technical and econometric analysis. Over the next 15 months, research findings were subject to four more workshops, including one convened in General Santos City by the Mindanao State University. Moreover, a national opinion poll was designed to help determine whether the personal experiences of prejudice against Muslims which surfaced during the research were indicative of wider phenomena.

Among the key findings and observations thoroughly discussed in the main theme chapter:

■ 91 percent of all provinces were affected by ideology-based armed conflicts during the 18-year period from 1986-2004.

■ Estimates of economic losses due to the Mindanao conflict range from P5 billion to P10 billion annually from 1975 to 2002. The measurement of economic costs due to the communist insurgency is more elusive but includes attacks on telecom and power facilities and the practice of collecting revolutionary taxes all of which increase the cost of doing business.

■ Even harder to measure are the loss of human life in direct combat, the deaths and morbidity due to internal displacement, and the injuries and indignities suffered by victims of discrimination. In the extreme, armed conflict has uprooted entire families and societies: anywhere from one-fifth to one-third of major Muslim tribes now live in areas outside their ancestral homelands.

■ Personal testimonies of anti-Muslim bias are not imagined or random. Opinion surveys have corroborated a significant degree of latent anti-Muslim bias across the country (about 33 percent to 39 percent of Filipinos).

■ The incidence of income poverty *does not* "predict" the frequency of armed conflict across provinces.

Neither do aggregate measures of income inequality. Measures of deprivation—such as disparities in access to reliable water supply, electricity, and especially *education*—however, *do* predict the occurrence of armed encounters.

■ The average income of the *middle class* (rather than average income by itself) matters to the incidence of armed conflict. Beginning with low incomes, the incidence of armed conflict first rises before falling as the average income of the middle class rises.

■ The rate of accomplishment of land reform is a good predictor of the frequency of armed conflict. However, the extent to which the land issue will remain an important determinant remains an open question.

■ Policy inconsistency within and across administrations has characterized government counterinsurgency strategies. This inconsistency is sustained by the public's superficial involvement and lack of information. For instance, the Moro conflict has been viewed as an exclusively "Mindanao issue" but should be a pressing question of human development and human security that touches all Filipinos.

The Report proposes, among others, that a common framework for peace, a legislated national peace policy, and a national constituency for peace are necessary ingredients for sustained peace-building. More important, it observes that socioeconomic investments are necessary and desirable in and of themselves if we are to believe that human security is a right. That these have also been shown empirically to be potentially effective in reducing the probability of armed conflict confirms the validity of the human development approach.



Arsenio M. Balisacan
President
Human Development Network

H.D.N.
Human Development Network

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Human security and armed conflict

Ako si m16 at your service bay
Aduna pud koy anak, si baby armalite
Ako si m16 at your service bay
Aduna pud koy anak, si baby armalite
Rattatatat tat tat tat tat tat ta ta tat
Tat tat tat tat...
Bang bang bang bang bang bang bang...bang!
– A POPULAR RAP BY JR. KILAT

In the early years of this new century, "security" has suddenly become the watchword. Ever since rich societies and powerful governments themselves came under threat—particularly after the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001—security has become the overriding global preoccupation. In its name, major wars have been waged throughout the world, regimes toppled or supported, and alliances re-examined and redrawn.

For people in poor and developing countries including the Philippines, however, little of this is really new. All too often in the past, as it is now, "security" has been and is still understood simply as the preservation of a status quo—however this may be defined by governments, regimes, and mainstream or majority populations. At a fundamental level, however, what matters most is not the abstract security of a regime or a state but rather the *security of real people*, or *human security*. For many reasons, many Filipinos have never been secure but rather live in vulnerable and precarious conditions.

Terrorism in the most recent period has made even mainstream Philippine society aware that it, too, is vulnerable to violence and must share the insecurity that the rest of the country already experiences. Metro Manila has not been spared: witness the Rizal Day 2000 light-rail transit bombing (14 dead, a hundred injured), the 2004 SuperFerry 14 bombing (116 dead), the country's worst maritime attack; the "Valentine's Day" 2005 bombings in Makati and Davao, and General Santos (7 killed, 150 injured), and many other less spectacular but no less unsettling incidents.

To be sure, the government has sought to paint recent terrorism as being limited to isolated incidents and as solely the work of the Abu Sayyaf or of foreign elements like the Jemaah Islamiyah. Even if this were true, there would still be no question that recent terrorism is only the most toxic excrescence of a deeply rooted plant drawing its strength from a rich soil of legitimate grievance. And deplorable as it is, the new terrorism has driven home at least two important points: **first**, that security must now be understood not in terms of abstract geopolitical or regime goals, but in how safe and free ordinary people feel in their daily lives; **second**, that the state of peace and security for communities, countries, or peoples cannot be conceived of separately but are indivisible or "all of a piece." Sooner or later, in one form or another, the insecurity in one part of the population spills over and affects the rest.

At its most basic level human security consists of the *freedom from fear*, *freedom from want*, and *freedom from humiliation*. These are essential conditions for

people to function effectively and achieve their goals. While human development—already discussed in previous Philippine Human Development Reports—is the process that widens the range of people's choices, human security means that people can make those choices safely and freely. In other words, *human security is the external precondition for human development*.

The sources of fear, want and humiliation are manifold: human insecurity can arise from want of a job, lack of access to food, threats to health, poor infrastructure, oppression by the state, social discrimination and prejudice, crime, and so on **[Box 1.1].** From the aspect of geography alone, the Philippines is vulnerable to human insecurity on a vast scale. Located in both the "ring of fire" and the typhoon belt, the country experiences volcanic eruptions, earthquakes and typhoons more frequently than any other country in the world, averaging eight major disasters a year [Bankoff 2003:31] and resulting in major economic and social dislocations. The successive typhoons and mudslides that devastated Quezon in late 2004 and carried off more than 1,300 lives in a few weeks are only the most recent example.

This Report, however, focuses on a particular source of human insecurity, namely, that caused by **ideology-based armed conflicts (IBACs).** This refers to those armed conflicts—at times called "insurgencies" or "armed revolutionary struggles"—that derive from the *espousal of alternative state-visions*[1]. This focus does not stem from the fact that, among all sources of human insecurity, IBACs have been the most devastating. Indeed it can be argued that in the most recent period natural catastrophes have probably taken a larger toll in human lives. However, unlike environmental threats, which are mediated if not wholly caused by natural causes, IBACs are directly human undertakings and impositions on either side. They differ even from other types of violence, such as common crimes, which are determined by narrow causes and directed at specific persons. Instead IBACs stem from divergent thought-systems and differing ways of life that can affect, appeal to, and mobilize large masses and sections of society. As a result, the issues involved are often highly complex and multifaceted, taking many years, if at all, to resolve.

It is important not to oversimplify, however. Threat and violence arising from armed conflict are not one form of human insecurity arising separately and that can therefore be highlighted on its own and resolved separately. More often, one form of insecurity leads to another. The insecurity of one group with respect to their livelihood, or cultural identity, may lead it to take up arms or resort to terror when no credible peaceful alternative is in sight. War and terror will in turn impose their own type of threats. Hence, a cycle of human insecurity can often arise, where one type of human insecurity leads to violence, leading to further insecurity.

Historically, such IBACs—no less than natural calamities—have been the cause of massive disruptions of social and economic activities, loss of life, severe psychological trauma and collective insecurity. The communist and Moro insurgencies in the Philippines are among the world's longest-

Table 1.1 Provinces with the highest number of armed encounters (1986-2004)

Encounters involving the MILF or MNLF	Encounters involving the NPA
Maguindanao	Quezon
North Cotabato	Davao del Norte
Basilan	Albay
Lanao del Norte	Cagayan
Lanao del Sur	Metro Manila
Davao del Sur	Davao Oriental
South Cotabato	Isabela
Sultan Kudarat	Davao del Sur
Sulu	Camarines Sur
Zamboanga del Sur	Agusan del Sur
	Surigao del Sur
	Kalinga-Apayao

Source: C. Bautista [2005]

running armed conflicts. In its present incarnation, the communist insurgency has persisted for almost four decades, while the contemporary Bangsa Moro rebellion is more than three decades old.[2] It is a sobering fact that over the same period, conflicts in Central America, the Balkans and in Africa have come and gone—even the "troubles" in Northern Ireland are close to an end—yet the armed conflicts in the Philippines have persisted.

Even during the relatively short period 1986-2004, 91 percent of the provinces were affected at some point by ideology-based armed conflicts. (Of 21 provinces with the largest number of armed encounters, 15 are in Mindanao.) Only seven provinces witnessed no armed encounters during the period.[3] The people's concern over the armed conflict has never been stronger, and peace has perennially ranked high as an issue. In March 2005, as many as 35 percent of Filipinos cited "peace in the country" as an urgent national concern, next only to inflation (cited by 45 percent) and the perennial fight against graft and corruption (36 percent) [Pulse Asia, *Ulat ng Bayan*].

This Report counts the costs and recounts the roots of the conflict. It inquires into why various approaches to a solution have failed, and finally suggests a way forward for the government, the insurgent groups, and the rest of society.

Counting the cost of conflict

The human cost of armed conflict can be analyzed in a number of ways. From the viewpoint of their *scope and impact*, costs can be classified into those specific to the locality itself, as against those costs that "spill over" to the larger region or to the country as a whole. For example, the damage to property caused by a military bombardment is a cost specific to the locality. On the other hand, although the physical damage wrought by armed conflict may be local, it could yet discourage business from coming to the entire region or cause it to shun the Philippines altogether (e.g., a drop in Mindanao tourism as a whole, or a postponement of investment plans). The potential revenue or output that could have been generated is no less a cost of the conflict. Even at the level of the locality itself, costs may be further subdivided into direct ones versus those that represent foregone opportunities (i.e., "implicit" costs). The mortality and illnesses among refugees caused by their displacement are an example of a direct cost; on the other hand, the output that cannot be produced because displaced persons cannot return to their homes is an implicit cost or a foregone benefit.

Table 1.2 Costs of armed conflict, a classification

	Nonmonetary	Economic
Local direct	deaths and injuries among combatants and civilians due to fighting; deaths and morbidity from displacement and diaspora	property and infrastructure destroyed lost output military spending on both sides; social spending
implicit	loss of cultural identity and social cohesion; loss of personal dignity	foregone investment alternative use of local resources
Spillover	prejudice; ethnic and social tensions; rise in kidnap-for-ransom, drug-trafficking and other illegal activities	lost output foregone investment; alternative use of national funds

From the aspect of their *form*, on the other hand, costs can also be classified into those that are easily translated into a money-equivalent and damage or injury whose significance cannot be adequately or accurately captured by a money-metric. While the amount of property lost or damaged and of investment foregone can *in principle*—and if sufficient data were available—be measured in peso terms, the value of human life can be a subject of vigorous dispute **[Box 1.2]**. Even more difficult to valorise are the injuries and indignities suffered by victims of discrimination, or the loss of cultural traditions among minorities, or the rise of prejudice social and ethnic tensions in mainstream society. Table 1.2 above provides a summary of this classification.

Loss of human life. Possibly the most palpable cost of armed conflict is the threat to human existence,

especially for immediately affected communities. Battles and armed encounters take a toll on the lives and limbs of the combatants themselves, but they also place noncombatants at grave risk. Their effects frequently persist long after the actual incidents themselves have passed, particularly when they result in periodic social dislocations or a permanent diaspora.

There is little systematic documentation of the exact number of lives lost, directly and indirectly, throughout the history of the two armed conflicts. Even numbers of casualties among direct combatants are highly tentative at best, with either side having an incentive to inflate the casualties among their adversaries and understate their own losses. For the post-Marcos years, however, the summary in Table 1.3 should be indicative.

Table 1.3 Combatants killed and injured in armed encounters (1986-2004, by administration)

	Aquino	Ramos	Estrada	Arroyo	Total
NPA-AFP					
NPA killed	828	2	90	484	1404
NPA injured	92	0	12	80	184
AFP killed	735	2	130	492	1359
AFP injured	301	1	49	254	605
Subtotal	1956	5	281	1310	3552
MNLF-AFP					
MNLF killed	66	0	139	2	207
MNLF injured	12	0	0	0	12
AFP killed	55	50	21	5	131
AFP injured	18	1	8	0	27
Subtotal	151	51	168	7	377
MILF-AFP					
MILF killed	2	213	471	492	1178
MILF injured	0	7	92	108	207
AFP killed	5	26	222	222	475
AFP injured	0	11	270	218	499
Subtotal	7	257	1055	1040	2359
Memorandum:					
Total killed	1691	293	1073	1697	4754
Total injured	423	20	431	660	1534

Source: Compiled by P. Abinales and E. Ramos. See Bautista [2005]

The table shows that over 18 years of post-Marcos armed conflict, some 4,700 combatants have been killed and 1,500 wounded. Over the period, therefore, the two insurgencies may be said roughly to have taken the lives of at least 260 combatants and injured 85 *every year*. Of total combatant-lives lost, 58 percent were due to the communist insurgency, 35 percent to the conflict with the MILF, and 7 percent to the conflict with the MNLF.

Apart from being tentative, however, the above figures are incomplete. They fail to include political assassinations, "disappearances" and victims of vigilante groups (whether actual participants or those merely suspected). A related phenomenon are the mass revolutionary purges that revolutionary movements inflict on their own followers. Although it subsequently abjured its acts, the Communist Party initiated a series of purges in 1982, 1985, 1987, and 1989 in an attempt to rid itself of suspected infiltrators.[4] These activities led in many cases to torture and in some to summary executions. It is estimated that more than a thousand persons have been executed, mostly in Mindanao.

Figure 1.1 Armed encounters with the NPA, MILF, and MNLF (Number of incidents by administration)



Source: Compiled by P. Abinales and E. Ramos. See Bautista [2005]

As the figures suggest, an important factor influencing the loss of life is the shifting political approach and strategic fortunes of both insurgencies and administrations. The lowest incidence of casualties among combatants was recorded during the Ramos

Box 1.1 Human security: Key concepts

The concept of human security was first advanced in the 1994 Human Development Report. The following is a summary of its key points:

1. *Human security* should not be equated with *human development*. Human development is a broader concept defined as *a process of widening the range of people's choices.* HS means that people can *exercise these choices safely and freely*—and that they can be relatively confident that the opportunities they have today are not totally lost tomorrow.

a. Human security means, first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in patterns of daily life (whether in homes, jobs, communities.) Loss of human security can be human-made (wrong policy choices), stem from the forces of nature, or both.

b. Human security stresses that people should be able to take care of themselves; it's a critical ingredient of participatory development. It is therefore not a defensive concept—the way territorial or military security is—but an integrative concept.

c. As envisioned by the UN, the two major components of human security are freedom from fear and freedom from want. *"The battle of peace has to be fought on two fronts. The first is the security front where victory spells freedom from fear. The second is the economic and social front, where victory means freedom from want. Only victory on both fronts can assure the world of an enduring peace.... No provisions that can be written into the Charter will enable the Security Council to make the world secure from war if men and women have no security in their homes and their jobs."* (1945, US Secretary of State). Unfortunately, in later years, it was the first component, freedom from fear, that dominated.

2. Most of the threats to human security fall under seven categories:

a. Economic security—an assured basic income, usually from productive and remunerative work or, in the last resort, from publicly financed safety nets. Income security is related to job security: the global shift to more "precarious" employment has been accompanied by increasing insecurity of incomes. Indicators of economic insecurity include (i) high and prolonged unemployment, underemployment, (ii) falling incomes, high rates of inflation and (iii) homelessness, one of the severest effects of economic insecurity.

b. Food security—assured physical and economic access to basic food. Availability of food is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for food security. Unless the question of assets, employment and income security is tackled upstream, state interventions can do little for food insecurity downstream. Indicators include (i) food production per capita, (ii) increasing trend in food import dependency ratio and (iii) daily per capita calorie supply.

c. Health security—linked with poor nutrition and unsafe environment, i.e. polluted water. Threats are usually greater for the poorest; the situation for women is particularly difficult (as evidenced in the North-South gap in maternal mortality.) Disparities in access to health services (e.g., ratio of doctors to population, annual per capita spending on health care) are also sharp.

d. Environmental security—need for healthy physical environment. Threats to local ecosystems include short water supply, pressure on land (deforestation, desertification, salinization) and air pollution. Threats may be chronic/long lasting or sudden/violent (e.g., Chernobyl). Human beings have provoked many chronic "natural" disasters, e.g., when population growth moves people into marginal or disaster-prone areas.

e. Personal security—security from physical violence. Threats may come from the state (torture), other states (war), other groups (traditional practices, ethnic tension), individuals/gangs (street crime), directed at women (rape, physical battery, sexual harassment), or the vulnerable (child abuse, including child labor). The greatest source of anxiety for many people is crime, particularly violent crime.

f. Community security—most people derive security from membership in a group which provides a cultural identity and reassuring set of values. Threats may come from within (when traditional communities perpetuate oppressive practices) or from other groups. Ethnic tensions are often over limited access to opportunities, whether from state (social services) or market (jobs). Indigenous people also face widening spirals of violence.

g. Political security—assured basic human rights. Threats include state repression. One of the most useful indicators of political insecurity is the priority the government accords military strength (ratio of military to social spending).

3. *"When human security is under threat anywhere, it can affect people everywhere."* Global human security is indivisible; threats within countries rapidly spill beyond national frontiers. Six emerging threats include: unchecked population growth, disparities in economic opportunities, excessive international migration, environmental degradation, drug production and trafficking, international terrorism.

4. Where there are multiple problems of personal, economic, political or environmental security, there is a risk of national breakdown. *Identifying potential crisis countries is an active peace policy.* An early warning system based on a clear set of indicators could help countries avoid the crisis point. Indicators may capture only a few dimensions but *if several indicators point in the same direction*, the country may be heading for trouble.

administration, which also showed the smallest number of encounters across the four post-Marcos administrations **[Figure 1.1]**. But this fact is both more and less than it seems. The Ramos administration reaped the benefits from the (partial and temporary) resolution of the MNLF conflict during the Aquino period. It also took a less aggressive stance toward the camps of the MILF (Chapter 2), leaving the Estrada administration to reassess and radically change this stance later as the camps grew in size. On the CPP-NPA front, the Ramos administration gained from the strategic weakness of the communist movement,

owing to both the partial success of an iron-fist policy of its predecessor (implemented by Ramos himself), and the deep schisms within the communist movement **[Chapter 3]**.

The intensity of conflict, whether measured by incidents or casualties, has increased since the Estrada administration. During the Arroyo administration, total armed encounters, particularly involving the NPA and the MILF, as well as the number of casualties, reached their highest levels since the end of martial rule.

Casualties among noncombatants may be greater or smaller relative to combatant casualties, depending on the stage or intensity of conflict. The World Bank [Schiavo-Campo and Judd 2005:5] cites a figure of a total of 120,000 deaths (civilians and combatants) from the Mindanao conflict from the 1970s to the present. A similar and frequently-cited figure comes from then-representative (now executive secretary) E. Ermita[5], who estimated that some 100,000 persons were killed in the Mindanao conflict from 1970 to 1996. At least 20 percent of them were noncombatants (the balance accounted for by the 30 percent from the government side and 50 percent from the rebels). Conventional positional warfare—particularly in the struggle for control of towns and large rebel camps—results in higher casualties among noncombatants, as against sporadic encounters. The most historically significant have all involved the Moro conflict (from the landmark Marawi Uprising in 1976, to the overrunning of Camp Abubakar in 2000, and the raid on the Buliok Complex in 2003.) Periodic military campaigns involving aerial and artillery bombardment have exacted a particularly heavy toll among civilians, both because of their often indiscriminate effect and because they inevitably lead to massive displacement of populations, spilling the conflict over into nearby areas **[Map 1.1]**. This pattern was evident even in the earliest period of the Moro conflict. For the period 1969-1976, which included the fiercest fighting between the government and the MNLF under the Marcos regime, it is estimated that as many as 60,000 people may have been killed, 54,000 wounded or maimed, and as many as 350,000 displaced **[Chapter 2]**.

To the extent the communist insurgency has been less willing or able to engage in positional warfare, or to maintain large camps, the "collateral" loss of noncombatant lives from the fighting has not been as great as that from the Moro conflict. Military bombings of NPA camps in the vicinity of populated areas have also occurred but these are less frequent.

Terror. Besides armed encounters between combatants, terrorist attacks have increased in significance as a reason for the loss of human life and as a source of heightened risk among the population. The worst terrorist attack in the country has been the 2004 bombing and sinking of SuperFerry 14 off Corregidor, which killed 116 persons. The Rizal Day 2000 bombing of the light-rail transit killed 14 and injured a hundred. This year's "Valentine's Day" bombings killed 7 and injured 150 people in Makati, Davao, and General Santos. The Abu Sayyaf's Palawan-Lamitan kidnapping spree in 2001 left 77 civilian casualties and 104 injured in its wake[6] and the country's image in shambles. Besides these more dramatic events, not a week passes without some incident involving political assassination, abduction, or threatened or actual sabotage and bombing, particularly of public venues relating to the communist or Moro conflict.

Whether or not to use terror is a crucial question that every insurgency must confront. The resort to direct attacks on civilians as a means to disrupt daily life, sow mass panic, show up the powerlessness of established authority, or spark a "revolutionary situation" is always an attractive option for any revolutionary movement. This is because, logistically speaking, terror is a "low-cost" option (requiring only a few operatives working on well-delimited targets) when compared to the political impact it could create. Lenin, that consummate theoretician of communist revolution, did not reject the use of terror in principle; he merely opposed the idea that it could work *exclusively*:

Box 1.2 Measuring the value of human life

Putting an accurate monetary value on the human cost of conflict is a near-impossible task. In the literature, the attempts to do so have come mostly in the form of adding up the potential earnings lost of those who have died and those injured or disabled due to war. However, the use of foregone potential earnings is a conservative estimate of the actual cost of morbidity or mortality. One reason is that, for the case of mortality, the average income per year underestimates the lost potential income especially for age groups whose potential future income stream can be expected to be higher than their present income. Moreover, productivity is not totally captured by income, and valuation of human life solely in terms of incomes across countries tend to differ, with citizens of developed countries receiving higher valuations due to higher per capita incomes.

An alternative approach is the disability-adjusted life year (DALY). The DALY measures the combination of the healthy life lost to premature mortality and the one lost as a result of disability, using the World Health Organization's Global Burden of Disease (GBD) as a reference for life lost to various illnesses and injuries. The DALY is given by

DALY = YLL + YLD

YLL or the years of life lost to premature mortality corresponds to the number of deaths multiplied by the standard life expectancy at the age at which death occurs. On the other hand, in quantifying YLD or the years lived with disability, the number of disability cases is multiplied by the average duration of the disease and a weight factor that reflects the severity of the disease on a scale from 0 (perfect health) to 1 (dead). The disability weights are continuously being refined by WHO to improve the methodological and empirical basis for the valuation of health states. [See the World Bank's World Development Report 1993 for an application of this concept].

Collier and Hoeffler [2004] present some estimates in terms of DALYs as an attempt to account for the social benefits of avoiding war. According to the study, most of the costs do not come from the direct casualties of combat, but from displacement and the collapse of basic preventive health services. Ghobarah, Huth and Russett [2003] likewise estimate this in terms of DALYs as well as in terms of mortality rates, especially among infants. WHO [2000] estimates that there were 269,000 deaths and 8.44 million DALYs in 1999 as direct costs of all wars, civil and international.

In the Philippines, Peabody et al. [2003] used the DALYs in the computation of the economic consequence of tuberculosis (TB) in the Philippines. The two main data sources for this study were the 1997 National TB Prevalence Survey (NTPS) and the 1998 Annual Poverty Incidence Survey (APIS), from which the authors computed the daily wage differentials between individuals with TB and those without. This was then applied to the (age and gender-stratified) DALY estimations to estimate annualized income loss. Furthermore, using the YLL calculation and the projected income stream, they estimated the country loss owing to premature deaths (in this case, from TB).

Illustration

Due to data limitations, we will use the estimated foregone earnings approach to estimate the human cost of conflict for the period from 1986 to 2004. Moreover, we consider only figures on the combatant casualties (there is no data on civilian casualties and injured). Hence, these estimates must be viewed as very conservative floor estimates. In the case of soldiers, it will be assumed that one year of working life lost is equivalent to a monetary loss of P 69,300 (a private soldier's monthly income of P5,775 multiplied by 12). In the case of nonsoldiers, using FIES 2003, the average per capita income of the Philippines is computed. Hence, P27,443 per year, is used as the potential income lost.

We use the data in Table 1.3 which shows the total reported combatants killed between 1986 and 2004. Of the 4,754 total killed, 1,965 were soldiers and 2,789 were rebels. Several assumptions are made. First, it will be assumed that the deaths were evenly spread out over the 19-year period. This means 103 soldiers and 147 rebels die in combat each year. Second, it will be assumed that all those killed were of such age that they would still be of working age in 2004.

Table A presents an estimate of the foregone earnings of the casualties for the 19-year period. The foregone earnings for soldiers is estimated at P1.36 billion and for nonsoldiers P765 million, for a total of P2.13 billion (in 2003 prices). Note how these figures were arrived at. For instance, in 1986, income lost for soldiers was 103 (no. of soldier casualties) × P69,300 (annual income of soldier) = P7.17 million. In 1987, the income lost for soldiers is equal to that lost by the new casualties (also equal to P7.17 million) plus that income lost this year by those soldiers who perished in 1986 (which is also P7.17 million). Thus, total income lost for the two-year period is P7.17 × 3 = P21.5 million. This procedure is repeated until 2004.

Table A Income lost from 1986-2004

AFP or Non-AFP	No. of total deaths	Average Annual Income lost (in 2003 Million PhP)	Income lost for 19 years (in 2003 Million PhP)
AFP	1,965	71.67	1,361.75
Non-AFP	2,789	40.28	765.38
Total	**4,754**	**111.95**	**2,127.13**

Terror is one of the forms of military action that may be perfectly suitable and even essential at a definite juncture in the battle, given a definite state of the troops and the existence of definite conditions.[7]

On the other hand, some interpretations of *jihad* among some Moro insurgents approach that of a total war against nonbelievers that tolerates attacking civilians besides the opposing military forces[8].

Map 1.1 Conflict-affected areas and spillover areas in ARMM

ARMM areas: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Basilan, Sulu, Tawi Tawi and Marawi City

Terror tactics, it must be said, are no monopoly of insurgents. Government forces have countenanced and at times even supported—particularly through the activities of paramilitary and vigilante groups—covert abductions, "salvagings," and killings of legal personalities suspected of collaborating or sympathizing with insurgents. For some on the government side, terror tactics can look like a cheap and convenient way to resolve certain issues and set up a deterrent without the inconvenience of going through the legal system. TFDP et al. [2003] cite the practice of summary executions across all administrations, in particular documenting 152 cases of summary executions under the Ramos administration and 28 under Estrada, numbers which on the other hand can be compared with the estimated 2,500 summary executions under the Marcos regime. An ominous indication that such a mind-set is alive and well in the military is the recent "Knowing Your Enemy" CD released by the AFP, which lumps legitimate church (including the CBCP and the AMRSP and journalist organizations such as the NUJP and the PCIJ) with the CPP-NPA as "enemies of the state." Such sweeping accusations and associations represent an indirect threat to such legitimate organizations.

Ultimately what makes terror objectionable in the modern sense is its blurring of the distinction between military and noncombatant targets. Its indiscriminate character is most blatant when saboteurs and suicide-bombers target buses, trains, ferries, malls and public markets, with the express aim of killing or maiming civilians. The fundamental objection to such practices is based on the old established idea—first attributed to Hugo Grotius [1583-1645]—that *noncombatants should be immune and protected during conflicts*[9]. It was the development of this same doctrine that ultimately led to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and, among others, was crucial in limiting the indiscriminate use

of aerial bombing on heavily populated areas (such as occurred during World War II in Manila, London, Dresden, among others).

The ultimate aim of terror, of course, is a political one, and only politics can ultimately persuade both sides to abjure it. The point is rapidly being reached where the use of terror tactics by either side in a conflict—like carpet-bombing or the use of anti-personnel land mines—will no longer be tolerated as part of the *legitimate technology* of armed conflict under any pretext or any circumstances, i.e., where the resort to terror is more likely to reverse than to advance the political fortunes of the user. This is what both sides of the conflict must now come to realize.

Child soldiers. A further feature of the armed conflicts that has caused increasing concern is the recruitment of children as combatants, putting their future and their lives at risk. International conventions, notably the Convention on the Rights of the Child, explicitly prohibit the recruitment of children ("every human being below the age of 18 years"[10]) into conflict-groups. This has not stopped both sides from utilizing children in varying degrees as instruments of war. Even the government side, for a time in the 1980s and 1990s, took children "volunteers" into paramilitary units such as the CAFGUs. Interviews of MILF guerrillas by the International Committee of the Red Cross/Crescent (ICRC) also point to the MILF's recruitment of children as young as 10 years old [Merliza 2002], although it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between education in *madrasahs* and training and indoctrination as fighters. Children are used as lookouts, couriers and procurers, and in the worst instances, as reserve-troops.

In recent years, however, it is the communist insurgency's stance on this issue that has caused renewed concern. Before they were modified, the NPA's basic rules (1969) stated that membership of its fighting units would take *no account* of "age, sex, race, nationality, or religion." An upsurge in the recruitment of children seems to have occurred in order to make up for the drop-off in NPA membership since the 1990s, with children as young as 9 being recruited. There are no independent estimates of the number of children involved in armed conflict. The military estimates that as many as 25 percent of the NPA's recruits are children, and that children may constitute some three percent of the NPA's total regular troop strength [cited in Mekinano 2002]. Independent reports, however, have documented children being employed as regular combatants, members of liquidation squads, armed camp guards, couriers, post-battle scavengers, and support staff to combat troops.

Whether or not they serve in a front-line combat capacity, however, children forming any part of an armed movement are directly or indirectly placed in harm's way. The anomaly of the situation cannot be mitigated by an appeal to whether the children themselves have "volunteered" to join, or whether their doing so has their parents' consent.

Internal displacement dwarfs any other immediate human cost of armed conflict in terms of the number directly affected. A familiar pattern has been established in recent years: a large AFP military offensive follows upon an insurgent provocation or a change in government policy stance. Escalating skirmishes or heavy shelling then force people to seek refuge in evacuation centers (typically schoolhouses, warehouses, temporary shelters such as tents, or relatives). Normal social life and productive activity come to a halt. In the meantime, people must endure the harsh and hazardous conditions in evacuation centers. The majority can return to their homes only as the fighting subsides in their areas—that is, until the next incident occurs.

As already noted, the communist insurgency has resulted in less massive internal displacement in specific areas owing to the differing character of warfare that has been waged. Nonetheless, in the worst phase of this conflict, the period 1986-1991, which witnessed the Aquino government's "total war" against the NPA, some 1.2 million people throughout the country were displaced **[Table 1.4]**. Some of the worst cases occurred as a result of the aerial bombing and shelling of villages, particularly in Marag Valley

and in Apayao in 1990-1992. In Apayao some 30,000 people were dislocated, an entire village was put to the torch, and human-rights abuses were committed.[11] The large number of people affected is due to the broad, nationwide character of the communist insurgency, unlike the Moro conflict, which tends to be confined to specific Mindanao regions.

Table 1.4 Displacement due to conflict between AFP and NPA (1986-1992)

Year	Number of incidents	Families displaced	Individuals displaced
1986	67	9,462	52,513
1987	192	62,895	329,829
1988	272	57,871	307,412
1989	213	35,778	189,330
1990	150	41,012	219,654
1991	137	31,862	173,362
Total	1,031	238,880	1,272,100

Source: Citizen's Disaster Response Center

Table 1.5 Internally displaced persons, Mindanao (2000-2004)

	Persons added	Net* returnees	Year-end number	Remarks
2000	800,000	500,000	300,000	March: "all-out-war" policy vs. MILF's Camp Abu Bakar
2001	52,000	202-222,000	130-150,000	June cease-fire with MILF; November MNLF unrest in Sulu, Zamboanga
2002	95,000	180-200,000	45,000	Cease-fire violations
2003	438,000	403-423,000	60-80,000	Buliok offensive vs. MILF; ceasefire restored July
2004			60,000	No clashes since May; international monitoring in place Oct

*Equals additions in year t, plus additions in year (t + 1), less year-end number in year (t + 1)
Source: Various sources, as cited in the Global IDP Project (www.idpproject.org)

Over the entire period of the Mindanao conflict since the 1970s, it has been estimated that as many as 2 million people may have experienced dislocation [Schiavo-Campo and Judd 2005]. Table 1.5, constructed using data from the Global Internal Displaced Persons (IDP) Project, shows the changes in the approximate number of displaced persons in Mindanao only in the more recent period since 2000. The figures fluctuate widely from 800,000 in mid-2000 to the 60,000 at the end of 2004.

Some facts will be immediately evident from this table: *first*, the largest increases in IDPs have occurred when government forces launch major offensives. Particularly disruptive were the shift to an "all-out-war" policy by the Estrada administration, which aimed at dismantling the MILF Camp Abubakar in 2000 and the Arroyo administration's 2003 "Buliok offensive," also directed against a major MILF camp. By some accounts the former displaced almost one million people, while the latter caused almost half a million IDPs.

Second, an extended lull in fighting or an incipient peace process does allow large numbers of people to return to their homes within a short time. For example, the restoration of the cease-fire with the MILF in mid-2003 and relative peace in 2004 allowed some 400,000 people to return home and pick up their lives. On the other hand, the risks of returning itself cannot be underestimated, as the following account from the 2000 Pikit siege by R. Layson, OMI, reveals:

> A young evacuee couple left their two children to the care of relatives in the evacuation centers. Somehow, they managed to return to their village to harvest some crops to augment the meager ration in the evacuation center. The couple never returned to see their children again. Three days later, their bloated bodies were found floating in their farm lot. The father bore a gunshot wound in the head while the mother bore a similar wound in the belly. The mother was seven months pregnant. The two kids were brought to me at the convento. One was two years old and the other was three [Layson 2002].

Third, it is less than obvious that evacuation itself is simply a move from an extremely dangerous situation to a condition fraught with its own risks, given the typically substandard conditions in evacuation centers. The toll among evacuees even in the relative "safety" of the evacuation centers cannot

be ignored. Again, Layson [2002] recounts:

> Pikit, as you all know, was isolated from the rest of the world for one week. Nobody knew what was happening in Pikit after electric posts were toppled down, plunging the entire town into total darkness. Food assistance could not go through because of the food blockade imposed by the military for reasons only they knew. People went panic-buying and it took only two days before rice ran out in the market..
>
> ….there was actually a sea of tents in that place (i.e., the evacuation center) and inside those makeshift tents were about 5,000 evacuees, mostly children, women, elderly, and newly-born babies. A number of them have already died because of various diseases and illnesses. On rainy days the whole plaza would be submerged in knee-deep waters. It would look like a big swimming pool.
>
> … People were dying at the evacuation centers because there was not enough food. Medicines were even scarcer. The government had enough money to buy bullets and bombs to kill the enemies, but it did not have enough money to buy medicines.

The longer people must endure such conditions, the greater the health risks. (Indeed, even two weeks may be fatal under certain conditions.) What the table does suggest is that not all IDPs can return to their homes equally readily; some may be compelled by circumstances to remain longer than others. An Oxfam [2002] report on the 2000 displacements in Central Mindanao[12], notes that *76 percent of evacuees* had already spent more than five months in the centers, 17 percent had stayed 3-5 months, and only 7 percent had been there less than two months. The same Oxfam report observes that the longer-staying evacuees tend to be Muslim (ca. 85 percent of evacuees), since Christian evacuees come from places closer to the centers, while Muslim groups and *lumad* come in from the remote interior, where aerial bombings, armed skirmishes and artillery fire tend to be concentrated.

In 2000 the UNDP [Oquist 2000:4] reported an increasing tendency for people (whose homes have been destroyed) to stay away longer, if not permanently.

> Only 10 percent of the persons whose homes have been destroyed desire to return to their place of origin as of October, 2000. … The displaced persons do not wish to return to the locations of their previous homes due to the presence of the military, not because they fear the soldiers, but rather because stationary or in transit military draw MILF attacks that frequently place civilians in cross-fire situations. The net result is that human security in the areas affected has deteriorated as a result of militarization.

Chronic or recurrent evacuees are obviously among the most vulnerable groups in society. On the other hand, relocation or forced migration subjects them to a different sort of trial and insecurity.

Diaspora and discrimination

Armed conflict in the Philippines has disrupted the lives of entire communities and in the extreme uprooted entire families and societies. In the process, entire cultures and ways of life have been undermined and threatened with extinction.

Table 1.6a suggests the extent of displacement of selected Muslim tribes. For major ethnic groups such as the Maranao, Maguindanao, Tausug, Yakan and Iranon, anywhere from one-fifth to one-third now live in areas outside their ancestral homelands, some reduced to virtual Muslim ghettoes in mainstream settlements, such as in Metro Manila, Tanay and Baguio. Indeed the exodus of Filipino Muslims has reached neighboring countries: thousands of Muslim Filipinos now work illegally in Sabah, Malaysia, exposed to harassment, periodic crackdowns and possible deportation.

The figures in Table 1.6a come from the Office of Muslim Affairs. As an aside it should be noted that these are tentative at best, since they differ substantially from the figures of the National Statistics Office (NSO), which are given in Table 1.6b. They show a much smaller total population of Muslim peoples (about 4 million, versus more than 8 million according to the OMA), constituting what some critics have called "statistical genocide" that contributes to minimizing the social and political importance of the Moro issue. An important reason for the statistical problem is symptomatic of the issue itself: the non-Muslim workers of the statistics office work under the handicap of being mistrusted by the

Muslim communities they are tasked to enumerate **[Box 1.3].** The extent of the Moro diaspora recorded in the census, as suggested by the proportion living outside Mindanao, is also much less (8 percent versus almost 30 percent).

Table 1.6a Distribution of Muslim population by ethnic group and by region, 2000 (in percent)

Region	Maranao	Maguindanao	Tausug	Yakan	Iranon	Others	Total
1	1.39	0.62	1.35	3.14	0.00	3.55	1.66
2	1.67	1.34	1.22	0.65	1.03	2.12	1.47
3	1.80	1.88	1.28	0.94	2.26	3.32	1.93
NCR	5.86	3.78	4.29	5.71	1.28	3.98	4.55
4	3.59	3.20	3.28	6.40	9.56	14.76	5.83
5	2.04	1.24	2.07	1.93	5.81	4.88	2.48
6	2.17	1.58	1.10	1.36	0.00	2.97	1.81
7	3.78	2.76	2.60	5.03	8.25	5.50	3.91
8	1.50	2.63	0.37	6.85	1.56	4.84	2.61
Non-Mindanao	23.82	19.02	17.58	32.01	29.75	45.93	26.25
Mindanao	76.18	80.98	82.33	67.99	70.25	54.07	73.74
9	3.15	11.50	78.28	61.35	23.60	31.42	29.46
10	15.53	3.85	1.23	0.80	4.77	1.55	6.02
11	3.31	8.87	2.05	4.71	5.87	20.14	7.50
12	54.19	56.76	0.77	1.12	36.01	0.96	30.75
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Memorandum: Number (thousands)	2,334	2,011	1,504	732	357	1,411	8,349

Source: Office of Muslim Affairs

Table 1.6b Distribution of Muslim population by ethnic group and by region, 2000 (in percent)

	Maranao	Maguindanao	Tausug	Yakan	Iranon	Others	Total
Non-Mindanao	5.04	1.45	2.34	0.33	1.21	20.96	5.52
Mindanao	94.96	98.55	97.66	99.67	98.79	79.04	94.48
TOTAL	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Memorandum: Number (thousands)	1,036	1,008	918	155	154	583	3,854

Source: NSO Census of Population and Housing 2000

Busran-Lao [2005] has pointed to the particular difficulties confronting people of the diaspora. These include the breakdown in social cohesion and of the traditional leadership and consequent difficulties with an alien governance system; the indignity suffered by previously productive people now reduced to penury, or compelled to engage in activities foreign or offensive to their tradition and derogatory of their self-worth; and the special vulnerability of women, children and the elderly to exploitation.

Aggravating these inherently difficult adjustments is discrimination and prejudice by the majority, predominantly Christian, Filipinos. Some of this is captured in the personal interviews of Busran-Lao [2005]:

> All the migrant Maranaos I spoke to in my visits told of being discriminated against in terms of having a choice space in the marketplace, of being denied access to credit, and of being refused employment in offices and firms because they are Muslims. One young female in Puerto Princesa said that despite her very good academic standing, she was refused employment because she is a Muslim.

Being an IDP has been compared to "being reduced to the very lowest caste." One is looked down on and routinely blamed for crimes and illegal activities in the host communities. Women and children in particular are discriminated against and exploited.

A particular source of indignity and resentment, however, lies in the insensitivity of majority Filipinos to the cultural needs and traditions of forced Muslim migrants. In Lao's interviews, she explains:

> But of the issues raised, the most important is their need for a Muslim cemetery to bury their deceased loved ones. For Muslims, it is a religious obligation to bury the dead within 24 hours. For Muslims in a distant place like Baguio with no burial site for themselves, it is indeed a nightmare whenever somebody dies. They had to bring the corpse down to Laoag or Manila. This is such a strain to the family and relatives of the dead, both financially and emotionally.

With comparable callousness, on the other hand, residents of an exclusive Metro Manila subdivision objected to the designation of a simple prayer room for Muslim traders in a mall, contending that this would attract terrorists aside from ipso facto lowering the value of their property.

Individual testimonies of prejudice are corroborated by opinion surveys that point to a significant degree of latent anti-Muslim bias across the country **[Appendix 1.1]**, a bias reflected in people's tendency to agree with negative stereotypes of Muslims [HDN-Pulse Asia 2005]. For instance, a majority of national respondents (55 percent) think Muslims are more prone to run amok. Large pluralities think Muslims are terrorists or extremists (47 percent), that they harbor hatred toward non-Muslims (44 percent), and do not consider themselves Filipinos (44 percent). Typical of classic prejudice, such opinions persist although only a small fraction of Filipinos (14 percent) have had firsthand encounters with their Muslim brethren, and even secondhand information is available only to a minority (28 percent).

Equally telling are "social distance measures" that ask people to choose between people with Muslim names versus those with Christian-sounding names as possible boarders, domestic help, employees, or neighbors. Large pluralities systematically prefer hypothetical alternatives with Christian-sounding names over those with Muslim-sounding names. Combining these factors into various alternative indices of prejudice, the survey firm Pulse Asia [2005: xiv] unequivocally concludes that "a considerable percentage of Filipinos (33 percent to 39 percent) are biased against Muslims."

It may be argued, of course, that notwithstanding such aggravations, life in diaspora may mean a significant improvement in the migrants' quality of life, especially if this facilitates a move to larger urban centers with greater economic opportunities. Some economic studies indeed point to some "positive" spillovers of the diaspora to the extent that people migrate (admittedly involuntarily) to places where their skills and talents find better use. (For example, many Maranao traders have expanded their business interests in Metro Manila.) Even in cases where this is true—it is not invariably so—care must be taken not to reduce the question to a question of money or economics. History is replete with examples where resentment and discontent—at times feeding into terrorism—have festered even in the midst of relative affluence. (Osama bin Laden was hardly destitute.) Perceptions of indignity and alienation from the mainstream society are not the preserve of the materially deprived. Furthermore, as will be discussed below, it is often not abject material that

Box 1.3 Is the Muslim population underestimated in official statistics?

As of 2000, there were 3,854,315 people in the country who were Muslim, or 5.1 percent of the total population. Of this number, 3,641,480, or 94.5 percent resided in Mindanao, and the rest outside Mindanao. The Muslims in Mindanao comprise 20.1 percent of the total Mindanao population.

Box Table 1 NSO official estimates of Muslim population by tribe, by region, as of 2000

Region	Maranao	Maguindanao	Tausog	Yakan	Iranon	Others	Total
1	2,094	129	283	14	13	378	2,911
2	1,629	128	138	9	19	436	2,359
3	3,462	462	1,144	40	94	1,499	6,701
NCR	23,891	11,873	8,672	356	1,382	9,126	55,300
CAR	1,017	107	159	2	90	228	1,603
4	11,666	1,410	9,520	56	211	95,259	118,122
5	2,175	123	203	2	8	543	3,054
6	1,954	245	185	7	41	1,962	4,394
7	2,729	157	447	12	8	1,528	4,881
8	1,555	22	740	9	2	11,182	13,510
Non-Mindanao	52,172	14,656	21,491	507	1,868	122,141	212,835
Mindanao	983,792	993,763	896,573	154,581	152,048	460,723	3,641,480
9	5,846	35,955	221,512	154,127	5,112	134,985	557,537
10	13,413	1,144	670	12	81	4,137	19,457
11	22,069	70,807	24,223	51	668	63,914	181,732
12	321,494	376,243	4,272	25	23,669	1,387	727,090
ARMM	614,290	509,145	645,114	360	122,504	255,563	2,146,976
CARAGA	6,680	469	782	6	14	737	8,688
TOTAL	**1,035,964**	**1,008,419**	**918,064**	**155,088**	**153,916**	**582,864**	**3,854,315**

Source: 2000 CPH, NSO

The figures above are obtained from the public use files of the 2000 Census of Population and Housing (CPH) conducted by the National Statistics Office (NSO).

To the Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA) however, the NSO figures undercount the Muslim population by almost half. According to Director Kim Edres of the OMA Plans and Policy Service (PPS) there were already almost 10 million Muslims all over the country during the Ramos administration, as the President himself declared. Since Muslims do not believe in family planning, the number of Muslims should be even greater than this today. OMA's own count shows a total of 8,349,183 Muslims all over the country, or 10.9 percent of the total population. It is known as the "unofficial record" of the Muslim population.

Box Table 2 OMA estimates of Muslim population by tribe, by region, as of 2000

Region	Maranao	Maguindanao	Tausug	Yakan	Iranon	Other	Total
1	32,557	12,466	20,367	23,002		50,145	138,537
2	38,895	27,000	18,410	4,757	3,682	29,986	122,730
3	42,101	37,729	19,324	6,902	8,052	46,929	161,037
NCR	136,760	75,978	64,581	41,822	4,558	56,192	379,891
4	83,831	64,346	49,372	46,822	34,100	208,316	486,787

5	47,697	24,886	31,107	14,099	20,738	68,853	207,380
6	50,731	31,691	16,600	9,985		41,904	150,911
7	88,231	55,553	39,214	36,785	29,410	77,590	326,783
8	35,048	52,887	5,612	50,107	5,569	68,328	217,551
non-Mindanao	555,851	382,536	264,587	234,281	106,109	648,243	2,191,607
Mindanao	1,778,001	1,628,692	1,239,423	497,685	250,530	763,245	6,157,576
9	73,462	231,339	1,178,460	449,083	84,168	443,541	2,460,053
10	362,439	77,378	18,564	5,883	17,005	21,838	503,107
11	77,272	178,420	30,842	34,500	20,948	284,256	626,238
12	1,264,828	1,141,555	11,557	8,219	128,409	13,610	2,568,178
TOTAL	2,333,852	2,011,228	1,504,010	731,966	356,639	1,411,488	8,349,183

Source: OMA

Box Table 3 OMA vs. NSO estimates of Muslim population as of 2000

Area	Total Muslim Population (OMA)	Total Muslim Population (NSO)
Non-Mindanao[1]	2,191,607	212,835
	3.8%	0.4%
Mindanao[2]	6,157,576	3,641,480
	34.0%	20.1%
Philippines	8,349,183	3,854,315
	10.9%	5.1%

[1] percentage value is computed using the total Muslim population in Non-Mindanao areas over the total population in Non-Mindanao

[2] percentage value is computed using the total Muslim population in Mindanao over the total population in Mindanao

Is there an underestimation of the Muslim population in official statistics—what some have referred to as "statistical genocide"?

For the NSO, the "alleged underestimation is not correct." The results of the census are obtained from interviews made by public-school teachers all over the country. All barangays, including those in remote areas, are visited. Barangay officials are also asked to certify that the enumeration in their barangays was completed. The NSO employs different levels of supervision to ensure high data quality.

NSO points out that the 2000 statistics are consistent with the counts in all previous Census of Population and Housing since 1948 (except in 1970 and 1980 where there are no data on Muslim population). The statistics consistently show that the proportion of Muslim population ranges from 4.1 to 5.1 percent. These are equivalent to 791,617 in 1948 to 3.9 million Muslims in 2000.

Box Table 4 Number and percent of Muslim population in the Philippines by census year: 1948, 1960, 1990 and 2000 (source: NSO, correspondence June 8, 2005)

Area	Census							
	1948		1960		1990		2000	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Philippines	791,617	4.1	1,317,475	4.86	2,769,643	4.57	3,862,409*	5.06

* Differs slightly from the total generated in Box Table 1

Director Edres speculates, however, that data-gathering difficulties experienced in Muslim areas are bound to lead to underestimation. First, Muslims basically don't believe in registration of births and deaths. Second, the number of Muslim converts or the Balik-Islam is usually hard to determine. Third, and perhaps the most important, respondents may not wish to admit to being Muslims for fear of being labeled a "terrorist." In other words, Muslims, especially those residing outside Mindanao, lack trust in NSO enumerators and so are not keen to register and affirm themselves as Muslims. This prevents NSO from getting the accurate count of Muslims, especially outside Mindanao.

OMA gathers data through its 11 regional offices. Through the Bureau of Muslim Settlement, it conducts its own survey using Muslim enumerators. Specifically, for the CARAGA and Region 10, the OMA ties up with Tableegh, a Muslim religious group, whose representatives act as enumerators. For the remaining nine regions, OMA recruits Muslim enumerators directly. The Tableegh gathers reports on the number of Muslims from Muslim leaders in each mosque and transmits this back to the OMA regional offices, while OMA enumerators ask the Muslim leaders in each community how many Muslims there are in their mosques and madrasahs. Having Muslim enumerators greatly facilitates getting the trust of Muslim respondents and thus helps in getting accurate data, especially in areas outside Mindanao. Unlike NSO, however, OMA does not use any scientific method in the design and conduct of its survey—it does not have the manpower or resources to conduct a house-to-house survey and get detailed information on Muslim household characteristics, for instance.

Given the huge discrepancy between OMA and NSO figures, OMA is proposing to the NSO the conduct of a joint survey, deploying Muslim enumerators to Muslim areas.

conditions themselves, but rather a sense of injustice and indignity in the face of violation of rights that ignites the fuse of insurgency.

The economic cost

The greater part of the direct economic cost of armed conflicts **[Table 1.2]** consists of losses in present and future production. This value will depend on the types and quantities of products and services the locality or region was initially producing, on how badly the armed conflict disrupts current production (say, because people are displaced and cannot work), and on how much of productive resources it destroys, since that bears upon how much of future production will be lost. (Note that to the extent people are a productive resource, deaths and injuries suffered also have an economic consequence in terms of output losses.)

While other partial attempts have been made at estimating the economic cost of conflict, the study by Barandiaran [2002] is the source of most frequently cited numbers. Ironically, estimates of the *direct* economic or monetary costs of the armed conflict in Mindanao are relatively small. The method, which uses an econometric model[13], basically asks whether and by how much the trajectory of regional and national output per head might have been changed by the varying intensity of the conflict. The difference between what is predicted with and without the conflict[14] is then denoted as the output foregone. Based on this procedure, Barandiaran estimates that during the periods of acute conflict, 1970-1982 and 1997-2001, the Moro insurgency resulted in lost annual output valued at $150 million, about P8.175 billion (= $150 m × P54.5/$1), or a daily P22 million daily in current pesos.[15] The cost during periods of less intense conflict becomes much lower. Over the entire period of the conflict covered, 1970-2001, however, it is estimated that output lost directly was $2 billion-$3 billion or P108 billion-P158 billion, or about P5 billion-P7.5 billion annually. These figures are significant, particularly to the economies of the affected areas, but they are not particularly large from the viewpoint of the national economy. This amounts only to some 2.5 percent of regional GDP of central and southwestern Mindanao and half of a percent of GDP for the entire country.

The reason for the modest figure is the physical confinement of the fighting to a small area of the country (hence also precluding large negative spillovers); the fact that resources mobilized for war on either side have never been large; the "low economic value" of the resource base of the area in question, particularly since fighting has occurred in the more remote areas; and the weak economic linkages between the affected areas and the rest of the country (again precluding large disruptions in the supply chain to the rest of the country) [Barandiaran 2003:33-34].

A recent paper on the Mindanao conflict by Schiavo-Campo and Judd [2005], on the other hand, argues for supplementing Barandiaran's estimates because the latter neglect a larger implicit economic cost, which is *investment deflection*, or, in the terminology of Figure 1.2, foregone investment:

> There is anecdotal but persuasive evidence from the international investment banking community that the "troubles" in the island have adversely affected the image of the country as an investor-friendly venue. This is consistent with the evidence …to the effect that *capital flight is a main result of civil conflict, with capital repatriation following a settlement of the conflict.* In the case of Mindanao, however, such capital flight (limited by the low level of the initial capital) has been compounded by a failure to attract the equity investment that could be expected based on the area's location and factor endowments—investment which was deflected to other areas in East and Southeast Asia. [Schiavo-Campo and Judd 2005].

Foregone investment is both an implicit local cost and a spillover cost. At the local level, investment in agriculture by communities (say in irrigation or in plantations) may be inhibited by the insecurity spawned by fighting. At the level of the whole country, investment may also be lost, as the country's attractiveness as an investment location suffers from its association with the region troubled by armed conflict. Foreign investors can afford to to be fastidious

when their location options span many countries, many with similar endowments, and not all of which suffer from armed conflict and human insecurity.

Figure 1.2 Investment growth (durable equipment) 1998-2003



Still, a simple yet vivid illustration of this relationship is provided by the figure above, which shows the growth of investment for the entire country as well as for major island groups, including Mindanao. The test-shock used is the 2001 Abu Sayyaf kidnap incident originating at a resort in Palawan and leading to a manhunt and violent confrontation in Basilan, which drew worldwide attention. The figure clearly shows a sharp drop in investment for the entire country and for all regions that coincides exactly with the year of the incident. It is obvious that the drop in Mindanao is much sharper. More noticeable, however, is the fact that durable-investment growth in Mindanao continued to shrink two years following the incident, even after spending in the rest of the country began to recover. Schiavo-Campo and Judd estimate that if investment deflection were to be counted in, the economic cost of the Mindanao conflict would amount to P10 billion annually, or a total of $370 million over the period 1975-2002.

This argument brings up the larger question of hypotheticals, however. Part of the problem with using historical values and trends to estimate "lost output" from conflict is that it double-penalizes the region and the locality for its violent history. The conflict in Mindanao is found to have little impact on national growth because the area's and the region's economic contributions are weighted by their *currently small* contribution. Some may choose to interpret this to mean that the conflict is of little significance. But one must note that the small current contribution of the region is due in no small part to the presence of the conflict itself. The Mindanao conflict is in danger of being given low priority owing to its "small" peso-cost; yet this "small cost" in terms of lost GDP is itself due to the conflict and the official neglect. Indeed the real tragedy of armed conflicts is that they prevent areas such as Muslim Mindanao from attaining their full potential. In this sense, all estimates of lost output based on current performance are understated.

The economic costs—both direct and spillover—entailed by the communist insurgency are no less real, although their measurement is more elusive. As already mentioned, the NPA's wider area of operations and the relatively low-level, non-episodic character of the conflict make it difficult to isolate the conflict's effects on trends in economic growth and investment behavior for specific areas or over specific periods. A visible and substantial direct economic cost of the conflict, however, is due to the NPA's attacks on infrastructure, particularly on telecommunications and power facilities in the CALABARZON area [Morada 2005].

Between 2000 and 2003, 46 attacks on cell sites were reported, with half of them occurring in Central Luzon, Southern Tagalog and Bicol region, all of which are known NPA strongholds. Some 20 cell sites of Globe Telecommunications were downed in the last three years alone. With each site costing telecom companies between P10 million and P15 million to build, the repair or rebuilding of 46 sites would cost companies anything from P460 million to P690 million. NPA attacks were apparently triggered by their failure to "pay up" on the so-called revolutionary taxes.[16] Another target of NPA guerrilla fighters has been power-supply infrastructure. The entire network of transmission lines and power plants is a fairly easy target. Major attacks include the one on the 600-megawatt coal-fired power plant in Calaca, Batangas, in January 2004, which caused a major power outage in Metro Manila and other parts of Luzon, and a

major disruption of business and people's lives.

The CPP-NPA follows the peculiar practice of collecting "revolutionary taxes"—which government calls plain extortion—as an assertion of its existence as a "provisional government" alongside that of the Republic of the Philippines. The bulk is said to be collected from "class enemies," or the enterprises and their operations located within the guerrilla front. In some cases revolutionary taxes appear to be the opportunity costs of avoiding the sabotage of one's facilities. Morada [2005] assembles some data suggesting the magnitude of these activities

> In the first six months of 2004, the AFP reported that the communist insurgents collected some US$740,000 "revolutionary taxes" mostly from mining, agricultural, telecommunications, and transportation firms.[17] In 2002, it was estimated that some P279.2 million worth of equipment and property were lost due to NPA attacks, that included commuter bus burning, toppling of mobile phone relay towers, and similar activities in the mining, logging, and agricultural estates. In the same year, Davao-based rebels collected about P23.08 million, followed by Southern Tagalog with P22.29 million. Central Luzon came in a distant third, with only P7.62 million.[18] Both local and foreign firms in the Philippines have been victims of NPA revolutionary taxes, which effectively increased the cost of doing business in the country.
>
> NPA documents captured in 2001 indicate that telecommunications companies operating in the CALABARZON area pay as much as P80,000 to P120,000 per year. Medium-scale enterprises such as ice plants and poultry farms pay between P50,000 and P60,000 per year, while small landowners are taxed from P10,000 to P20,000 during harvest season. For projects such as property development or road construction, the NPA charges 1 to 3 percent of the project budget. In the late 1980s, which was the peak of the CPP-NPA's taxation activities, the Southern Tagalog region contributed about P45 million per year. The industrial belt running from Calamba to San Pedro, Laguna, is an important source of funds. Many of the companies in the area covertly give to the communist insurgents usually through union funds or percentages from collective bargaining agreements.[19]

From such microeconomic accounts, it becomes clear that such practices are bound to have a fallout in terms of lower investment, lower output growth, and higher employment than otherwise, in the same way that ordinary taxes raise the cost of doing business. This unfortunately also means a further setback to the development of the affected areas, compared with others unaffected by armed conflict.

A related NPA practice has been the collection of fees for "permit to campaign" during elections:

> Based on estimates from the May 2001 elections, permit-to-campaign fees extorted by the NPA reportedly totaled P4.2 million in the CALABARZON area alone.[20] During the six month-campaign period leading to the May 2004 elections, the AFP estimated that the NPA collected a total of P13 million (although the Philippine National Police estimated it lower at P9.6 million) from politicians. The PNP reported that NPAs in Caraga region in Mindanao were able to raise some P5.05 million, followed by Bicol and CALABARZON regions, with a combined collection of at least P3.6 million.[21]

From the foregoing, it is clear that the continuation of the conflict imposes peculiar economic and political costs on affected areas.

Armed conflict affects human development through human security

The effect of the various costs of armed conflict on levels of human development can be telling. As human insecurity increases from armed conflict, people turn away from those social and productive activities that could have facilitated the development of their human potential. Lives are destroyed, families and communities torn apart, cultures decline, and investment is foregone or deflected. Development in the immediate area stagnates and, through spillovers, the entire region and perhaps the entire country is affected. In this manner, by degrading human security, persistent armed conflict ultimately affects human development and living standards.

The robustness of this causal mechanism is evident from several aspects. At the local level, the fate of Marawi City in Lanao del Sur is illustrative from a diachronic perspective **[Box 1.4]**. From the old, genteel Dansalan that was the social and commercial crossroads for Muslim and Christian Filipinos, Marawi was transformed into "ground zero" of the Moro insurgency in the 1970s, beginning with the provocations and atrocities of lowland Christian vigilantes (*Ilaga*), to the October 21, 1972, MNLF-led uprising and its brutal suppression by the armed forces. Both remarkable and portentous for others affected by conflict, however, is the fact that more

than three decades since, the city still has not lived down its reputation as the nest of Muslim-Christian strife. Even today, therefore, compared to *all other cities* in Muslim Mindanao, Marawi manifests the lowest per capita income, the highest poverty incidence, the lowest proportion of workers in manufacturing, and the lowest business and real-estate tax collections. It is evident—given its recent violent history—that investment, tourism, and economic activity in general have come to shun Marawi over the long term. One is then left to contemplate a city with the best-educated population of all Muslim cities, but with paradoxically the worst standards of living.

Table 1.7 Top- and bottom-10 provinces in life expectancy (in years), 2003

Top-10 provinces	Years	Bottom-10 provinces	Years
Cebu	72.6	Antique	62.6
Pampanga	72.2	Kalinga	62.5
Batangas	71.8	Apayao	62.4
Bulacan	71.4	Eastern Samar	61.7
Camarines Sur	71.3	Western Samar	61.4
Nueva Ecija	71.2	Basilan	60.6
Davao del Sur	71.1	Lanao del Sur	57.9
Rizal	71.0	Sulu	52.8
La Union	70.6	Maguindanao	52.0
Cavite	70.5	Tawi-Tawi	51.2

Source: Statistical Annex 1

On a more general scale, successive issues of this Report (see particularly HDN [2002]) have documented how the bottom-10 provinces in almost every aspect of human development always include some of the most conflict-ridden provinces. The five provinces with the lowest life expectancy in the country are in Muslim Mindanao **[Table 1.7]**. There is a gap of 20 years between life expectancy in Cebu for example and that in Maguindanao and Tawi-Tawi, and this is ultimately reflected in the latest overall HDI rankings **[Table 1.8]**, which also lists those provinces as the bottom-dwellers for the entire country. The fact that four of these provinces (Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Basilan, and Sulu) are also found on the list of the provinces most affected by conflict **[Table 1.9]** is no coincidence but rather suggests a deeper relationship. The presence of two Cordillera provinces among those with the lowest life expectancy is also suggestive, since the area is known to be a traditional area of operations of the communist insurgency.

Table 1.8 Top- and bottom-10 provinces in human development, 2003 (0< HDI < 1)

Top-10 provinces	HDI	Bottom-10 provinces	HDI
Benguet	0.738	Lanao del Sur	0.480
Laguna	0.717	Eastern Samar	0.474
Batanes	0.711	Western Samar	0.469
Rizal	0.708	Sarangani	0.448
Cavite	0.704	Zamboanga del Norte	0.446
Nueva Viscaya	0.686	Masbate	0.442
Pampanga	0.685	Basilan	0.409
Bataan	0.679	Tawi-Tawi	0.364
Bulacan	0.663	Maguindanao	0.360
Ilocos Norte	0.659	Sulu	0.301

Source: Statistical Annex 1

Table 1.9 Provinces most affected by Moro (MILF/MNLF) conflict (by number of encounters and by number of casualties, 1986-2004)

By number of encounters	By number of casualties
Maguindanao	Maguindanao
North Cotabato	Lanao del Norte
Basilan	North Cotabato
Lanao del Norte	Lanao del Sur
Lanao del Sur	Basilan
Davao del Sur	Sulu
South Cotabato	Sultan Kudarat
Sultan Kudarat	
Sulu	
Zamboanga del Sur	

Source: C. Bautista [2005]

Box 1.4 Illustrative Case: Marawi City

Conflict changes the economic mix of a place as it undermines formal organizations such as banks, and disrupts the transportation system. It reduces transaction-intensive activities relative to less transaction-intensive ones. It results in a fall in capital-intensive activities and those with significant transportation requirements. It results in greater reliance on subsistence production, and reduces formal while increasing informal sector activity. There are thus proportionately less manufacturing and less long-distance trading domestically and internationally in conflict places [Stewart and Fitzgerald].

This is illustrated in Marawi. In what follows, Marawi will be put side by side other "comparable" cities in Mindanao and will be shown to compare very unfavorably. Some of the other comparator cities are also in some ways affected by conflict; the difference is in degree, with Marawi presumed to have the highest degree of conflict. A caveat: some of the comparator cities such as Davao, Cagayan de Oro, Zamboanga, and General Santos have the advantage of being port cities.

Marawi, prior to the conflict[1]

When the Spaniards first explored Lanao in 1689, they found a well-settled community named *Dansalan* at the northern end of Lake Lanao. *Dansalan* became a municipality in 1907 and the capital of Lanao in 1914. In 1940 it became a chartered city (predating neighboring cities of Iligan and Cagayan de Oro) and in 1956, was named *Marawi* (from the word "ravi," referring to the reclining lilies in the Agus River, the outlet of the lake that flows into Iligan Bay.) When Lanao was divided into two provinces in 1959, Marawi was made the capital of Lanao del Sur and is now the only chartered city in the country with a predominantly Muslim population. Through a plebiscite in 1989, Lanao del Sur voted "yes" to join the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao but Marawi voted "no."

The Maranao, or "people of the Lake (i.e., *ranao*)," comprise the dominant Muslim population in the province and city. The Maranaos are among the most devout and most traditional of the Muslim groups. They are sensitive to *maratabat*, which is intricately linked to family honor, and are very conscious of their status. The province boasts of numerous *sultans*.

Up until the 1960s, the city was the center of commerce, drawing traders not only from neighboring communities but from Manila and Cebu. It was the meeting place of Muslims and Christians—many of whom had come from the Visayas and Luzon and who were concentrated along the north coast, up Panguil Bay in Dansalan and Malabang—and the distribution center for Maranao goods. On market days, traders came to display their products at the public market adjacent to beautiful Lake Lanao, on which painted and decorated Moro boats sail like fluvial parade. A sprinkling of foreigners—Americans, Chinese, and Japanese—resided in the area.

That Muslims and Christians lived relatively harmoniously before the conflict is borne out by accounts of non-Muslims (Christians and Chinese) of their experience in Lanao del Sur and Marawi City:

" The relationship between Muslims and Christians was so close. We coexisted peacefully. Our neighbors were all Maranaos. It did not matter then. We also spoke Maranao. My playmates and friends were all Maranao during my childhood."

" I was born in Maguing (a municipality of Lanao del Sur). All of us seven siblings were born there. We call the 'hilot' who helped our mother during her deliveries as Ina (Maranao term for mother), the same way we call our mother also as Ina. Then we transferred to Marawi where we all spent our childhood and adolescence, with Maranao playmates, classmates, and friends."

Box Map 1 Conflict-affected areas in Lanao del Sur



" I remember the girls we grew up with did not wear any veil. We treated each other in the neighborhood like brothers and sisters. The families exchanged bowls of soup during meal time. "

" I remember very well when I was young, when my friends and I went caroling at night during Christmas to both Christian and Muslim houses; during Ramadhan we also fasted. The same excitement was in the air during Valentine's Day. We were not conscious of these two occasions as exclusive religious practices."

The emergence of the Ilaga (the most notorious Christian vigilante group) and the Marawi rebellion in October 1972, however, "sucked the soul of the area" and marked the beginning of the "decay and death" of the city.

"In Marawi, non-Muslims like the Christians and the Chinese businessmen sold their properties and vacated the city because they were afraid of retaliation from Muslims affected by the conflict."

" It seems all those years of being so close together suddenly turned to mistrust, and hatred. It was explained to us that it was no longer safe to stay".

" There were horrendous stories of fighting and killings. Many people evacuated. Then our Maranao friends told us we had to leave for our own safety. . . Things were no longer normal."

With the conflict persisting over 30 years, what was once a "stunning, vibrant, melting pot of diverse cultural community in Mindanao" has never quite recovered **[Box Map 1].**

Marawi today

Busran-Lao [2005] observes that in contrast to the progressiveness that characterized the city before 1970, Marawi today is notable for what it lacks relative to comparator or even fledging cities. For instance, there are none of the franchises one would expect such as Jollibee, Chow King, Dunkin' Donuts, or Mercury Drugstore (although Iligan city boasts the presence of a Jollibee franchise and four Mercury Drugstores). There is only one courier service and its lone telecommunication center, RCPI, is located at the MSU campus and not the city proper. The province or city does not have any big department store or shopping mall (like Shoemart or Gaisano) and, up to two years ago, had just one hotel located at MSU. The only banking services available to residents in the province and city are the Land Bank of the Philippines, the Philippine National Bank and Amanah Bank.

Primarily because of the presence of Mindanao State University (MSU), Marawi has a very high percentage (34.7%) of college graduates among its adult population. This is much higher than in any other city in Mindanao, including Cagayan de Oro and Davao City, and certainly well above the Philippine average of only 13.3% **[Box Figure 1].**

Box Figure 1 Percent of population 25 yrs and over that finished college, Mindanao cities, 2002



Source: APIS 2002

One might have expected such a high level of human capital to have attracted and spurred more businesses, creating better employment opportunities and greater prosperity for its population, particularly relative to the other cities. But such is not the case. If quality of employment were measured by the percentage of workers in industry, Marawi would be at the bottom with only 6.1% in industry, well below the national average of 16.3% **[Box Figure 2].** According to the national census, the city has the fewest manufacturing enterprises and financial establishments (banks and pawnshops) **[Box Table 5].**

Box Table 5 No. of Manufacturing enterprises and financial establishments, Mindanao cities, 2000

City	Mfg Enterprises	Banks and Pawnshops
Marawi	80	**9**
Cotabato	114	35
Butuan	316	81
Iligan	100	41
Zamboanga	224	65
Gen. Santos	141	57
Cagayan de Oro	271	169
Davao	740	252

Source: 2000 Census

Of course, the fewer businesses there are, the smaller the revenue take of the local government and the less money to spend for infrastructure and social expenditures to offset the effects of war. Marawi's revenues are dwarfed by those of other cities **[Box Table 6].**

Box Table 6 Tax and non-tax revenues, Mindanao cities, 2000 (million pesos)

City	Total revenues (including non-tax)	Real property tax
Marawi	4.987	0.673
Cotabato	91.323	10.119
Butuan	159.902	23.980
Iligan	220.836	73.119
Tagum	175.681	33.386
Zamboanga	435.452	40.815
General Santos	332.900	61.390
Cagayan de Oro	320.653	68.883
Davao	1026.140	218.253

Box 1.4 Illustrative case: Marawi City

The result of all these is the unusual case of Marawi as a city of well-educated people having a very low standard of living. Of all cities above, the people of Marawi have the lowest per capita income and the highest poverty incidence by a large margin **[Box Figures 3 and 4].**

Box Figure 2 Percent of workers in industry, Mindanao cities, 2002



Source: APIS 2002

Box Figure 3 Per capita income, Mindanao cities, 2000



Source: FIES

Box Figure 4 Poverty incidence, Mindanao cities, 2000*



Source: FIES 2000
* Uses Balisacan's consistent cost-of-living poverty lines

Spillovers and Diaspora[2]

The spillover of the conflict is most manifest in the Diaspora **[Box Map 2].** Most of the other cities and regions in the country became a safe haven for the displaced persons from Lanao del Sur and Marawi City. They were forced to flee for human security and economic survival. Diaspora individuals interviewed by Busran-Lao [2005] talk about their experience of the war and the lost opportunities, not only in terms of damage to properties but also of their chance to improve their quality of life. They speak of being forced to take on jobs they have no knowledge of and experience and live in an alien environment that is culturally insensitive.

The spillovers are therefore not only economic and geographic, but also emotional and psychological. Indeed, the trauma of the 1970s still haunts those affected by it. Most of the children of this period, now already in their 40s or 50s, still tremble and break down in tears whenever asked to recount the incidents.

An 85-year-old Maranao woman recalls: *"The conflict in the 1970s was very hard, depressing and difficult.... Too much militarization and the military created fear among many civilians. Military that time were very bad. They captured women for their mistresses, and almost all men were tortured. Military conducted raids of civilian houses and confiscated all the properties they liked. Maranao women were forced to marry just to be saved from the military. There were many disappearances of men and women."*

Note, however, that it was not only Muslims but also Christians who were traumatized. Indeed, some who remember clarify that the war was not one of Muslims versus Christians. Moros do not attribute their situation today to Christians but to the government.

Participant, GenSan forum: "There was a good number of Christians in Marawi; for example, twin brothers…. *Nagre-rent sila sa bahay ng uncle ko. Pagputok ng Marawi Uprising, yung brother-in-law ko pinuntuhan sila, kinuha sila at dinala sila sa tuba. Sa mga bahay namin sila yung pina-stay sa mga katre, sa mga kuwarto. Para lang protektahan yung mga Christian friends namin. In other words, yung giyera sa Mindanao ay hindi Muslim versus Christians…. I am very sure that in many Christian areas…mga Muslim friends nila saved them from the llaga or from any armed element…. So the Moros….largely blame 'yung gobyerno sa nangyari. Hindi yung mga Kristiyano dito sa Mindanao yung bini-blame nila."*

"I could still remember the martial-law years... those salvage victims came from both Muslim and Christian groups. The whole family also experienced living in Jolo, and the Tausugs were as good as the Maranaos. It was the government side with which we have a bitter experience, especially when our fishing boat was attacked with gun fire. It was mistakenly identified as a boat with rebel passengers…"

The more recent "all-out war" and other GRP-MILF encounters are no less traumatic. The ages of some victims indicate that spillovers are also likely to be intergenerational.

From a 70-year-old widow: *"Afraid to experience again the bombings in our community by the military during the martial-law years, we vacated our places and hiked through the forest together with our kids, pregnant women and sick*

Box Map 2 The Lanao del Sur diaspora in the country



persons to look for a secure place. We lost our properties like our houses, farm animals and harvest from our farm field. We lost some family members who were not given proper burial due to the displacement."

From a 10-year-old evacuee: *"I was 7 years old in 2000 when we evacuated from Koliya, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, to the Carmelites compound in Marawi City. We walked on foot through the forests to reach Marawi. I was carrying a chicken and my father carried my younger sister. We saw some rebels and military people shooting at each other. The war wrecked our home. My father abandoned us at the evacuation center. My mother worked in the market as tobacco vendor. My eldest brother was forced to render hard labor and then worked as street vendor in Manila."*

" The conflict forced our young children to work as domestic help abroad to earn for the family."

[1] Taken from Busran-Lao, 2005
[2] Taken from Busran-Lao, 2005

Indeed, a more systematic regression analysis that controls for other factors (geography, climate, access and infrastructure, and other initial conditions) confirms a robust *negative relationship* between being a province in Muslim Mindanao on the one hand, and a host of indicators of human development on the other. Other things being equal, a province in Muslim Mindanao tends on average to have:

- an incidence of poverty that is *higher* by 32 percentage points;
- income per person that is P11,000 *lower* (in prices of 2000);
- cohort-survival rates in basic education that are 31 percentage points *lower*; and
- infant-mortality rates that are 15 points *higher*.

It is interesting, however, that the same causal connection between human development and armed conflict cannot be easily demonstrated in as clear-cut a manner for the communist insurgency. At most, one observes that infant mortality in a Cordillera province is also significantly higher than the average province (other than those in the ARMM) holding all other variables constant. Part of the reason for this weaker relationship undoubtedly lies in the fact that the war waged by the CPP-NPA-NDF is more diffuse than the Moro conflict. While the NPA and the MILF have about the same troop strength (ca. 12,000), the MILF confines its principal operations to specific areas of Mindanao; the NPA, whose ideology and constituency are national, must spread throughout the archipelago [Chapter 3 of this Report]. Moreover the NPA's logistics are inferior in some ways to that of the MILF (e.g., the latter produce their own anti-tank weapons) which prevents it from mounting the same fixed-positional warfare that the MILF is capable of waging. In turn, however, it should be noted that the NPA has begun to shift some of its emphasis to Mindanao [Bautista 2005].

The relatively diffuse and shifting character of the communist insurgency, therefore, probably accounts a great deal for the fact that the armed conflict it wages does not figure prominently in a cross-section analysis of human development. For if all provinces were hypothetically equally prone to being affected by the communist armed conflict, then the level of human insecurity across provinces would not be detected as a relevant variable. This does not negate its effect, however **[Box 1.5].** Certainly, the country *as a whole* could have been more secure *without* the armed conflict, and a comparison of the Philippines with other countries without similar insurgencies would likely show the latter doing better than the former in human development terms.

The causes of conflict: Does low human development cause conflict?

The large costs of ideology-based armed conflict in terms of losses in human life, property, and economic and social opportunities are obvious in the preceding. It is another question, however, whether these costs are sufficiently large for the participants to justify stopping the conflict and seeking a peaceful resolution. Clausewitz observed that war was the continuation of politics by other means. Ultimately, therefore, whether or not insurgent groups and their supporters abandon armed conflict as a means for pursuing their ideology in favor of peaceful means will depend on whether they perceive the costs of continuing to pursue a war as being high enough to outweigh any gains they can derive from it, *or* if the consequences of abandoning armed struggle do not demand too large a sacrifice of their ultimate goals—or both of these. Mainstream Filipinos as well as the government must themselves also reconsider their recalcitrance or indifference to the demands of the insurgencies in relation to how much more of the costs of conflict—which we showed are already large—they can afford to bear.

The histories, ideologies, and changing demands of the Moro and communist insurgencies are discussed in greater detail in Chapters 2 and 3 of this Report. At its root, the Moro insurgency is a struggle

against the "historical and systematic marginalization and minoritization of the Islamized ethno-linguistic groups, collectively called Moros, in their own homeland in the Mindanao islands" [Chapter 2 of this Report]. From 76 percent of the Mindanao population in 1903, Muslim groups currently account for no more than 19 percent (1990) **[Figure 1.3]**.

The roots of the Moro problem have been summarized in *six key elements*: (1) economic marginalization and destitution; (2) political domination and inferiorization; (3) physical insecurity; (4) a threatened Moro and Islamic identity; (5) a perception that government is the principal party to blame; and (6) a perception of hopelessness under the present set-up. This is the context in which the demands for autonomy and—for some groups—independence under a separate state should be appreciated.

The communist insurgency, on the other hand, is nominally part of what was formerly a worldwide ideology that in its most advanced form rejects capitalism as a social and economic system. It seeks to steer the country's political and economic development away from a capitalist and towards a socialist future by nurturing a revolution based on the failures of a "semicolonial, semifeudal" system: (1) widespread and deep poverty and an inequitable distribution of wealth and control over the resource base; (2) poor governance, as seen in the poor delivery of basic social services, the absenteeism of elected local officials, corruption and inefficiency in government bureaucracy, and poor implementation of laws, including those that should protect the environment; (3) injustice and abuse by those in authority, human-rights violations, corruption, and delays in the administration of justice; (4) structural inequities in the political system, including control by an elite minority, traditional politicians and political dynasties, and enforcement of such control through private armies; and (5) exploitation and marginalization of indigenous cultural communities, including lack of respect and recognition of ancestral domain and indigenous legal and political systems [National Unification Commission 1993, as quoted in Chapter 3 of this Report].

The demand for agrarian reform is important in the analysis and rhetoric of the mainstream communist insurgency, since the movement has traditionally believed that land is the principal source of wealth and therefore—in Marxist fashion—also political power in Philippine society.

Given these histories and ideologies, armed conflicts should be expected to occur and to persist in areas that are the most deprived, where deprivation is broadly measured by such variables as poverty incidence, inequality, or some aggregate or component measure of human development. *The straightforward argument is that deprivation breeds discontent and a sense of injustice, which in turn lead to armed conflict.*

Frequently enough, not even the most abject conditions will by themselves cause grievances, much less lead to revolutions and secessions. Many traditional communities that have always lived off a sparse environment, for example, have only minimal expectations and make the most minor demands. For such communities, hardship is not deprivation and therefore no cause for grievance—rather, it is a fact of life, perhaps even a chosen way of life.

For grievances to exist, people must perceive and be convinced that something higher and better than their present condition is indeed possible. Deprivation after all is never abstract: it is always a perception framed *relative to some standard*. Ideology articulates such a standard, for one of its essential functions is to argue how the present could be otherwise for its potential adherents. As Marx perceptively pointed out regarding revolutions, "the problem itself arises only when the material conditions for its solution are already present." That is to say, a revolution is likely to attract a following when its promised changes are at least plausible.

Often the most persuasive demonstration that things *can* be different is the fact that some people in society seem to undeservedly enjoy certain rights and entitlements that others do not. From the viewpoint of the secessionist movement, for example, mainstream

Box 1.5 Costs of armed conflict in Bicol[1]

The Bicol region has figured prominently in the CPP-NPA Protracted People's War since its origins more than 35 years ago. In 1970, the year of the "First Quarter Storm," the Southern Luzon Party Committee was established as the first regional committee. The following year, open hostilities broke out in Southern Luzon when government forces were ambushed in San Pedro, Iriga City. Plaza Miranda was bombed in August of that same year. At around this time, the CPP urban guerrilla movement was beginning to experience the effects of Marcos's repressive administration and many of the CPP-NPA leaders went to NPA base areas in Eastern Luzon and the Bicol region.

A number of Bicolano students and labor activists went back to their hometowns to engage in teach-ins and attend to the region-wide expansion of the CPP-NPA organization. One of them was Romulo Jallores, who returned in 1971 and established his base area in the town of Tigaon in Camarines Sur. Jallores belonged to a poor family of abaca farmers and strippers of this town.

In December 1971, Jallores, now *Kumander Tanqkad,* was seriously wounded in a bloody encounter with Philippine Constabulary (PC) soldiers. In a relative's house in Naga where he sought refuge, a PC team trapped and killed him. Six months later, his younger brother Ruben, *Kumander Benjie,* was also killed by PC soldiers in a remote sitio of Ocampo, Camarines Sur. Witnesses said, the PC team cornered him and his five companions; tied their hands and riddled them with bullets.

The large crowd that flocked to the Catholic Church where their bodies were brought and to the funeral procession signaled the growth of the CPP-NPA movement, and the escalation of armed conflict in Camarines Sur and throughout mainland Bicol. The rebels who captured (and subsequently released) two Philippine Army soldiers in March 2004 in Tinambac, Camarines Sur, identified themselves with the Jallores command, indicating the conflict persists.

Bicol is the third poorest region in the country, trailed only by Central Mindanao and ARMM. At least 53.1 percent of the population are poor, 19 percentage points higher than the national figure of 34 percent as of 2000. One reason for this is its low level of productivity—attributed mainly to climate conditions—and it is not clear whether and how the persistence of the CPP-NPA armed insurgency has contributed. Nonetheless, the insurgency has and continues to involve tremendous costs in terms of lost lives, displaced families, destruction of properties, and derailed development processes. Available data cover more recent years.

Combat-related deaths and displacement. As many as 25,000 combat-related deaths have occurred since 1969. At least 49 persons in the Bicol region were killed in 2000, and at least three women in Barangay Pawa, Masbate, in 1999. Over 50,000 have been displaced by the conflict. In Libmanan, Camarines Sur, some families had to move from their homes in CPP/NPA zones, leaving their farms untilled.

Children have also been specifically victimized, as the NPA has reportedly been recruiting them into their ranks. The report of the Regional Peace and Order Council (RPOC) for year 2003 attributed the increase in the strength and number of firearms of the rebel groups in the region to the continuous recruitment of children and adolescents. The rebels recruit students from barangay high schools and from universities and state colleges in the region.

Human-rights abuses, committed mostly by military and paramilitary groups. On March 1, 2004, two Army soldiers were captured in a gunfight at Sitio Caramboan, Barangay Bataan, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, held captive for five months and 18 days, and released on August 18, 2004, in Presentacion, Camarines Sur. During that five-month period, more than 31 human-rights violations were committed allegedly by the Philippine Army in connection with the rescue operation. Fact-finding missions of Karapatan, Bayan and other groups documented these violations, which involved killing and abduction, arbitrary arrest and detention, illegal search, physical assault and torture, grave threats and coercion, and illegal trespassing to dwellings. Fearing harassment, 240 individuals of Barangay Salvacion, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, evacuated their homes

From 2000-2004, the Commission on Human Rights Region V recorded 81 insurgency-related human-rights violations in five of the six Bicol provinces.

Destruction to property. Financial losses from the armed conflict may be gauged from recent bombings and destruction to property perpetrated by rebel groups in Bicol.

- Globe cell site, Bubulusan, Guinobatan, Albay, on September 4, 2003. (Note: a totally destroyed cell site may cost anywhere between P10 million and P20 million to rebuild. Damage to the base only would amount to P1 million to P2 million per cell site.)
- Globe cell site, San Roque, Masbate, on March 6, 2003
- Smart cell site, Travesia, Guinobatan, Albay, on October 26, 2002
- Globe cell site, Sorsogon, on October 17, 2002
- RCPI/Bayantel, Quinarabasahan, Bula, Camarines Sur, on October 5, 2002
- Burning of Philtranco (P11.5 million) and Raymond Buses (P5 million) in Ligao, and Ragay, Camarines Sur respectively.
- Burning of St. Jude Bus (or Buban Bus) on July 23, 2002, in Brgy. Libod, Camalig, Albay (P1.2 million)
- Burning of Philtranco Bus on January 5, 1998 at Sitio Malobago, Barangay Buga, Libon, Albay (P7 million)
- Burning of a heavy equipment (grader) parked at the project site of the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) at Barangay Busac, Oas, Albay, by four unidentified men believed to be CTs (Oas PNP report)
- Burning down of Palanog Good Found Cement Factory in Brgy. Palanog, Camalig, Albay, on November 29, 2002.

Such destruction has jacked up nonlife insurance premiums for commercial establishments, bus services and other properties, a cost likely to be passed on to consumers.

These acts of destruction are believed to be rebel punishment for owners who fail to pay **revolutionary taxes** to the NPA. Revolutionary taxes are claimed as a legitimate way of generating funds for the revolutionary government. Taxes are collected from farmers every harvest time, and from fisherfolk, small businessmen (owners of karaoke bars and *sari-sari* stores), government infrastructure projects and private contractors (roads and bridges, electrification, irrigation, and other civil works), where revolutionary taxes can amount to anywhere between 5 and 10 percent of the project cost regardless of the project.The most lucrative source of revolutionary taxes are cell sites of the two big telecommunication networks. Rebel groups demand anywhere

from P 50,000 to P 200,000 per site, per year, or as much as P500,000 for a newly set-up site. Attacks on cell sites may reflect the inability to pay these taxes.

The specific case of Pio Duran in Albay is presented by Rosco [2004]. In Pio Duran, barangay officials pay a revolutionary tax of P1,000 every quarter, broken down as follows: P600 from the council, and P400 from the internal revenue allotment (IRA) of the barangay.

"Madam Nelly," a businesswoman, was assessed for P8,000 a year. Since she could not afford this, "*it was reduced to P1,000 yearly, in addition to the other needs that the members of the NPA are asking for. . . this can be in the form of a sack of rice, cigarettes, bags, etc.*" Landowners like "Sir Nestor" and "Sir Inggo," on the other hand, usually pay at every coconut harvest time (every 45 days), or upon receiving demand letters from alleged NPA members.

Residents say that they comply with these demands for their own security or protection against "bad elements" or robbery, since their businesses are open until late at night. Others consider it a "donation" to the revolutionary movement.

Foregone investments and development opportunities. The CPP-NPA armed conflict has an adverse effect on the growth and development of the area where the insurgents maintain a stronghold. On the one hand, the threat of being subject to revolutionary taxes deters entrepreneurship at the community level.

On a larger scale, investments are delayed or foregone, as in the case of telecomm services. The expansion of telecomm lines and and cell sites is frequently deferred for an extended period pending the search for a suitable place in order to avoid the revolutionary taxes or, in case of nonpayment, harassment. Note that as of 2002, only 14.4 percent of families in Bicol had access to a cellphone or telephone, less than the proportion nationwide (28.5percent). Other examples:

- A $50-million World Bank funded project, i.e., the Community Based Resource Management Project (CBRMP). The project may have failed to take off after LGU project coordinators received letters from the NPA asking them to discontinue their activities. This was reported in the municipalities of Castilla and Magallanes in Sorsogon, San Miguel in Catanduanes, and Presentacion and Bato in Camarines Sur (Calara 2002)—all NPA strongholds in Sorsogon and Camarines Sur. The CBRMP in Presentacion was indeed discontinued. More cases follow:
- In Presentacion, Camarines Sur, a marble-cutting industry that started using local resources was discontinued due to the very high revolutionary tax demanded.
- Barcia [2003] reported that the CPP-NPA groups are writing banks and/or traders in Bicol asking them to pay revolutionary taxes; some of them already "started paying such taxes to the NPA for fear of reprisal." A serious repercussion of this practice might be the loss of opportunity for local producers to market their products with lower transportation costs.
- In Albay, a 72-hectare farmland in Guinobatan owned by the Catholic Church became due for land reform two years ago. The church complied and the whole tract of land was assigned to the rightful tenants. However, when the geodetic engineer from DAR started to conduct the land survey, he was harassed by a group of NPAs, who also confiscated his surveying instruments. Efforts of the church to dialogue with the rebels failed. The tenants eventually lost their legitimate claim to ownership as provided under the CARP.

Local peace-building workers viewed the NPA behavior in this last case as grossly inconsistent with the cause it was purportedly fighting for. As such, it raised doubts as to whether their current activities and practices were still ideology-driven.

Intergenerational impact. The story of the Jallores brothers of Tigaon may be viewed as a microcosm of the path that families of rebels have taken. After their deaths, a sister, Gavina, who used to try to persuade Rommel to shun demonstrations, had a complete change of mind. The Jallores brothers became a source of pride for the family and nephews and younger cousins eventually joined the movement.

Families of rebels certainly live in poverty and are deprived of education in the absence of a provider, a cycle repeated in the succeeding generation. Similarly, orphaned children of rebels, including those of the military, stand to suffer most from the loss of better education and opportunities for a brighter future.

Intergenerational effects will also be seen in the destruction of the environment, which continues, unabated in remote areas, as the LGUs cannot enforce environmental laws in NPA-controlled areas.

Effect on governance. Requiring a Permit to Campaign (PTC) during election time is another form of rebel fund-raising. In some cases, congressional candidates strike a compromise with the rebels, assuring them of a certain percentage of their countryside development fund. Local candidates who can ill afford to pay large sums are required to pay in kind with cell phones, two-way radios, laptops and the like.

During the last elections, some candidates failed to pay for the PTC or seek a compromise, and were unable to reach remote areas during the campaign. Such a situation deprives the residents of valuable information and wider choices and undermines their right to free and meaningful participation in the electoral process. Conversely, politicians who submit to the authority of the rebels by seeking a PTC virtually condone the practice and create conditions for perpetuating such activities. Most likely, poor governance and corruption is then institutionalized downstream as scarce public funds in the form of the CDF or the IRA are leaked out to the NPA and communities lose vital public services or capital.

[1] Taken from the *Case Study on the Human Development and Economic Costs/ Spillovers of Armed Conflict in Bicol* by J. Lobrigo, et al., 2005. Background paper prepared for the PHDR 2005 available at www.hdn.org.ph.

Christian regions and populations enjoy certain social advantages not available to Moros. The communist insurgency harps on the obvious disparities between landowners and landless, and between capitalists and workers. Thus, ideology seeks to show that people are deprived relative to *what could be* under some promised alternative, whether this takes the form of an independent Moro state—secular or Islamic—or an imminently-socialist society. Indeed, the revolutionary argument is that deprivation can be relieved and injustice remedied only by pursuing such alternatives.

Governments counter this by seeking to persuade the contested constituencies either: (a) that the perceived conditions do not constitute deprivation but are rather unavoidable if regrettable circumstances (also implicitly arguing that the improvements promised by the competing ideology are not reasonable but demagogic fantasies); or alternatively (b) that *some* relief from these grievances is in fact forthcoming from the existing system itself—making insurgency and revolution unnecessary. Then of course, any revolutionary movement worth its salt will always argue that any reforms promised by the government are either inadequate, incomplete or insincere.

Hardship versus deprivation

The observation that deprivation and injustice, rather than hardship alone, lie at the heart of armed conflict can be empirically demonstrated. It may surprise some to learn, for example, that the frequency of armed conflict across provinces is *not* directly related to the incidence of poverty in such provinces [Edillon 2005]. In short, the provinces with the greatest concentration of the poor are *not* necessarily those most likely to experience armed conflict. Even more remarkable is the fact that aggregate measures of income inequality (e.g., the Gini coefficient or ratio) also do not explain the incidence of conflict.

This begins to make sense if one remembers that deprivation is always relative. Hence people in local communities will take their frame of reference as pertaining to their immediate surroundings, which may be smaller and more limited in scale than the situation suggested by aggregate measures of poverty incidence or inequality.

By contrast, measures of deprivation do "predict" the occurrence of armed encounters that occur across provinces **[Appendix 1.2]**. In particular, the presence or absence of basic services such as *electric power*, *education*, *reliable water-supply*, and *road transport* is an important component that feeds into whether communities regard themselves as deprived or not. The widespread and well-known availability of these services to mainstream communities serves as an adverse point of comparison for neglected and desolate areas, turning experienced hardship into palpable grievances and making people receptive to competing-state ideologies.

Minoritization

Relative deprivation becomes more acute with *minoritization*. If everything else were equal, the frequency of armed encounters would be less in the predominantly "minority"-dominated provinces[22], that is, provinces where a high proportion of the original settlers remains (that is, the less is the degree of minoritization). An obvious reason for this is that relative homogeneity in culture eliminates *at least one* possible frame of unfavorable reference for deprivation, namely, marked differences in treatment between mainstream populations and minority ethnic groups.

Figure 1.3 Moro population and population share in Mindanao (1903-2000, in percent and in thousands)



Source: Population censuses of the Philippines and S. Santos [2000: 208]

In practice, however, there will be large gaps in the provision of social services *within* a province, which becomes especially perceptible when an area's original inhabitants are reduced to the status of minorities in their old homelands through the influx of new settlers. Historically, of course, this is what occurred on a massive scale in Mindanao: because of a deliberate resettlement policy as well as autonomous in-migration from other parts of the country, the original Moro peoples of Mindanao have been reduced from as much as 76 percent of the population at the turn of the 20th century to as little as 18 percent towards its end (Figure 1.3). Especially in "mixed" provinces where large majority and minority populations live side by side each other and the proportion of original inhabitants is small, differences in treatment and provision of services provide striking contrasts and potent sources of discontent.

Why rising incomes may or may not stem conflict

As mentioned, average income (or equivalently average expenditure) does not by itself predict the incidence of armed conflict. The manner by which incomes affect the occurrence of armed conflict is a complex one and reflects the interaction of ideology, organization, and real grievances.

Broadly speaking, average incomes can affect insurgencies and the occurrence of armed conflict in two ways. On the one hand, as intuition suggests, the poorer people are, the more likely they are to harbor grievances and a sense of injustice. From this aspect, therefore, armed conflict should rise as incomes fall and should fall as incomes rise. But on the other hand, low-income communities will also have more difficulty sustaining an organized insurgency in logistical terms, since the need to support full-time armed rebels represents a significant material burden on the people themselves. On this score, therefore, *higher* incomes in an area may raise rather than reduce the likelihood of armed conflict. A further reason is the correlation between rising incomes and education: the more of a poor community's population become educated, the better able they are to articulate what may have been previously unexpressed grievances, and the greater the following for a revolutionary ideology. If the former represents the "demand"-side for an insurgency, the latter is akin to its "supply"-side[23].

Figure 1.4 Relationship between per capita spending and average number of encounters in minority and mixed provinces



Figure 1.4 above (from Edillon [2005]) shows and substantiates the course of this relationship (differentiating between minority-dominated and mixed-population provinces). The net effect is that beginning with low incomes, the *incidence of armed conflict first rises before falling as the average income of the middle class rises*. The fact that it is the average incomes of the middle class (i.e., the third quintile)

that seems to matter is also intuitively clear: elements of the middle classes (e.g., students, professionals) are typically the bearers of revolutionary ideology and also provide the bulk of leadership.

Several implications follow from this empirical relationship: first, there may be localities that in a real sense are "too poor to rebel"; the relative peace or lack of an active insurgency in some areas, however, does not mean that such communities are not deprived or victimized. It may only mean they are not well-off enough to sustain an organized rebellion. Many communities of *lumad*, Ati, and other traditional ethnic groups are prime examples. From a human-development perspective, however, it is important that the mere absence of open conflict should not make it any *less* urgent to address real human deprivation, so that not only "the squeaky wheel gets the grease."

Second, it simply cannot be taken for granted that average affluence will mechanically cause insurgencies to "die away." That depends on people's reference point. Even in relatively well-off areas, pockets of neglect and discrimination will provide both the means and the motive for rebellion, so it is no longer curious that rebels do thrive and operate even in relatively affluent areas, including some municipalities of Bulacan and Rizal [see Morada 2005]. This will also imply that in some very poor localities, improvements in income or education may at first increase rather than reduce the incidence of conflict, so that alternatively, one might argue this is an argument against piece-meal or tokenist approaches. There is a "hump" or threshold of improvement, which intervention must clear before a difference in the atmosphere of social conflict can be felt. This is partly an argument that intervention in behalf of the poorest communities should be substantial and sustained.

Then, again, minoritization matters. Although everywhere a certain threshold will always be reached where improved economic well-being leads to a decline in the incidence of conflict, *a larger improvement in middle-class income* is needed to bring down the incidence of armed conflict in mixed-population provinces than in the minority provinces. (In Figure 1.4, note the black curve is flatter than the brown curve.) An important reason for this phenomenon may be found in the context of relative deprivation: where minoritization is pronounced (i.e., in the "mixed" provinces), the unequal treatment of and discrimination against minorities provide additional sources of resentment that cannot completely be offset by improvements in average incomes alone. As a result, *larger* income improvements are needed to compensate for the situation than in the more ethnically homogeneous minority provinces, where odious interpopulation comparisons are not as stark. Alternatively, of course, one can argue that if the dimension of discrimination could be minimized or eliminated (as in, say, the minority-dominant provinces), then the "payoff" to higher incomes in terms of reducing the incidence of armed conflict would be easier to reach.

Land reform

Not surprisingly, the rate of accomplishment of land reform turns out to be a good predictor of the frequency of armed conflict: the higher the proportion of land redistributed under the comprehensive agrarian reform programme (CARP) relative to the potential land reform area, the lower the likelihood of armed conflict. Access to land is, after all, a basic demand, especially for the mainstream communist insurgency, whose ideology, strategy and tactics are irretrievably linked to the agrarian question. To a lesser extent, of course, even the Moro conflict involves an implicit land issue, since it reasserts historical communal claims to land against the property rights of non-Moro settlers.

It remains an open question, however, to what extent land reform is important because it is a truly strategic issue for human development, or simply because it is *the* particular advocacy emphasized by the

communist insurgency at the moment and therefore the basis of its organizing activities. One might validly ask whether the failure to fully implement the CARP is as crucial an obstacle to the achievement of human development as other grievous failures of the current system—its failure to provide quality basic education or primary health care, adequate infrastructure, and more productive alternatives to agricultural occupations. More recent assessments of the government's land-reform accomplishments, after all, do concede that the extent of redistribution has been significant:

> By 2002, CARP officially claimed to have redistributed nearly six million hectares to more than two million peasant households, accounting for nearly half of the country's total agricultural lands and two-fifths of the total rural households, respectively. This nationally aggregated land redistribution outcome is below the optimistic projections and claims by its ardent supporters, but it is also beyond the pessimistic predictions and claims of CARP critics [Borras 2004:107].

Indeed, a rough counterfactual exercise [Edillon 2005] suggests that even in terms of reducing the incidence of armed conflict, the payback from a completion of CARP does somewhat less well than simply improving adult education, although it creates a larger impact in majority-dominant or in mixed provinces **[Table 1.10]**. In minority-dominant provinces, however, a completion of CARP is inferior to both provision of education and improved access to water supply. Hence, if there is currently an 88-percent chance of an armed encounter occurring in a minority-dominant province, completing the CARP scope would reduce this chance to 84 percent; but removing disparities in social services, such as access to water supply, could reduce this to as low as 70 percent. Even in majority-dominant provinces, where the impact of completing CARP is largest, it results in only a five-percentage-point reduction in the probability of an armed encounter occurring.

Table 1.10 Probability of at least one encounter per year given certain interventions (in percent)

	Type of province		
	Majority	Minority	Mixed
Base run	75.5	88.3	79.7
With interventions			
finish CARP scope	70.2	84.4	76.4
increase access to electricity	73.7	86.4	76.6
increase adult education	nil	nil	nil
remove disparity in water supply	75.5	69.5	79.7
increase road density	75.5	86.8	78.6
Peace policy	nil	35.79	nil

Note: "nil" means almost zero probability Source: Edillon [2005]

The question therefore arises whether the sources of discontent and future course of an insurgency—say, a decade from now—will still be crucially determined by the outcome of the land issue. This is no mere conjecture: it is already one reason for the schism within the communist movement itself, with some factions seriously doubting the continued relevance of a movement addressing a predominantly rural constituency. As Chapter 3 of this Report argues:

> It would seem that for the progress of peasant mass base-building of the CPP, agrarian reform and agrarian revolution are not the crucial factors. The CPP's peasant mass base (or at least its guerrilla fronts) appears to be increasing despite the significant redistributive outcome of CARP and the relatively low level of revolutionary land reform. The persistence or strength of the NPA has some other stronger basis or source. According to a former CPP insider, it is the function of the NPA to function itself as a "social police" in the countryside where the state has no presence. Stated otherwise, "the insurgency survives because it is an alternative political movement supported by force." In short, *another state structure.* [Original emphasis].

From the government's viewpoint, of course, the real challenge is going beyond the merely pragmatic question of whether it should continue to pay attention to the land issue as and when its association with armed conflict declines.

History matters

A history of past conflict also increases the expected number of armed encounters: a province that has already experienced an armed encounter is that much more likely to experience one again, for two reasons: First, it simply reflects the "supply" side of revolutionary organizations. The operations and activities of insurgents are founded ultimately on the receptiveness of communities to the ideological "investments" made in them by revolutionary movements and the lasting network of organizations and personal relationships formed on that basis. Irrespective to some extent of the prevailing material and social conditions, therefore, a certain level of sympathy and support for the insurgency will always be found in some areas, making it that much easier for the rebel movement to locate there. Examples of these are some Central Luzon provinces in the 1960s, Isabela in the 1970s, the Cordilleras in the 1980s, and the provinces of the Bondoc Peninsula since the 1990s. For the Moro conflict, ethnic and clan reasons predetermine natural bases in the Sulu archipelago and Lanao. A second reason is to be found in the typical cycle of violence and retaliation engendered by armed conflicts themselves. The resulting loss of human life, destruction of property and social disruption may provide sufficient reason for armed conflict to continue. Raids by the armed forces on suspected rebel bases, for example, can often lead to abuses of human rights, even among noncombatants and the politically uninvolved. Relatives may take up arms in order to avenge family members killed, or in retaliation for perceived violations of their rights. For such reasons, therefore, hysteresis alone will predispose certain provinces to further armed conflict.

Whether or not one agrees with the particular ideologies and solutions they espouse, the communist and Moro insurgencies cannot be ignored, since they are undeniably based on real grievances. The most obvious reason for not ignoring them is the huge human, social and economic costs they entail, costs borne not only by the combatants but increasingly by mainstream Filipino society as well. The spillover of part of that conflict into terrorist forms is deplorable, but it merely makes explicit the already latent truth: namely, that the Filipino majority can refuse to confront the roots of the conflict only on pain of putting their own security and way of life at risk.

Apart from the majority's interest in self-preservation, however, the more fundamental reason for not ignoring the insurgencies is simply that they raise fundamental questions regarding human development. For mainstream society to ignore questions relating to deprivation, injustice and discrimination means for it to ignore the principles on which it was putatively founded. In a profound sense, all insurgencies hold up a mirror to mainstream society and challenge it to deliver to minority populations and the deprived what it seems to provide adequately to majorities and amply to the socially privileged. An inability of mainstream society and the government to rise to this challenge would bolster the insurgent message that the project of a Filipino democracy has failed, and that indeed armed rebellion (even terror) is what is needed to attain a socialist state, or a separate Moro or an Islamic republic that alone can deliver the minimum levels of human development for neglected constituencies.

Reinforcing current peace efforts: some proposals

I've been crying lately, thinking about the world as it is.
Why must we go on hating, why can't we live in bliss?
'Cause out on the edge of darkness there rides a Peace Train,
Oh, Peace Train, take this country, come take me home again.
—**Yusuf Islam** (formerly Cat Stevens)

Until now, the Philippine government's approaches to the ideology-motivated armed conflicts have fallen under three types. Paul Oquist [2002] has aptly termed these (a) the "military-victory" position, (b) the "pacification and demobilization" position, and (c) the "institutional peace-building" position. The *military-victory* position is easiest to comprehend, since it proceeds from the simple belief that insurgencies are best addressed through a decisive military response. This is the typical resort when an insurgency has just begun, since it feeds on the hope that an insurgency can, as it were, be "nipped in the bud". But—as has obviously occurred in both the Moro and communist conflicts—an easy solution through this means is typically out of reach. Nonetheless, the logic of the position typically leads not to an abandonment of the use of military force but first to an escalation: the initial failure to stem conflict is rationalized to mean simply that not enough resources have been committed to the war.

Unfortunately, the escalation itself only engenders further resistance and retaliation, since an intensified military response will typically be associated with human-rights violations, casualties among noncombatant populations, and the social and economic dislocation. Insurgents may also resort to terror and view this as a justified response to a numerically superior foe. Conflict is then further prolonged, as a vicious cycle of self-destruction sets in.

Despite its futility, the purely military option presents itself not only at the beginning of a conflict, but also when a stalemate is reached (to break it), or when frustration with other approaches sets in. Powerful interests also stand to benefit from it, not the least of whom are some groups in the military for whom opportunities for corruption increase with bloated war-appropriations: "budget Huks" are part of the lore and more recently the staging of imaginary encounters and battles has been documented. A more serious charge has also been made that the AFP has itself sold munitions to rebels

Majority-population interests (e.g., from cynical ones, such as land grabbers and speculators, to ordinary citizens), may also benefit from the displacement of minorities by large-scale military operations or from the simple deterrent of military presence in an area. For these reasons, the victory position is susceptible to manipulation. Those who stand to benefit from a war have an interest in provoking it or manipulating "events on the ground" (e.g., including provoking cease-fire "violations" or "terror" attacks) to obtain that result. Unsurprisingly, this was the predominant approach under the Marcos regime.

The *pacification and demobilization* position differs slightly in that it aims to achieve a cessation of hostilities and a demobilization of forces, usually culminating in a peace agreement with rebels. But it seeks to do so with as little adjustment and as few concessions to the other side as possible. The use of military force is not ruled out, to the extent that this helps to soften the stance of the adversary (i.e., changing the "facts on the ground") and therefore improve the government's bargaining position. Just as important, however, is the use of co-optation of active elements of the insurgencies (rebel leaders and followers), particularly through the offer of positions, or livelihood, or integration. Attention is typically focused only on individually accommodating the active elements of the insurgency, leaving the deeper roots of the conflict typically unaddressed. For this reason, any peace concluded under this approach tends to be impermanent, since the neutralization of insurgent leaders notwithstanding, the insurgency's deeper roots put out new shoots in the form of new leaders and organisations. Historically, this is evidenced by the succession in the communist insurgency from the Huks to the CPP-NPA, and in the Moro secessionist movement, from the MNLF to the MILF.

Pacification tends to be attractive to most elected governments. Even as such governments may desire to end armed conflict, they pragmatically do not want to displease their majority constituencies and vested interests. They therefore seek the path of least resistance and change. Not surprisingly, this has also been the position adopted for the most part by the Philippine government. Intermittent military offensives combined with the accommodation of important communist and Moro leaders have been a tried-and-tested formula in many administrations.

From a human-development and human-security perspective, however, even the pacification approach falls short. For it seeks to stop armed conflict not by squarely confronting the issues raised by insurgency, but merely by degrading its most active and conscious elements. This is attained either through superior military might, cooptation, corruption, or all of these. Almost cynically it concentrates amelioration efforts only on the most critically influenced and violent-prone areas, oiling only the parts of the machine that squeak, without regard for the corrosion in the rest. It is in this sense that—no less than the victory position—the pacification perspective is also reactionary.

The only approach that potentially accommodates the framework of human development is what Oquist [2002] has broadly called *institutional peace-building*, whose goal is "the adoption and implementation of the policies necessary to achieve sustainable, long-term peace and the articulation of institutions to implement and consolidate those policies as central tasks". Thus where pacification sees a peace agreement as concluding the process, an institutional approach regards it only as a starting point. The search for long-term peace requires the government side to re-examine itself and society's priorities against insurgent demands and decide on institutional change, where these are called for. This is ultimately the meaning of the well-worn phrase "search for a just and lasting peace".

If this is to occur, however, the government itself must agree in principle to be weighed and measured, using a scale or metric against which the potential and the outcomes of mainstream society and the existing state can be laid down—and this metric is essentially what human development and human security provide. Hence, for example, profound questions can be asked regarding whether mainstream society has systematically denied the country's Moro areas of education, health and income opportunities, and how much of this is due to discrimination and to pressure from non-Muslim settlers. Similarly, questions may be asked to what extent society has truly deprived small farmers and farm workers of future opportunities owing to the lack of land, or access to social services.

To engage in such questioning is not to "surrender" to rebel demands. That would be the case only if government were unwilling or incapable of offering a compelling framework to address the demands of the insurgency. A dictatorship, for example, would in principle not be able to respond "institutionally" to a demand for genuine participation in the political process. A government built on ethnic or racial purity and the interest of settlers could not respond "institutionally" to a demand for self-determination or even for guaranteed ancestral domains. Human development, however, can in principle be asserted and accepted by both sides, without papering over the *ideological differences* in the means to promote it. Hence, for example, the communist insurgency may insist that the problem of low rural incomes can be solved only by a dispossessing the rural landowning classes. Without denying the validity of raising rural incomes, however, government may take a broader view and also consider land taxation, redistribution of public lands, as well as providing nonfarm incomes and education opportunities. It then becomes an empirical matter whether the government's approach or that of the insurgents is more effective.

The remaining sections of this Report suggest a number of steps that can place the existing peace efforts on a sounder footing and lead to a solution to the conflict.

1. Ensure policy consistency

A precondition in the work for peace is the achievement of a consistent national policy towards

the communist and secessionist insurgencies. The constantly changing strategies and approaches to armed conflict that have been adopted by various administrations are greatly responsible for the erosion of the credibility of the government's initiatives and have contributed to policy incoherence.

The incoherence of policy is evident not only across but also within administrations. Various factions espouse differing policy positions that proceed from widely varying starting points and interests, with the "right-hand" (military approaches) frequently not knowing what the "left-hand" (socioeconomic development approaches) is doing. Civilian and military agencies are "wedded to their own framework, language, and tactics" [Hernandez 2005]. The schizophrenia and oscillations in national policy towards the different armed conflicts have compounded errors and yielded grotesque policy configurations. Hence, for example, while the antisubversion law (RA 1700) was repealed (RA 7636) in 1989, the government ironically tolerates a "dirty war" conducted by the military against leftist politicians and their symphathizers who do care to participate in elections. In more recent years, in relation to the MILF, the "all-out war" policy of President Estrada in 2000 was reversed to an "all-out peace" policy by President Arroyo in 2001, only to revert back to "all-out war" in 2002-2003. The lack of policy consensus, coherence and consistency is an important reason for the "extreme protraction of the peace process."

But while policy coherence is essential, even more important is the *nature* of the policy pursued. All administrations have given lip service to the peace process, but within each, the cause of genuine peace has been invariably damaged by the recurrent resurgence of the "victory" position, as espoused prominently by some military circles. To be sure, no solution to an insurgency is likely to dispense with a military and police component that stands ready to defend the civilian population. It is altogether different, however, when an administration is seduced by the notion that peace can be achieved solely or primarily through a decisive military victory. Founded partly on fear and prejudice on the part of majority-populations and fuelled by corruption by some military elements who derive benefits from war, this stance has led to the most massive human costs on both sides and large numbers of noncombatant casualties (e.g., the 2000 "all out war" and the 2004 Buliok offensive).

Policy-coherence demands a ***common framework for peace*** *that can be consistently adopted across administrations.* Such a framework must be broad enough to provide a common ground for dialogue even with insurgents, and general enough to gain wide assent from the mainstream population and possibly the international community. Ideology-based armed conflicts are especially difficult to address, since they are premised on highly specific state-visions interwoven with tightly argued justifications and demands. The "one long argument" of this Report, however, is that human development and human security do provide such a framework. Human development and human security it presupposes are, after all, first principles the validity of which should be difficult to dispute by either side and which provide a common metric for progress that transcends opposed ideologies and social systems.

The common framework must be supported by a ***national constituency*** *for peace.* Peace efforts up to now have been almost exclusively the domain of designated specialists and negotiators. This is merely symptomatic of the marginalization of the issue and reflects the attitude that the armed conflicts can be compartmentalized and addressed away from mainstream society. Politicians have seen fit to involve majority populations only to the extent that "terrorism" is superficially raised as an issue. More public and media attention, for instance, is likely to focus on proposed "anti-terror" legislation than on the problem of displaced populations and discrimination against Moros in general. The Moro conflict in particular is depicted as an almost exclusively "Mindanao issue"—meaning one that concerns only the inhabitants of the island—rather than a pressing question of human development and human security that touches all Filipinos. The public's superficial involvement and lack of information is a basic reason for the inconsistency of policy. Lacking an anchor in a

well-informed public consensus, policy-making is always at risk of being held hostage to the narrower interests of politicians and the military.

The complexion of policy would be vastly different if the public were directly involved in support of a peaceful and just resolution of the country's insurgencies, that is, if the general political constituency were to "own the process". Once the cause of peace and the resolution of armed conflicts occupy a place in the national discourse as prominent as that taken by various corruption scandals, deviations from the national consensus would entail political and electoral consequences that the nation's politicians could not ignore. What is sorely needed is a mobilization of popular support to make peace and human security an integral part of the mainstream political agenda. To accomplish this, civil society organizations, media, and political leaders must exert common efforts to overcome the majority's indifference and point out their own stakes in the issue in the form of huge human, social, and economic costs of ignoring the roots of the insurgency and the risk of the armed conflict degenerating into terrorism. This is further discussed in proposal 6 below.

2. Legislate a national peace policy

Ultimately the government's commitment to peace must be elevated to become enduring. This can be done only through a **national policy for peace** with the force of law. Various administrations have taken on the task of making peace, at times with highly promising results. But the danger has always existed that even positive initiatives will be reversed or abandoned with changes in administration, in priorities, or in fortunes on the part of the administration. Notwithstanding promising peace initiatives of the National Unification Commission (NUC) and later the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP), for example, subsequent administrations pursued them only erratically: "[T]he voices of OPAPP and peace advocates are heard only if the President is willing to listen. Inside government, the OPAPP has to counter the influence of a military establishment schooled in Cold War ideology and corporate interests unreceptive to the structural reforms identified through the NUC consultations as necessary for peace-building" [Ferrer 2002].

Until lately, the current Arroyo administration appeared to make significant progress towards opening formal peace talks with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, while it was already in the midst of talks with the CPP-NPA-NDF. The severe credibility problems affecting the Arroyo administration, however, have spilled over and affected the progress of negotiations. It is fair to say that the decision of the NDF representatives to put talks on hold was at least partly motivated by strategizing over whether it was worthwhile to negotiate with its counterpart whose hold on power was tenuous and whose commitments might not be binding on a successor. Uncertainty such as this can be minimized if legislation exists to sustain, harmonise, and build upon the on-going peace processes. For then it would be evident that any commitments the government made carried the support not only of the executive under a particular administration but also the approval of Congress and the entire nation.

Specific legislation may take the form of creating a permanent advisory and coordination mechanism for the peace process. Some of these functions are now being performed by the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, an office created under the executive. A process is needed, however, by which the commission or agency regularly reports to Congress and the nation on the status and progress of peace negotiations and other peace processes. Then any changes in the government's stance adopted with respect to the peace process would have to be justified before the legislature. Needless to say, this also serves to reinforce the supremacy of civilian authority over the military and addresses the weaknesses and uncertainties inherent in the change of administrations.

Besides creating a permanent peace commission, the law should also outline the broad principles to guide any administration's approach to the Moro secessionist threat and the communist-led armed conflict, respectively. Reinforcing the "six paths to peace" formulated in 1993 by the National Unification

Commission[24], the essential points of a national peace policy should include the following:

1. The renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy and a reaffirmation of the principle of civilian authority over the military. This shall mean the primacy of peace negotiations over military action in addressing the various rebellions, as well as the primacy of civilian authority in the peace process.

2. A clear distinction between rebellion and terrorism, which implies that their respective solutions shall also be distinct. Hence, the war on terror should never prejudice the peace talks.

3. In matters of security, including counter-terrorism, a preference for the people-centred human security approach over the state-centred national security approach. This implies an approach that protects peace, respects human rights, and promotes human development.

4. A search for a peace that is just, lasting and comprehensive. This means the peace process should be understood not only as the formal peace negotiations with rebel groups but should also address the roots of the conflict and existing political, social, cultural and religious cleavages. The process proper should involve not only talks among negotiators but also entail people-to-people and public participation in peacemaking as part of building a popular constituency for peace.

5. A reaffirmation of the principle that peace and development go hand in hand. More particularly, peace negotiations and processes shall go hand in hand with relief, rehabilitation and development efforts, especially in areas affected by internal armed conflict.

6. A continuity of peace processes. Peace processes must build upon the accumulated gains of previous and current peace negotiations and agreements, complement existing solutions, encourage new ideas and open new formulas that permanently solve the problem, including fundamental changes in the existing legal and constitutional order.

7. Insulation of the peace process from partisan politics. In short, the process should enjoy multipartisan support regardless of presidential administration.

The attempt to define and to legislate a national peace policy will likely generate controversy. But this should not be viewed as a drawback, but part of the great public debate needed to bring the questions raised by armed conflict into the agenda of mainstream political life, where they belong.

3. The Moro armed conflicts: pursue an approach along three tracks

As discussed in Chapter 2 of this Report, there are effectively three "tracks" to approaching the Moro insurgency, corresponding roughly to the issues raised by armed movements led by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). While they are interrelated, each differs in terms of the state of progress and the goals to be realized. These tracks, particularly the first two, should not be confused with Tracks 1 and 2 used in international diplomacy.

3.1 Address gaps in and learn from the implementation of the peace agreement with the MNLF (Track 1)

In formal terms, the state of hostilities with the MNLF ended when the Philippine government entered into a Final Peace Agreement (FPA) with the MNLF on 2 September 1996. Concrete results include the demobilization (though not total disarming) of the MNLF, the integration of about half of its armed fighting force into the AFP and PNP, and the creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, the regional government of which has been headed by MNLF leaders (notably Nur Misuari) since 1996.

In many senses, this branch of the Moro conflict—also the oldest—should have been the easiest to resolve: it is here, after all, that progress has been greatest; that a formal settlement has been accepted by both sides; that the principal demand of the movement is limited to a reasonable demand for regional autonomy; and that the movement has abandoned armed struggle as the means to achieve

this goal. Indeed it now involves "a Moro stream of integration into the Philippine political and economic mainstream" (Chapter 2). It is therefore an obvious anomaly that despite the ARMM's creation by law (RA 6734 amended by RA 9054) and its integration as a permanent feature of the nation's political life, both mainstream populations (particularly in Mindanao) and many of of the MNLF's adherents express a deep dissatisfaction with the reality of regional autonomy in the current framework. This frustration was most sharply evidenced by former ARMM governor Nur Misuari's "revolt" and the hostilities between government troops and MNLF forces in November 2001 and February 2005.

Depending on who is doing the viewing, the ARMM is a glass that is either half-empty or half-full. In both cases, it is considered a disappointment. Majority politicians and mainstream media consider the entire ARMM experience an utter failure. The sweeping majority-population view is that huge amounts of resources have already been allotted to "Mindanao", but that ineptitude, corruption, and bad faith on the part of the ARMM leadership (many of whom are ex- or current-MNLF) are to blame for the failure to improve people's lives and end armed conflict. The blanket "lesson" said to emerge then is that the entire project of Moro autonomy (and, moreso, Moro independence) is wholly misdirected, since Moro leaders cannot deliver the goods; the government will always be blamed for what are actually self-inflicted failures; and bad faith will cause a resumption of armed struggle again in some other guise.

Ironically, the MNLF has also come to view the ARMM project as a failure, but one attributable to bad faith on the part of government. In the first place, the shape of regional autonomy was finalized without the MNLF's input and consent. Contrary to the letter and intent of the Peace Agreement of 1996, the law giving final shape to the ARMM (RA 9054) was passed unilaterally, without the consent or inputs from the official negotiating party, the MNLF, nor have all the stipulations of the already-imperfect law even been fully implemented.

In the MNLF's equally sweeping judgement, therefore, the ARMM venture was doomed—perhaps even programmed deliberately—to fail, and the MNLF, in being asked to take it over, playing the role of an unwitting accomplice to a fraud. What is true is that important provisions in the Peace Agreement and RA 9054 pertaining to the geographical extent of the autonomous region, the accountability of local governments to the regional government, the protection of cultural diversity, the treatment of ancestral domains, and the conduct of the ARMM elections were either excluded or not implemented. Valid issues may also be raised about whether enough financial support and flexibility existed to give the regional government a fair chance at proving itself: in particular, the level of commitment to a so-called "mini-Marshall plan" and the degree of financial and revenue autonomy allowed to the autonomous government have been seriously questioned. Misuari's revolt was a reaction to his marginalization but also to these perceived deviations from the peace accord and the impending railroading of the process.

Objectively, therefore, it cannot be said that the 1996 Peace Agreement leading to the creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao has failed—more accurately, it should be said this strategy was never given a chance, simply because its stipulations still have not been fully implemented. On the other hand, it is equally an oversimplification to attribute all the failures of the ARMM to a lack of finance or to the law's deficiencies; the MNLF's own political and management shortcomings cannot be overlooked.

Nonetheless, particularly after the ARMM recent elections, it is tempting for some to proceed from a pure pacification viewpoint and wave away such problems by simply telling the affected Moro communities that everything—mistakes, bad faith, and all—is now water under the bridge and should simply be accepted. This outlook is especially appealing, since the MNLF as an organization is admittedly no longer the armed threat it once was (now riven by divisions, partly co-opted, and with vanishing international support), so that any opposition from it is likely to be manageable.

Adopting such a view would be extremely wrong-headed, though. First, despite the ARMM's problems, it does represent a significant gain for the Moro cause for self-rule and reflects some of the true sentiments and aspirations of the Bangsamoro people. Second, the government's dealings with the MNLF will inevitably be regarded as a gauge of its sincerity and fairness in its dealing with the MILF. For the government to blatantly abandon important parts of the MNLF autonomy-agreements, simply because the latter no longer represents a threat, would merely vindicate existing and future Moro groups in their resolve to continue on the path of armed struggle and in their maximum secessionist demand. Even as a strategic option, therefore, mere "pacification" again is not viable. *Rather, a peace framework based on human development and human security demands that the government exert efforts to implement all practicable and deliverable aspects of the 1996 Peace Agreement and RA 9054.* The government should not rule out further enhancements to Moro autonomy implicit as and when a final settlement in turn is reached with the MILF.

As redress for the unilateralism with which the Philippine government implemented the peace agreement, *the leadership of the autonomous regional government should be encouraged to sponsor a wide-ranging process of consultation among its constituents* to determine, among others, whether the ARMM constituencies view the current arrangements as adequate based on standards of human development or other criteria; what options for governance they may desire (e.g., monocultural or multi-culturalist); and how these might be made operational. Existing and additional studies on the ARMM should inform this process in order to ensure the quality of the debate. After a sufficient period of consultations and public information, a *referendum* should be held by the autonomous government on the question of what *political expression* self-rule might take, including the options of current or improved autonomy, complete independence, regional autonomy under a federal or unitary system, and so on. The results of such a referendum may or may not be binding, but such a powerful statement of the people's will certainly cannot be ignored by Congress in the process of legally revising the parameters of self-rule. It goes without saying that for such a consultation and referendum process to succeed, mechanisms to ensure its integrity must be provided for, including mechanisms to ensure the impartiality of the new ARMM leadership as its facilitator.

3.2 Give the highest priority to negotiations with the MILF (Track 2)

Chapter 2 of this Report argues that the conclusion of peace between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) is the single boldest step to be taken for peace in our time and serves as the linchpin of the broader Mindanao peace process, as well as of the legitimate fight to defend against terrorism. In short, how the government deals with the MILF will largely determine whether even the regional autonomy deal with the MNLF can be sustained and whether the threat of terrorism can remain confined to its present narrow basis in the ASG and similar groups.

History itself dictates that the substance of negotiations involving the MILF is bound to be more demanding and complex. The movement's *maximum objective* of an independent Islamic state is potentially one dimension higher than, say, the MNLF's previous demand of self-rule under a secular state, with even this subsequently being moderated to a demand for regional autonomy. As aptly put in Chapter 2 :

> The GRP should realize that the MILF did not split from the MNLF in 1977 and continue to wage its own armed struggle, Islamic diplomacy and peace negotiations, only to end up with a mere enhancement of the existing ARMM, which would still be basically same terms of settlement imposed earlier on the MNLF. It has to be qualitatively and substantially better than that.

As further noted, however, it is promising enough that this maximum objective is not presented as the MILF's negotiating position. Instead the talk is of "[f]inding a political and lasting solution… with the end in view of establishing a system of life and governance *suitable and acceptable to the Bangsamoro people*" [emphasis supplied]. In short, what form self-rule will take—from autonomy to secession—is ultimately to be left to a process in which the final

decision is taken by the Moro people.

The historic challenge, not only to the Philippine government but also to the non-Moro mainstream population, is whether they can make a credible commitment to political reform and to an improved general social environment that can give reasonable guarantees of development, dignity, and security to the way of life of Moro communities. It is in this sense that the government's record in implementing the *less difficult terms* of the MNLF peace agreement serves *initially* as a test of good faith and *ultimately* as a minimal template for an MILF accord. Gains already realized for Moro autonomy under the ARMM must be preserved and built upon, even as gaps are filled with regard to the MILF's aspirations for a distinctly Islamic way of life and form of self-rule. A great deal of additional work must be devoted to the difficult but crucial issues that were simply set aside or glossed over in the MNLF settlement. Especially complex is the concept of *ancestral domain* and its connection with self-rule and territory—not to mention its reconciliation with existing concepts of rights to private property and the exploitation of resources (e.g., mining rights). But a particularly difficult issue is the MILF's concern to establish an explicitly Islamic system of life and governance, which raises questions regarding separation of church and state, the superiority of the constitution over the Q'uran, and the protection of the rights of non-Muslims under such a system.

The recent interest in amending the Constitution—though admittedly motivated by other concerns—may be viewed as an opportunity to accommodate a wider range of options in any final settlement and a chance to reinforce government commitments and guarantees by implementing them as constitutional amendments if necessary. If the solution "acceptable to the Bangsamoro people" were to take the form of some kind of federalism, for example, then it would certainly be ruled out under the present Constitution—although it could possibly be accommodated under a new one. This consideration is even more relevant when dealing with the question of how to accommodate an explicitly Islamic system of governance and way of life for some areas.

While the MILF and MNLF operate in distinct areas and find their strengths in different ethno-linguistic constituencies, their histories give them valid claims to representing distinct but related aspirations of the entire Bangsamoro people. It remains to be seen whether the solution that will be agreed upon in upcoming MILF negotiations can be accommodated in the same political framework that contained the agreement with the MNLF, although it is just as likely the latter may be enveloped by the former, or that both will exist alongside each other. The two tracks set benchmarks for each other, so that any substantive improvements achieved in one must be reflected in the other. From the viewpoint of arriving at a definitive and lasting solution to the Bangsamoro problem, therefore, it would be optimal if the solutions to the admittedly distinct aspirations represented by each were to be consolidated or, at the very least, coordinated. The process of accomplishing this also cannot be specified beforehand; at some point, however, it must boil down to the people in the concerned areas voicing out their opinions through some politically credible and valid process, e.g., through a consultation, referendum or plebiscite.

On hindsight, the government's present predicament of having to confront and negotiate successively with various Moro groups can be seen to stem from its failure to address the social roots of conflict and its reliance instead on superficial strategies of victory or pacification. The various armed movements espousing self-rule—whether culminating in some form of autonomy, federalism, or outright independence—are a response to real human problems of deprivation and discrimination and a desire to protect a threatened way of life. The government can remove the social bases for future armed movements only if it can demonstrate that it can provide answers to these issues in a framework of peace, human development and respect for the rights of minorities.

3.3 Delineate terrorism clearly and deal with it firmly without prejudicing the larger peace process (Track 3)

The resolution of armed conflict has been complicated by the internationalization of the

issue of terrorism. Terrorist practices certainly antedate the international concern provoked by the "9/11" events in the US and subsequent attacks affecting other countries. But the transnational scope of contemporary terror, the association of important terror networks such as Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah with Islamic fundamentalism, and their impact in exposing the vulnerability of even powerful countries such as US, the UK, and Russia, have brought the issue to the forefront of the international agenda.

This prominence has had several effects. On the positive side, greater awareness has led to a sharper definition and wider condemnation of terrorist acts. Until lately, the terrorism condemned under the Geneva Conventions and Protocols referred only to those perpetrated against civilians in times of war or armed conflict (hence arrayed with war crimes and crimes against humanity) [Santos 2005b]. Such definitions failed to cover acts committed by small informal terror networks, or groups with unclear belligerency status, especially in times of peace. For example, the terrorist acts of small urban-guerrilla groups in the Europe of the 1970s (e.g., the Baader-Meinhof group in Germany or the Brigatti Rossi in Italy) or of the present Al Qaeda network would have fallen through the cracks.

The emergent definition of terrorism generalizes its scope to include even acts committed in those ambiguous situations falling short of the threshold contemplated in the Geneva Conventions. The gist of the work of the United Nations High Panel was paraphrased by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan when he defined any action to be terrorist *"if it is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or noncombatants, with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a Government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act"*[25]. This development is welcome to the extent that it raises to the level of an international crime the violation of the rights of noncombatants under all circumstances. The extra "teeth" of this definition bite against groups that seek to justify acts of terror in the name of resistance to or defence against "state terror". As Kofi Annan explains, however:

> We do not need to argue whether States can be guilty of terrorism, because deliberate use of force by States against civilians is already clearly prohibited under international law. As for the right to resist occupation, it must be understood in its true meaning. It cannot include the right to deliberately kill or maim civilians.

The international concern over terrorism has its downside, however, in that it makes it easier to justify foreign intervention. Foreign powers feeling threatened by terrorist attacks may feel emboldened and justified to act preemptively by siding with one side or another in a domestic conflict. The government of country A whose citizens were actual or threatened victims of a terrorist attack in country B may now feel its intervention justified. From the viewpoint of governments dealing with domestic conflicts, however, the impact of such foreign intervention on facilitating the prospects for peace and human development can be ambiguous, to say the least.

In the Philippines the Abu Sayyaf group (ASG) has been the principal organization resorting to terror as the main means to attain its ends. The group was responsible for the country's worst cases of hostage-taking (Sipadan, Malaysia in 2000 and Palawan in 2001) as well as the deadliest perpetrated against civilians, including the Rizal Day (2000), Super Ferry (2004), and Valentine's Day (2005) bombings. Originally consisting of young Moro rebels, the group, as described in Chapter 2, has degenerated into "banditry with a confluence of Moro, outlaw, and Islamic identities". It has been listed by both Philippine and the US governments as a terrorist organization and is the subject of a manhunt by both police and the military. On the other hand, the case for the inclusion of the CPP-NPA in the US list of terrorist organizations is less clear-cut.

Thus far the government has done the right thing—even at the risk of displeasing some foreign powers, notably the US—by drawing a formal line of distinction between the MNLF and MILF on the one hand and the Abu Sayyaf and other terrorist groups on the other. The distinction turns principally

on the issue of whether or not such groups are willing to eschew the use of terror as well as any links with international terrorist networks such as the Jemaah Islamiyah. This both the MNLF and the MILF have been willing to do; but not the Abu Sayyaf. Both MILF and MNLF have condemned the Abu Sayyaf as "un-Islamic"; the MILF has cooperated in combating terror by providing information on the activities of terrorist groups.

Despite fine official distinctions, however, it cannot be denied that the other major impact of the globalized "war on terror" has been to heighten the importance of military responses and mailed-fist solutions *in general*. On the ground, military and police action in the guise of "counter-terrorism" has been applied not only against real terrorist groups but also against the mainline insurgencies and even the Moro "unarmed struggle". Ostensible manhunts for Abu Sayyaf elements are as likely as not to result in firefights between government troops and the MILF or the MNLF, or the detention of legal activists and innocent civilians. This is unsurprising, given fluid conditions on the ground, overlapping constituencies, and the already-high levels of mistrust and prejudice on either side.

Also latent in this, however, is the desire by some parties to actively provoke conflict, undermine the constructive peace process, and force a military solution. It has hardly helped that some foreign governments—less concerned with peace and more with their own immediate security and global interests—appear to encourage a stronger and less discriminating military response to both terrorists and the insurgency. This approach is advanced both by none-too-subtle political pressure (e.g., publicly calling the present government "the soft underbelly in the war on terror", or Mindanao the "doormat" of international terrorists) as well as by an overt bolstering of the military establishment through assistance and joint military exercises. The US listing of the CPP-NPA as a terrorist organisation on disputable grounds is another form of pressure and an unnecessary burden on the peace talks between the government and communist rebels. The obvious point for government, of course, is to ignore such pressures and aggravations and to remain focused on its own agenda of peace.

The human right to be free from fear—of terror attacks from whatever quarter and at all times—is a right that needs to be asserted, and this is what the current global condemnation of terrorism has done. It is, nonetheless, still mainly the reinforcement of a right that the majority population already largely enjoys. There is thus always the real danger that in asserting that right, a line will be crossed where the rights of *minorities* may be violated. "Anti-terror" legislation in certain countries (notably the post-9/11 "Patriot Act" in the U.S. and recent laws in Australia) has been severely criticized for allowing, among others, warrantless searches and arrests, indefinite detentions, and violations of privacy through wire-tapping, eavesdropping, and internet site-tracking. These new "powers" are typically arrayed first against the profiled minority-populations, these days invariably Muslims. To be sure, violations of such rights are occurring even today, as seen in the indiscriminate arrests and charging of "suspected ASG" or "suspected JI" members. What they still do not have is the odor of legality. *In view of pending proposals for "anti-terror" laws in this country, extreme vigilance should be exercised to ensure that while a proper legal framework for terrorism is devised, the new legislation itself continues to uphold human rights and the rule of law.* It would be one of the greatest ironies of the misnamed "war on terror" if, in asserting the freedom from fear, other basic rights and civil liberties themselves were sacrificed. To majority-populations that worry about terror, the maxim of Benjamin Franklin may be instructive: "Any people that would give up liberty for a little temporary safety deserves neither liberty nor safety."

4. The communist insurgency: resume negotiations and institute reforms in parallel

With respect to the communist insurgency, there is a need first of all to arrest the backward slide of

negotiations. In particular, the reliability and value of negotiations with the Arroyo administration have been placed in doubt, especially in view of the credibility problems the administration has encountered even among the majority population groups that are its constituency. What is vital is for lines to be kept open, for negotiations to resume between the government and representatives of the National Democratic Front, and for agreements already concluded—such as those on human rights and international humanitarian law—to be reaffirmed.

Nonetheless, it should be clear that any real resolution of the communist-led armed conflict must involve an acceptance by at least the bulk of the rebel movement's followers that the present political system—for all its obvious imperfections—is at bottom a *democratic system* open to reform. What distinguishes the Philippine communist movement is not any specific character of its analysis, concrete demands, or long-term vision for society. Rather, it is the fact that, unlike other communist or social-democratic movements, especially in industrial countries, it does not believe its aims can be attained except through armed struggle. More important, it is able to persuade significant segments of the population that that is indeed the case, and mobilize them on that belief.

The real challenge to ending this armed conflict is not the fulfilment of the substance of one or another specific economic or social demand, but rather the resolution of a *primarily political issue*, namely, a reasonable guarantee that the radical Left can join the mainstream of political life and advocate its aims armed with nothing more than "the weapons of criticism" rather than resorting to "criticism by weapons".

The history and the current operation of the existing political system, of course, give ample basis for skepticism. Historically, the candidates of the Democratic Alliance—which included a number of communists—were legitimately elected to Congress in 1946 but expelled through the machinations of the dominant vested interests. Even today, the constraints of the party-list system militate against the success of ideology-based parties. The obstacles range from the rules themselves (e.g., the limitations on seats; the wide discretion given to the Comelec in applying the rules) to unwritten realities, such as the harassment and assassination of candidates and political workers of Left-leaning parties. On top of this, of course, is the profound crisis engulfing the country's political system—underscored by the "Garci"-wiretapping scandal—where even mainstream participants themselves consider the current electoral process a mockery of a genuine democracy and question its capacity to deliver fair and honest results.

Hence the sharpest question posed by the insurgency is whether *this system is capable of reform*. Can it reach a level of maturity comparable to that in industrial democracies, where parties can advocate widely diverging ideologies and alternate in power or share it without risking loss of human life and catastrophic disruptions of social existence?

If there is any reason for hope, it can be found in the common ground that the post-Marcos government is committed—in principle and in rhetoric—to move towards genuine democracy. The government's current comprehensive peace process policy under Executive Order 3 maintains that it "seeks to establish a genuinely pluralistic society, where all individuals and groups are free to engage in peaceful competition for predominance of their political programs without fear, through the exercise of rights and liberties guaranteed by the Constitution, and where they may compete for political power through an electoral system that is free, fair and honest." In many ways, therefore, the insurgency's claims are no more than what citizens of the mainstream would demand.

Central to the entire issue is the conduct of elections. No genuine solution to the insurgency can be proposed without ensuring the equality, fairness and integrity of electoral contests *as a precondition*. Indeed some NDF documents refer explicitly to electoral reforms "to take away undue advantage to political parties of the comprador and landlord classes and providing for genuine democratic pluralism, allowing a fair chance for political

parties representing the workers, peasants and the middle class". On the one hand, this simply requires adherence to the formal rules in place, including the independence and fairness of election officials, the integrity of the count and the dispatch of the results. Beyond this, however, clearly even broader electoral reforms must be addressed, including the following enumerated by Casiple [2004]: (i) depoliticization of the police and the military; (ii) cracking down on violence, intimidation, and other illegal means to win elections; (iii) preventing the use of public resources for partisan purposes; (iv) restrictions of campaign spending and campaign finance; (v) regulating media access and use for partisan purposes; (vi) enacting a ban on political dynasties, as stipulated by the 1987 Constitution; (vii) promoting political maturity among citizens; and (vii) promoting a party- and platform-based politics.

In undertaking these reforms, the nation would be responding in a substantial way to the rebel movement—more important, however, it would redeem itself in its own eyes. Even if for some reason therefore the GRP-NDF peace negotiations never reach the agenda item of political and constitutional reforms, it would still be a step in the path to peace to pursue those electoral and other reforms addressing the root causes of internal armed conflicts and social unrest. Among the root causes identified by the NUC in 1993 after nationwide consultations were structural inequities in the political system, including control by an elite minority, traditional politicians and political dynasties, and enforcement of such control through private armies. The necessary reforms should be pursued on their own merit even outside the peace process, though better if informed by it.

If one were simply wedded to a pacification approach, there would be no particular imperative to take reforms seriously, especially since it is public knowledge that the NDF—unlike the MILF—regards participation in the peace talks as a mere tactical move than a true strategic alternative. Nevertheless, a notable character of the communist insurgency's demands is that it asserts ultimate values—nationalism, democracy development, and social equity—that many people in mainstream society support, although they would not necessarily endorse the program and means the NDF espouses. For this reason, regardless of the progress and eventual outcome of the peace talks with the communist movement, it only makes sense for the government to propose and implement *its own means* to attain such goals. Agrarian reform is an important example: while the government's own concept of land redistribution and its ultimate significance for rural development may differ from the NDF's, there is no reason that the government should fail to expedite the completion of its own program. Similarly, it is ultimately an empirical matter whether it is true—as the NDF believes—that physical expropriation of assets and an over-arching economic role for the state are a sine qua non for attaining social equity and development or whether—as the government maintains—a market economy supplemented by social services financed by a progressive tax system would suffice to achieve the same result.

5. Dovetail possible charter change with the peace process

The administration's recent enthusiasm for constitutional change is both promising and precarious from the viewpoint of the peace process. On the one hand, the possibility of changing the Constitution opens the door in principle to a wider range of options to end the armed conflict. This is especially true for the Moro conflict. Concretely, the negotiations with the MILF may result in arrangements that exceed the provisions of the current constitution—a proposal for one or several federal states for predominantly Muslim areas is an example—so that constitutional amendment becomes necessary. If the option of charter change was not available, agreement may be that much harder to reach.

Similarly, negotiations with the NDF could be positively influenced by the government's commitments to unilaterally undertake reforms of the electoral process and the political system more

generally. One of the four points on the substantive agenda of the joint framework for talks (Hague Joint Declaration) between the government and the NDF was "political and constitutional reforms," which up to now, however, have not been specified. Nonetheless, unilateral government guarantees for honest, fair, and representative elections would gain in credibility if these were embodied in enabling laws and policies (e.g., ensuring integrity in the selection of Comelec members, the settlement of electoral disputes, rules on campaign finance, and strong prohibitions of political dynasties). Some writers [e.g., Casiple 2004] have also strongly suggested that a parliamentary form of government founded on a strong multiparty and party-list system has a good chance of accommodating the political agenda of the NDF.

Despite such possibilities and all the controversy generated by charter change, scarcely anyone has thought to justify the necessity of constitutional amendment based on the opportunity it presents for resolving the country's long-standing armed conflicts. Yet the direct contribution of charter change to lasting peace in our time could in fact constitute its strongest rationale.

The fact that the current debate seems oblivious to the peace process underscores the downside risk of charter change—namely *unilateralism on the part of the government and the majority population*. For unless the two processes are explicitly coordinated, constitutional proposals will most likely be adopted that are not the product of negotiation and agreement between the government and the other side. Irrespective of how bright or inspired ideas may be, these will have been solutions unilaterally conceived and imposed by the majority.

Nor will this be the first time it has happened. A good deal of the continuing problems and hostilities with MNLF stems from the fact that the government promulgated the provisions on autonomous regions in the 1987 Constitution and the two organic acts for the ARMM (1989 and 2001) without the consent and participation of the opposite side with whom it had already entered a formal agreement. One sees the same tendency now in the rife references to Mindanao's supposed superior fortunes and the attainment of peace under a proposed "federal system" (indeed even a "Mindanao Republic"). It is clearly anomalous, however, that virtually all such proposals emanate from mainstream, predominantly non-Muslim politicians. They therefore have absolutely no bearing on the peace process and the MILF negotiations. Therefore there can be no guarantee that such proposals will go any way towards persuading insurgents that they should lay down their arms and instead join a political process they have not helped to shape. Federalism of some sort may well ultimately suit the Bangsamoro (while its inclination for secession is an open secret, the MILF has not placed it as a *sine qua non* in its Agenda). But this cannot on principle be determined and decided on by the government or by mainstream politicians—many of whom represent the very interests that provoked the Bangsamoro insurgencies in the first place. Rather, the precise form of self-rule for the Bangsamoro state should emerge as the outcome of negotiations.

The respective peace negotiations and the movement for charter change will likely proceed at their own pace, and it would be too much to expect these to be synchronised. Nonetheless, provisions must be made for effective consultation mechanisms with both sides of negotiating panels, by the newly created Consultative Commission, by Congress itself if convened as a constituent assembly, or by a constitutional convention if one is called for the purpose.

6. Build a national constituency for peace

Peace talks by themselves are unlikely to prosper unless supported by a broad popular constituency that desires peace and is willing to undertake fundamental reforms to achieve it. The basis for this broad constituency may simply be the desire to avoid the negative consequences of armed conflict and terrorism that spill over into the daily life of the majority. Or it may be the desire to undertake social reforms for their own sake, the contribution to peace efforts being merely a natural consequence. That should not matter; in both cases, the link between peace and reform is established.

Building a national constituency for peace, however, means overcoming public indifference and ignorance through an education process that involves civil society organizations, media, the private-business sector, and the education system.

In this process, *civil-society organizations* (CSOs), being the most conscious elements, must inevitably take the lead. CSOs have already been particularly active in the peace process and in cultural work. To them falls the task of acting as independent and nonpartisan monitors of the peace process and of the results of self-rule attained thus far, who must provide timely and accurate information to other sectors of society. There is a need for a public articulation and appreciation of the positions of both sides to the conflict and the stakes involved for each. Apart from CSOs that specialize in the monitoring of the peace process, however, organizations that work in the cultural field are also important, particularly in areas dominated by majority-populations. Anti-discrimination and anti-defamation leagues can serve as watchdogs that expose and document bias, discrimination, and other forms of human-rights abuse wherever these occur. While a number of these already exist that monitor human rights abuses related to the communist-led armed struggle, efforts to prevent or denounce abuses against Moros or Muslim Filipinos are much less. Finally, CSOs can facilitate people-to-people exchanges between the majority-population and the Bangsamoro to break down barriers and form a common basis for expectations from the peace process. If the peace effort is to achieve a wide constituency, the advocacy of peace CSOs must extend outside Mindanao itself and address mainstream audiences in Metro Manila, Cebu, and other power-centres. **[Box 1.6]**

Owing to its wide reach and influence *the role of media* in information and education is vital. In the survey discussed earlier, respondents cited television, radio and newspapers as their main source of information on Muslims. Thus, for a start, there is a need to agree on and implement guidelines that redress language and reporting that encourage bias, prejudice, and stereotyping. For example, it has long been noted that such terms as "Muslim terrorist", "Muslim bandit", or even "Muslim rebel" fail to pass the standard of accurate and unbiased reporting, since one rarely observes a terrorist's religious belief (just as one could never identify a "Catholic kidnapper"). Remarkably, however, this practice continues. It is a measure of ignorance that some media actually see it fit to report a witness's descriptive statement that the armed persons "spoke Muslim". Perhaps more difficult than this is raising the level of reporting by demanding a higher standard of evidence and explanation from authorities as well as a more comprehensive view of the various conflicts. Often enough, assertions are too readily reported as fact. In routine public parades of suspected "bombers" and "kidnappers", for example, media people rarely question the authorities about the weight of the underlying evidence. More than this, there is probably a need to balance the reportage on the consequences of the conflict. A good deal of attention is devoted to the more spectacular, acute aspects of conflict (firefights, sieges, bombings, etc.), typically from the viewpoint of urban, mostly Christian population. There is less effort on the other hand in reporting on long-term conditions in the countrysides, social conditions of Moro communities, and internally displaced populations. Part of the problem is likely due to the dominance of the majority-population and the weak representation of Moros in both national and local media.

The stake of the *private sector*, particularly big business, in the success of peace efforts is virtually self-evident given the damage armed conflicts have already wrought on the nation's economy, tourism, and investment reputation. For this reason alone, it is in the long-term interest of business to reduce the causes of grievances among minority-populations and marginalized communities. Philippine business has involved itself intensively and productively in political issues in the past, e.g., in governance and fiscal policy. It is remarkable, therefore, that business has not similarly lent its weight and influence in order to press government to expedite the resolution of an issue that affects them all—namely the armed conflict. Part of

this reason might stem from the misconception that the solution to the armed conflict lies primarily in the military sphere. If however business were to take a longer view (which is what it does when it invests), it would soon realise that only a long-term commitment to the social and economic rehabilitation and development of communities will stop armed conflict. This is a sphere where they can play a role even now. Once more it is important to reach out to a wider audience. It is wrong to think that the Moro conflict is the concern merely of the Mindanao business sector. Rather the negative harvest of armed conflict is directly or indirectly reaped by all businesses in the country. Indeed, it is big business in the country that may be in a better position to act in behalf of peace since, aside from having more resources at its disposal, it is not hostage to the mutual animosities and prejudices prevailing at the local levels.

If public and private stakeholders are convinced of the need to build an informed, concerned and proactive national constituency for peace, deliberate efforts should be made and regularly evaluated. A concrete way of doing so is to invest in surveys—along the lines of that conducted for this Report [Appendix 1.1]—and other social science research that can indicate whether and exactly how much progress is being made with regard to overcoming public indifference or reversing prejudice.

7. Undertake key reforms alongside and outside formal peace talks

7.1 Clean up the electoral process and institute governance reforms

It bears reiterating that an immediate and crucial focus of reform should be the electoral process. The heavy cloud of scandal and mistrust engulfing the integrity and credibility of elections—and especially those in Mindanao and the ARMM—must be dispelled. The unabashed meddling of the national leadership in the process of selecting leaders in the autonomous region must cease and the people's voice permitted to triumph. The integrity of elections and plebiscites is crucial to the peace process and beyond (remembering however that this is a move that serves not only the cause of the peace process but society at large). For at the heart of any future settlement in the Moro conflict will be successive determinations or validations of political options by the people: what form self-rule will take; what governance structure will prevail; what timetable should be followed; what the political-geographic coverage of the new arrangements should be; who the leaders will be, and so on. None of these questions can be settled without confidence on both sides that the mechanisms of public choice are fair and aboveboard. Similarly, all talk about an open and genuine multiparty system that is open to parties with a Left advocacy will remain purely speculative without electoral reforms. It is crucial, therefore, that political and if necessary even constitutional solutions be found to thoroughly revamp the nation's electoral processes, beginning with the elections of 2007.

Renewed initiatives to improve the conduct of governance—especially though not exclusively in areas affected by conflict—will lend further support to peace efforts. These include measures to combat corruption and enhance the responsiveness, transparency, and accountability among local governments, and improve their capacity to deliver social services. Again these are likely to be things that are needed and desired of themselves; but their relevance to on-going peace process lends them even more urgency. Of special concern should be the quality of governance in the ARMM. That creation to date is the only visage of autonomy and tolerance for Moro and Muslim governance that the Republic can present to remaining insurgents and the rest of the world. It cannot be a reassuring sign of future progress that governance in the autonomous region thus far has been clouded by persistent allegations of corruption, nepotism, and ineptitude that the people it presides over continue to fare among the worst in almost every aspect of human development. While many are willing to write this off as a failure of the Moro leadership of the ARMM, it is no less an indictment of the government and mainstream society which allowed it to occur. Above all, both national

Box 1.6 Good news amid conflict[1]

Amid the problems of conflict areas, many communities have organized themselves to create and/or strengthen indigenous mechanisms for providing economic and social services to their people. In other cases, external actors supported local institutions in order to hasten implementation of development projects and to promote peace and conflict-resolution strategies in war-scarred areas.

According to Coronel-Ferrer [2005], in a background paper for this Report, project and program interventions by civil society organizations in terms of peace-building may be classified according to aims: (a) those that *intervene directly in the conflict*, such as preventing violence from escalating, strengthening confidence-building and facilitating dialogue and undertaking unarmed protection and prevention; (b) those that *address the consequences of violence* such as postwar reconstruction; and (c) those that work on the social fabric or *ensure that institutional reforms are taken* in order to reduce the negative impact of conflict. These may also apply to the initiatives of local government units, or even the national government, in areas destroyed by war.

Strengthening interfaith dialogue

1 The **Peacemakers' Circle Foundation, Inc**., meant to enhance Christian-Muslim dialogue particularly in Metro Manila, has focused on the relationship between Muslims and Christians in Barangay 188, Phase 12, in Tala, Caloocan City—home to one of the largest concentrations of Muslims in Metro Manila. Friday weekly interfaith sessions are conducted in the local mosque to discuss personal reflections on community and family life. These sessions led to the creation of a Muslim-Christian Peacemakers' Association, a local self-help group, and to the construction of communal water facilities.

2 Plans to build a Muslim-Christian community center, carry out sustainable livelihood projects and install lighting in a common recreation facility are on the pipeline of the Peacemakers' Circle. It organized workshops for enhancing dialogue between religious groups in June 2004 after a Muslim organizer of a crime-watch organization was assassinated by unknown assailants, sparking distrust among members of the two faiths. Early this year, it supported the building of a mosque at the Greenhills shopping area, where Muslims own a significant number of shops, after many residents in nearby subdivisions opposed the proposal.

3 The **Al-Mujadilah Development Foundation**, founded by a women's rights and peace advocate, Yasmin Busran-Lao in 1997, has helped mobilize the Muslim-Christian Women's Interfaith Dialogue in Lanao del Sur and collaborated with other nongovernment organizations and development groups to address issues of gender, good governance and peace-building. They were meant to allow women to understand better their sociopolitical situation and take part in the socioeconomic changes needed; and to bridge gaps between women of different ethnic and religious communities. The foundation has also worked to popularize the Code of Muslim Personal Laws or PD 1083, and this has been translated into local dialects, with the foundation teaching Muslim women to understand its implementation.

Addressing basic needs of communities torn by war

In many areas, peace and development efforts have focused on meeting the basic needs of communities torn by war and destruction. Residents of barangays in the past who had evacuated to temporary shelters did not risk returning to their homes. Support to evacuees was believed to be better in government-administered shelters, and many of the strife-torn areas were physically isolated from political centers, thus constraining delivery of services. But in many recent cases, socioeconomic programs were undertaken in the communities just a few months after the scene of the heaviest fighting—and with successful results.

1 In **Pikit, North Cotabato**, national and local government officials in June 2003 persuaded residents of Barangay Bangoinged, scene of the heaviest fighting between the military and the MILF in February of the same year, to return home. The barangay was said to be the center of what has been known as the "Buliok complex," the training and command center of the MILF in Central Mindanao. The regional Department of Social Welfare and Development office provided psychological debriefing and relief goods to returning residents, after the national government declared the area around the Buliok complex as a zone of peace in March.

2 The DSWD, with the Gawad Kalinga project of the Couples for Christ Foundation, undertook the "Bangsamoro Pabahay" project which built 1,030 homes (as of 2004) out of a target 5,491 in Central Mindanao, including the area of Pikit. A peace dialogue program provided venues for discussion among the residents, and the Armed Forces and MILF combatants. Fr. Bert Layson, parish priest of Pikit, re-established the "Space for Peace," which allowed war evacuees to return to their home areas to rehabilitate their communities; cessation of hostilities in these areas also allowed other development organizations to provide assistance in these communities. A productivity and skills training center was built; and the government rehabilitated and built municipal roads, reconstructed seven badly-hit mosques and gave shelter to 627 families.

3 Development efforts in **Basilan province** were spurred by a project of the Christian Children's Fund (CCF), an international development agency, utilizing funds from the United States Agency for International Development. This aimed to improve community health systems, improve tuberculosis control, provide family planning services and strengthen local governance in 62 barangays in all six municipalities. The project, started in 2002, has made a significant impact among the residents. In one municipality alone, more than 3,400 families received nutrition, education and housing assistance; at the same time, at least 3,000 children received vitamin supplementation, were dewormed and immunized, and received medical checkups. The CCF has helped by providing psychosocial counseling and healing among the war-scarred populace; in May 2004, it sponsored the sixth Puhmalin Children's Peace Festival featuring talent competitions among the youth and symposia and discussions on peace process.

4 CCF partnered with local Army units to retrain soldiers and members of the local paramilitary, and deepen their orientation for peace and rehabilitation. As a result, the Peace Advocates of Zamboanga, which helped the CCF design the workshops, reported that "the Civilian Action Force Geographical Units (or CAFGU, the local paramilitary) have displayed more peaceable social attitudes (in their orientation towards the civilian populace)… (and have become) effective peacemakers and advocates in their respective milieus and social frontlines." By the end of 2005, more than 3,500 CAFGU members would have received such training. Sala'am teams, or military units composed of Muslim members or integrees from the Moro National Liberation Front, were deployed to conduct literacy sessions, build sanitary facilities, repair school houses, mediate family feuds, provide medical first aid, and do other types of reconstruction work.

5 In other cases, peace and order stabilized because of decisions made by local government leaders. In the **municipality of Lantawan,** also in Basilan, residents can now socialize and walk down the streets after sundown—something unheard of 10 years ago. Lantawan Mayor Tahira Ismael, a Muslim; Vice-Mayor Felix Dalugdugan, a Christian; and a multi-ethnic municipal council reopened schools, confiscated illegally parked boats, and held office at the municipal hall that used to shelter goats and pigs.

6 In order to rehabilitate farm areas and improve food self-sufficiency in the highlands of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), the University of Southern Mindanao, with the support of the Japan International Cooperation Agency and in collaboration with the Philippine Rice Research Institute, undertook a program called **Pagkain Para sa Masa for the Mindanao Uplands** (PPsM) since 1999. Demonstration farms (called "bahay kubo" models) for rice farming and backyard gardening were built in 30 municipalities. Seeds and planting materials are provided to the poorest farmers (some get native chickens or ducks), who are then trained in the demonstration farms on planting and harvesting techniques.

7 In 2004 alone, more than 3,837 farmers benefited from the PPsM. According to the project's 2004 annual report, "the PPsM has played a big role in providing both technical and material assistance in the form of start-up planting materials to farmers in upland communities or those internally displaced by the Mindanao conflict… planting materials distributed include root crops, rice, corn and assorted vegetables as well as start-up breeder ducks to qualified beneficiaries. This way, thousands of families especially in the war-affected areas in Mindanao had something to start with for them to generate sufficient food as well as source of income."

8 The United Nations Development Program boosted peace and development in Mindanao through the **Multi-Donor Programme** which began in 1997. Now on its third phase (known by its acronym, UN MDP3), the program has a post-conflict strategy involving the convergence of UN and government services in so-called Peace and Development Communities (PDC). It has three key outcomes: improved capacities of target communities in partnership with their local governments for self-sustaining development and improved access to basic services; strengthened institutional support mechanisms to promote collaboration and enhance coordination for continuing support to peace and development; and an environment of mutual trust and confidence among the peoples and institutions leading to lasting peace.

9 One such PDC is **Barangay Manili in Carmen, North Cotabato**, where 76 Maguindanaoan villagers died when armed men sprayed gunfire and lobbed grenades during Saturday prayers in June 1971. Until 30 years after the incident, barangay residents would flee the area whenever government forces and the MNLF would fight in nearby barangays. In 2000, when the government declared an all-out campaign against the MILF, armed groups destroyed barangay property, including the local mosque. In 2002, the UN MDP3 helped develop a five-year Barangay Development Plan, which attracted support from donors in building core shelter and potable water systems and in undertaking livelihood training, sustainable agriculture and seed dispersal programs. The participation of the local government, military and the nongovernment organizations has bolstered confidence that development would be sustained.

10 In July 2003, the **Bohol provincial government** and local leaders reactivated the Bohol Peace Forum, a multisectoral network chaired by the diocesan bishop to revitalize the discussion of the peace agenda with local communities and nongovernment organizations and to explore avenues for peace talks with the local units of the New People's Army. The peace forum was originally created in 1999 and has been responsible for targeting 10 conflict-affected barangays for development assistance in 2001.

11 To spur development efforts in Bohol, the provincial government created the Poverty Reduction Management Office in order to manage and hasten delivery of programs and projects being targeted in priority barangays, most of which are areas where armed skirmishes between the military and communist insurgents occurred. The provincial government wants to remove Bohol from the list of the 20 poorest provinces by 2010 and, in line with the Millennium Development Goals, to reduce poverty incidence by half (to an estimated 28 percent) by 2015 by spurring development efforts in the poorest areas. Major national and donor agencies have coordinated assistance in these selected areas; local programs on drug purchase subsidies, employment assistance and facilitation, scholarship programs, and improvement of school and day care facilities have been undertaken. With the improved peace and development, the number of armed insurgents declined from 283 in 2001 to 64 in 2004, according to estimates by the provincial government.

Strengthening local institutions and training local leaders

Efforts to strengthen local institutions, and train local leaders to ensure people's needs are met, have been plenty. Training seminars were provided to local chief executives to improve the level of governance in these conflict areas. Ensuring that community leaders and representatives of nongovernment organizations were represented in barangay councils encouraged greater local participation.

1 In 2001, the mayors of the municipalities of Buldon, Matanog and Barira in Maguindanao province formed the **Iranun Development Council**. The Iranuns, who preceded the arrival of Maranaws and Maguindanaoans, are an indigenous ethno-linguistic group of Filipinos who had converted to Islam and who form the majority of the population in these municipalities. It is also in these municipalities that the MILF set up its central command and headquarters called Camp Abubakar until this area was taken over by government forces. This interlocal planning body was supported by a local NGO, the Institute of Strategic Initiatives (ISI), and a Manila-based NGO involved in local governance reform, the Institute for Politics and Governance. In 2001 and 2002, the ISI trained local facilitators in development planning activities in the 34 barangays of the three towns. Around 170 community organizations of women, youth, government workers (i.e., teachers) and farmers were formed.

2 In 2003, the IDC started to carry out a Sustainable Integrated Area Development Program, using the Kapit-Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan anti-poverty approach of the national government. It garnered more than P100 million in project commitments during a donors' forum that year; the Department of Agriculture alone had planned more than P50 million in projects (currently, there is a backlog of P 23 million in projects). The DA supported the construction of farm-to-market roads and warehouses that spurred the marketing of local crops to other areas; agricultural production was reported to have increased by as much as 1200 percent due to improved delivery of farm inputs and better transport of crops. By 2005, more than 70 community organizations existed in order to improve the welfare of the community, especially in Barira, and the barangay and municipal governments had become more proactive in responding to the development needs of their constituencies. The remaining organizations had planned to coalesce into the Iranun People's Organizations Assembly to spur development efforts in their areas. The recognition of local efforts by national government leaders—led by the President—has made the military units deployed in these areas less wary of development efforts.

3 ***Pagtabangan*** **BaSulTa** is a joint effort of 10 nongovernment organizations, foundations and aid agencies to engage and support local leaders and multisectoral constituencies in the provinces of Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, and to assist in the development of sustainable interventions to address poverty, conflict and marginalization in the region. *Pagtabangan* BaSulTa was born out of a series of discussions, starting in July 2004, to spur development efforts in the three most marginalized provinces in the ARMM. The coalition aims to help bring the human development index of the three provinces on par with the rest of Mindanao by 2010.

4 The consortium's engagement process is based on the premise that only when responsible leaders and citizens engage institutions to be more responsive and provide the needed development opportunities in the region can human security be achieved. The consortium's work addresses the issues of Education, Water and Health, Livelihood, Environment, Governance and Participation and Culture of Peace. The consortium has engaged different stakeholders, including national and local governments, donors, civil society groups, business, armed groups and traditional leaders, in planning peace and development activities in the three provinces. At the provincial level and municipal level, civil society convenors participate in planning and implementation of the executive-legislative agenda (ELA) for the province or municipality.

5 In its first months of operation, the consortium committed more than P100 million to various development projects in the area. Additional resources are being mobilized to ensure that priority programs are implemented accordingly. An additional 150 local leaders are being trained to lead consultations in their communities; capacity-building activities will boost implementation of development programs.

These cases represent the efforts undertaken to strengthen dialogue, widen socioeconomic development and provide opportunities for political transformation in the midst of violence. These also illustrate the strength and resiliency of local communities in ensuring that, with a modicum of external assistance, they can overcome the cycle of conflict and maldevelopment.

[1]Prepared by P. Tuaño for the PHDR 2005. Both Tuaño [2005] and Coronel-Ferrer [2005], cited above, are available at www.hdn.org.ph.

government and all Filipinos should instead realise the common stake they possess in the success of the Moro experiment with self-rule within the Republic. For this reason it is in their interest to ensure that institutions of the autonomous region are held up to the highest standards.

7.2 Reform the security sector

The security sector, namely the police, the military, the justice system, and the intelligence services, is literally the "front line" between mainstream society on the one hand and the insurgencies and the communities that support them, on the other. In many rebel-influenced areas, the presence of the military—often also performing civilian tasks—is as much government as people are likely to see in a lifetime. Hence the mien and behavior of the armed forces and the police will largely determine people's ideas of the quality of government and its respect for their rights, beliefs, and ways of life.

The need to implement a consistent peace policy at the national level has already been discussed; what is important, however, is whether that policy is transmitted, represented, and implemented where it matters most—at the grass-roots. At that level, however, it is not government negotiators or peace activists (at times not even local officials) who are *in situ* but the police and the military. It matters, therefore, that the military and the police comprehend the rationale behind the peace policy and realize its implications for their actions.

It is a first imperative to ensure the supremacy of civilian authority over the military; otherwise, what happens on the ground may be vastly different from what leaders think is the policy being implemented. The problem of an overbearing and headstrong military that goes its own way is relevant not only to the resolution of armed conflict but for mainstream society as well (as witness the various attempted coups d'etat, "mutinies", and shifts in allegiance since 1986). The recommendations of the Davide and Feliciano Commissions should be pursued in this respect, particularly as they deal with the problem of strengthening civilian control, professionalizing the military, insulating it from partisan politics, and clamping down on military corruption.

The country's security sector also requires an indispensable minimum build-up of its capacity if it is to discharge its tasks adequately. The need to attend to the military's resource problems in the field has already been highlighted by others (e.g., the Feliciano Commission). To this, one might add the equally serious resource-problems of the justice system. Many human rights violations are at least partly explained by sheer resource constraints: false arrests of suspected rebels, for example, are partly a problem of inferior police training and poor logistics; detentions are unnecessarily extended owing to the clogged dockets of prosecutors and courts; children are mixed with adult prisoners in appalling conditions for simple want of space.

Finally a thorough reorientation of the military, the police, and the penal system is in order with the view to underscoring the rule of law, respect for human rights, and cultural sensitivity. The latter is particularly important in minority-dominated areas: an image that continues to haunt many Moros is that of a President of the Republic, his commanders, and his soldiers feasting on *lechon* and beer near the mosque of Camp Abubakr which they have just overrun—scarcely an encouragement to stay in the republic rather than secede. A human-rights reorientation becomes even more imperative in view of impending "anti-terror legislation" that would give wider latitude to the police and the military to hunt down suspected terrorists.

8. Undertake human development investments for their own sake

Much of this Report has argued that the state of peace and security is indivisible, that sooner or later insecurity in one part of the population spills over and affects the rest, and that therefore it is in the interest even of those who feel themselves secure at the moment to be concerned for the security of others. This *externality* argument must be used with caution, however, since it can be distorted into the purely utilitarian interpretation that the majority should concern itself with the security of the minority only *as* and *to the extent to which* their own security is at

stake. This could also lead to the fallacious corollary that the insecurity of a minority should be alleviated only to the extent that is necessary to secure the security of the majority. For the same wrong reason, a government may choose to emphasize and address the problems of only those minorities that constitute an armed threat, ignoring the problems of others who may be more powerless and less aggressive. Left unqualified, this could lead simply to the "pacification" approach to armed conflict, an approach this Report rejects.

There is a second argument, however, the *rights* argument, which tempers such notions. Human security, like human development is an *end in itself*. Its imperative derives from the right to human development, since the former is simply the free and secure exercise of human development choices. In other words, the attainment of human security is first and foremost a right of all, quite independently of the consequences of its attainment or non-attainment.

From this perspective, and as argued in all previous Reports, socioeconomic reforms that seek to address deprivations in health, knowledge, and access to safe water, electricity and other economic provisions that make for decent standards of living are both necessary and desirable *in and of themselves*, even without reference to the armed conflicts they undoubtedly engendered. It is nonetheless reasurring, however, that empirical evidence does exist to show that investments in these same arenas—and most especially in education—are also the most potent policy handles to reduce the likelihood of armed conflict. This result simply gives the human development framework that much more validity.

The Moro and communist-led armed conflicts in the Philippines have lasted for at least three decades now and if one includes their historical antecedents, then perhaps for many decades even before that. The bizarre phenomenon of "wars without end," alongside which one must now add "peace-talks without end", is the foreseeable consequence of failing to adequately and squarely address the roots of conflict. There will be some for whom this state of affairs is tolerable: their only aim may be to keep conflicts "manageable". Such attitudes may possibly change only if the security of the majority is put truly at risk, say, because of a sharp rise in terrorism.

A human-development perspective, however, always sees the question as whether human security will thus have been increased—freedom from fear and want not only for the mainstream or the majority who would wish to be shielded from the insurgency or terrorism, but no less for the minorities and the marginalised populations as well. In most cases, failing to respond to the roots of conflict merely tightens the cycle of conflict-insecurity-further conflict.

The human-development perspective instead chooses to take insurgencies and armed conflicts seriously as mirrors to society. To be sure, mirrors may be distorted to a greater or to a lesser extent: ideologies and pet theories may exaggerate certain objectionable features and details and hide others. Dealing with them squarely, however, will always provide an opportunity for the current system to peer closely at itself and discover at least some of its defects.

The valuable contributions to the national agenda of the causes espoused by the various insurgencies are undeniable. The critique of the overweening influence of foreign powers (particularly the U.S.) in the country's political life was provided primarily by the Left movement, a national debate that finally led to the removal of U.S. bases in the country. The decades-old socialist and communist advocacy for land redistribution culminated ultimately in the government's several agrarian reform programs. The Moro struggle, on the other hand, serves to expose the age-old injustices and iniquities perpetrated in the settlement of Mindanao, as well as laid bare the ugly layer of intolerance and anti-Muslim prejudice that runs silently through the predominantly Christian, mainstream Filipino society.

In many ways, the insurgencies have helped Filipinos and their government realize how they ought to build a more just, more democratic society. Then it should not be paradoxical if, by engaging in the peace process with its erstwhile challengers and adversaries, Philippine society itself should emerge a better one.

APPENDIX 1.1

Measuring the bias against Muslims

In the course of the research and consultation workshops in preparation for the Philippine Human Development Report 2005 (PHDR 2005), an alarming picture of apparent discrimination against Muslims emerged. People recounted personal experiences and anecdotes about how Muslims were shut out of jobs, study opportunities, ignored in public places, or greeted with patronizing, shocked comments about how come they are so "good" even though they "are Muslims." Following are some representative stories of ignorance, prejudice and misrepresentation.

From a high-ranking official of a prestigious Mindanao university: *" I was once part of a batch picked to undergo training in Australia, I was told my name was erased, but the phrase Moro Nationalist could be read clearly beside it."*

The same official once signed a contract with a manager of Pepsi or Coke in GenSan. The manager met the college dean of education and he said, *"You know I met your chancellor, and it's the first time I met a public official who's not crooked. But I find that hard to accept because he's a Muslim, and how come he's not corrupt?"*

Another professional had a different complaint: *"I earn more than P20,000 and a member of my staff earns P14,000. When we both applied for a loan, hers was approved, mine was rejected. I asked the INCOR management, 'Why are you doing this, when in fact, I am the one signing because as her department head I am her collateral?'"*

Another professor narrated: *"My colleague was invited by the UN to present a paper at a UN forum on indigenous peoples in New York. He was barred entry in California because his name is [Muslim-sounding]."*

The use of the headscarf has also provoked discrimination.

"I used to wear my veil. I always brought my laptop with me and I was always stopped at airports and asked to open my laptop. Once I tried asking a male colleague to bring my laptop, and no one asked him to open it."

"My husband and I were waiting for a taxi in Manila and no one would stop. My husband told me to remove my veil. So I had to take off my veil simply because we could not ride a taxi."

Decent, law-abiding Muslims often bear with discrimination in business and employment.

"I have a second cousin who is a successful businessman in Metro Manila. He sells expensive vehicles in Metro Manila, married to a Christian. But just to get hired there, he had to change his Muslim name of Namamental to Mark Anthony."

Another individual who had worked seven years in Saudi Arabia could not get a job back in General Santos City. A classmate from high school told him, "For as long you state your religion is Islam no one will hire you." He was advised to put down Seventh

Day Adventists (SDA), because the SDA members also don't eat pork. That way, he wouldn't be forced to eat pork at company functions.

Dr. Jamail A. Kamlian, Vice-Chancellor for Research and Extension of the MSU-Iligan Institute of Technology in Iligan City, was turned down when he tried to buy a lot in Frontiera Subdivision, Cagayan de Oro City, after the sellers who made the offer to his Catholic wife found out she is married to a Muslim.

In a focus-group discussion (FGD), some Muslims in Metro Manila said Muslims routinely became the targets of police operations for crimes such as illegal drugs and terrorism.

In order to validate this picture of bias, the HDN commissioned a survey to explore public perceptions on Muslims and to measure the extent of anti-Muslim bias, if any, among Filipinos.

Methodology

A stratified random sample survey was conducted from March 3 to 16, 2005, in which 1,200 Filipino adults were interviewed face-to-face. Respondents from three barangays in Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur were not asked the questions in the HDN-Muslim module, however. As a result, there are only 1,185 respondents for the Muslim probes. Of these 1,185 respondents, 21 are Muslims. They are found in barangays not predominantly Muslim. They constitute about 1.8 percent of the respondent sample for the Muslim module.

Survey questionnaire

Sixteen questions were included in the Pulse Asia *Ulat ng Bayan* March 2005 survey. Four questions (the"proximity" questions) probe whether the respondent is willing to have a male Muslim for a boarder in his/her home, hire a female Muslim as domestic help, hire a male Muslim as worker, or live near a Muslim community, e.g.

> *Suppose that two young men applied for the one position open at a fast food restaurant. Both have finished 3rd year college, are equally qualified, and intend to work in order to earn money for tuition. Who would you choose?*
>
> **SHOWCARD**
> ABU HASSIN MALIK 1
> DANILO DE LOS REYES 2
> KAHIT SINO SA KANILANG DALAWA *(Either will do)*. 3

Five questions (the "personal traits" questions) deal with perceived personal traits of Muslims relating to industry, honesty, peaceful disposition, trustworthiness, and fanaticism, e.g.

> *Which of the following appropriately generally describes Filipino Muslims?*
>
> **SHOWCARDS**
>
> TALAGANG MAPAGKAKATIWALAAN 5
> *(Very trustworthy)*
>
> MEDYO MAPAGKAKATIWALAAN 4
> *(Somewhat trustworthy)*
>
> HINDI MASABI KUNG MAPAGKAKATIWALAAN
> O HINDI MAPAGKAKATIWALAAN 3
> *(Can't say if trustworthy or untrustworthy)*
>
> MEDYO HINDI MAPAGKAKATIWALAAN..... 2
> *(Somewhat untrustworthy)*
>
> TALAGANG HINDI MAPAGKAKATIWALAAN..... 1
> *(Very untrustworthy)*

Another five questions (the "stereotype" questions) look into agreement with stereotypical images of Muslims. Specifically, that Muslims are oppressive to women, prone to run amok, hate non-Muslims, are terrorists or extremists, and do not consider themselves as Filipinos, e.g.

> *We will now read some statements to you expressing different opinions about Filipino Muslims that some people may have. To each of these statements, would you please say whether that statement is probably true or probably false …*
>
> ANG MGA MUSLIM AY MGA TERORISTA O "EXTREMISTS"
> *(Muslims are terrorists and/or extremists)*

The 15th question asks for the respondent's source of information on Muslims and the last question asks the respondent to name a group that she/he associates with the word "terrorism" (unaided recall).

Findings

Sources of information about Muslims

Respondents were allowed to name as many sources of information on Muslims as they had. Only 14 percent could cite their own experience with Muslims. Twenty percent (20%) obtained information from friends, and 8% cited relatives in Mindanao and the Middle East. Television is the main source of information of majority of the respondents (78%), followed by radio (44%) and newspapers (29%).

Even among Mindanaoans, direct contact with Muslims is limited. Only 28% of the Mindanaoans cite their own experience as source. Essentially the same percentage (31%) obtains information from friends, while less than 20% have relatives for source.

Attitudes to proximity to Muslims

Asked to choose between two persons said to be alike in all other relevant aspects, but with one having a Christian name and the other having a Muslim sounding name, slightly less than half of Filipino adults say that either person will do (male boarder—47%, female domestic helper—46%, male worker—44%). About the same percentages will choose the person with the Christian name (male boarder—42%, female domestic helper—40%, male worker—46%). Interestingly, ***less than 10% choose the person with the Muslim-sounding name*** (male boarder—3%, female domestic helper—7%, male worker—4%).

Higher percentages of Mindanaoans opt for the male boarder (54%) or male worker (57%) with the Christian name compared to those from other geographic areas. However, the percentage of Mindanaoans preferring the female domestic help with the Christian name (49%) is essentially the same as those for other geographic areas.

Those from Luzon appear to be the most indifferent to choosing between a Muslim-sounding and Christian names. At least half of the adults in Luzon (50% to 54%) indicate that either person will do in each of the three situations presented to them.

Preference for the person with the Christian name appears to increase with increasing age. Greater percentages of those aged 55 years or over tend to choose the person with the Christian name (male boarder- 50% to 58%, female domestic help—48% to 53%) than those below 35 years of age (male boarder—32% to 40%, female domestic help—31% to 33%).

A different pattern is observed in the responses to the question on choice of residence. When it comes to choosing between a residence with cheaper rent but located near a Muslim community and a residence with higher rent but far from a Muslim community, nearly the same percentage choose the residence with lower rent (37%) as do those who choose that with higher rent (40%). Only about one in five (22%) indicate that either option will do.

More than half of those from NCR (57%) and the ABC (59%) opt for the residence with higher rent but far from a Muslim community. Not surprisingly, however, nearly half of the poorest class E (49%) opt for the residence with lower rent. NCR residents are the least indifferent to choosing between the two options (12% vs 22% to 24% for other geographic areas).

It appears that capacity to pay as well as the actual possibility that the respondent will face such a situation (in the case of NCR respondents) exerts a greater influence on the responses to the residence question than to the other questions.

Personal traits of Muslims

Possibly because less than 15% of them have had direct dealings with Muslims, the majority of the respondents (56% to 64%) indicated indecision insofar as personal traits that best describe Muslims are concerned. Higher indecision levels are recorded for Luzon (67% to 76%); lower, though still substantial, indecision levels are found for Mindanao (37% to 40%). Even in Mindanao, the indecision levels are higher or as great as the percentages for the other responses.

It appears that a plurality, if not a majority of Filipinos, would rather not convey any negative

impressions they may have of Muslims. This is evident from their responses to the next set of questions that deal with possible stereotypes of Muslims where—unlike this set on personality traits—respondents are forced to choose from among two options or to refuse to provide an answer.

Muslim stereotypes

A majority of Filipinos think that Muslims are probably more prone to run amok (55%) although probably not oppressive to women (59%). A plurality believes that Muslims are probably terrorists or extremists (47%) and that they probably consider themselves as Filipinos (49%). There are equal percentages (44%) of those who believe that Muslims probably secretly hate all non-Muslims and those who do not.

Both images of running amok and being terrorists or extremists connote violence; yet the majority of the respondents did not choose "being violent" as descriptive of Muslims in answering the section on personality traits. This may be an indication that many respondents have reservations about revealing their biases, i.e., given a choice (as in the preceding set of questions), respondents would choose the option representing the middle ground. An alternative explanation is that the probes on personal traits can be answered with detachment on the respondent's part, as these do not require him/her to imagine the Muslim in relation to other members of society, particularly to himself/herself. The probes on the stereotypes, on the other hand, imply a relation between the Muslim and other members of society, the respondent included. The respondent thus becomes more involved, less indifferent when responding to the probes on stereotypes.

Visayans tend to have a more negative view of Muslims than those from other geographic regions. A majority of them (62% to 71%) agree that Muslims probably follow four of the negative stereotypes, while a plurality (42%) believes that Muslims are probably oppressive to women.

Those from the NCR, on the other hand, tend to have a less negative view of Muslims. The majority (55% to 63%) think that Muslims probably do not follow four of the negative stereotypes. However, 53% of those from NCR think that Muslims are probably prone to run amok. Interestingly, a majority of Mindanaoans tend to believe Muslims are not oppressive to women (58%) and regard themselves as Filipinos (57%), but appear to regard Muslims as violent. A majority of those from Mindanao agree that Muslims are probably terrorists and/or extremists (56%) and are prone to run amok (54%).

Members of class ABC differ from the other socioeconomic classes only insofar as viewing Muslims as terrorists or extremists is concerned; a lower percentage of them (31%) believe that this is probably the case.

Opinions on the stereotypes are essentially the same across the categories of other sociodemographic groupings.

Groups associated with terrorism

The Abu Sayyaf (30%) and Muslims (27%) are the most oft-cited groups associated with the word "terrorism." Larger percentages of NCR respondents (42%) and those in urban areas (36%) cite the Abu Sayyaf compared to their counterparts in the other geographic regions (24% to 29%) and in the rural areas (22%).

About one in five (19%) Filipinos cannot name a group they associate with terrorism. There are more in the rural areas and larger percentages of them among the elderly and those with at most an elementary education. Many of these people are likely not even aware of or are unfamiliar with the phenomenon or issue.

Indices of anti-Muslim bias

Given the huge indecision levels of the responses to the questions on personal traits, these responses were excluded from the construction of the anti-Muslim bias indices. Only the responses to the proximity and stereotype probes were included.

Description of the indices

Several anti-Muslim bias indices are considered. *Index 1* is based on the responses to the "proximity" questions. A respondent is assigned a point for each Christian name chosen or for choosing the residence

that is far from a Muslim community. Respondents who obtain at least three points (out of a possible total of four) are tagged as having anti- Muslim bias.

Index 2 is a modification of the first and is based only on the responses to the first three proximity questions (considered in view of the fact that responses to the probe on choosing a residence appear to have been influenced by capacity to pay). A respondent is assigned a point for each Christian name chosen. Respondents who obtain at least two points (out of a possible total of three) are tagged as having an anti-Muslim bias.

Index 3 is based on the responses to the "stereotype" questions. A respondent is assigned a point each time the negative stereotype is chosen. Respondents who obtain at least three points (out of a possible total of five) are tagged as having an anti-Muslim bias.

Index 4 is based on the responses to the "proximity" and "stereotype" questions, that is, it is a combination of Indices 1 and 3. A respondent obtaining at least five points (out of a possible total of nine) is tagged as having an anti-Muslim bias.

Index 5 is a combination of Indices 2 and 3. A respondent obtaining at least five points (out of a possible total of eight) from the first three proximity questions and the stereotype questions is tagged as having an anti-Muslim bias.

Index 6 is a combination of Indices 1 and 3 but doubles the weight of the proximity responses. A respondent obtaining at least seven points (out of a possible total of 13) is tagged as having an anti-Muslim bias. One justification for doubling the weights for the proximity responses is as follows: A person can be more liberal in outlook when reacting to the stereotypes, but may exercise greater caution in her/his preferences when proximity is involved. Thus, the responses to the proximity question may be more reflective of his/her true attitude toward Muslims.

Possible disadvantages of the indices

Indices 1 and 2 ("proximity-based" indices) may yield underestimates, since the questions allow the respondent to choose the "politically correct" option "either of the two." Index 3, on the other hand, may be statistically biased since the respondent is forced to choose between the two alternatives, short of refusing to answer. The direction of the bias, if any, in Index 3 is not clear.

Profile of those with anti-Muslim bias

Results for the six indices indicate that from ***33% to 44% of Filipino adults have an anti-Muslim bias, with a larger percentage of Visayans (from 50% to 67%) exhibiting bias*** if the Indices 3, 4, 5 and 6 are used. ***The age-related pattern, wherein more of those aged 55 years or over tend to exhibit bias than those under 35 years of age, persists*** in Indices 1, 2 and 6.

Survey-weighted logistic regressions of the anti-Muslim bias indices were performed using sociodemographic variables and source of news as explanatory variables. Only geographic area, socioeconomic class and age appear to be helpful in providing a profile of those with an anti-Muslim bias. The correct classification rates are again not high, ranging from 61% to 64%.

Those aged 54 years or over tend to be more biased, while those aged 35 years or below tend to be less biased whether the proximity-based indices or the stereotype-based index is used. A larger percentage of Visayans exhibit bias with respect to stereotypes. Based on the Index 2, which excludes information on choice of residence, more Visayans and Mindanaoans emerge as biased. But the bias of many NCR adults may have been masked by the removal of the residence question from the computation of the index.

Socioeconomic class appears as a factor in only one model. Based on the combined index, those from class D2 appear to be more biased than those from the other socioeconomic classes.

Association of the anti-Muslim bias indices with selected perception variables

Survey-weighted logistic regressions relating the indices to two variables—the choice of Muslims as the group associated with terrorism and preference for a hard stance in dealing with the Muslim rebels in Sulu[1]—were performed to evaluate the indices.

Specifically, each of these variables were regressed on sociodemographic variables, source of information on Muslims and an index to determine whether the index can help explain the variable.

It appears that the first two combined indices—Indices 4 and 5—have better explanatory power than the other indices. The choice between the two indices is not easily settled on the basis of statistical considerations, since Index 4 has better predictive power for the model on perception of Muslims as terrorists; while Index 5 has slightly better predictive power for the model on the adoption of a hard stance on the Sulu issue. The choice between the first and second combined indices should be decided on the basis of whether the question on renting a residence far from a Muslim community should be included in the construction of the index.

Note that it is those from Mindanao and ***those aged 54 years or over who are more likely to associate Muslims with terrorism,*** even after anti-Muslim bias is taken into account. ***Those who cite their own experience as source of information on Muslims are more likely to adopt a hard stance,*** while those with at most an elementary education, cite radio as source of information, or are from Luzon, are less likely to adopt a hard stance.

Conclusions

It thus appears that a considerable percentage of Filipinos (33% to 39% based on Indices 4 and 5) are biased against Muslims notwithstanding the fact that only about 14% of them have had direct dealings with Muslims. The bias appears to be adequately captured by the questions on stereotypes and serves to explain hiring and leasing decisions of Filipinos, as well as perceptions of Muslims as terrorists and the adoption of a hard stance with respect to approaches in pursuing peace in Sulu.

The more widely held stereotypes are that of Muslims being more prone to run amok and being terrorists or extremists. A stereotype that Filipinos apparently do not subscribe to is that Muslims are oppressive to women.

Bias appears to be associated primarily with geographic location and age. A larger percentage of Visayans exhibit bias with respect to stereotypes.[2] Majority of them (62% to 71%) agree that Muslims probably follow four of the negative stereotypes, while a plurality (42%) believes that Muslims are probably oppressive to women.

A majority of Mindanaoans, on the other hand, tend to believe Muslims are not oppressive to women (58%) and regard themselves as Filipinos (57%). But a majority of them also regard Muslims as violent, specifically, that the latter are probably terrorists and/or extremists (56%) and are prone to run amok (54%). The logistic regression models indicate that even among those already tagged as biased, ***those from Mindanao are more likely to perceive Muslims as terrorists.***

Those from NCR subscribe to the stereotypes the least; a majority of them (55% to 63%) think that Muslims probably do not follow four of the negative stereotypes. However, they are more likely to exhibit bias when choosing a residence; they would opt to rent the more expensive residence that is far from the community. If the responses to the question on residence are excluded from the computation of the anti-Muslim indices, NCR residents appear to be as less biased as those from Luzon. It seems that the question on residence provides information that the other three proximity questions do not and should be retained in the computation of the index

Those from Luzon are the least biased against Muslims. Those aged 54 years or over tend to be more biased, while those aged 35 years or below tend to be less biased.

[1] This was not a probe in the HDN-Muslim Module but a separate probe in Pulse Asia's Ulat ng Bayan survey.

[2] Two reasons have been proposed to explain this. First, it may have to do with the issue of piracy before the Spanish time; the Muslims of Mindanao conquered the Visayas by means of piracy. Second, it may be because of the history of dislocation and displacement between Muslims and those from the Visayas. Many of those who had migrated to Mindanao and displaced Muslims were from the Visayas. According to Chancellor Muslim, "practically the whole Cotabato Empire was sliced up into several parts, each part dominated by a cultural group coming from the Visayas" so "the win of the Visayans was actually the loss of the Moros in Mindanao." A politician from Panay also remarked that it was something of an obligation for Visayans to support the Ilagas.

APPENDIX 1.2

Preliminary indicators of human insecurity

One of the objectives of this Report was to determine whether and how an "early warning" system for the incidence of ideologically motivated armed conflicts was possible. For the Global HDR 1994, identifying potential crisis areas is an active peace policy. In light of this objective, Edillon [2005] undertook to determine factors that gave rise to such conflicts. Among the variables that appeared to significantly affect the incidence of conflict were (i) Access to convenient water supply, (ii) Educational attainment of adults, (iii) Access to electricity (iv) Level and growth of median income, and (v) Evidence of minoritization (of original settlers in the province.)

Interestingly poverty incidence, income inequality, and demographic variables did not figure as significant. In addition, the relevance of these variable differed somewhat according to whether the province was classified as a "minority" province (all municipalities in the province have at least 40 percent of municipal population of "marginalized" groups, defined as ethno linguistic groups which account for less than 1.5 percent of the country's total population), a "majority" province (all municipalities in the province have low concentrations of marginalized groups), or a "mixed" province (both high and low municipalities are present).

While Edillon [2005] captured only about 52% of the observed variability in conflict incidence from 1986-2004, in terms of monitoring conditions that will likely give rise to conflict, these five variables represent a feasible, albeit preliminary, set. Statistical Annex 8 presents these variables on a provincial level.

Factors that may lead to frustration:

Disparity in access to water supply and minoritization

Aggression arises from frustrations that emanate from a sense of relative deprivation. Perceptions that basic resources such as safe water are accessible only to a privileged few might push those who feel unfairly deprived of their right to a basic resource, to give vent to their frustrations in violent confrontations with government. Edillon's study shows that indeed inequitable access to basic resources, indicated by disparity in access to convenient water supply systems, has contributed significantly to the incidence of armed conflicts in the country. Note that it is not just the provision of safe water that matters but the convenience of access as well.

Disparity for a minority province is defined as the difference in access to water (levels 2 and 3) with respect to those residing in the nearby regional centers. For a mixed province, it is computed as between municipalities with "high" versus "low" concentrations of marginalized groups within the same province. The statistic is not considered for majority provinces.

A second indicator, *minoritization*, proxied by the proportion of "original" settlers in the region, seems to lead to frustration, particularly in mixed provinces. The higher the proportion of original settlers (that is, the lesser the degree of minoritization), the less is the incidence of conflict.

Barriers to information or factors that increase the cost of verifying the "truth":

Low educational attainment among adults and lack of access to electricity

In building a mass base for an ideological movement, organizers tend to present simplistic analyses of the root causes of the problems faced by the people they are organizing. Government usually figures in these analyses as a major, if not the primary, cause of their hardships. In the absence of information or the low capacity of potential recruits to obtain and process additional data, they might tend to uncritically accept overly simplified presentations. In this regard, higher educational attainment appears to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of issues that could temper the decision of would-be followers to join a movement that engages the state in armed confrontation.

Using the average years of schooling among adults rather than functional literacy as proxy for deprivation in knowledge, Edillon's policy simulations reveal that interventions to improve the educational attainment of adults to at least six years of basic education reduces the probability of the incidence of armed conflict in any given year after 2003 to almost nil. This is the case regardless of type of province.

Access to electricity, which facilitates access to communication technology and information, is also a factor contributing to incidence of conflict although not as significantly as educational attainment. Edillon's findings show a lower incidence of conflict when the proportion of households with access to electricity is higher.

Factors that affect expected costs and benefits of supporting armed struggle:

The level and growth of median permanent income

The incidence of conflict increases with average permanent income, where average is represented by the average income of the middle quintile. However, at a high enough level of (permanent) income, incidence of conflict decreases. This means that incomes of the middle class have to increase sufficiently high in order to discourage potential adherents from supporting the cause. At this point, discounted expected benefits no longer outweigh the expected immediate costs (which may even be in terms of foregone current incomes) of supporting the armed struggle.

Table 1.11 below lists the 10 most vulnerable provinces along the statistical determinants of incidence of ideology-based armed conflicts.

Table 1.11 10 most vulnerable provinces by indicator of "human insecurity"

Disparity in water (2000)*	%	Minoritization (2000)**	%	Percentage of adults w < 6 yrs educ (2000)	%	Percentage of households with no electricity (2000)	%	Median income (2003)	Pesos
Lanao del Sur	80.80	Nueva Ecija	0.6	Sarangani	42.0	Tawi-Tawi	82.8	Sulu	6,720
Capiz	77.31	Quirino	1.6	Western Samar	40.3	Sulu	82.7	Tawi-Tawi	8,192
Tawi-Tawi	72.93	Bataan	3.9	Basilan	39.7	Masbate	77.6	Zamboanga del Norte	8,979
Aklan	72.42	Aurora	4.8	Maguindanao	39.7	Maguindanao	75.7	Masbate	10,222
Palawan	67.21	North Cotabato	7.1	Sulu	39.1	Apayao	66.6	Basilan	10,298
Bukidnon	66.31	Sultan Kudarat	7.6	Negros Oriental	38.7	Northern Samar	66.5	Maguindanao	10,753
Masbate	66.16	South Cotabato	11.8	Northern Samar	34.7	Zamboanga del Norte	65.6	Siquijor	11,428
Surigao del Sur	65.82	Surigao del Norte	15.2	Ifugao	33.5	North Cotabato	63.8	Romblon	11,448
Maguindanao	65.75	Tawi-Tawi	26.0	Masbate	33.4	Sarangani	63.4	Marinduque	11,844
Apayao	64.33	Sarangani	28.6	Zamboanga del Norte	33.2	Negros Oriental	63.3	Western Samar	12,004

*For minority provinces, disparity is defined as the difference in access to water source with respect to those residing in the nearby regional centers. While for mixed provinces, it is the difference in access to water source between municipalities with "high" versus "low" concentrations of marginalized groups within the same province.
** Proportion of "original" settlers

Map 1.2 Philippine administrative map by province type



Map 1.3 Average number of armed encounters (1986-2004)



Map 1.4 Disparity in access to water source (2000)



Map 1.5 Minoritization (2000)



Map 1.6 Percentage adults with less than six years of schooling (2000)



Map 1.7 Percentage households with no electricity (2000)



Map 1.8 Average income of middle quintile 2003 (NCR 1997 prices)



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Endnotes to Chapter 1

[1] In doing so, this Report knowingly excludes the armed violence spawned by electoral contests, clan rivalry (e.g., *ridô*), or warlordism, which are essentially contests to redistribute power and spoils or settle scores *within* the same political system but do not seek to replace that political system itself.

[2] That is, 37 years since the re-establishment of the Communist Party of the Philippines in 1968 (and 36 years since the foundation of the New People's Army). On the other hand, the start of the present Moro insurgency can be dated from 1972.

[3] The seven provinces are Antique, Batanes, Camiguin, Catanduanes, Romblon, Siquijor, Tawi-tawi. It is interesting that Catanduanes, which enjoyed the reputation of being the only genuinely peaceful province in Bicol, experienced its first NPA-related violent incident in February of this year.

[4] These were, respectively, Operation Kadena de Amor (1982) in the Quezon-Bicol region, the Kampanyang Ahos (1985) of the CPP's Mindanao Commission, and Operation Missing Link (1987) in Southern Tagalog, and Operation Olympia (1988) in Metro Manila. [Newsbreak 31 March 2003, E. Parreño, "Comrade v. comrade"]

[5] Privileged speech delivered July 1996.

[6] This excludes 82 government troops killed and 229 wounded, as well as 249 Abu Sayyaf casualties.

[7] See his 1903 article "Where to begin".

[8] For example, it is argued by some that Christian civilians are legitimate targets because they contribute taxes to their governments, which taxes in turn are used to wage war against Islam.

[9] In his work *De jure belli ac pacis* (1625).

[10] Definition according to Article 1 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

[11] See the Asia Society's www.asiacource.org/asip/carling.cfm/#military

[12] Covering Maguindanao, North Cotabato, and Sultan Kudarat provinces.

[13] That is, a neoclassical growth model of per capita income as a function of the investment ratio, population growth, education (human capital), and intensity of conflict, among others.

[14] That is. the coefficient of the dummy-variable representing conflict intensity.

[15] This is not far off from R. Dy's estimate of the agricultural losses stemming from the Estrada administration's all-out war policy in 1999-2000, i.e., ca. P25 million daily [Mindanao Business Council 2003]

[16] Kal Kaufman, "Globe, Smart among rebels' milking cows," ibid.

[17] Carlos Conde, "Rebels' 'revolutionary tax' adds to cost of business in the Philippines," 20 October 2004, *International Herald Tribune*, from http://www.iht.com/articles/2004/10/19/business/rebel.html.

[18] Manny Mogato, "To Fund a Revolution," 31 March 2003, *Newsbreak*, from http://www.inq7.net/nwsbrk/2003/mar/31/nbk_4-1.htm.

[19] Jet Damazo, "Breaking Free," *Newsbreak*, 31 March 2003, from http://www.inq7.net/nwsbrk/2003/mar/31/nbk_5-1.htm.

[20] Karl Kaufman, "NPA campaign racket endangers peace talks," Manila Times, 15 July 2004.

[21] "Military, NPA clashes took 201 lives," 21 June 2004, Inquirer News Service, from http://www.inq7.net/brk/2004/jun/21/brkoth_1-1.htm.

[22] Edillon's study [2005] operationally defines "marginal groups" as ethno-linguistic groups that constitute less than 1.5 percent of the country's entire population based on the 2000 Census of Population and Housing. "Minority provinces" are those where such marginalized groups make up at least 40 percent of each municipality. Provinces where none of the municipalities is home to such concentrations of minorities are called "majority" provinces. Provinces whose municipalities consist of both those with high and low concentrations of minorities are termed "mixed" provinces.

[23] Suppose armed encounters a become less likely as average incomes y rise, since the potential causes of grievance then become fewer. One can then define $a = f(y)$, where f is a negatively sloped "demand" function for armed conflict. On the other hand, it is also true that the material and human-resource requirements for armed conflict rise with average income, so that one can

define the "supply" of armed conflict as $a = g(y)$, with g positively sloped. The *actual level* of armed conflict A is then the smaller of the two, i.e., $A(y) = \min [f(y), g(y)]$ It becomes evident that at low levels of income, where $g(y) < f(y)$, armed conflicts rise with income, but that at high enough levels of income, $f(y) < g(y)$, and conflicts fall with increasing incomes.

[24] The six paths are: (i) the pursuit of social, economic, and political reforms to address the root causes of armed struggle and social unrest; (ii) consensus-building and empowerment for peace through continuous consultation at the national and local levels; (iii) peace negotiations with armed groups; (iv) measures for reconciliation, reintegration of former combatants and rehabilitation of those affected by the conflict; (v) conflict management and protection of civilians; (vi) to build, nurture and enhance a positive climate for peace.

[25] Keynote address to the International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security, 10 March 2005.

CHAPTER 2

Evolution of the armed conflict on the Moro front[1]

The contemporary armed conflict on the Moro front is the sharpest expression of the ***Moro or Bangsamoro problem***: the historical and systematic marginalization and minoritization of the Islamized ethnolinguistic groups, collectively called Moros, in their own homeland in much of the Mindanao islands, by Spain (from the 16th to the 19th century), the US (in the first half of the 20th century), and more recently by successor Philippine governments since formal independence in 1946. It might be viewed as a ***clash between two imagined nations or nationalisms***, Filipino and Moro, each with their own narratives of the conflict. For the Moro liberation fronts, it has been a conscious struggle to regain the historical sovereignty of the independent Moro nation-states called sultanates over their old homeland. For the Philippine government (henceforth, GRP) and nation-state of the 20th century, it has been a matter of defending the territorial integrity of the country against secession and dismemberment among the three main island regions of Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. This has made the conflict a veritable case of "irresistible forces, immovable objects."

Historical roots

Both Spanish and American colonial regimes had to contend with small but fiercely independent sovereign nation-states (sultanates) of the main Moro ethno-linguistic tribes. Islam had arrived in Sulu in the last quarter of the 13th century and the Sulu sultanate was established in 1451, more than a century before the start of the Spanish period in 1565. The Spanish colonial period was marked by bitter Spanish-Moro wars (the so-called "Moro Wars") fought in six stages spanning four centuries. The colonialists called the Muslim natives "Moros" after their hated enemy, the "Moors," who had previously ruled Spain for eight centuries. The Spaniards fostered Christianized *indio* (Filipino) prejudice against Moros through such cultural institutions as the "moro-moro" plays.

American rule started in the Philippines in 1898 and military pacification of the Moros began in 1903 with the organization of the Moro Province, a military government distinct from that for the rest of the Philippines. Though the Moro people had remained free of Spain, by 1913 Christian and Muslim Filipinos were, by force of arms, under a single government and sovereignty. At that time, an American colonial official in charge of Moro affairs defined the Moro problem as the question of "method or form of administration by which the Moros… can be governed to their best interest… for their gradual advancement in culture and civilization, so that in the course of a reasonable time they can be admitted into the general government of the Philippine islands as qualified members of a republican national organization." One might say that the post-colonial Philippine government's definition

[1] Condensed from Santos [2005] *Evolution of the Armed Conflict on the Moro Front,* background paper prepared for the PHDR 2005. The original paper with complete footnotes is available at www.hdn.org.ph.

of the Moro problem remains essentially the same, including its corresponding policy solution of national integration.

Philippine independence in 1946 marked full-fledged Filipino nation-statehood. Because Moroland was incorporated into Philippine territory, however (or annexed, as some Moro nationalists would say), this event also sealed the loss of Moro independence.

Muslim (1994) sums up the historical roots and contemporary causes of the Moro problem listing 10 foundational causes from 1898 to 1972. Historical roots include (1) the forcible/illegal annexation of Moroland to the Philippines under the Treaty of Paris in 1898; (2) military pacification; (3) imposition of confiscatory land laws; (4) indionization (or Filipinization) of public administration in Moroland and the destruction of traditional political institutions; (5) government-financed/induced land settlement and migration to Moroland; (6) land-grabbing/conflicts; and (7) cultural inroads against the Moros **[Box 2.1].** Contemporary causes are (8) the Jabidah Massacre in 1968; (9) Ilaga (Christian vigilante) and military atrocities in 1970-72; and (10) government neglect and inaction on Moro protests and grievances. The triggering event of the contemporary Moro armed struggle was President Ferdinand E. Marcos's declaration of martial law on September 21, 1972.

The contemporary conflict

The contemporary armed conflict on the Moro front may be set in periods as follows, based on qualitative changes in the situation, key issues, decisions, and developments:

1. Formative Years (1968-72)
2. Early Martial Law and Moro War of Liberation (1972-75)
3. First Peace Negotiations and Tripoli Agreement (1975-77)
4. Rest of the Marcos Regime (1977-86)
5. Aquino Administration (1986-92)
6. Ramos Administration (1992-98)
7. Recent Years: Estrada (1998-2001) and Arroyo Administrations (2001-present)

Presidential administrations are natural periods because of the differences in administration policy or approaches towards the Moro problem and the Moro liberation fronts. But there are also key developments *within* an administration that signify the beginning or end of a distinct period. This is especially so within the 20-year (1965-85) Marcos presidency, which, in terms of milestones in the Moro conflict, was marked by the 1968 Jabidah massacre, the 1972 declaration of martial law, the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, and the 1986 end of the Marcos dictatorship.

By the time of the short-lived Estrada administration and continuing into the Arroyo administration, ***three tracks had emerged, parallel though sometimes converging, which now constitute the current evolution of the Moro conflict:*** (1) the implementation of the GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement; (2) the GRP-MILF peace negotiations; and (3) Post-9/11 terrorism and counterterrorism on the Moro front.

Before discussing this current form of evolution, however, it would be instructive to discuss ***certain themes in the evolution of the contemporary Moro conflict which cut across the various periods from the formative years to the current years.*** Among these are standard bearer, main demand or aspiration, forms of struggle and features, and main GRP policy responses. In the process, also discussed are international influences and other contributory factors **[Box 2.2].**

Moro standard bearer

The main standard bearer of the contemporary Moro armed struggle, at least from 1972 to 1996, has been the ***Moro National Liberation Front*** (MNLF). The MNLF was founded in 1969 by its long-time Chairman ***Nur Misuari*** as an instrument for the liberation of the Moro nation "from the terror,

Box 2.1 Historical roots of the Moro struggle: The Lanao perspective[1]

Scholars of Philippine history are unanimous in their account of the Moro people being the most dominant and advanced groups all over the Philippine archipelago before the arrival of the Spanish colonizers. They dominated both local and international economy, particularly trade, and possessed the most advanced technology of that period, which enabled them to produce surplus and engage in foreign trade. In politics, they had the most organized and centralized form of government, albeit feudal. The Sultanates as a political organization already existed in 1450 A.D.

Furthermore, two Bangsamoro "nation-states" existed before colonizers arrived in the archipelago. The Sulu and the Maguindanao Sultanates had, by the time of Spaniard's arrival, already perfected the requisites of nationhood, namely, territory, people, government, and sovereignty. And in the history of the Bangsamoro Sultanate, citizens included the non-Moro.

The Maranaos of Lanao del Sur and Marawi City share the same collective psyche with the rest of the Moros in Mindanao in their view of the historical injustice or holocaust inflicted by the Spanish and American colonialists and the Philippine Republic.

Spanish Colonial Period (1567-1898) The Spanish invasion of the Lanao region started with a recollect mission at Bayug, near present-day Iligan City in 1637. From this location they launched an invasion of the lake basin in 1639 but when they failed to subjugate the Moros, they retreated and built a fort to block Muslim fighters to the bay of Panguil (now Iligan Bay) (Majul, 1973:140-142). Because the Spaniards were aided by their Christian Filipino (Indio) allies, the campaign solidified a deadly Muslim-Christian antagonism in the region, and established the Christian "indios" as representatives of the colonial invaders.

For 200 years, the Lanao Muslim kept on resisting the Spaniards even as Muslim power disintegrated elsewhere in Mindanao. There was little interaction across the boundary between Muslim and Christian groups, and the small number of transactions that took place were usually facilitated by third parties, normally by the Chinese. The Spaniards finally succeeded in building and holding a fort in the lake area only after heavy campaigning in 1851-1895. Still the Muslims kept the fort under constant desultory siege [Majul, 1973:312-14].

American Colonial Period (1898-1946) According to Peter Gowing [1977:84], the initial American policies in Lanao closely paralleled those of the late Spanish regime, although American officials were more concerned with impressing the Maranao with their concern for the "personal welfare and material prosperity' of the indigenes. The American policies reflected both objectives of military control and pacification. Along with the military subjugation of the area, roads were opened on the coast to entice Maranao contact with the pacified Christian population (Philippine Commission, 1901:36). While administrative separation of the Muslim and Christian spheres was maintained, the territorial boundary between the two groups was breached.

Commonwealth Period and the Philippine Republic (1946 -) Among the Muslims in the Philippines, the Maranaos were the most critical of the commonwealth government. They criticized of the government's emphasis to develop Mindanao for the benefit of the country, the assignment to the province of officials with no experience or little knowledge of Maranao culture, the Military Training Act which required a quota of young men to undergo military training outside of their province, especially if they had to serve under Christian Filipino officers. Moreover, they were hostile to government tax collection campaigns, and indifferent to the incentives given in order to increase school attendance. The increasing number of Christian settlers who farmed traditional lands, held offices, and dominated the educational system infuriated the Maranao who felt their ancient legacies were being undermined. The dissatisfaction sparked several confrontations with government forces occurred [Dansalan Quarterly Vol. III/3 (1982); Vol. VI, 1984].

This period marked the dramatic political and economic dislocation of the Muslims. During the commonwealth, but more so during the post-war decades, the influx of thousands of migrant families affected large parts of Muslim areas especially in Cotabato and Lanao. In the Kapatagan basin in the western part of what is today Lanao del Norte, for instance, the number of Christian families increased to 8,000 in 1941. By 1960 there were some 93, 0000 Christians. This greatly outnumbered the 7,000 Maranaos still living in the area, resulting in 1959 in the political division of the Lanao Province into two—Lanao del Norte dominated by Christians, and Lanao del Sur by Muslims. The Maranao found themselves a minority in areas they once dominated.

The Muslims resented the loss of their lands, including those idle but which formed part of their traditional community. This resentment grew as Muslims witnessed the usurpation by Christian settlers of vast tract of prime lands. This ignited disputes between them and the Christian settlers. The question on land ownership and land disputes between Muslims and Christians was crucial during the post-war period. Journalist T.J.S George describes the intensity of such disputes, thus:

"...Virtually every incident sprouted from land disputes, religions only lending intensity to them. After migration gained momentum, the disputes multiplied in thousands. In one month in 1962, the Commission on National Integration listed cases involving 20,000 hectares valued at P20 million…More often than not, these cases went against Muslims as they were decided under Philippine laws [Dansalan Quarterly Vol. III/3 (1982); Vol. VI, 1984].

[1] Taken from Busran-Lao, 2005. See references for Chapter 1

oppression and tyranny of Filipino colonialism" and "to secure a free and independent state for the Bangsa Moro people." Born of the ***Jabidah massacre*** of March 1968 **[Box 2.3]**, the MNLF led the armed resistance in Mindanao against the Marcos martial law regime and was the main vehicle for placing the Moro cause on the national and international agenda. The MNLF's lasting contribution has been to make the name "Moro" respectable and the basis of a common identity and consciousness for 13 disparate ethno-linguistic groups of Muslims in their historical homeland of Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan (or Minsupala). In practice, the MNLF tended to project the nationalist (national self-determination) and territorial (homeland) dimension more than the Islamic one.

The MNLF was and continues to be recognized as "the sole legitimate representative of Muslims in

Box 2.2 Periods and themes in the evolution of the armed conflict on the Moro front

	Formative years (1968-72)	Early martial law and Moro war of liberation (1972-75)	1st Peace negotiations and Tripoli Agreement (1975-77)	Rest of Marcos regime (1977-86)	Aquino administration (1986-92)	Ramos (1992-98)	Recent years (1998-2004)
Moro Groups (* Standard Bearer)	MIM (1968) MNLF(1969)* BMLO (1970)	MNLF*	MNLF* (Split: "New MNLF Leadership", 1977)	MNLF* (Split: MNLF—RG, 1982, MILF, 1984) BMLO (re-emergence)	MNLF* MILF ASG (1991)	MNLF* MILF ASG	MILF* MNLF (4 Factions) ASG Factions
Main Demand or Aspiration	Independence	Independence	Autonomy under the 1976 Tripoli Agreement (TA)	Independence / Implementation of TA	Independence / Implementation of TA	Autonomy under the 1996 Peace Agreement (PA)	Independent Islamic State (MILF & ASG) Implementation of 1996 PA (MNLF)
Main Policy Response	Triggering Events	Martial Law and Military Campaigns	OIC/OPEC Diplomacy & Peace Negotiations	Divide & Rule Cooptation & Coercion	1987 Phil. Constitution & RA 6734 for ARMM; "Multilateral Consensus—Building Approach"	Comprehensive Peace Process & "Six Paths to Peace" (EO 125)	"Military Victory" Position and "Pacification & Demobilization" Position; RA 9054 for New ARMM
Forms of Struggle (ranked)	Preparations for Armed Struggle	1. Armed Struggle 2. Islamic Diplomacy	1. Peace Talks w/ OIC 2. Islamic Diplomacy	1. Islamic Diplomacy 2. Armed Struggle	1. Islamic Diplomacy 2. Armed Struggle 3. Peace Talks w/o OIC	1. Peace Negos. w/ OIC 2. Islamic Diplomacy	Both Peace Negotiations and Armed Struggle
Main Features of Armed Struggle	"Ilagas" vs. "Barracudas"	Conventional & Positional Warfare	Reduction (1975) & Ceasefire (1977)	Guerrilla Warfare (MNLF) Military Build-up (MILF)	Guerrilla Warfare (MNLF) Initial Salvoes (MILF)	Cease-fire w/ MNLF; Acts of Terrorism by ASG	Cease-fire & Hostilities, Semi- Conventional to Guerrilla Mode (MILF); More & Bigger Acts of Terrorism by ASG

Box 2.3 Contemporary causes: The Jabidah massacre and the Ilaga

Among the foundational causes cited by Dr. Macapado Muslim (1994), two in particular aggravated the marginalization and unrest of the Muslim communities in the 1960s and triggered the contemporary Bangsamoro armed struggle.

1. The "Jabidah" or Corregidor massacre on March 17, 1968. At least 28 young Muslim recruits in the Philippine Army (PA) were killed by their Christian superiors on the island of Corregidor, triggering outrage at the local, national, and international levels. It also became a turning point in the political careers of the politically awakened Moro youth, including Nur Misuari and others in Metro Manila universities, leading to the formation of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). To many Moros, the acquittal of all the accused military officers involved in the massacre signalled the government's low regard for Muslim lives.

2. The subsequent massacres of Muslims and the burning of their homes and mosques by Chistian vigilante groups, particularly the Ilaga, and some units of the military from 1970-1972. The Ilaga, the most notorious among the Christian vigilante groups, was reported to have been organized by seven local Christian politicians ("Magnificent Seven") and supported by influential Christian capitalists and logging magnates. The Ilaga was the most feared by many Muslims because of what its members did to their victims (carving out ears, slashing nipples, plucking out eyes, and marking bodies with crosses).

Ilaga atrocities started in Muslim villages of the then two Cotabato provinces (North Cotabato and South Cotabato), then spread to the province of Lanao del Sur, particularly the municipality of Wao (one of the centers of Christian Filipino migration), and to several Muslim towns in Lanao del Norte, Bukidnon and Zamboanga del Sur. For two years, practically all Muslim areas in Mindanao were under siege by the Ilaga.

Ilaga atrocities included the massacre of 70 Muslims and the wounding of 17 others inside a mosque and a nearby school in the barrio of Manili in Carmen, North Cotabato, on June 19, 1971. There were several more incidents like the Manili massacre but the government's failure to stop these led many Muslims (including some government officials) to believe that the military was involved. In fact, many Muslims believed that the Ilaga members were actually government soldiers made to appear as Christian civilian armed elements.

Simultaneous with the reported Ilaga atrocities were the massacres of Muslims reportedly by units of the Philippine Constabulary and the Philippine Army. They also happened in many areas where the Ilaga operated, like the Muslim towns in Cotabato and Lanao del Norte, and likewise went unpunished. Among such incidents were the January 19, 1971, massacre of 73 Muslims in Alamada, North Cotabato, and the November 22, 1971, massacre of 37 Muslims in Barrio Tacub, Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. An additional 22 Muslims were wounded and 140 reported missing in the second incident.

Ilaga atrocities against the Muslims and the military converted several Muslim areas into "killing fields," while the rest were used as evacuation centers. The Muslims in these areas and those of neighboring towns were forced to leave their farms and homes, many of which were subsequently looted and occupied by Christians. Muslim lawyer-delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention listed, among the Muslim areas vacated, burned and occupied or to be occupied by incoming Christian settlers the municipalities of Alamada in North Cotabato; Upi and Ampatuan in Maguindanao; Bagumbayan, Isulan, Columbio, and Palembang in Sultan Kudarat province; and Wao, Lanao del Sur. Also targeted were all Muslims along the national highway in Lanao del Norte, a distance of over 100 kilometers; all Muslims living in several municipalities along the National Highway and in several small villages along the seacoast of Zamboanga del Sur; and all Muslims living in several municipalities in Bukidnon.

The Ilaga and military atrocities had a strong radicalizing effect on the Moro masses, even in areas where the Ilaga had not operated like Sulu, Basilan, and Tawi-Tawi. Muslim residents outside the centers of atrocities felt the gravity of the situation as thousands of evacuees flooded their areas. As more atrocities plagued Muslim areas in 1971 (especially in the few months preceding the November 1971 election), village-level self-defense units started to develop, especially in Mainland Mindanao where the Ilaga depredations were spreading.

How the Ilaga brutalities and military attacks emotionally touched many Muslims is illustrated by an interviewee of Dr. Muslim in Cotabato. The interviewee traced the beginning of his involvement in the contemporary struggle to the massacre of some 70 Muslims in Manili, Carmen, North Cotabato, on June 19, 1971. Then a government employee, he went to the area on hearing of the incident, and saw the bodies of the victims, mostly old men, women, and children. What touched him most, however, was the sight of a little girl among the few who survived sucking the breast of her dead mother. Right there, he made the decision to help fight the Ilaga and the government. After helping haul the bodies and before going home, he bought big quantities of rice, salt and other basic food items which his family would require while he was away. He and his relatives were among the small and isolated armed groups that resisted the Ilaga and the military in Cotabato during the pre-martial-law period. And as the violence escalated after the declaration of martial law, he joined the then-fledgling MNLF. Until now, he is a mujahideen.

This mujahideen did not have relatives among the Manili massacre victims. But if he was moved, how much more the children, siblings and parents of these and other victims. This is one reason why the MNLF did not find difficulty recruiting men and women when it began to assume leadership of the Moro resistance.

Taken from Busran-Lao, 2005

Southern Philippines (Bangsamoro people)" by the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and is the signatory party to the ***1976 Tripoli Agreement*** and ***1996 Jakarta Accord*** to address, if not solve, "the Question of Muslims in Southern Philippines." Following the Jakarta Accord, the MNLF has been at the helm of the regional government of the ARMM.

In 1977, the failure of negotiations on the implementation of the Tripoli Agreement (discussed below) led to a split in the MNLF. Misuari, in response to the failure, wanted to revert to armed struggle for independence, but his Vice-Chairman ***Salamat Hashim*** was for exhausting the peace process for autonomy under the Tripoli Agreement. Hashim's group officially declared itself a separate organization in March 1984, calling itself the ***Moro Islamic Liberation Front***. ***The split, which would shape the later course of the Mindanao conflict and peace process,*** was based on differences not only in political strategy (armed struggle vs. peace negotiations) and objectives (independence vs. autonomy) but also more fundamentally in ideological orientation (secular-nationalist vs. Islamic revivalist), leadership styles (centralized vs. consultative), and ethnic allegiances (Tausug vs. Maguindanao), reflecting the respective spheres of the historical Sulu and Maguindanao sultanates, respectively. At least since the advent of the Estrada administration in 1998, the MILF has been the main standard bearer of Moro aspirations, stated by the Second Bangsamoro People's Consultative Assembly as "an Islamic ideological paradigm …the framework of our vision to establish a new nation in fulfillment of the quest to reassert our right to self-determination and freedom."

MNLF fragmentation continued in March-June 1982 with the emergence of the Maranao-based MNLF-Reformist Group (MNLF-RG) and the re-emergence (after the breakdown of the Tripoli Agreement) of the Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization (BMLO). Both groups died natural deaths in the mid-1980s, however, marking the definitive passing away of the traditional Muslim elite leadership over the Moro struggle.

In fact, Bangsamoro generational change has been a critical variable in the whole Mindanao conflict and peace process, and "the upcoming generation will be the most influenced by the unfolding international tendencies in the Muslim world." The ***Abu Sayyaf*** group was formed mainly by ***Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani*** in Western Mindanao in 1991 after being exposed to radical Islamism abroad and particularly the *jihad* against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. They represent a younger and more radical Bangsamoro generation disgruntled with the MNLF leadership. They have wanted an independent Islamic state for the whole of Mindanao and use extremist, terrorist methods against Christian civilians—thus ***antedating "9/11" by at least one decade.*** How the Bangsamoro successor generation "relates to the existing configuration of MNLF, MILF, and Abu Sayyaf options, or whether it will develop new options of their own, is an unknown quantity of great importance."

Main demand or aspiration

The main demand or aspiration represented by the two Moro liberation fronts since 1968 has alternated between *independence* and *autonomy*. In the current conjuncture, the MILF represents the "independence track" for the Moros while the MNLF represents the "autonomy track."

From the 1968 Jabidah massacre up until 1976, independence was the agenda of the new Moro movement. The ***Tripoli Agreement*** of December 23, 1976, mediated by the OIC, changed the dispute issue from independence to autonomy, and is ***the most significant juncture in the evolution of the GRP-MNLF peace process.*** It became the main term of reference between the GRP and the MNLF for the next 20 years and led to autonomy for the Muslims in the Southern Philippines within Philippine sovereignty and territorial integrity. Thirteen provinces and all the cities and villages therein would be covered but these would be subject to a plebiscite among the

people there. Foreign policy, national defense, and mines and mineral resources would be under the central government but nine substantive issues would be tabled for later discussion and detailed in a final agreement. A provisional government appointed by the President was to be established. The GRP was to take all necessary constitutional processes to implement the agreement.

The implementation of the Tripoli Agreement was immediately problematic. In March 1977, Marcos issued Proclamation 1628, creating two regional autonomous governments—thereby dividing into two groupings and reducing by three the 13 provinces under the Tripoli Agreement—and then subjecting this to a plebiscite in April. The MNLF rejected this new arrangement, leading to a breakdown in the peace talks, the cease-fire and the autonomy process. Tempered by diplomatic support from the OIC, however, the trajectory of the MNLF was still to push for the Tripoli Agreement's implementation.

The eventual ouster of Marcos in 1986 and the assumption of Corazon C. Aquino to the presidency led to a cease-fire, a resumption of peace negotiations, and the ***Jeddah Accord*** of January 1987. The accord actually deviated from the Tripoli Agreement by entertaining an MNLF proposal for full autonomy to Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Palawan (23 provinces all in all) "subject to democratic processes." However, the accord was overtaken in February 1987 by the ratification of the ***1987 Philippine Constitution***, which had provisions for an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao "within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty, as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines." This had the most strategic and far-reaching consequences, for better or for worse, on the Mindanao peace and autonomy process because certain parameters for the autonomous region were now embedded in the fundamental law of the land. Again, the MNLF rejected it for having no part in its formulation. It unsuccessfully suggested the suspension of the plebiscite as far as the proposed constitutional provisions on autonomous regions were concerned.

Under the Ramos administration the GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement or ***Jakarta Accord*** was signed on September 2, 1996. This was deemed as the final and full implementation of the Tripoli Agreement although, again, it was a deviation. In lieu of the MNLF-desired provisional government, it conceptualized a transitional implementing structure and mechanism: Phase 1, three-year extendible transitional Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) to give the MNLF the chance to prove itself over a now 14-province Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD); Phase 2, congressional action and a plebiscite on a new organic act incorporating the Peace Agreement on the substance of autonomy (to replace that of the existing ARMM); and the operation of the new Regional Autonomous Government. In the meantime, a GRP offer *outside* of the formula was accepted by the MNLF for an alliance with the ruling party, enabling the MNLF to gain control over the existing ARMM through elections held immediately after in September 1996.

The MILF found the latter agreement wanting. Not only was it a deviation from the framework of the Tripoli Agreement; it was not a solution to the Bangsamoro problem. In elaborating on this single talking point for its peace talks with the GRP, the MILF said "Finding a *political* and lasting solution to this problem will form part of the agenda in the forthcoming formal talks between the GRP and the MILF panels, *with the end in view of establishing a system of life and governance suitable and acceptable to the Bangsamoro people*." (italics supplied).

It is no secret that the ***maximum objective of the MILF is an independent Islamic state,*** although this is not presented as its position in the current peace talks (as the GRP would clearly not negotiate on this as a starting point). The MILF would leave it to the Bangsamoro people to be the final arbiter for acceptance of a suitable system or political solution.

Forms of struggle and main features of the armed conflict

The MNLF has waged three forms of struggle that would alternate in primacy during the various periods of the Moro conflict: **armed struggle, Islamic diplomacy,** and **peace negotiations.** These same forms would be used by the MILF during its turn as Moro standard bearer.

Armed struggle

The formative years of the Moro conflict saw depredations by and skirmishes between Christian vigilantes called "Ilagas" (see Box 2.3) and Muslim vigilantes called "Barracudas" and "Blackshirts." The series of Ilaga and military atrocities against Muslims in Mindanao from 1970 to 1972 caught international attention and raised concern in the Muslim world, especially when reported as acts of genocide. One particular BBC radio broadcast on the Manili massacre of 1971 drew the interest of Libyan leader Colonel Muammar al Ghadaffi. In March 1972, the OIC took official notice of the matter and in a resolution at the 3rd ICFM in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, it expressed "serious concern for the plight of Muslims living in the Philippines."

It would take President Marcos's martial-law proclamation in September 1972 to bring out the MNLF in open rebellion. An early thrust of martial law was the collection and confiscation of firearms from civilians, which, in the context of the two previous years of Ilaga and military atrocities, could only spark Muslim resistance. Exactly a month after martial law was declared, some MNLF Maranao forces (without the official go-ahead of the Central Committee) led an attack on GRP forces in Marawi City in Lanao del Sur, the so-called ***Marawi Uprising***. The "Moro war of liberation" then officially began in Misuari's Tausug heartland, Jolo Island, in November 1972. The Jolo offensive was followed by another in the Maguindanao heartland of Cotabato in Central Mindanao in February 1973.

To counter the MNLF offensive, President Marcos created the Central Mindanao Command (CEMCOM) of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The fighting that ensued was considered the ***most serious threat to the security of the state,*** with the MNLF displaying all the earmarks of a military operation by an organized army, giving residents of Cotabato City a taste of war on their front steps. This was followed by another major MNLF assault on Jolo in February 1974, leading to the bloodiest battle between the MNLF and the AFP.

The Jolo and Cotabato battles were just the milestones among many battles in the "New Moro

Box 2.4 Counting costs of the protracted war in Southern Philippines 1969-1996

For the 7-year period from 1969 to 1976, Dr. Inamullah Khan, secretary-general of the World Muslim Congress, estimated the human costs of the conflict on the Moro front as follows:

Area	Dead	Wounded	Displaced
Cotabato	20,000	8,000	100,000
Lanao	10,000	20,000	70,000
Sulu, Tawi-Tawi	10,000	8,000	100,000
Zamboanga	10,000	10,000	40,000
Basilan	10,000	8,000	40,000
TOTAL	**60,000**	**54,000**	**350,000**

Loss of property was also estimated at between P300 million and P500 million.[1]

[1]Che Man, *Muslim Separatism* 114, citing Inamullah Khan, "The Situation in the Philippines" (typescript, 1979); Parouk Hussin, "The Marcos Regime Campaign of Genocide" in Komite ng Sambayanang Pilipino, *Philippines: Repression and Resistance* (Utrecht, The Netherlands: Komite ng Sambayanang Pilipino, 1981) 257-60; and Felipe B. Miranda, "The Military" in R.J. May and Francisco Nemenzo (eds.), *The Philippines After Marcos* (London: Croom Helm, 1985).

War." The AFP mounted counteroffensives with a series of major military operations, from "Operation Sibalo" to "Operation Bagsik." The ***mainly conventional and positional war*** in 1973-74 saw the bloodiest fighting in the Philippines since World War II. It reached its peak and a stalemate in 1975. The veritable civil war also saw the worst violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by both sides **[Box 2.4].**

Islamic diplomacy and peace negotiations

No longer able to ignore the situation, the OIC in June 1974 urged the GRP to enter into peace negotiations with the MNLF. This signaled a new arena of struggle and Islamic diplomacy**,** with the OIC as the object of a diplomatic contest between the GRP and MNLF. In fact, after the 5th ICFM resolution in 1974, the contest was ***more diplomatic than military.*** Fighting had tapered off by 1975, and more so with the cease-fire in 1977. By the late 1970s, war tactics shifted to lower-intensity guerrilla and counterguerrilla mode.

Even before the OIC official involvement, however, the MNLF was approaching leaders of Muslim countries for support. The GRP would play catch-up, deploying its Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) in what is perhaps the best evidence of the internationalization of the conflict.

Islamic diplomatic (and petroleum) pressure and the military stalemate led to peace negotiations between the GRP and the MNLF, another form of struggle. As described earlier, peace negotiations under Marcos were held from 1975 to 1977 featuring the Tripoli Agreement; under Aquino in 1986 and 1987 leading to the Jeddah Accord, and under Ramos from 1992 to 1996 resulting in the Jakarta Accord. In between negotiations, there was a "no war, no peace" situation, with occasional resumption of hostilities notwithstanding cease-fire agreements during each episode, especially under Marcos. While there were no negotiations, the conflict would be played out in the diplomatic circuit and to a lesser extent in the military field. OIC resolutions would almost perfunctorily call for further negotiations on and implementation of the Tripoli Agreement.

The short-lived 1977 cease-fire arising from the Tripoli Agreement validated the military stalemate and hostilities would resume with the breakdown in the post-Tripoli talks. Particularly bloody episodes such as the Patikul massacre in October 1977 wiped out Brig. Gen. Teodulfo Bautista and his men, and the Pata incident in February 1981, left 2,000 civilian casualties in the familiar pattern of massacre and counter-massacre.

A new situation for questions of war and peace between the GRP and the two Moro liberation fronts ensued with the February 1986 EDSA "People Power Revolution." This was dramatically illustrated by a protocol-breaking meeting between the new President Aquino and MNLF Chairman Misuari held in Jolo in September 1986 (which resulted in the Jeddah Accord). Soon thereafter, the MILF launched a five-day tactical offensive (the "MILF 5-Day War") leading to its own truce and meetings with President Aquino. Thus the MILF successfully conveyed the message that "it was not a pushover organization, but a power to reckon with."

Even as it had just clinched the final peace agreement with the MNLF in 1996, the Ramos administration pursued peace talks with the MILF, which led to a general cease-fire agreement in July 1997. Nonetheless, a pattern of recurrent hostilities started such as in Buldon in January 1997 and in Rajamuda in June 1997. There were also hostilities with the Abu Sayyaf, which surfaced towards the end of the Aquino administration. The Abu Sayyaf and the Islamic Command Council (ICC) breakaway group from the MNLF, made their presence strongly felt with the raid of Ipil town in the Zamboanga peninsula in April 1995, killing more than 50 people, looting banks, and burning almost all buildings in the town center.

Main GRP responses

The GRP response or approach to Moro unrest has, through the years, been characterized by **military counteroffensives** on the one hand, and ***rehabilitation, reconstruction*** and ***development*** interventions on the other. A good example of this was the policy response in the 1970s when ***Proclamation No. 1081*** of martial law and its ensuing military campaigns were "complemented" by a ***Reconstruction and Development (RAD) Program in Muslim Mindanao*** launched in 1973. The latter failed, however.

GRP responses have also been characterized by ***unilateralism***, especially during the Marcos and Aquino administrations. For example, Marcos's proclamation creating two regional autonomous governments in 1977 represented a unilateral "implementation" of the Tripoli Agreement, lending credence to the observation that Marcos never sincerely intended to implement it as signed. Another major example was the ratification of the ***1987 Philippine Constitution*** with provisions for an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao as the constitutional process for the implementation of the Tripoli Agreement although not in accordance with it. Early on, the Aquino administration had, even more than the Marcos regime, adopted a policy to de-internationalize the MNLF, avoid reference to the Tripoli Agreement and OIC mediation, and discourage negotiations to bide time for a new Congress to be elected and to enact an organic act for the autonomous region in accordance with the new constitutional provisions.

Because the Aquino administration had to deal with a military establishment averse to peace with the Moro (and communist) rebel groups, it shifted to a new strategy called the ***"multilateral consensus-building approach"*** which downgraded bilateral negotiations with rebel groups. One form this took was the multisectoral Mindanao Regional Consultative Commission (March-September 1988), which was, however, subjected to meddling from the executive department. In the end, many of the provisions it drafted for the organic act did not find their way into the final law (RA 6734, the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao). In the November 1989 plebiscite, only four out of the 13 provinces listed in the Tripoli Agreement voted to join the ARMM.

The multilateral consensus-building approach was carried on by the Ramos administration that created the National Unification Commission (NUC) in September 1992. Nationwide consultations conducted by the NUC, especially at the provincial then the regional levels up to May 1993, were the basis of its recommendations for a subsequent comprehensive peace process. The core of this was the "***Six Paths to Peace***" framework, eventually institutionalized through ***Executive Order No. 125*** in September 1993. The third path was "peaceful, negotiated settlement with the different rebel groups."

By the time of the current years of the Estrada and Arroyo administrations, ***three competing policy positions*** had crystallized. In the analysis of Dr. Paul Oquist of UNDP, these three competing positions existed across the years in Filipino society, in the governments, in the armed forces, and in civil society at the Bangsamoro, Mindanao and national levels. The three positions are: "***pacification and demobilization,***" consisting of negotiating concessions necessary to achieve the cessation of hostilities and demobilization of rebel combatants; "***military victory,***" advocating the military defeat of the MILF and NPA, the political defeat or marginalization of the MNLF, and the extermination of the Abu Sayyaf and other terrorist and kidnap-for-ransom groups; and the "***institutional peace-building***" position advocating the short-, medium- and long-term construction of policies and institutions for peace in the economic, social, political, cultural, and ecological spheres through participatory and consultative mechanisms.

These positions have combined in different proportions, especially the first two positions. For instance, ***Executive Order No. 3*** of February 2001 defining government policy for comprehensive peace efforts, might look like an "institutional peace-

building" position on paper but in practice—by the GRP peace negotiators and by the Cabinet Oversight Committee on Internal Security (COC-IS) under ***Executive Order No. 21*** of June 2001—it has been the "pacification and demobilization" and sometimes the "military victory" positions. All three of the competing positions are at play in the Mindanao peace process and they all have significant sources of support in civil society and government. None of these stakeholders, including the AFP and the MILF, are monolithic in relation to these positions.

The relative influence of these positions has varied dynamically across time, and shifts have occurred not only from one administration to the another but also within one administration. Perhaps the best example of this in relation to the MILF front was the shift from the "all-out war" policy of President Estrada in 2000 to the "all-out peace" policy of President Arroyo in 2001, and then back again to an "all-out war" policy in 2002-03.

All told, there has been no policy consensus, coherence and consistency from the GRP side. Thus, the "extreme protraction of the peace process" —just about as protracted as the protracted people's wars themselves.

Three tracks in the current evolution of the GRP-Moro conflict

Three tracks comprise the current form of the armed conflict on the Moro front: (1) implementation of the GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement; (2) GRP-MILF peace negotiations; and (3) Post-9/11 terrorism and counterterrorism on the Moro front.

Implementation of the GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement (1996-present)

This might be referred to simply as the ***"MNLF track."*** It represents a Moro stream of **integration** into the Philippine political and economic mainstream. Although the established autonomy for the Muslims in the Southern Philippines is a limited one, there are still gains for the Bangsamoro people—in terms of recognition, representation, participation, access and power-sharing—from the final peace agreement and its implementation. The MNLF has adopted the path of "Liberation through Peace and Development," away from armed struggle. It has basically demobilized from combatant mode but has not disarmed, an arrangement mutually acceptable to both sides. With the MNLF integration of about 7,250 MNLF members into both the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP), or at least half of whatever force strength it had, one can say that the MNLF has been substantially defanged. Not completely, though, because some fighters, a lot of arms and a mass base still remain. The MNLF counts some 80,000 ex-combatants.

For two successive terms from 1996 to the present, the MNLF has been at the helm of the regional government of the ARMM. Some MNLF leaders have also successfully run for local government positions but not yet successfully for national positions. Invariably, they have found out that it is harder to run a government than to rebel against it. For some time, they were also at the helm of special regional development bodies like the SPCPD and the Southern Philippines Development Authority (SPDA) until these were abolished. At the ground level, some MNLF mass base communities have become "peace and development communities" benefiting from livelihood, cooperative and other projects, with main funding support from international and foreign development organizations.

However, the MNLF feels that the peace process particularly Phase 1, is being concluded unilaterally by the GRP without satisfactorily implementing important socioeconomic development requirements, including a verbal commitment to a so-called "Mini-Marshall Plan" for the SZOPAD. The MNLF blames the GRP for not providing the resources for this component, in the face of the economic needs of its ex-combatants, not to mention the non-MNLF poor in their areas **[Box 2.5].** As for Phase 2, which was signaled by ***R.A. 9054, New Organic Act for the ARMM***, the MNLF sees this as violating or not including aspects of the peace agreement, such as that

Box 2.5 Official Development Assistance (ODA) in Mindanao: A view from the communities

1. ODA in Mindanao. The 2002 MEDCO ODA update states that ODA programs and projects "continue to strengthen Mindanao's drive towards economic development and poverty alleviation by meeting the island's infrastructure requirements and ensuring effective governance."

It lists 24 ongoing projects exclusively for Mindanao, worth US$964.9 million. Among them are the World Bank-assisted Mindanao Rural Development Project (MRDP), aimed at increasing agricultural production, efficiency and diversification of rural economic activities, and the Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) Social Fund, now the ARMM Social Fund (ASF) Program.

The MEDCO update also cites a NEDA-PIS report indicating that the total estimated value of ODA commitments and pipeline projects in Mindanao reached US$ 261.2 million and US$816.7 million.

2. Issues on the Impact of ODA Projects. While a more systematic discourse on the impact of ODA-assisted programs and projects is needed, some questions are being raised by community-based organizations and advocacy networks.

2.1 Are people's realities counted? As part of a comprehensive package of political, economic and cultural reforms, projects are supposed to boost confidence and trust in the peace process among peace stakeholders, whether armed or unarmed. Participation of the broader populace in these projects is thus an essential to achieving goals beyond the material gains resulting from these projects.

In September 1999, the CO Multiversity completed an External Monitoring and Assessment of the SZOPAD Social Fund (SSF) to explore local stakeholders' perspectives on projects implemented up to August 1999. Most of the findings point to the need to make the projects more participatory, relevant and needs-based. Some findings:

- On knowledge of the SSF: There was an uneven response from the nonbeneficiaries of the SSF projects in terms of knowledge and information. Except for the Maguindanao and Cotabato areas, little information about the SSF reached them. Most nonbeneficiaries understood that this was an MNLF project and therefore only MNLF members were qualified to benefit. Thirty percent of respondents said the MNLF members who benefited from the SSF were younger ones who did not participate in the long struggle and that those who were in the revolution remained poor, unable to get a share of the peace dividend.
- On project appraisal: The project proponents tended to be the family or close connections of the state chairs and/or the zone commanders because, initially, information and proposals were coursed through these two institutions. According to the SSF, however, this was necessary since the mandate of the Fund was to fast-track the delivery of assistance. As a consequence, people were barely consulted.
- Still, based on the simple information that SSF was supporting small infrastructure projects, there was a deluge of proposals from different parts of ARMM. These were of uneven quality, both in type and proponent organization, however. Organizations thus had a hard time complying with requirements; some projects did not benefit the community, but only a few who were close to the project proponents or managers.
- On project implementation: Due to the lack of people's participation in project design and construction, there was very little ownership of projects and most respondents were unclear about their participation, say, in the maintenance of the subprojects. This is especially true for the madrasah buildings whose ownership was sometimes unclear and maintenance was thus not guaranteed. Facilities such as solar dryers and warehouses were sometimes found idle and/or limited in use to the project proponents and managers.
- Lack of women's participation in the design and decision-making of the projects was evident in all areas visited.

As a result of that study, the second phase of the SZOPAD Fund contracted the services of NGOs to help undertake capacity-building interventions for six months for communities which had received projects. The timing of these interventions was rather late, however, as it came on the heels of an implemented project.

The third phase of the UN Multi-Donor Programme seems to have discovered a workable formula for ensuring people's participation. *Peace and Development Communities* (PDCs) are the focal point of the Programme's intervention and appear to be the most important innovation in mobilizing all stakeholders.

2.2 How much of ODA funds really reach communities? The visibility of expatriates sent in as consultants and technical experts for ODA-assisted programs raises the question of how much ODA funds reach communities and how much are ploughed back to donor countries. The Institute of Philippine Culture research entitled "Reforming Technical Cooperation: the Philippine Experience" devotes a section describing the consultancy mechanisms in the technical assistance projects funded through ODAs.

The study identified the role of Filipino professionals as consultants, either as members or partners in local consulting firms; individuals directly hired by government (Philippine or foreign, national or local), business firms, or multilateral or bilateral aid agencies; or professionals hired by a local or foreign consulting company that has won the bid for a project.

It is a common practice, though, for bilateral organizations to tap their nationals (individuals or firms) as principal consultants who may then partner with a local consultant or consulting firm. However, the rates for Filipino consultants are lower than those of the expatriates, and when local consultants are subcontracted by foreign or international consulting firms, task assignments include field or leg work and downstream activities. Local consultants thus complain about being overworked and doing bulk of the work.

Whether or not ODA funds are used judiciously, one can compare the rates of consultants and technical experts and the cost of a barangay power project. It cost the Iranun Farmers' Association of Brgy. Bayanga Norte in Matanog, Maguindanao, about P40,000 to install a barangay electrification cooperative in its village within the defense perimeter of Camp Abubakar. This is equivalent to approximately half of the monthly salary of a field program manager and a quarter of the monthly rate of a regional manager. Over two years, therefore, the opportunity cost of consultant fees in terms of POs that would have been able to install their own power systems is staggering. In Brgy. Mataya, Buldon of the same province, the same amount was used to build a multipurpose center which now serves as the nucleus of the ongoing peace dialogues and conflict mediation processes.

NGOs who work with some US-based donors also experienced having to agree, as part of the terms of reference, to purchase US-made or US-branded equipment. Again, the question: whose economy are these projects boosting?

Another approach and tool is the Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA), advocated by the Local Government Support Program (LGSP)[6] and The Asia Foundation (TAF)[7]. Peace zone communities in Maguindanao and Lanao Sur are learning that development does not always bring peace and, in many instances, even exacerbated the causes of conflict. In one instance, a community project for animal raising was scrapped because the need to select only a few beneficiaries was potentially very divisive among residents. In its place, a water system, envisioned to be more unifying and beneficial to majority of the people, was selected.

As most institutions have found, an integrated perspective and approach is an imperative to finding just and lasting solutions to the situation in Mindanao. The question is: how many of the ODA-assisted projects are ready to find precious time to undertake development work at the pace of peace?

Taken from *Putting the Money Where the Mouth Is: ODA in Mindanao, A View from the Communities* by Marides Gardiola. Background paper for the PHDR 2005

on strategic minerals. They view the new, expanded ARMM (with Basilan and Marawi City added) as too weak to address even basic human development needs. All told, there is a general sense in the MNLF of its being marginalized from participation in the peace process, including some leaders who feel they are being cut off or undercut by the GRP. These frustrations were at the backdrop of the outbreak of hostilities between Misuari and GRP forces in Sulu and Zamboanga in November 2001 and again in Sulu in February 2005.

The MNLF is now split into four factions, the two main factions being the Misuari group and the anti-Misuari "Council of 15." An MNLF unity process is, however, under way with support from Libya. Because of the MNLF split and leadership crisis, there has arisen in the OIC the question of representation of the MNLF as observer there. Parallel to this, the GRP has made a bid to replace the MNLF as observer on the basis mainly of the elected ARMM government representing the Muslims in Mindanao. The sense in the OIC seems to be to close the chapter in due time on the GRP-MNLF peace agreement implementation.

The MNLF has also, perhaps fatally, neglected to maintain or recreate itself as an organization, whether as a politico-military liberation organization or as "a political party and/or civil society movement and/or cooperative movement and/or business group, and preferably all of the above." The pacification scenario for the MNLF seems to have come to pass: concessions, cooptation, divide-and-rule, demobilization and, worse, political defeat or marginalization through its own mismanagement of the ARMM. It may almost be said that they won the war (by stalemating the AFP) but lost the peace.

The February 2005 hostilities in Sulu involving the MNLF Misuari group are, however, a wake-up call for this group which is now, by the number of its forces, more clearly, the real MNLF mainstream. Since in their perception the GRP is "destroying" the Peace Agreement, they now "are back to being MNLF." The Sulu hostilities should also be a wake-up call for the GRP. Contrary to its notions of the Sulu situation "normalizing," there is still a state of war there. For the GRP to treat what it calls the "Misuari Breakaway Group" as "lawless elements" to be destroyed like the Abu Sayyaf is to miss the point, at its own peril, about the real MNLF mainstream which may finally reject the moderate track of the Peace Agreement in favor of a more radical independence track now bannered by the MILF.

A Filipino Muslim scholar has astutely described the complementarity of the two Moro liberation fronts this way: "The MNLF and the MILF are separated ideologically, they are like security guards with shifting schedules. When one takes a nap, the other takes over." For the most part since 1996, while the MNLF has napped (though it has recently awakened), the MILF has taken over.

GRP-MILF peace negotiations (1997-present)

This might be referred to simply as the ***"MILF Track."*** With the unraveling of Misuari, the MNLF, the implementation of the peace agreement and the ARMM, the MILF has emerged as the main standard bearer of Moro aspirations. Its maximum long-term aspiration is an independent Islamic state, with Islam as a way of life and governance in predominantly Muslim areas. This is seen as the ultimate solution to the Bangsamoro problem of Philippine colonialism. The MILF ***tendency is to exit or separate/secede from the Philippine system rather than to access or share power in it.***

This brings the MILF into frontal conflict with the GRP. Besides the constitutional challenge it represents, the MILF is also a formidable military challenge. Though considered only second to the communist-led NPA as a threat to national security, the MILF has an estimated force of more than 12,000 concentrated in Central Mindanao (compared to just under 12,000 for the NPA dispersed nationwide), a force kept intact despite being subjected to two major AFP offensives in

three years, the "all-out war" of 2000 and the "Buliok offensive" of 2003. Before the "all-out war," the MILF had 13 major fixed camps and 33 secondary ones—on which basis it was oriented to semi-conventional warfare, including positional warfare with the AFP. The MILF has since shifted to a more mobile guerrilla mode with base commands still using field camps more remote or hidden than before.

While holding on to the armed struggle option, however, the MILF has made a ***strategic*** (not just tactical like the NDF) ***decision to give the peace negotiations a chance***, even a maximum chance, to achieve a negotiated political settlement or solution to the Bangsamoro problem. It has stayed with the peace negotiations track despite the two "treacherous" AFP offensives while peace negotiations were ongoing. It also agreed to the general mode of a cease-fire accompanying the peace talks (in contrast to the NDF's position of no cease-fire during peace talks until and unless there is a negotiated political settlement.) And the MILF equally treats armed struggle and peace negotiations—"war by other means"—as forms of struggle (unlike the NDF which adheres to the primacy of the former.)

Since 1997, the GRP-MILF peace negotiations have been held in two stages: a "domestic stage" from January 1997 to June 2000 and a "diplomatic stage" with Malaysian mediation from March 2001 to February 2003. The two suspensions, first from June 2000 to March 2001, and second from February 2003 to the present, were the direct results of the "all-out war" and "Buliok offensive." Although the pattern of recurrent hostilities has continued, this appears to have been broken since the mutual cease-fire agreed on in July 2003 (but marred by two firefights in January 2005) and will probably be consolidated with the support of international and civil society mechanisms to monitor the cease-fire.

This security aspect is complemented by rehabilitation and development, in which projects are supposed to be determined and managed by the MILF through its NGO, the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA). The novel idea here is to have a truce not only for negotiations but also for development; and for rehabilitation and development and negotiations to go hand in hand. This approach is supposed to create the right conditions on the ground for when contentious political issues are discussed.

There is some concern, however, about the peace talks falling into the same protracted pattern as experienced with the MNLF (and NDF). Although the MILF agenda "to solve the Bangsamoro problem" was presented early on, there still have been no negotiations on the substantive agenda, starting with ancestral domain. Itself already a complex, difficult, and contentious issue (even only in the context of indigenous peoples rights), ancestral domain is made more so by its possible linkage to territorial (e.g., homeland) and governance (e.g., self-rule) aspects of the Bangsamoro problem. The ancestral domain aspect is not necessarily the last substantive agenda item for the peace talks but it could be, if discussed comprehensively to fast-track a final peace agreement, as the GRP is inclined to do.

Enhancing the nominally MNLF-led ARMM is the GRP's preferred framework for a final peace agreement with the MILF based on power-sharing between the MNLF and MILF, their unity efforts being actually a parallel negotiation. The question is whether this framework will satisfy the MILF. If a "political and lasting solution to this Bangsamoro problem" can be found with "respect for the identity, culture and aspirations of all peoples of Mindanao," then the GRP-MILF peace negotiations can go beyond completing the solution to the Bangsamoro problem; it can also serve as a catalyst for the broader Mindanao peace process and even for the fight against terrorism on the Moro front. One of the bright spots of this process is the growing civil society-led movement for peace in Mindanao, sections of which have consciously adopted the human security framework. Hopefully, the emerging multiple international involvements—Malaysia, Libya, OIC, the US, the UN and other international organizations, some with a human security framework—will facilitate,

rather than complicate, the crucial GRP-MILF peace process.

The alternative, as again highlighted recently by the "all-out war" and the "Buliok offensive," are enormous costs, not only in human security and human development terms but also in economic and business terms.

Post-9/11 terrorism and counterterrorism on the Moro front (2001-present)

Terrorism in the Philippines predated "9/11" by at least one decade through the Abu Sayyaf which prefers to be referred to as *Harakatul al-Islamiya* (Islamic Movement). In a sense, it represents a certain track, that of ***local terrorism in relation to 9/11-type international terrorism.*** After Janjalani's death in 1998, the Abu Sayyaf degenerated from being a movement of young Moro rebels to banditry, with a confluence of Moro, outlaw and Islamic identities. It achieved international notoriety with the Sipadan hostage-taking in April 2000 and the Dos Palmas hostage-taking in May 2001. Both involved the bold kidnappings for ransom of Westerners including Americans, beheadings of civilian hostages and a cross-border foray into Malaysia in the case of Sipadan.

The Abu Sayyaf has been on the US list of "foreign terrorist organizations" for several years now, and was the target of joint US-Philippine "Balikatan 02-1" military exercises in Basilan in February 2002.

There are now several factions of the group though the most recognized leader is Janjalani's younger brother Khaddafy. After the bombing of a SuperFerry passenger ship in February 2004, regional intelligence officials and terrorism experts observed "the group is returning to its Islamic roots and is using the familiar weapons of terror—bombing and assassination—in an attempt to achieve an independent Muslim republic in the southern Philippines…" National Security Adviser [Norberto] Gonzales describes Abu Sayyaf as "by far the most dangerous group in the country today." It claimed responsibility for the Valentine's Day 2005 bombings in three big cities and for the following month's jailbreak in Bicutan which ended with a police siege killing 22 prisoners, only a few of whom were leaders of the jailbreak and of the Abu Sayyaf. Both the MNLF and the MILF have rejected and condemned its methods as "un-Islamic."

Memorandum Order No. 37, issued by President Arroyo in October 2001, provided for a 14-pillar anti-terrorism policy, which emphasized military measures. However, after 9/11, the militarization of the response to terrorism (e.g. Abu Sayyaf) has tended to be carried over to the response to rebellion (e.g., the MILF and the NPA). This approach has in turn tended to disregard human rights, thereby aggravating the problem by creating more terrorists and rebels.

The "global war on terror" has also made the armed conflict on the Moro front more intractable by localizing the "clash of civilizations" through the "terrorist" profiling of Muslims in general and Moros in particular. The negative impact on the Mindanao peace process is, therefore, not only vertical (on the peace negotiations at the top) but also horizontal (on the Christian-Muslim relations at the community level.) There has been a discernible increase in discrimination against Muslims in Mindanao and in other parts of the Philippines.

Many reports, intelligence as well as journalistic, and some evidence indicate Al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah operations in the Philippines, highlighted by the rash of urban terrorist bombings in 2000, and linkages with the MILF and the Abu Sayyaf going several years back. The difference is that these linkages have been renounced by the MILF post-9/11 but not by the Abu Sayyaf. More recently, the MILF has also joined the fight against terrorism.

Military solutions "will only treat the symptom, not the disease…military solutions in counterterrorism should be carefully targeted and efficiently, and democratically monitored: the use of counterterrorism as a legitimation for human-rights violations could make the medicine more deadly than the disease." Counterterrorism should not be misused

by the GRP to target political opposition, including Moro "unarmed struggle." Governments must ensure that counterterrorism measures respect the rule of law, human rights and international humanitarian law (IHL)—key principles upheld in some peace agreements—and create or reinforce mechanisms that monitor and hold the state accountable to human rights and constitutional standards.

Conclusion

Addressing the root causes of rebellion in Mindanao would also address the root causes of terrorism there. The armed conflict on the Moro front had better evolve in this direction, for the sake of human security and human development in Mindanao and the rest of the Philippines. Of the three tracks constituting the current form of evolution of this conflict, the ***MILF track seems to be a linchpin of the broader Mindanao peace process and the legitimate fight in defense against terrorism.*** This is because this track is still evolving. In the MNLF track, the final peace agreement has encountered problems in implementation, some of which may be due to the inadequacy of the agreement itself. The third track, the nature of the terrorist problem with the Abu Sayyaf, does not partake of peace negotiations.

The MILF track is the key link that merits priority. The two other tracks deserve proper attention. A good indication of this is the policy statement from the MILF's highest level rejecting terrorism and terrorist links, its entering into joint action arrangements with the GRP for the interdiction of criminal elements, and its actual cooperation with the AFP in striking against such elements as the Pentagon gang, which is on the US list of "foreign terrorist organizations." The MILF also has ongoing unity processes and links with both main MNLF factions, namely, the Misuari group and the "Council of 15." It in fact offered to mediate between the MNLF Misuari group and the GRP regarding the recent Sulu hostilities.

***Giving priority to the MILF Track is the bold step that must be taken for peace in our* time,** rather than the path of least resistance of just keeping to Track One. The MNLF can be expected not to begrudge additional gains for Bangsamoro aspirations (such as those not adequately addressed by the 1996 Peace Agreement), which the MILF might achieve in its negotiations with the GRP. At the same time, the GRP should realize that the MILF did not split from the MNLF in 1977 and continue to wage its own struggle, only to end up with a mere enhancement of the ARMM. It has to be qualitatively and substantially better than that.

Neither should the MILF just sweep aside the gains from the MNLF track. In fact, at one point it may seem necessary for the negotiations to bring in the MNLF. One proposal is for a three-cornered peace process leading to "a new peace agreement involving the GRP, MNLF and MILF." Since the GRP-MNLF peace negotiations have been concluded, anything new will have to come from the pending GRP-MILF peace negotiations which are only about to enter the substantive phase. Then things could eventually settle anywhere between the existing ARMM and Bangsamoro independence. A more recent proposal is to establish a GRP-MNLF-MILF Commission on Bangsamoro self-determination with an MNLF-MILF working group within it to review the existing ARMM and determine what key changes may be necessary.

Thus, the MILF-MNLF unity process should be sustained, as with the MNLF unity process. "It is difficult to imagine an experiment in Islamic self-determination succeeding against a backdrop of Moro disunity. While such disunity may have been instigated by Manila's imperial governments in the past, no amount of constitutional accommodation by the center can solve this now for Muslim Mindanao. Self-determination now requires that the Bangsamoro people imagine themselves as one nation."

MILF-MNLF unity or interface should be seen in the context of *finally completing the solution* to the Bangsamoro problem. If at least the most important aspirations of the Bangsamoro people are addressed, then there should be no more social basis for another,

new Moro rebellion. This would leave, if ever, only fringe extremist groups like the Abu Sayyaf, who would be better dealt with by the Moro people and mainstream groups themselves. For example, in Sulu, the common main area of operation of the MNLF Misuari group and the Abu Sayyaf, the MNLF State chairman says that if things between the MNLF and the GRP are resolved, then solving the Abu Sayyaf problem is next in line for them.

This is also why it is important for the GRP to properly and immediately handle the current state of war in Sulu with the MNLF Misuari group. How the GRP handles the situation will have a bearing on the GRP-MILF peace negotiations which has much promise as it resumes. What is really at stake here is whether this whole conflict can be ended in this generation, or whether it will be passed on to the next one and evolve into a new form.

CHAPTER 3

Evolution of the armed conflict on the communist front[1]

The armed conflict on the communist front, i.e., between the Philippine government and communist rebel forces—primarily the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)-New People's Army (NPA)-National Democratic Front (NDF) and its breakaway factions—has spanned more than 35 years, counting from the CPP and NPA founding years of 1968 and 1969, respectively. It is contemporaneous with the armed conflict on the Moro front which reckons its struggle from the Jabidah massacre in 1968. There was no such corresponding triggering event on the communist front. The closest to a signal event was the First Quarter Storm (FQS) of 1970, a CPP-led series of big, mainly student demonstrations in Manila against the Marcos administration which, partly due to police brutality against these demonstrations, drew public attention to the national-democratic movement and its issues.

But this new beginning for the CPP-led movement was actually only the culmination of more than a decade of its gestation and the rekindling of a progressive mass movement since 1959, practically the whole decade of the 1960s which witnessed "student power" globally. This "student power" was in fact a common experience of the first line of leaders of both the CPP and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), even crossing paths in such hotbeds of student activism as the University of the Philippines (UP). But while some Moro student activists would draw inspiration from Islamic revival in Cairo, those who would found the CPP drew theirs from the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China. In both cases, however, the main historical terms of reference were local. For the MNLF, it was the several centuries of Moro resistance against Spanish colonialism since the 16th Century. For the CPP, it was the "unfinished" Philippine Revolution of 1896 against Spanish colonialism.

In their current form, one seeks independence or better autonomy for Moro areas in southwestern and central Mindanao vis-à-vis the Philippine republic; the other seeks the overthrow of the national ruling system and its radical replacement through the armed seizure of central political power. So much so that while one may be characterized as a clash between two imagined nations, Filipino and Moro, the other may be characterized as *a clash between "two Filipino governments," the established official government and the shadow underground " government," competing for the allegiance, hearts and minds of the Filipino people*. The CPP-led "People's Democratic Government" offers them the alternative of a national-democratic society with a socialist perspective. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) perceives this as a threat to national security which includes the people's way of life and institutions which must be protected by overcoming the insurgency nationwide. This clash between "two Filipino governments" has

[1] Condensed from Santos [2005] *Evolution of the Armed Conflict on the Communist Front,* background paper for the PHDR 2005. The original paper with compete footnotes is available at www.hdn.org.ph.

largely taken the form of a protracted people's war and a counterinsurgency war.

Root causes of rebellion

The National Unification Commission (NUC) Report to President Fidel V. Ramos in 1993, the result of nationwide consultations especially at the provincial and regional levels in 1992-'93, identified the root causes of Philippine internal armed conflicts and classified them under five categories:

1 Massive and abject poverty and economic inequity, particularly in the distribution of wealth and control over the resource base for livelihood

2 Poor governance, including lack of basic social services, absenteeism of elected local officials, corruption and inefficiency in government bureaucracy, and poor implementation of laws, including those to protect the environment

3 Injustice, abuse of those in authority and power, violations of human rights; and inequity, corruption and delays in the administration of justice

4 Structural inequities in the political system, including control by an elite minority, traditional politicians and political dynasties, and enforcement of such control through private armies

5 Exploitation and marginalization of indigenous cultural communities, including lack of respect for and recognition of ancestral domain and indigenous legal and political systems

Other identified causes were ideological differences between conflicting parties that include, on one side, the belief in armed struggle as the means to achieve political goals; perceived foreign intervention in domestic affairs; and degeneration of moral values. *Serious concerns were also expressed about* the destruction of the natural environment, *the conduct of counterinsurgency, and the continuing hardships experienced by communities in the midst of armed conflict.*

The government's National Peace and Development Plan of 2000 even more graphically depicts the insurgency as a tree whose "taproot" is maldistribution of the fruits of the land because of the concentration of wealth, especially land ownership, in the hands of a few. This "taproot" analysis actually comes from Gen. Victor N. Corpus, who has seen or come from both sides of the conflict, as NPA and as AFP. Corpus emphasizes the agrarian issue of the peasant farmers as the taproot, to be dug out to find a lasting solution to the insurgency. He calls this digging out of the root causes the "silent war" aspect of counterinsurgency.

Indeed, in the literature of the CPP-led national-democratic revolution, like its 1970 "Bible" *Philippine Society and Revolution* (PSR), the **land problem** of the peasantry is the main issue of the national-democratic revolution. Stated otherwise, the revolutionary struggle for land is the main democratic content of the Philippine revolution to seize political power and consolidate it. Feudalism is actually one of the three basic problems of the Filipino people, the other two being US imperialism and bureaucrat-capitalism. These basic problems account for the semi-colonial and semi-feudal character of Philippine society dominated by the few of the landlord class and the comprador big bourgeoisie which exploit mainly the majority peasantry and the proletariat. The latter are the main and leading forces, respectively, of the national-democratic revolution to establish a national-democratic society with a socialist perspective.

A long-time observer of Maoist insurgency since the Vietnam War, albeit from a counterinsurgency perspective, argues that the "causes" of an insurgency must be viewed carefully. He points to "the tension between the goals of the leadership—in the CPP's case these are generally alienated intellectuals strongly committed to Marxism-Leninism—and its foot soldiers—primarily, estranged peasants committed to armed struggle as the means to obtain a degree of social justice… Put another way, the Philippine case is part insurgency—here, an ideologically motivated armed effort to make revolution—and part peasant/worker rebellion. The balance between the two components in any area is fundamental to predicting the impact of government reform efforts." There is basis to his view that the CPP's national-democratic revolution is *more a political revolution to seize political power than it is a social revolution to solve certain social grievances* related to structural disparities. Therefore, "political change is as basic to successful resolution of an insurgency as is socioeconomic development."

Box 3.1 Periods in the evolution of the armed conflict on the communist front

	Formative Years (1968-72)	Early Years of Martial Law/Marcos Dictatorship (1972- 77)	CPP-NPA-NDF Recovery (1980-83)	Ninoy Aquino Assassination up to EDSA I (1983-86)	Aquino Administration (1986-92)	Ramos Administration (1992-98)	Recent Years (1998-2004)
GRP Key Developments, Issues and Decisions	Increasing repression during First Quarter Storm; Plaza Miranda bombing, writ suspension/ arrests	Main target: communist threat; Fascist form of rule; Political polarization; Marcos land reform	Political "normalization" w/ formal lifting of Martial Law and "presidential elections"	Marcos on political defensive, calls for snap presidential election under US pressure	Restoration of elite democracy; first peace talks, cease-fire, then "total war;" RA 6657 CARL; Senate rejection of bases treaty	Ramos "comprehensive peace process" policy; Peace negotiations with Hague Joint Declaration	GRP-NDF CARHRIHL; On & off peace talks; Estrada impeachment; "terrorist" listing of CPP, NPA & Sison;
CPP-NPA-NDF Key Developments, Issues and Decisions	CPP sets line, esp. Maoist protracted people's war (PPW) strategy, builds guerrilla army & mass movement	NDF PrepCom; CPP adjustment; "Specific Characteristics" & "Our Urgent Tasks;" Capture of 1st line	First internal debate on elections; "golden days" (accelerated advance of the movement), increased workers strike movement	Broad protest movement, nat-dem forces in lead; continued "golden days;" Internal debate on insurrectionism; *Kampanyang Ahos*; Boycott blunder	CPP leadership disarticulated; Peak strength then big & sudden decline; crisis of socialism	CPP big split: "reaffirmists" vs. "rejectionists; rectification movement; breakaway of factions	BAYAN participation in EDSA II; *Bayan Muna* in Party-List;
Key Military Features	NPA early substage of strategic defensive (ESSD) AFP "Task Force Lawin" type	NPA ESSD, mainly armed propaganda teams	NPA entry into advanced substage of strategic defensive (ASSD); platoon-size then company-size tactical offensives; AFP Oplan *Katatagan*	NPA ASSD, program towards strategic counter-offensive (SCO)	CPP scraps SCO, back to ESSD; AFP Oplans *Mamamayan* & *Lambat-Bitag*	Continued decline in NPA strength & TOs up to 1995; *Lambat-Bitag* terminated; NPA recovery 1996 up	CPP-NPA now in process of developing middle phase of strategic defensive
CPP-NPA-NDF Strength and Growth	1969: 60 fighters, 35 rifles, 80,000 mass base in 1 district 1972: 10 guerrilla fronts (GFs), 600 rifles, 1,000+ fighters	1976: 21 GFs, 1,000 rifles, 1,500+ fighters	1980: 28 GFs, 4,000+ rifles, 8,000 fighters 1983: 45 GFs, 10,000 rifles, estimated 20,000 fighters	1985: 6,800 high-powered rifles (HPRs), 6,849 fighters, 26 companies, 38 platoons, 17 squads	1987: 25,500 guerrillas, 15,500 firearms, 72 GFs 1988: mass base of 7M dwindled by 60%	1995: 6,025 fighters, 5,298 HPRs 1997: recovered 1983 mass base level	2001: 11.930 fighters, 7,159 HPRs 2003: 04—128 GFs with equiv. of 27 battalions, all GFs have companies

Periodization and brief history of the conflict

The armed conflict on the communist front may be laid down in the following periods, based on qualitative changes in the situation, key issues, decisions and developments in the history of this conflict **[Box 3.1]**.

1. Formative years (1968-72)

This period saw the founding of the CPP and NPA by university intellectual Jose Maria Sison (as "Amado Guerrero")—the latter through peasant rebel Bernabe Buscayno (as "Commander Dante")—in close succession on December 26, 1968, and March 29, 1969, respectively. Silently at first, a guerrilla (and counterguerrilla) war shortly ensued, starting with its first peasant mass base in the Second District of Tarlac, then expanding to Isabela and subsequently to other regions nationwide. The national-democratic revolution, however, burst into the open with the CPP-led "First Quarter Storm" (FQS) of big student demonstrations against the Marcos administration in January-March 1970 and the release of Sison's PSR book in July 1970. With these, the CPP laid down and propagated the national-democratic (nat-dem, ND) line, and completed the "collective action frame" (vanguard party, guerrilla army and mass movements) of the revolutionary movement. Marcos responded with increasing repression. The Plaza Miranda bombing and ensuing suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus on August 21, 1971, were seen as part of Marcos's moves to cling to power, although one account still holds that Sison/CPP authored the bombing to induce a revolutionary situation.

2. Early martial law/Marcos dictatorship (1972-77)

The September 21, 1972, proclamation of martial law mainly targeted the CPP-NPA. It marked the start of the Marcos dictatorship with a blatantly fascist form of rule. Aside from "saving the republic" from the communist threat, Marcos also sought to "reform society" dominated by an oligarchy by instituting redistributive reforms like land reform in rice and corn lands. In 1976-1977 martial law captured most of the first line of the CPP Central Committee, including Buscayno and Sison. Leadership of the CPP passed on to its cadres from the FQS generation of student activists.

3. CPP-NPA-NDF recovery and advance (1978-83)

This period, especially 1980-83, saw the recovery and then accelerated advance of the revolutionary movement, to basically continue until 1987. These were considered "golden days" of the Philippine revolution when the movement had hegemony in the anti-dictatorship struggle. There was large-scale mass organizing, an expansion of its international solidarity work, and an intensification of guerrilla warfare. The CPP assessed that the protracted people's war was moving beyond the "early substage of the strategic defensive" and entering the "advanced substage." These substages, including a third one of "strategic counteroffensive," were conceptualized around 1980-81. Earlier, however, in 1978, the CPP had its first major internal debate on participation in that year's interim parliamentary elections, the harbinger of future disunities within the CPP, especially on the question of elections. From 1981 up to the end of the Marcos regime, the AFP employed Oplan *Katatagan* as its basic strategy against the NPA and massively redeployed troops from MNLF areas, as the CPP-NPA became the major threat to national security in the 1980s (compared to the MNLF in the 1970s). On the political front, Marcos initiated some political "normalization," (some say) with the 1978 interim parliamentary elections, the formal lifting of martial law in September 1980, and the holding of farcical presidential elections in June 1981.

4. Ninoy Aquino assassination up to EDSA I (1983-86)

Any pretense at "normalization" was shattered with the August 21, 1983, assassination of Ninoy Aquino, chief political rival of Marcos. Almost immediately, this generated an unprecedentedly broad anti-Marcos dictatorship protest movement which continued up to 1985, with national-democratic forces playing a leading role as a factor for radicalization. This may be considered a continuation of the "golden days" of the Philippine revolution. On the protracted people's war front, a program for advance to the "strategic counteroffensive" (SCO) was drawn up. But the revolutionary movement would also encounter some setbacks: the internal debate on an alternative insurrectionary or "political-military" ("pol-mil") strategy; the falling out with allies in the formation of the "broad legal alliance" *Bagong Alyansang Makabayan* (BAYAN); the *Kampanyang Ahos* anti-infiltration campaign against "deep penetration agents" in Mindanao; the "tactical blunder" of the decision to boycott the snap presidential election; and the consequent marginalization at the February 22-25, 1986, EDSA "People Power" Revolution which ousted Marcos.

5. Aquino administration (1986-92)

The assumption of Cory Aquino to the presidency on February 25, 1986, signaled the restoration of elite democracy. One early post-EDSA feature was some "democratic space," highlighted by the release of political prisoners including Sison and Buscayno in March 1986. But in April 1986, the AFP adopted a new Oplan *Mamamayan* strategy against the NPA. It then held the first peace talks with the NDF from August 1986 to February 1987, including a 60-day cease-fire. But after the talks collapsed with the January 22, 1987, Mendiola massacre of peasants demonstrating for land reform, the Aquino administration waged "total war" on the NPA by March 1987. Early on, but most seriously in August 1987 and December 1989, President Aquino would be rocked by seven military coup attempts which had the effect of pushing her government to the Right. By September 1988, the AFP would have its best so far Oplan *Lambat Bitag* strategy against the NPA.

From 1986 to 1989, the CPP leadership seemed quite disarticulated, then, in the international scene, came the crisis of socialism of 1989-91. Though the continued momentum of the earlier "golden days" of the Philippine revolution would carry it to its peak armed strength in 1987, 1988 saw the start of a big and sudden decline of the revolutionary forces in the whole country and in 1990, the SCO program for its protracted people's war was scrapped. With the US military bases voted out in September 1991, the revolutionary movement was coming to an ineluctable crossroad between a push for a fundamental change in the CPP's orientation and a reaffirming of the original party dogma.

6. Ramos administration (1992-98)

The Ramos administration took the initiative to develop a comprehensive peace process after military threats from both the Right and Left subsided towards the end of the previous administration. This would lead to the second (and still current) series of GRP-NDF peace talks signaled by their *Hague Joint Declaration* of September 1, 1992, setting the framework for peace negotiations without an interim cease-fire. But the end of 1992 saw the surfacing of a big split or "Great Schism" in the CPP between "reaffirmists" (RA) and "rejectionists" (RJ) of the original party line centered on the protracted people's war strategy. The RJ factions would break away while the RAs, led by Sison, launched what he called the "Second Great Rectification Movement," and redeployed the NPA to recover the mass base. From 1992 to 1995, NPA strength and tactical offensives continued to decline and by 1995, the AFP terminated *Lambat-Bitag* and shifted its focus to external defense and the Moro front (but from 1996 onward, the NPA strength then steadily increased). In March 1998, the peace negotiations produced its first substantive

agreement, the *Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law* (CARHRIHL).

7. Estrada administration (1998-2001)

In August 1998, President Estrada approved the CARHRIHL, but subject to implementation in accordance with Philippine constitutional and legal processes. This led to an impasse on the modalities for its implementation The peace negotiations were also suspended several times on side issues like the government's ratification of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) in May 1999. Estrada then, in June 1999, opted to localize peace efforts. His impeachment process in 2000, leading to his ouster in January 2001, was participated in prominently by BAYAN and allied national-democratic forces.

8. Arroyo administration (2001-04)

The nat-dems' prominent role in EDSA II marked the revolutionary movement's resurgence on several fronts. In the second party-list elections in May 2001, nat-dem party-list group *Bayan Muna* topped the list to get the maximum three seats on its first try and by the third party-list elections in May 2004, the nat-dem bloc doubled its number of seats to six, the biggest party-list bloc. The NDF also got a boost when Norway resumed peace negotiations in 2001 and then facilitated it in 2004. In its 35th anniversary statement of December 26, 2003, the CPP assessed that it has "by and large developed the early phase of the strategic defensive and is now in the process of developing the middle phase." The CPP-NPA and Sison himself were set back after 9/11 by their inclusion on a "terrorist" list by several countries, including The Netherlands, where he is based and In August 2002, President Arroyo issued "Nine-Point Guidelines on the CPP" which welcomed that "terrorist" listing. Earlier, in January 2002, a new AFP Internal Security Operation (ISO) Plan *Bantay-Laya* and Campaign Plan *Balangai* took effect for the next five years (up to 2007). **The war goes on.**

Protracted people's war and counterinsurgency

Unlike the conflict on the Moro front in which the main forms of struggle or strategy, Islamic diplomacy and peace negotiations, alternated with armed struggle, the main form of struggle and strategy on the communist front *all the way* has been protracted people's war (PPW). The principal stress here is on revolutionary struggle in the countryside through armed struggle, land reform and base-building, notwithstanding several major political changes along the way. This shows the particularly strong role of the ideological framework (e.g., Marxism-Leninism-Maoism) in this case.

PPW was conceptualized (and accomplished by Mao in China in 22 years) with three major stages: the strategic defensive, the strategic stalemate and the strategic offensive. The CPP-led PPW (now 36 years from 1969) has so far been in the strategic defensive stage.

While armed struggle in the form of rural guerrilla warfare is the principal form of struggle in PPW, the key requirement for this is mass base-building, meaning guerrilla fronts to encircle the cities from the countryside. This mass base-building involves more political and organizational, rather than military work. In the earlier stages of mass base-building, the NPA in fact plays more the role of a shield, rather than a sword or spear, to enable the CPP to painstakingly construct a political infrastructure of mass organizations and local organs of political power. All these require TIME or *protracted* work, thus the *protracted* characteristic of this people's war. This war cannot be sustained without mass support; thus, it must be a *people's* war.

The CPP political infrastructure, with its local organs of political power at the barangay level (Barangay Organizing Committees and Barangay Revolutionary Committees) at the base, is what it treats as its nascent "People's Democratic

Government." This has been the framework from the very start, more so at present, as the CPP asserts that "Two governments exist in the Philippines."

Again, while rural armed struggle is the principal form of struggle in PPW, it also engages in other *supporting* forms of struggle especially in *urban* areas—legal struggle, mass movement, coalition work, elections, parliamentary work, peace negotiations, and international solidarity work. All these involve political and organizational, rather than military, work. But the important thing is how they serve the armed or military struggle. So there is also an urban counterpart to the rural infrastructure.

The protracted armed conflict in the Philippines of more than 35 years spells tremendous accumulated human, economic and environmental costs in terms of human security and human development**,** but for Sison and the CPP, "The costs of keeping the reactionary ruling system are far higher than the costs of waging armed revolution. Exploitation and oppression exact a terrible toll on the people and are precisely what drive people to wage armed revolution. We should be able to see the high cost of the violence of daily exploitation to recognize the necessity and lower cost of armed revolution."

There are some factors or ***reasons for the relative success, resilience or staying power*** of the PPW. *First*, the perseverance, determination and commitment, a sort of "voluntarist" spirit, of CPP cadres coupled with good organizational skills. *Second*, the good early guidance in 1974-76 from key documents which systematized and "codified" revolutionary work. *Third*, weaknesses in the AFP counterinsurgency strategies and table of organization and equipment, including a "strategic blunder" of terminating the effective Oplan *Lambat Bitag* in 1995. That it was forced to expand drastically and quickly at the time of martial law, also resulted in estrangement between combat formations and the higher headquarters, patronage and the like. *Fourth*, the AFP concentration in or redeployment to Moro areas in the 1970s and in 1996-2002, thereby easing the military pressure on the NPA. And *fifth*, the small archipelagic country, and uneven development of base areas. Of course, these two factors *can work either way* for the NPA and the AFP tactically and strategically—for the NPA, the advantage of dispersing the AFP forces deployed against it and of operating in or expanding into areas not covered by the AFP. The NPA's disadvantages,though, is the difficulty of securing arms support from abroad. It allows the AFP to use strategic massing against priority target guerrilla fronts, and prevents the NPA from strategic naval transport and concentration of forces for a final offensive on the seat of power.

Then, of course, there have been some factors or ***reasons for the setbacks, decline and slowdown*** of the PPW. *First*, the internal problems of the CPP—major errors of deviation from the PPW strategy (the official/RA view), self-destructing anti-infiltration campaigns; the big split and consequent focus on consolidation/rectification. *Second*, the leadership abilities and efforts of AFP field commanders (especially battalion level) who were militarily proficient and followed a professional code of the officer corps. Ironically, the patronage at the higher echelons during martial law made the situation more difficult for the NPA, because it strengthened the AFP as an opponent in the field, with combat units often led by veteran commanders. Even the AFP's lack of weapons and equipment on field had the unexpected impact of boosting counterinsurgency. The 70 or so AFP battalions became the critical foundation upon which government survival depended. Thus, a war of battalions. At no time did the NPA achieve a concentration of strength such that the AFP could not appear at will. The result was that, even in NPA strongholds, the CPP could not develop a viable societal alternative to the existing structures.

Third, the informed reworking of AFP counterinsurgency strategies, particularly with the *Lambat Bitag* series, around a general strategy of "war of quick decision" and campaign strategy of "gradual constriction" (with the usual four basic phases of "clear, hold, consolidate and develop") in a kind of *reversed people's war*.

A new approach was also anchored on

democratic institutions/political processes even as the CPP took a more militarist approach. The restoration of democracy, albeit elite, after the ouster of the Marcos dictatorship, led to the government's embrace of the primacy of political factors. So, in more recent years the CPP has returned to its roots of political organizing, after a period of pushing to the fore military considerations in what was, after all, a political war. And it has regained ground, if the increased number of guerrilla fronts is any indication.

The CPP's claim of belligerency status—or that it leads another state—seems to be the source of a lot of violence or coercion being committed in its name. This has been manifested in its enforcement of "revolutionary taxation" and even "permits to campaign" in its areas for candidates in elections. The "two-state" claim has led to some insensitivity on its part to popular sentiments and civil pursuits. When it tends to be more militarist, the danger grows that it may lose the moorings which it had in dealing with civilian and noncombatant elements in areas of civil strife.

There is always the question of "who is winning?" But is this measured when it is the political organization of the mass base that is critical? How does one measure the influence of a political movement whose power is not primarily reckoned in terms of votes? *Or should this "who is winning?" question be entertained at all?* Should war instead be viewed from a human security and development frame because there are no real winners in war?

Impact of political changes on the war

In this continuing war of more than 35 years, the major political periods have been really just two: the martial-law *dictatorship* (1972-86) and the restored elite *democracy* (1986-present).

One might also a bit simplistically characterize these two periods as representing the mainly military and mainly political approaches, respectively, to the communist insurgency. Ironically or perhaps not, the former has been less effective than the latter. It is already clear that the martial-law dictatorship was a tactical setback for the CPP-NPA-NDF in the short run but a strategic boost for it in the long run. The blatantly fascist form of rule was the best argument for armed struggle against it.

Soon after the Aquino administration took over from the Marcos dictatorship, the new "democratic space" in the political field was complemented by a more sophisticated counterinsurgency doctrine known as "low intensity conflict" (LIC), which was developed based on both Philippine experience and US influence. The term "low intensity" is misleading when in fact it involves "political, economic, and psychological warfare, with the military being a distant fourth in many cases." A US commander said, "It is total war at the grassroots level."

But *the new political context of restored elite democracy allowed for a more politically (and militarily) sophisticated counterinsurgency*. The early years of this new political situation from 1986 to 1989 saw the CPP leadership seemingly disarticulated, including its discernment of the character of the Aquino administration. It engaged in several arenas like the 1987 congressional elections without a clear sense of where these would lead; recruitment of new members to the CPP-led movement significantly declined. From another perspective, it is explained that such recruitment becomes difficult without the engine of repression, like that of the Marcos dictatorship, to drive the alienated into the movement fold.

The political (and economic) situation in the early Aquino years did not remain static, and neither did the CPP. The CPP, through its combination of three "institution-like" components (vanguard party, guerrilla army and mass movements), has generally adjusted and adapted to changes in the strategic context of the international and domestic environments. But the CPP admitted a "tactical blunder" in its decision to boycott the January 1986 snap presidential election.

The boycott significantly marginalized the CPP-led movement from this final drive, causing it

to miss a key opportunity to share political power. Most critical analysts attribute the boycott error and other significant political errors of the CPP, to the overriding strength of the "PPW discourse" within the CPP. The boycott decision was made from the frame that it takes an armed revolution, not elections, to topple bourgeois state power since "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." It is this strategy and this thinking, however, which has remained static with the CPP.

It was mentioned earlier that "political change is as basic to the successful resolution of an insurgency as is socioeconomic development." There are other examples of the impact of particular political changes on the evolution of the conflict on the communist front. Key examples are the 1989-91 crisis of socialism and the post-9/11 US-led "global war on terror."

All these impacted not only on the state-CPP conflict but also on the CPP's own internal debates. These debates covered a wide range of issues—an analysis of Philippine society and mode of production, revolutionary strategy and tactics, vision of an alternative society, international line, democracy within the party, the role of the NDF, peace negotiations, crisis of socialism, and so on. For example, debates on strategy and tactics significantly included the question of elections; that on the vision of an alternative society was about the Maoist "people's democractic dictatorship" with the CPP as the designated ruling party versus notions of "pluralist democracy" or "democratic pluralism." Such *evolution* of theory and theoretical debates within the CPP would help explain the CPP's behavior, even as those theoretical aspects are not the main concern of this paper.

Eventually these internal debates would come to a head in 1992 in the big split in the CPP between the "reaffirmists" (RAs) and the "rejectionists" (RJs). To a certain extent, this has reshaped the evolution of the conflict on the communist front because the latter is no longer limited to the form of struggle and strategy of protracted people's war **[Box 3.2].**

Suffice it to highlight for now, *again, the role or question of democracy as the key political change vis-à-vis the insurgency*. In fact, Victor N. Corpus once observed, "If we can maintain the democratic system, the CPP is indeed a spent force." Of course, this is easier said than done. Among the RAs and RJs, there might be said to be an external debate on the discernment of the character of Philippine democracy as it is evolving. One view is to reject it and boycott its institutions and processes as a tool and façade for bourgeois class rule. A second view, the "instrumental view," is to utilize the democratic institutions and processes as mere instruments for tactical gains, such as for propaganda, resources and legal cover, which serve the strategic agenda of armed revolution. The RAs and some RJs hew closer to these two views.

A third view coming from the emergent democratic Left, including some RJs, is the "integral view" of democracy which recognizes and accepts the intrinsic value of formal democratic institutions as more than merely formal because they at least make free and open debate possible, and can be deepened to become more participatory and egalitarian. In time, *the evolution of the armed conflict on the communist front will depend much on the evolution of Philippine democracy itself. Political conditions have to change but there is a difference between political change for counterinsurgency and political change to address the people's needs*.

Peace negotiations and its role in overall strategy

What would it take to peacefully resolve the conflict? Are there *ideological* requirements for this? What are the prospects with the GRP-NDF peace negotiations, a particularly relevant *political* engagement/arena of the parties?

It doesn't look too good because of both parties' tactical or instrumental frameworks or approaches to the peace negotiations. For the GRP, the policy is mixed or incoherent because, on one hand, "peaceful negotiated settlement with the different rebel groups"

Box 3.2 "Rejectionist" and other Left paths

The "Rejectionist" and other Left paths are significant in that they influence the evolution of the conflict away from the war mode while still working for and achieving progressive social and political change. These "rejectionist" factions put a premium on the mass movement, trade unionism, peace negotiations, development work, elections, and parliamentary work over armed struggle.

One paradigm shift for Left groups is an integral conception of democracy, recognizing the intrinsic value of formal democratic institutions, even with their imperfections, to effect a gradual transformation of the power relationships in society—or a protracted process of social and political change. Some of the Left groups surveyed below have adopted or are moving toward this integral view, while old habits of an instrumental view of democracy die hard with some.

The brief survey below is limited to Left groups with national-democratic (as distinguished from "social-democratic") origins or links. While the mainstream "reaffirmist" CPP represents a "unified orthodoxy," the "rejectionist" and other Left paths since 1992 represent "divided pluralism."[1]

Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa ng Pilipinas (RPM-P)

- mainly in Western Visayas and Manila, though claiming a Luzon-Visayas-Mindanao presence
- Marxist-Leninist with a socialist orientation
- adopted the politico-military (pol-mil) concept as strategy, rejecting a war strategy as the principal means, and subordinating armed struggle to the mass movement
- has an **armed wing** Revolutionary Proletarian Army-Alex Boncayao Brigade (RPA-ABB) but not actively engaged in armed struggle due to an **interim peace agreement** with the GRP; has had armed encounters with the NPA
- has a **party-list group** Alab Katipunan but failed to get elected.

Partido ng Manggagawang Pilipino (PMP), a merger of the original PMP with the Sosyalistang Partido ng Paggawa (SPP) and the Partido Proletaryo Demokratiko (PPD)

- mainly in Manila-Rizal but also with a Luzon-Visayas-Mindanao presence
- Marxist-Leninist, esp. Leninist, with a socialist orientation
- accent on the mass movement, especially trade unionism
- has an **armed city partisan** wing Armadong Partisanong Panlungsod (APP)
- has two **party-list groups** Partido ng Manggagawa and Sanlakas, which have gotten elected

Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa ng Mindanao (RPM-M)

- mainly in Central Mindanao and more recently other parts of Mindanao
- Marxist-Leninist with a socialist orientation and a Mindanao tripeople (Christians, Moros and Lumads) approach
- multiform struggle but gives paramount importance to peace-building and development work at this time because of the adverse effect of war on the "tripeoples" of Mindanao
- has an **armed wing** Revolutionary People's Army (RPA) but not actively engaged in armed struggle due to engagement in **peace negotiations** with the GRP
- has a **party-list group** Anak Mindanao (AMIN), which has gotten elected

Marxista-Leninistang Partido ng Pilipinas (MLPP)

- mainly in Central Luzon and Manila
- originally a "reaffirmist" faction which was more "reaffirmist" than the mainstream CPP
- has an **armed wing** and is **actively engaged in armed struggle,** both with the AFP & the NPA

Akbayan! Citizens Action Party

- **a party-list group** project of the independent socialist Bukluran para sa Ikauunlad ng Sosyalistang Isip at Gawa (BISIG), the rejectionist faction Padayon, the democratic socialist Pandayan para sa Sosyalistang Pilipinas (Pandayan), and ex-popular democrats
- said to have fully taken an "integral view" of democracy, as distinguished from the "instrumentalist view" of the CPP and possibly some of the "rejectionist" Marxist-Leninist parties

Movement for Popular Democracy (MPD), formed post-EDSA 1986 well before the 1992 split, but effectively dissolved in 1999

- promoted popular democracy (people's empowerment and political pluralism) initially as a development of and then later a possible alternative to national democracy
- emphasized the role of **nonparty political formations** (NPPFs) and civil society in changing society from below

[1]Caouette, *Persevering Revolutionaries*

is one of the official "Six Paths to Peace," but on the other hand the pursuit of a "multitrack peace process" is also subsumed under the national internal security plan and strategy to overcome insurgency nationwide [see Chapter 1].

For the CPP, the peace negotiations are clearly subordinate to the PPW strategy and is only of at most tertiary importance as a form of struggle. (Unlike the cases of the MNLF and MILF), *there has been no strategic decision to give peace negotiations a real chance for a negotiated political settlement.* There are only tactical objectives: international diplomatic recognition of belligerency status; propaganda; prisoner releases; and, more recently, to help secure the

legitimacy of the CPP, NPA and Sison internationally in view of their "terrorist" listing. Some critics, from the Left at that, even say that CPP leader Sison, as chief political consultant of the NDF for the talks, is fashioning protracted peace talks to be a form of struggle within the PPW.

Actually, the mutually antagonistic frameworks of the parties account for the protraction of the peace negotiations—leading to this historical situation of PPW (36 years from 1969 to the present) and protracted peace talks (19 years from 1986 to the present but more off than on). These two tracks have run simultaneously since 1986 without an interim general cease-fire except for a brief 60-day period in 1986-87, thus constituting a mode of "talking while fighting," though it has been much more fighting than talking. This creates its own dynamic, with developments in the field like arrests, captures and killings often impinging on the talks.

There have been two series of peace talks. The first, a one-shot affair from August 1986 to February 1987 during the Aquino administration, collapsed because, among others, the parties could not even agree on a framework for the talks. Each side did not have a clear framework or game plan of its own. The second started in September 1992 with an agreed framework in the *Hague Joint Declaration* which provided for mutually acceptable principles and for a four-point substantive agenda. Since then, there have been many rounds of talks but most were on preliminary and peripheral matters. Besides these, there were long suspensions and impasses.

Still, the peace negotiations produced the CARHRIHL on its sixth year (1998), and continue to hold the promise of socioeconomic, political and constitutional reforms next on the agenda. On the other hand, the reform agenda in the peace negotiations may not progress further without a framework or paradigm shift at the strategic level on both sides. Until there is some kind of breakthrough, maximizing the CARHRIHL through implementation, or the framework of human rights and IHL, might be the best to hope for, besides pursuing the reform agenda on its own merits *outside* the peace negotiations.

The GRP's recent attempt in early 2005 at a paradigm shift of sorts is to break the "talk and fight" mode by demanding an interim cease-fire for a limited period of, say, six months of intensive talks focusing on the substantive agenda towards a final peace agreement. The NDF has rejected this outright, not surprisingly because of its well-known aversion to what it considers long cease-fires like six months. This is now part of the current impasse in the talks, perhaps the most serious all these years because of the likely shift from "talk and fight" to "fighting without talking." With due respect to the GRP, it is hard to see how this can be better. People forget that the "talk and fight" mode at least produced the CARHRIHL and other agreements, the groundwork for the next substantive negotiations, and maintained lines of communication and discussion on certain issues even if peripheral but still relevant to some reduction in the level of violence. The substantive talks should not be held hostage even by the valid desire for a cease-fire—especially since this lately "seems to be the hardest word" on both the communist and Moro fronts.

On the other hand, neither should the substantive talks be held hostage by the likewise valid NDF demand for more effective GRP action to lift the foreign "terrorist" tag on the CPP, NPA and Sison, which caused the current suspension of the talks in August 2004. There are indications that the GRP has taken advantage of this to keep the diplomatic pressure on the CPP, NPA and especially Sison, in his place of self-exile, The Netherlands. This appears to be part of what the GRP likes to describe as a "multitrack process," including military and diplomatic components, in dealing with insurgencies, whether on the communist or the Moro front. The government cannot seem to develop a bolder, more imaginative and coherent plan of dealing with the CPP-NPA-NDF that puts the main premium on a negotiated political settlement.

Here in the GRP-NDF peace negotiations is most true the observation, albeit made in the Moro

context, that "if war, as once aptly put, is an extension of politics, and negotiation is an aspect of war, then negotiation is war in another form."

Impact of the post-9/11 U.S.-led "global war on terror"

The post-9/11 (2001) US-led "global war on terror" has added fuel to the local war situation, both the PPW and the counterinsurgency war. The latter has a tendency to be framed as a counterterrorist war with the US-led "terrorist" listing of the CPP, NPA and Sison. The Arroyo administration has welcomed and taken advantage of this listing, as shown soon thereafter by the "Nine-Point Guidelines Issued by the President Re: the CPP" and by her order for redeployment of the AFP against the NPA in August 2002. Among the guidelines were:

> 2. The CPP-NPA has engaged in terrorist acts against civilian targets… as part of the overall aim to overthrow the duly constituted government and the democratic system;
>
> 4. The government welcomes the US action declaring the CPP-NPA as a terrorist organization; this is not interference in the internal affairs of the Philippines;
>
> 6. The government will maintain open lines of communication with the CPP-NPA in the hope of ending the use of violence and terrorism as a means to attain political ends, and to achieve national unity and reconciliation under the Constitution;
>
> 7. There is no cease-fire between the government and the CPP-NPA; military and police operations will continue;
>
> 8. The government calls on other communist organizations that are not engaged in unlawful acts to condemn the violence and terrorism being perpetrated by the CPP-NPA;
>
> 9. The government calls upon the entire citizenry to get involved in the fight against the CPP-NPA.…

Sison instantly reciprocated with a call for "all-out resistance" against the "US-directed Macapagal-Arroyo regime," and for strengthening "all types of alliances to isolate and remove the Macapagal-Arroyo ruling clique." The "terrorist" tagging seems to have created a siege mentality on the NDF side, especially as far as Sison himself is concerned.

It was clear from the "Nine-Point Guidelines Issued by the President Re: the CPP" that the Arroyo government was putting military action over peace negotiations in dealing with the CPP-NPA, which it treats more as "terrorist" than as "communist." And while it "will maintain open lines of communication with the CPP-NPA," there is no longer even mention of peace negotiations.

In fairness to the CPP-NPA's historical record of armed struggle, it has not, as a policy—and has not generally in practice—engaged in terrorism or acts of terrorism by deliberately targeting civilians. Unlike the *Abu Sayyaf* or the MILF, the CPP-NPA has no Islamic connection that could possibly put it in the network of *Al-Qaeda* or *Jemaah Islamiyah*. The CPP-NPA and, for that matter, the MILF, through its antecedent the MNLF, have pre-dated *Al-Qaeda*-type terrorism by several decades, having instead come from the tradition of national liberation movements of the 1960s.

The US-led campaign against terrorism reflects a drift to militarize of the response to terrorism, and a predominance of the military and military solutions in addressing not only terrorism but also rebellion and internal armed conflict. At another, more comprehensive or encompassing level, it has reinforced an already dominant or hegemonic ideology of national security, particularly its thrust of counterinsurgency as the framework to address insurgency or rebellion. Even the peace process has become subsumed under a national or internal security framework. The peace negotiations in particular, through the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP), have been subject to the Cabinet Oversight Committee (COC) on Internal Security created by Executive Order No. 21 with a counterinsurgency "Strategy of Holistic Approach."

The Arroyo government's objective for the peace process is no longer so much addressing the root causes of rebellion as it is demobilizing the rebel

forces. And even before Arroyo, there has been the persistent militarist mentality of degrading the rebels' military capability so as to be able to impose a peace settlement on them. And now there is the temptation to try to even finish them off with US anti-terrorist logistics support which also funds the AFP's modernization aspirations. More than 35 years of armed conflict should have shown to both sides the futility, illusion, and great cost of aspiring for a military victory over the other side.

Explaining the persistence of the movement

Cauoette [2004] posed this interesting question of explaining the persistence of an armed revolutionary communist movement in the Philippines, which may appear as a historical anachronism, the exception that confirms the rule. Such persistence is all the more puzzling given that the movement missed a key opportunity to seize or share in power towards the end of Marcos rule in 1986, underwent traumatic internal purges in the second half of the 1980s, and survived a major split in the early 1990s, any of which would have irremediably shattered a weaker movement. The CPP was in the doldrums for most of the 1990s but has recovered since. How to explain this? Explanations from the perspective of independent scholars and the critical Left are surveyed below.

One is that the Philippine revolutionary collective action frame gives meaning to action and rebellion, it has the capacity to organize, it helps people understand or rationalize why they engage in such high-risk activism, it makes "sense" given everything else. A related explanation is that people in dire straits, especially in the countryside, crave simple answers to their problems. The national-democratic argument about Philippine society and revolution, with its consolidated, clear-cut and confident explanations and answers for everything, has a certain compelling appeal. Sison himself explained it this way:

The CPP attracted young men and women because it showed the revolutionary way out of the oppressive and exploitative system. When people recognize a just revolutionary cause and the way to carry it forward, they become dauntless and consider it a duty to work hard and struggle, make sacrifices and overcome the odds.

They become unafraid of the high risks and adverse personal consequences. They become more resolute and militant as they become part of a growing movement, in which more and more people are being aroused, organized and mobilized. Their lives become meaningful and fruitful through the struggle for national liberation, democracy, social justice and other lofty goals.

Another, as already noted above, is the movement's particular form that combines the three components of vanguard party, guerrilla army and social movements. This allowed it to adjust and adapt to changes in the national and international situation, or to respond to political opportunities, in a way that ensures its survival. Unlike its fraternal communist parties in the region, the CPP did not limit itself to just waging a rural insurgency nor to engaging in purely parliamentary struggle. While constantly avowing the primacy of armed struggle in the countryside over legal, political struggle in the urban arena, the CPP in actual practice has given the latter equal or higher priority.

Following this is the more controversial or contestable explanation that some of the CPP's recent gains are attributable not to a reaffirmation of Maoist principles but to a departure from them. The fact that NPA activity has remained stuck at the level of small guerrilla actions despite an increase in tactical offensives indicates that in actual practice the political struggle has been given greater attention and prominence than the armed or military struggle in the past few years. This is controversial particularly to the CPP, because it attributes its recent resurgence to its rectification movement, which featured notably the redeployment of NPA forces mainly for mass work to recover the mass base and secondarily for military work.

And then, of course, there are many potential

Box 3.3 Is agrarian reform the 'taproot'?

If the "taproot" is the land problem, then shouldn't actions or achievements by either side in terms of agrarian reform or the agrarian revolution have a bearing on the evolution of the conflict?

Borras (2004) makes a critical assessment of the government agrarian reform program from 1972 to 2002. The redistributive reform attained so far through the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) process has been *significant in scale*. First, according to official data, nearly three-fourths of CARP's total working scope has been redistributed to peasant beneficiaries. The number of beneficiary households is some 2.5 million, or 15 million individuals, accounting for about 47 percent of the total rural household population of 5.2 million. (Compare this with CPP official figures that at its peak in early 1988 the NPA mass base was 10 million, broken down to seven million in the countryside and three million in the urban areas.) The total redistributed land accounted for a little more than 50 percent of the total farm land. The leasehold accomplishment is likewise substantial at 1.5 million hectares, which could be benefiting some .5 million tenant-households.

Second, the bulk of the accomplishment is in public lands, accounting for a total of 3.9 million hectares, or two-thirds of the total CARP output. This covers upland public lands where poverty incidence is usually high and which are the usual base areas of the NPA. Also, the bulk of DAR's balance is mainly in private lands outside of Operation Land Transfer (OLT) coverage of rice and corn land.

Borras [2004] cautions, however, that official government data may be contested. For example, the actual leasehold accomplishments may be much lower than 1.5 million hectares, and that some 300,000 hectares constitute "fake" land reform via voluntary land transfer. Nevertheless, the assessment is still that the CARP's land redistribution achievement is "modest but significant."

The same is true for the Agrarian Reform Communities (ARCs), the development program launched in 1993. An ARC is a barangay or cluster of barangays where a critical mass of farmers and farm workers await full implementation of agrarian reform, and an attempt is made to anchor the full socioeconomic development of the area through various projects and programs. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under Secretary Ernesto Garilao produced empirical evidence that agrarian reform actually works, especially when systematic support services are delivered. As of September 2004, there were a total of 1,664 ARCs found in 6,135 barangays in 1,137 municipalities nationwide. [Compare this with the CPP's latest claim of 130 guerrilla fronts in more than 9,000 barangays in substantial portions of around 800 municipalities and cities in nearly 70 provinces.] Again, a word of caution about the inherent limitations of ARCs—their nature and coverage—and the possibility that majority of officially declared ARCs are in fact "ARCs on paper."

What about the CPP's revolutionary land reform program? Borras discusses how the CPP's maximum program of land confiscation and free redistribution is to be implemented only after victory of the revolution. While this is being waged, the minimum program of land rent reduction, elimination of usury, raising of farm wages, improving prices of produce, raising production and rudimentary cooperatives is carried out. Some initial and partial gains for the peasants have been made, with some lands redistributed to landless peasants, and land rents and loan interests reduced in areas where the NPA was strong. But as soon as the general politico-military condition became unfavorable to the NPA in the late 1980s, most of these partial gains were rolled back as landlords violently took back their lands. The campaign to eradicate usury was contentious because it tended to stop local money lending, which was necessary to finance production. A former CPP insider says the rent reduction is still in the framework of share tenancy and therefore even inferior to the government's leasehold program. He says there has also been some CPP opposition to peasant acquisition of some big landholdings under CARP because these belong to landlords who are allies of the NPA [See example in Box 1.5].

It would seem then that agrarian reform and agrarian revolution are not in fact the crucial factors to the progress of the CPP's mass-base building. The CPP's peasant mass base (or at least its guerrilla front) appears to be increasing despite the significant redistributive outcome of CARP and the relatively low level of revolutionary land reform. Thus, the persistence or strength of the NPA must have some other stronger basis. According to a former CPP insider, this basis is precisely the NPA's function as a "social police" in the countryside where the state has no presence. Stated otherwise, "the insurgency survives because it is an alternative political movement supported by force." In short, *another state structure*.

recruits, mostly in rural areas. For many of them, there is no other alternative to survive economic deprivation. Field reports tend to show that many countryside recruits of the NPA join not so much due to political consciousness or commitment but for economic survival. Sison says, however, that "they join the revolutionary movement in order to struggle for their own national and social liberation.… The toiling masses of workers and peasants are the most oppressed and exploited. They have been the most interested in joining the movement…they know that the movement can succeed only with their resolute and militant mass struggle."

Finally, related to those subjective forces of the revolution are the objective conditions. Capitalism (or semi-feudalism in the CPP's view of the mode of production) has not been much of a success in the country. Over the past few decades, the Philippines has lagged behind its neighbors in economic growth. Massive and abject poverty and economic inequity continue to be there, if not worsen **[Box 3.3]**. On the political side, there is revulsion against traditional

elite politics.

Beyond the regime change in 1986, various social and political scientists point to the persistence of "local political bosses," "caciques" or "local authoritarian enclaves," especially in rural areas. In these enclaves, the martial-law regime has not ended: despotic local elites, whether inside or outside the state apparatus, have continued to rule ruthlessly. For the poor peasants, these despotic elites represent the system that needs to be overthrown. It is *a wonder and no wonder* then that, every year for several decades now, Sison has proclaimed "the objective conditions for revolution are better than ever before."

Conclusion

The protracted people's war and counter-insurgency war seem destined to go on for the foreseeable future unless there is some kind of a breakthrough like a paradigm shift in both parties' frameworks on war and peace—a remote prospect now, given the contending ideological visions. The rebellion has its root structural causes but it is also very clearly ideologically driven.

It seems little can be done to change ideology or even strategy as far as the CPP is concerned. One can at most find mutually acceptable terms of reference and the most promising for now is human rights, "the full scope of human rights and fundamental freedoms," to use the wording of CARHRIHL. Together with international humanitarian law, these can alleviate to some, if limited, extent the threats to personal, community and political security even as the war goes on.

Of course, that would not be enough to address the full scope of human security and human development which the people need. For this, socioeconomic, political and even constitutional reforms are needed. It would be ideal to achieve these through peace negotiations, perhaps additionally informed by the frameworks of human security and human development. But they can and should also be pursued on their own merits *outside* the peace negotiations and still be treated as part of a broader peace process. In other words, they should be pursued *not* with a counterinsurgency frame, not to overcome the insurgency, but to meet the needs of the people, to "serve the people."

From both sides of the conflict, the people's war is purportedly waged for and even by the people. It is time the people are empowered to freely decide, express and act about where they want this war to go. This itself may occasion some breakthrough. This in turn needs another breakthrough in terms of political reform for a more participatory and egalitarian democracy with mechanisms to address the root causes. Democracy, after all, is one of the mutually acceptable principles of the GRP-NDF peace negotiations. In its true or best sense, democracy might also be a framework for attaining a just and lasting peace.

CHAPTER 4

Human development, gender equity and human poverty

The 2005 Philippine Human Development Report (PHDR) embraces the period of political instability and recovery from the impeachment and people power II events in 2000 and 2001 to the months just shy of the 2004 national and local elections.

As the fifth in the series, the 2005 PHDR contains the fourth updating of the provincial human development indices (HDIs), including new estimates for 1997, 2000 and 2003. The first issue in 1994 contained only regional estimates. The second [1997] computed provincial HDIs for 1991 and 1994. The third [2000], provincial HDIs for 1994 and 1997, and the fourth [2002], for 1997 and 2000. Because of refinements in the HDI methodology, the HDIs should not be compared across editions of the PHDR. Other related indices, such as the Gender-related Development Index and the Human Poverty Index, and traditional indicators of well-being are also updated.

Human Development Index

The HDI is a tool to measure the overall achievements in three basic dimensions of human development, namely, longevity, knowledge, and a decent standard of living. It is premised on the principle that human development cannot be measured by the yardstick of income alone since income is a means, not an end, and there is no automatic link between income growth and human progress. This global Human Development Report (HDR) published by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) measures these dimensions across countries using life expectancy, educational attainment (simple literacy and combined primary, secondary, and tertiary enrollment) and adjusted per capita income in purchasing power parity (PPP) US dollars.

In the latest HDR [2005], the Philippines ranked 84th among 177 countries, placing it in the upper half of countries with middle human development. Over the years, the country's HDI has steadily been improving from 0.736 in 1995 to 0.758 in 2003. As noted in previous PHDRs, the Philippines has a high education index but a low GDP per capita income relative to other countries. While GDP per capita is lower for the Philippines than the group average of countries with medium human development, and life expectancy only 4.8 percent better than the average for the same group of countries, adult literacy and combined enrollment rates continued to be higher than the group average at 16.6 percent and 24.2 percent higher, respectively. This has enabled the country to rank much better in HDI (84th) than it does in terms of per capita GDP (103rd). Moreover, in terms of gender-related development index (GDI), which is simply HDI adjusted for gender inequality, the Philippines ranked 63rd among the 177 countries.

While it is interesting to know how the country fares relative to other countries, a closer examination of the components of human development is required

to understand the quality of overall performance, including any internal disparities hidden in national averages. In this chapter we look more closely into subnational performance to identify which provinces have performed better or worse across time by component of the human development index. In so doing, a fuller picture of the state of human development in the country will be presented.

Longevity

Our life expectancy figures for 1997, 2000, and 2003 were derived from a straight-line regression of life expectancy data points for years 1970, 1980, 1990, and 1995 obtained from Flieger and Cabigon (1994 and 1999). However, these estimates have not been updated, with data from the 2000 Census of Population and Housing. They thus represent one of the weaker aspects of the results reported here. On the other hand, it should be noted that life expectancy is among the variables that change very slowly across time.

Table 4.1 Life expectancy (in years, 2003) top 10 and bottom 10

Top 10	Years	Bottom 10	Years
Cebu	72.6	Antique	62.6
Pampanga	72.2	Kalinga	62.5
Batangas	71.8	Apayao	62.4
Bulacan	71.4	Eastern Samar	61.7
Camarines Sur	71.3	Western Samar	61.4
Nueva Ecija	71.2	Basilan	60.6
Davao del Sur	71.1	Lanao del Sur	57.9
Rizal	71.0	Sulu	52.8
La Union	70.6	Maguindanao	52.0
Cavite	70.5	Tawi-Tawi	51.2

Note: Metro Manila: 70.0 Source: Statistical Annex 1

With the exception of Maguindanao, estimates of life expectancy went up in all provinces. Top gainers were Davao Oriental, achieving the highest gain of 1.7 years, followed by Leyte, North Cotabato, Bukidnon and Camarines Sur, all between 1.4 and 1.6 years. Both the top (Davao Oriental, North Cotabato and Bukidnon) and bottom (Basilan, Tawi-Tawi and Sulu) gainers belong to Mindanao. This reflects the same pattern reported in PHDR 2002.

Provincial disparities continue to be large **[Table 4.1]**. Cebu has the highest life expectancy (72.6) followed by Pampanga (72.2.), Batangas (71.8), Bulacan (71.4), Camarines Sur (71.3). These four provinces have consistently topped the list since 1997. Rizal, which used to be in fifth place in 1997 and 2000, is now in 8th place, overtaken by Camarines Sur, Nueva Ecija and Davao del Sur.

On the other hand, at the bottom of the list are the five provinces of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), which have largely kept their places at the bottom 5. Antique, which was not previously in the bottom 10, is now there; Apayao, Eastern and Western Samar, have kept their rankings since 1997. Maguindano has a lower life expectancy today at 52.0 years from 53.2 years in 1997.

Compared to other countries, life expectancy in Cebu is slightly higher than that in Columbia (72.4) but lower than that in Malaysia (73.2). On the other hand, Sulu, Maguindanao and Tawi-Tawi are in the vicinity of Guinea (53.7), Congo (52.0), and Haiti (51.6).

Knowledge

When provincial HDIs were generated in the second and third issues of the PHDR, the knowledge component of the index was based, either entirely or in part, on *functional literacy rates* obtained from the Functional Literacy, Education, and Mass Media Survey (FLEMMS) of the National Statistics Office (NSO). This was consistent with the global HDI. However, since the FLEMMS had not been updated since 1994 and was not likely to be repeated (according to the National Statistics Office at the time), the fourth issue of the PHDR (2002) replaced functional literacy rate with *high school graduate ratio*, defined as the percentage of those 18 years and above in the

province who are at least high-school graduates.

This year, even though a new FLEMMS was undertaken in 2003, the use of the high-school graduate ratio has been maintained, and will be henceforth. Reasons for permanently adopting this statistic are (i) availability, (ii) timeliness, and (iii) consistency over time since the operational definition of "functional literacy" and thus how the FLEMMS will measure it may change according to expert opinion. While high-school graduate ratio is not a qualitative measure of literacy, the rank correlation between this statistic and functional literacy is quite high: 0.71 for 2003, 0.71 for 1994 and 0.93 in 1989 using the labor force survey.

The second component of the education index remains the *basic education enrollment ratio* or the proportion of children aged 7-16 years who are currently enrolled. This age range is used despite the lowering of the minimum age for grade 1 enrollees to 6 years in 1995 since there are still a handful of provinces where only 0 to 10 percent proportion of children aged 6 are enrolled in grade 1.

The estimate comes from the Annual Poverty and Indicator Survey (APIS) 2002. As explained in the 2002 PHDR, this statistic had been previously estimated using (i) estimates from the Department of Eduction (DepEd) in the numerator, i.e., the number of elementary and secondary school enrollees by province, including projections on private school enrollment and (ii) NSO population estimates of 7-16 year olds in the denominator. Since some implausible figures (i.e., a ratio greater than 1) were encountered, however, the shift to using APIS data was made, although sampling errors would still be present.

For the country as a whole, the proportion of high-school graduates among adults in 2003 was 52.1 percent. This was an improvement from the 2000 level of 49.4 percent and 1997 level of 46.8 percent. The greatest progress has been made by Western Samar (from 22.3 percent in 2000 to 31 percent in 2003, or a 39-percentage change) and Lanao del

Table 4. 2 Largest gainers, losers: High school graduate ratio, 2000 vs. 2003

Top Gainers	Percentage change	Top Losers	Percentage change
Western Samar	39.1	Sarangani	-24.8
Lanao del Sur	28.5	Maguindanao	-19.9
Batanes	25.7	Davao Oriental	-12.6
Siquijor	25.1	Zamboanga del Norte	-10.2
Masbate	22.2	Quezon	-5.2
Negros Occidental	20.1	Lanao del Norte	-4.1
Biliran	20.0	North Cotabato	-3.8
Apayao	19.9	Southern Leyte	-3.6
Tawi-Tawi	19.4	Mt. Province	-3.5
Camarines Sur	19.2	Camarines Norte	-3.4

Note: Metro Manila: 1.9% Source: Statistical Annexes 1 and 2

Table 4.3 High-school graduate ratio: Percentage of population 18 and above who have completed high school, 2003

Top 10	%	Bottom 10	%
Batanes	76.3	Northern Samar	32.1
Rizal	67.6	Agusan del Sur	32.1
Cavite	66.6	Negros Oriental	32.0
Benguet	65.3	Basilan	31.6
Laguna	63.8	Western Samar	31.0
Bataan	62.7	Maguindanao	28.9
Pangasinan	62.0	Masbate	28.5
Zambales	60.9	Davao Oriental	27.8
Misamis Oriental	58.1	Sarangani	25.3
Pampanga	57.4	Sulu	21.1

Note: Metro Manila: 75.7% Source: Statistical Annex 1

Table 4.4 Largest gainers, losers: Basic education enrollment rates, 2000 vs 2002

Top Gainers	Percentage change	Top Losers	Percentage change
Sarangani	15.6	Western Samar	-5.4
Sulu	7.9	Biliran	-4.4
Masbate	7.1	Apayao	-3.9
Camarines Norte	7.1	Negros Oriental	-3.6
Oriental Mindoro	7.1	Catanduanes	-3.6
Agusan del Norte	6.7	Siquijor	-3.2
Bukidnon	6.7	Bataan	-2.8
Davao del Sur	6.2	Occidental Mindoro	-2.7
Maguindanao	6.0	Bohol	-2.5
Zamboanga del Sur	5.5	Cavite	-2.3

Note: Metro Manila: -1.0% Source: Statistical Annexes 1 and 2

Table 4.5 Basic enrollment rate (2002)

Top 10	%	Bottom 10	%
Batanes	96.9	Bukidnon	88.3
Mt. Province	94.8	Camarines Sur	87.5
Benguet	94.8	Biliran	86.4
Zambales	94.7	Basilan	83.9
Misamis Oriental	94.3	Sulu	83.8
Kalinga	94.1	Maguindanao	81.2
Ifugao	93.9	Lanao del Sur	81.1
Aklan	93.7	Western Samar	80.9
Ilocos Norte	93.6	Sarangani	80.1
Southern Leyte	93.6	Negros Oriental	76.9

Note: Metro Manila: 92.8% Source: Statistical Annex 1

Sur (from 35.7% in 2000 to 45.9% in 2003, or a 29 percentage change), while Saranggani (from 33.6% in 2000 to 25.3% in 2003, or a -25 percentage change) and Maguindanao (from 36.1% in 2000 to 26.9% in 2003, or -20 percentage change) have made the least progress **[Table 4.2].**

In the current ranking, Batanes (76 percent) heads the list with more than three-fourths of its adult population having completed at least high school, greater than Metro Manila at 75.7 percent and overtaking five other provinces. Rizal, Cavite, Benguet, Laguna, Bataan, Pangasinan, Zambales, and Misamis Oriental continue to be in the top 10 although rankings have been altered since 2000 **[Table 4.3]**.

At the other side of the spectrum, Sulu continues to have the smallest proportion of high-school graduates among its adult population at 21.1 percent, with a slight improvement from its level in 2000 of 18.1 percent. Improvements from their 2000 levels are also noted for Northern Samar (from 31.8 percent), Basilan (from 28.6 percent), Western Samar (from 22.3 percent) and Masbate (from 23.3 percent) although they continue to be in the bottom 10. On the other hand, three provinces in Mindanao—Sarangani, Maguindanao, and Agusan del Sur—along with Negros Oriental are now among the bottom 10, replacing Bohol, Biliran, Northern Samar and Apayao.

The overall basic education enrollment ratio has slightly increased across the years, from 88 percent in 1998 to 89 percent in 1999 and to 91 percent in 2002. Largest gainers since 2000 are Sarangani, followed by Sulu, while losers include Western Samar, Biliran, and Apayao **[Table 4.4]**.

On a subnational level, Batanes and Mt. Province continue to be the two highest-ranked provinces, with nearly all their children aged 7-16 enrolled. Benguet, Zambales and Ilocos Norte also remain in the top 10 while new additions are Misamis Oriental, Kalinga, Ifugao, Aklan, and Southern Leyte **[Table 4.5]**.

At the other extreme are six provinces of

Mindanao—Bukidnon, Basilan, Sulu, Sarangani, Maguindanao, and Lanao del Sur—which have consistently appeared at the bottom 10 since 1998. The others at the bottom are Negros Oriental, Western Samar, Biliran and Camarines Sur. All six Mindanao provinces, along with Negros Oriental, Masbate and Camarines Sur, appear in the bottom 10 for at least one of the education indicators.

Standard of living

The Family Income and Expenditures Survey (FIES) for 1997, 2000 and 2003 provides the source of estimates of provincial per capita income. Consistency with the global HDI would have required provincial per capita GDP, but the latter is unavailable since GDP is disaggregated only up to the regional level.

As discussed in the PHDR 2002, to make sure income comparisons are consistent, two adjustments are made: first, income is measured consistently over time by deflating it to 1997 price levels using regional consumer price indices from the National Statistics Office; and second, they were made consistent across space by adjusting them using provincial cost-of-living indices derived by Balisacan [2000].

In the course of computing real per capita incomes this year, it was discovered that there were outliers—that is, households with extraordinarily high incomes—which were causing high-income variances within each province. For instance, in the province of Nueva Vizcaya, one household was recorded with a declared income of P6 million. To address this problem, this report computed for a top and bottom 0.5 percent-*trimmed mean* of per capita income. For purposes of comparisons over time, trimmed mean per capita incomes for 2000 and 1997 were also computed.

In the aggregate, real per capita income declined between 1997 and 2000, from 27,896 (NCR 1997 pesos) to 26,881 (NCR 1997 pesos), then slightly rose again in 2003.This is likely to reflect the struggle towards recovery from the political and social unrest

Table 4.6 Top gainers and losers: Real per capita income 2000 vs. 2003 (NCR 1997 pesos)

Top gainers	Percentage change	Top losers	Percentage change
Quirino	51.1	Zamboanga del Norte	-32.3
Ifugao	50.2	Palawan	-28.1
Camiguin	38.7	Davao Oriental	-27.7
Capiz	38.6	Surigao del Sur	-19.7
Eastern Samar	37.4	Guimaras	-19.3
Lanao del Sur	31.6	Siquijor	-18.3
Tarlac	26.5	Mt. Province	-16.2
Western Samar	22.4	Ilocos Norte	-16.1
Sorsogon	21.0	Leyte	-15.8
Masbate	19.0	Iloilo	-15.8

Note: Metro Manila: -14.5% Source: Statistical Annexes 1 and 2

Table 4.7 Real per capita income, 2003 (NCR 1997 pesos)

Top 10	Real per capita Income	Bottom 10	Real per capita Income
Nueva Vizcaya	36,485	Guimaras	17,049
Benguet	35,530	Romblon	16,712
Laguna	35,309	Marinduque	15,938
Batanes	32,181	Sarangani	15,014
Quirino	32,062	Masbate	14,454
Cavite	31,101	Zamboanga del Norte	14,218
Rizal	30,981	Maguindanao	14,198
Pampanga	30,355	Basilan	13,265
Bataan	29,916	Tawi-Tawi	10,780
Tarlac	29,473	Sulu	8,430

Note: Metro Manila: Php39,639 Source: Statistical Annex 1

the country has experienced for the past few years. Between 2000 and 2003, per capita incomes rose in 40 provinces and fell in 37 provinces. Metro Manila's per capita income declined by 14.5 percent **[Table 4.6]**. Largest gainers were Quirino (51.1 percent) and Ifugao (50.2 percent) while Marinduque experienced no change. On the other hand, the province of Zamboanga del Norte had the highest drop in income (-32.3 percent) followed by Palawan and Davao Oriental.

Table 4.7 shows the top 10 and bottom 10 provinces in terms of real per capita income (NCR 1997 pesos). Excluding Metro Manila, Nueva Vizcaya has the highest per capita income of P36,485; Nueva Vizcaya was previously ranked seventh with P30,892. Remaining in the top 10 since 2000 are Benguet, Laguna, Cavite, Rizal, and Bataan. They are joined this year by Batanes, Qurino, Pampanga and Tarlac, which replace Ilocos Norte, Bulacan, Abra, and Misamis Oriental.

At the other extreme is Sulu, the lowest-ranked since 1997. Other provinces which continue to occupy the bottom slots are Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, Masbate, Marinduque and Romblon. Three Mindanao provinces (Maguindanao, Zamboanga del Norte and Sarangani) along with Guimaras are new additions to the bottom 10 replacing Western and Eastern Samar, Sorsogon and, bucking the ARMM trend, Lanao del Sur which has moved from 70th to 48th place. ARMM provinces figure prominently in the bottom four provinces.

HDI levels

As usual, two sets of HDIs are computed in this report. The first set, labeled HDI-1, is used for comparisons across provinces and departs from the global HDI on two counts as indicated above: first, in its use of high-school graduate ratio in lieu of functional literacy; and second, in its computation of the income index. The second set, labeled HDI-2, is used to benchmark provinces to other countries and as such, hews as closely as possible to the global HDI computation. All refinements used to compute the 2003 indices, such as the use of trimmed mean per capita income, were applied to 2000 and 1997 data.

Table 4.8 Indicators used in HDI computation

HDI	Long and healthy life	Knowledge I	Knowledge II	Standard of Living
Global HDI (For inter-country comparisons)	Life expectancy	Simple Literacy	Combined elementary, secondary, and tertiary enrolment rate	GDP per capita in purchasing power parity US$
Maximum	85	100	100	40,000
Minimum	25	0	0	100
HDI-1 (For inter-provincial comparisons)	Life expectancy	% of adults high school graduate	Combined elementary and secondary enrolment rate (7-16 yrs)	Real per capita income in NCR 1997 prices
Maximum	85	100	100	Highest income across time from 1997 to 2003
Minimum	25	0	0	Lowest income across time from 1997 to 2003
HDI-2 (For international comparisons)	Life expectancy	Functional Literacy	Combined elementary, and secondary enrolment rate (7-16 yrs)	Per capita income in purchasing power parity US$
Maximum	85	100	100	40,000
Minimum	25	0	0	100

Table 4.9 Human Development Index-1, 2003

Top 10	Index	Per capita income rank minus HDI rank	Bottom 10	Index	Per capita income rank minus HDI rank
Benguet	0.738	1	Lanao del Sur	0.480	-20
Laguna	0.717	1	Eastern Samar	0.474	-15
Batanes	0.711	1	Western Samar	0.469	-26
Rizal	0.708	3	Sarangani	0.448	0
Cavite	0.704	1	Zamboanga del Norte	0.446	1
Nueva Vizcaya	0.686	-5	Masbate	0.442	-1
Pampanga	0.685	1	Basilan	0.409	1
Bataan	0.679	1	Tawi-Tawi	0.364	1
Bulacan	0.663	5	Maguindanao	0.360	-2
Ilocos Norte	0.659	2	Sulu	0.301	0

Note: Metro Manila: 0.793

Source: Statistical Annex 1

Table 4.8 compares the computations of the three HDIs : global, HDI-1 and HDI-2.

Statistical Annex 1 presents both HDI-1 and HDI-2 for the provinces. Unless we specifically say otherwise, any reference to HDI in the following text refers to HDI-1.

As shown in Table 4.9, all of the provinces in the top 10 are Luzon provinces. Two provinces—Pampanga and Nueva Viscaya are new additions to the top 10 list, replacing Misamis Oriental and Iloilo who were ranked 8th and 10th in 2000. Benguet has shown a consistent improvement, rising in the ranking from No. 7 and No. 4 in 1997 and 2000, respectively, to No. 1 in 2003, while Batanes made its way to the top from a rank of 9 in 2000.

On the other hand, seven out of the bottom-10 belong to Mindanao, five of which are from ARMM. Sulu continues to record the lowest HDI (0.301), followed by Maguindanao, Tawi-Tawi and Basilan while the fifth ARMM province, Lanao del Sur, is 10th from the bottom. Sarangani and Zamboanga are new additions to the bottom 10 list, replacing Romblon and Agusan del Sur which rose in the ranks to 67th and 61st, respectively.

Are gains in per capita incomes effectively leveraged into equivalent achievements in human development outcomes? Greater achievements in human development outcomes relative to incomes are registered for all provinces belonging to the top 10, with the exception of Nueva Vizcaya, as well as to three provinces in the bottom 10. This is indicated by a positive value moving from a province's ranking based on per capita income to its ranking based on the HDI. A negative value such as that of Nueva Vizcaya, Lanao Sur, and Eastern and Western Samar, on the other hand, signifies the inability to leverage relatively better levels of income into equivalent levels of human development outcomes.

Changes in the HDI

Between 2000 and 2003, the HDI level increased for 50 provinces and declined in 30, including Metro Manila.

Tables 4.10 and 4.11 give the list of top 10 gainers and losers in HDI-1 based on two different ways of computing improvement. The first is the usual percentage improvement given by the formula:

$$\textbf{Percentage improvement} = (HDI_t - HDI_{t-1})/HDI_{t-1}$$

Table 4.10 Human Development Index, 2003 top gainers

Province	Percentage change	Province	Gap improvement
Ifugao	22.0	Ifugao	20.5
Quirino	19.4	Quirino	19.9
Lanao del Sur	18.0	Batanes	16.9
Capiz	13.8	Tarlac	16.3
Eastern Samar	13.6	Capiz	15.3
Camiguin	13.4	Nueva Vizcaya	15.0
Western Samar	11.9	Camiguin	14.1
Tarlac	11.4	Benguet	13.7
Masbate	10.6	Lanao del Sur	12.3
Batanes	9.0	Cebu	10.9

Source: Statistical Annexes 1 and 2

Table 4.11 Human Development Index, 2003 largest losers

Province	Percentage change	Province	Gap improvement
Zamboanga del Norte	-12.4	Rizal	-17.3
Davao Oriental	-9.7	Ilocos Norte	-16.4
Palawan	-8.9	Zamboanga del Norte	-12.9
Ilocos Norte	-6.8	Davao Oriental	-12.2
Maguindanao	-6.6	Palawan	-11.2
Mt. Province	-6.1	Iloilo	-9.4
Metro Manila	-6.0	Mt. Province	-8.5
Rizal	-5.7	Bataan	-8.4
Guimaras	-5.6	Guimaras	-6.4
Iloilo	-5.1	Surigao del Sur	-4.7

Note: Metro Manila: -6.1% (percentage change); -32.8% (percentage gap improvement)

Source: Statistical Annexes 1 and 2

The second computation is the *gap* improvement given by the formula:

$$\textbf{Gap improvement} = (HDI_t - HDI_{t-1})/(1-HDI_{t-1})$$

Since improvements are based on how far a province still is from the perfect HDI (of 1), the second formula is preferred by many because it is not biased against those who already have high HDIs. Using either method, seven of the biggest gainers are Quirino, Ifugao, Capiz, Camiguin, Tarlac, Lanao del Sur and Batanes **[Table 4.10]**. Likewise, nine provinces are common to both lists of bottom 10 provinces **[Table 4.11]**.

The picture is mixed for the ARMM provinces. While Tawi- Tawi and Sulu do not figure among the top losers (perhaps because they have remained stagnant at the bottom), Lanao del Sur records improvement and lands in the top 10 gainers.

International comparisons

PHDR 2002 asked "if provinces were countries unto themselves, how would they fare against other countries?" To answer this question, we use the HDI-2 computations and juxtapose them against selected country HDI computations for 2003 (as featured in the (Global) 2005 HDR).

Compared to HDI-1, HDI-2 is less disperse, with the high HDI-1s generally having equivalently lower HDI-2s, and the low HDI-1s having equivalently higher HDI-2s. This is for the same reason mentioned in the previous report: the shift to the international maximum income threshold dwarfs even Metro Manila's per capita income. Table 4.12 shows the HDI-2 of the provinces relative to selected countries.

Unlike in the past report where all provinces fell within the "medium" human development category (HDI 0.799 to 0.500), this time, one province (Maguindanao) falls within the "low" human development category (HDI 0.499 to 0.000). Metro Manila's HDI is roughly equivalent to that of

Table 4.12 Provinces versus countries (province HDI-2 figures for 2003, country figures for 2003)

Australia	0.955		Negros Occidental	0.697		Mt. Province	0.650
Hong Kong, China (SAR)	0.916		Isabela	0.697		Sultan Kudarat	0.650
Singapore	0.907		South Cotabato	0.697		Kalinga	0.648
Malaysia	0.796		Indonesia	0.697		Palawan	0.647
Thailand	0.778		Albay	0.696		Ifugao	0.646
Metro Manila	0.777		Sorsogon	0.695		Guimaras	0.643
Samoa	0.776		Quezon	0.695		Antique	0.643
Saudi Arabia	0.772		Camarines Sur	0.693		Northern Samar	0.641
Ukraine	0.766		Nicaragua	0.690		Camarines Norte	0.641
Rizal	0.763		Oriental Mindoro	0.686		Davao Oriental	0.639
Lebanon	0.759		Abra	0.684		Gabon	0.635
Cavite	0.758		Bohol	0.684		Surigao del Sur	0.633
Batanes	0.755		Cagayan	0.683		Catanduanes	0.632
China	0.755		Camiguin	0.682		Morocco	0.631
Benguet	0.753		Ilocos Sur	0.680		Occidental Mindoro	0.630
Batangas	0.750		Misamis Occidental	0.680		Namibia	0.627
Bulacan	0.749		Mongolia	0.668		Negros Oriental	0.626
Dominican Republic	0.749		Marinduque	0.676		Masbate	0.625
Laguna	0.747		Surigao del Norte	0.674		Eastern Samar	0.625
Pampanga	0.747		Lanao del Norte	0.673		Agusan del Sur	0.624
Maldives	0.745		Leyte	0.672		Siquijor	0.615
Bataan	0.745		Agusan del Norte	0.671		India	0.602
Georgia	0.732		Moldova	0.671		Lanao del Sur	0.601
Azerbaijan	0.729		Zamboanga del Sur	0.670		Zamboanga del Norte	0.599
Cebu	0.728		Capiz	0.667		Western Samar	0.597
Zambales	0.727		Honduras	0.667		Solomon Islands	0.594
La Union	0.723		North Cotabato	0.666		Sarangani	0.593
Pangasinan	0.723		Davao del Norte	0.664		Basilan	0.578
El Salvador	0.722		Romblon	0.664		Myanmar	0.578
Misamis Oriental	0.717		Quirino	0.661		Cambodia	0.571
Nueva Ecija	0.713		Apayao	0.659		Lao People's Dem. Rep.	0.545
Ilocos Norte	0.712		Bukidnon	0.659		Sulu	0.540
Nueva Vizcaya	0.706		Southern Leyte	0.659		Ghana	0.520
Vietnam	0.704		Aurora	0.658		Tawi-Tawi	0.518
Davao del Sur	0.702		South Africa	0.658		Sudan	0.512
Kyrgyzstan	0.70		Aklan	0.656		Zimbabwe	0.505
Tarlac	0.698		Biliran	0.655		Maguindanao	0.498
Iloilo	0.698		Tajikstan	0.652		Swaziland	0.498

Thailand and Samoa, but lower than those of Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia. Cavite's HDI-2 is roughly equivalent to that of Lebanon, as Bataan's is to the Maldives'. Cebu's HDI is lower than Georgia and Azerbaijan, while Davao del Sur's is roughly equivalent to Kyrgyzstan.

Looking at the bottom provinces, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi find themselves among countries such as Lao PDR, Ghana and Sudan, while Maguindanao, with the lowest HDI, finds itself with Swaziland.

Gender-related Development Index

Just as national figures can mask differences at the provincial level, provincial figures can mask differences within subgroups—by gender, ethnicity, income.

The GDI is a measure of human development adjusted for inequality in the achievement of men and women. In other words, it is the HDI discounted for gender inequality. If on average the HDI for both genders are the same, then the GDI will be identical to the HDI.

We compute two sets of estimates: the GDI-1 which uses the same data as the HDI-1 and is used for the interprovincial comparisons, and GDI-2 which uses the same data as HDI-2 and is used for international comparisons. We are also interested in how the rankings of provinces change, moving from their HDI ranking to their GDI ranking.

Table 4.13 shows the top and bottom provinces in terms of GDI-1. Except for Zambales and Batangas, which replace Bulacan and Ilocos Norte, all the provinces in the top 10 are also in the top 10 for the HDI. This means that while human development is on average better in Bulacan and Ilocos Norte, Zambales and Batangas are actually better off discounting for inequalities between men and women. The improvement in the rankings of Rizal, Cavite and Batangas when one moves from their HDI ranking to their GDI ranking (indicated by a positive value for HDI rank minus GDI ranking) likewise indicates that these three provinces are on average better off in terms of human development after discounting for gender inequalities.

Statistical Annex 4 shows other large improvements in ranking when going from the HDI to the GDI. Aurora, which ranks 38 in the HDI, goes up 21 notches to rank 17th under the GDI, registering the biggest change. Other big gainers include Catanduanes (17 notches), Albay (17 notches), Marinduque (15 notches) and Nueva Ecija

Table 4.13 Gender Development Index-1 (2003)

Top	Index	HDI rank minus GDI rank	Bottom	Index	HDI rank minus GDI rank
Rizal	0.680	3	Eastern Samar	0.439	1
Laguna	0.662	0	Biliran	0.438	-5
Cavite	0.642	2	Agusan del Sur	0.429	-9
Benguet	0.635	-3	Zamboanga del Norte	0.428	1
Batanes	0.625	-2	Sarangani	0.425	-1
Zambales	0.624	9	Masbate	0.408	0
Bataan	0.619	1	Basilan	0.381	0
Pampanga	0.611	-1	Tawi-Tawi	0.356	0
Batangas	0.606	7	Maguindanao	0.314	0
Nueva Vizcaya	0.595	-4	Sulu	0.296	0

Note: Metro Manila: 0.735

Source: Statistical Annex 4

Table 4.14 Selected internationally-comparable provincial GDI (Province GDI-2 figures for 2003, country figures for 2003)

Hong Kong, China (SAR)	0.912	Viet Nam	0.702	Occidental Mindoro	0.645
Mexico	0.804	Indonesia	0.691	Camarines Norte	0.639
Malaysia	0.791	Abra	0.689	Agusan del Sur	0.617
Metro Manila	0.775	Mongolia	0.677	Morocco	0.616
Thailand	0.7744	Leyte	0.675	Eastern Samar	0.615
Rizal	0.764	Capiz	0.674	Lanao del Sur	0.597
Ukraine	0.763	Surigao del Sur	0.674	India	0.586
Cavite	0.756	Zamboanga del Sur	0.671	Western Samar	0.585
China	0.754	Mt. Province	0.671	Cambodia	0.567
Batangas	0.749	Quirino	0.668	Basilan	0.562
Saudi Arabia	0.749	Moldova	0.668	Lao PDR.	0.540
Bataan	0.746	Romblon	0.665	Sulu	0.540
Benguet	0.745	Aklan	0.662	Tawi-Tawi	0.539
Lebanon	0.745	Davao Norte	0.660	Maguindanao	0.536
Cebu	0.730	South Africa	0.652	Ghana	0.517
Ilocos Norte	0.707	Tajikistan	0.650	Sudan	0.495

Source: Statistical Annex 4 and (Global) Human Development Report 2005

(15 notches). For provinces which improve in ranking from HDI to GDI, the much better performance of women in terms of longevity and education is more evident than in other provinces. In general, women are better than men in terms of life expectancy and education variables, and are worse off in terms of estimated earned income.

All provinces in the bottom-10 provinces for GDI also figure in the bottom 10 for the HDI, except for Agusan del Sur and Biliran, which replace Western Samar and Lanao del Sur. In other words, Western Samar and Lanao del Sur are, on average, better off in terms of human development after discounting inequalities between men and women. Other provinces which register big downward adjustments when moving to their GDI rankings are Bukidnon, whose ranking falls 25 notches from rank 28 in HDI to rank 53 in GDI, Camiguin (22 notches), Kalinga (22 notches) Quirino, and Agusan del Norte (20 notches).

Using GDI-2, Table 4.14 indicates how our provinces compare to other countries in terms of gender-related human development. The relative positions of the top provinces are much the same as those in the HDI **[Table 4.12]** but at the bottom, Tawi-Tawi and Maguindanao now rank relatively higher than Ghana and Sudan. In terms of GDI, all the provinces fall within the medium human development category.

Income poverty and human poverty

A more traditional measure of well-being than either the HDI or GDI is poverty incidence, defined as the proportion of the population whose income falls below the poverty line. The poverty line is the amount of money just sufficient to meet a person's most basic food and nonfood needs.

In calculations of the poverty incidence, this Report uses the poverty lines developed by Balisacan [1999]. These lines are adjusted for inflation, as it is deemed more appropriate for interprovincial estimates. Following his methodology, we also use per capita expenditure instead of per capita income because, as the theory goes, it is more reflective of permanent income and it is likely to be more accurate given the level of detail at which it is obtained.

The FIES survey data used for poverty estimation were only available beginning 1985. From that time until 1997, results show that there has been, more or less, a steady decline in poverty incidence from 40.9 percent to 25.1 percent. From 1997-2000, poverty increased from 25.1 percent to 27.5 percent; while in the recent period, 2000-2003, poverty incidence declined from 27.5 percent to 25.7 percent, although this rate is still higher than that of 1997.

Statistical Annex 5 presents the changes in the *depth* and *severity* of poverty across provinces for the years 1997, 2000, and 2003. The poverty depth is an indicator of the incidence of poverty adjusted for how far the poor are, on average, from the poverty line. For two provinces with the same incidence, one with a higher poverty depth means that, on average, its poor are poorer (or farther from the poverty line). In addition, poverty severity accounts for the inequality among the poor. Statistical Annex 5 shows that from year 2000, 46 provinces, including Metro Manila, improved in terms of poverty depth and 32 provinces deteriorated. Likewise, 47 provinces, including Metro Manila, improved in terms of poverty severity and 31 provinces worsened. Using either statistic, it seems that, on average, the poor are less poor now than they were three years ago.

Table 4.15 shows the top gainers and losers in terms of reductions in poverty incidence. Ifugao has the highest decline in poverty incidence with a

Table 4.15 Gainers and losers in reduction of poverty incidence (2000 vs 2003)

Top Gainers	2003	Percentage-point difference	Top Losers	2003	Percentage-point difference
Ifugao	10.9	-29.9	Batangas	24.4	8.1
Romblon	52.1	-22.4	Surigao del Norte	45.1	8.2
Catanduanes	21.9	-21.3	Zamboanga del Norte	63.2	11.2
Sorsogon	34.2	-18.6	Occidental Mindoro	35.3	11.9
Eastern Samar	44.5	-17.2	Southern Leyte	44.4	12.0
Bohol	35.3	-12.8	Davao Oriental	41.7	13.4
Capiz	23.6	-12.5	Surigao del Sur	44.5	14.5
North Cotabato	23.7	-11.0	Maguindanao	55.7	19.6
Tarlac	9.7	-10.5	Palawan	50.5	25.1
Quirino	9.6	-10.2	Guimaras	48.8	32.3

Note: Metro Manila: -1.3%

Source: Statistical Annex 5

Table 4.16 Top and bottom provinces in poverty incidence with HDI ranks (2003)

HDI rank from the top	Top provinces	Incidence	HDI rank from the bottom	Bottom provinces	Incidence
43	Apayao	1.2	15	Marinduque	49.1
6	Nueva Vizcaya	3.8	22	Palawan	50.5
2	Laguna	5.7	18	Siquijor	51.9
7	Pampanga	6.0	11	Romblon	52.1
10	Ilocos Norte	6.7	2	Maguindanao	55.7
4	Rizal	7.9	5	Masbate	60.8
5	Cavite	8.5	6	Zamboanga del Norte	63.2
8	Bataan	8.9	4	Basilan	65.6
3	Batanes	9.2	3	Tawi-tawi	69.8
9	Bulacan	9.2	1	Sulu	88.8

Note: Metro Manila: 4.3

Source: Statistical Annex 5

29.9-percentage-point reduction from 40.9 percent in 2000 to 10.9 percent in 2003. Unlike the period between 1997 and 2000 when only three provinces had double-digit reductions, all the top provinces had double-digit reductions from 2000 to 2003. On the other hand, eight out of the bottom 10 provinces registered double-digit increases. The province with the highest increase in poverty incidence is Guimaras with a 32.3-percentage-point change, from 16.5 percent in 2000 to 48.8 percent in 2003. Overall, poverty incidence declined in 48 provinces and Metro Manila, while it increased in 30 provinces.

Table 4.16 shows the top and bottom provinces in terms of poverty incidence alongside their HDI ranks. Note that only seven out of 10 provinces in both the top and bottom rungs are alike for both

Table 4.17 Top and bottom provinces in HPI (2003)

Top Provinces (Least Poor)	HPI	Income poverty minus HPI rank	Bottom Provinces (Most Poor)	HPI	Income Poverty rank minus HPI rank
Batanes	6.5	9	Lanao del Sur	23.2	-20
Laguna	7.2	2	Sarangani	23.8	-7
Bataan	7.3	6	Zamboanga del Norte	24.8	4
Batangas	7.9	22	Camarines Norte	25.7	-4
Bulacan	8.1	5	Guimaras	27.7	-6
Pampanga	8.1	-2	Masbate	28.0	0
Cavite	8.9	0	Basilan	29.8	1
Pangasinan	9.3	12	Maguindanao	31.7	-3
Zambales	10.2	4	Sulu	32.7	1
La Union	10.3	8	Tawi-Tawi	39.1	-1

Note: Metro Manila: 7.7

Source: Statistical Annex 6

measures. For example, while Apayao has the lowest poverty incidence, it is ranked only No. 43 in terms of HDI. This means it is far less well off when one considers outcomes of a broader nature, beyond that of less income poverty alone. Benguet, on the other hand, is ranked first in terms of HDI but is not among the top 10 provinces in terms of low poverty incidence. Benguet's achievements in terms of longevity and knowledge outweigh shortcomings in terms of income poverty.

On the other hand, the provinces of Western and Eastern Samar, Lanao del Sur and Sarangani appear in the bottom 10 in terms of HDI but not in terms of high poverty incidence. In other words, they do worse in terms of human development than they do in terms of the incidence of income poverty. Sulu and Tawi-Tawi are at the bottom using either measure. In Tawi-Tawi, five out of every seven people are poor while in Sulu, eight out of every nine people are poor.

Human Poverty Index

The human poverty index (HPI) captures deprivation beyond income poverty alone. While the HDI measures overall progress in three dimensions of human development, the HPI measures deprivation in those same dimensions: longevity, as measured by the probability at birth of not surviving to age 40; knowledge, as measured by the adult illiteracy rate; and overall economic provisioning both public and private, as measured by the percentage of people not using improved water sources and the percentage of children under five who are underweight. Greater progress in reducing relative deprivation is indicated by a lower HPI. .

The indicators used in this report are the same as those used by the UNDP to compute the global HPI so our provinces may be compared with other countries. Statistical Annex 6 shows the HPI for all provinces.

Table 4.17 shows the top and bottom 10 provinces in terms of HPI. Those doing relatively well in terms of HPI are Batanes, Laguna, Bataan, Batangas, Bulacan, Pampanga, Cavite, Pangasinan and Zambales and La Union, which are all Luzon provinces. The top three provinces even have lower HPIs compared to that of Metro Manila (7.7).

At the bottom 10, we again find Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Maguindanao, Basilan, Masbate and Zamboanga del Norte, which also appear in the bottom for HDI and for income poverty.

Statistical Annex 6 shows how provinces fare when moving from their income poverty rank to their HPI rank. A positive figure indicates that the province may be doing relatively better in terms of addressing deprivations in basic economic provisioning, knowledge and longevity than what its incidence of income poverty may suggest, a negative value the opposite. Among the provinces with lowest HPIs, Batangas, Pangasinan, Batanes and La Union all show gains in ranking when moving from income poverty to human poverty outcomes. Bigger gains in ranking are in fact registered by Marinduque (51 notches), Surigao del Sur (46 notches), Romblon and Albay (42 notches each), Surigao del Norte (32 notches) and Oriental Mindoro (30 notches). On the other hand, provinces which register huge downward adjustments in ranking include Apayao (48 notches), Ifugao (44 notches), Capiz (40 notches) Catanduanes (38 notches) and North Cotabato (35 notches).

Comparing provincial HPIs with the country values found in the 2005 HDR, we see first that all provinces do worse (have a higher HPI) than Singapore (6.3). Among provinces with low HPIs, Laguna and Bataan are on a par with Columbia, while Bulacan and Pampanga are doing as well as Jordan. Among provinces with high HPIs, Zamboanga del Sur is comparable to Vanuatu, Basilan is between Congo and Djibouti, and Maguindanao is between India and Yemen. Tawi-Tawi does more poorly in terms of human poverty than Lao PDR, and Nepal, but better than Togo and Cambodia.

Table 4.18 Top and bottom provinces in inequality based on share in consumption of poorest 10 % to richest 10 % (2003)

Most Inequitable Provinces	Poorest 10%	Richest 10%	Ratio: Richest 10% to Poorest 10%	Least Inequitable Provinces	Poorest 10%	Richest 10%	Ratio: Richest 10% to Poorest 10%
Iloilo	2.8	31.9	11.6	Batanes	6.0	17.7	3.0
Davao del Sur	2.6	30.8	11.8	Apayao	5.0	19.2	3.8
Misamis Oriental	2.6	30.5	11.9	Sulu	5.1	19.6	3.9
Zamboanga del Sur	2.7	33.1	12.4	Tawi-Tawi	5.0	20.0	4.0
Bukidnon	2.6	33.1	12.7	Basilan	5.1	23.2	4.5
Zamboanga del Norte	2.8	36.2	13.0	Maguindanao	4.8	25.2	5.2
Cebu	2.4	31.7	13.4	Guimaras	4.5	24.3	5.5
Camarines Norte	2.9	39.3	13.5	Biliran	5.7	31.9	5.6
Negros Oriental	2.3	37.3	16.3	Sorsogon	4.8	27.3	5.7
Lanao del Norte	2.4	41.4	17.0	Ifugao	4.4	25.1	5.7

Note: Metro Manila: 3.2% (poorest 10%); 29.5% (richest 10%); 9.4%(ratio)

Source: Statistical Annex 7

Table 4.19 Top and bottom provinces in inequality based on Gini ratios (2003)

Most Inequitable Provinces	Gini	Least Inequitable Provinces	Gini
Masbate	46.7	Sulu	26.8
Eastern Samar	46.8	Apayao	28.3
Camarines Sur	47.4	Tawi-Tawi	28.9
Capiz	48.6	Basilan	32.4
Zamboanga del Sur	49.0	Nueva Ecija	32.9
Negros Oriental	49.0	Bulacan	33.5
Antique	49.4	Batanes	34.0
Camarines Norte	50.7	Maguindanao	34.5
Zamboanga del Norte	50.9	Zambales	35.4
Lanao del Norte	53.2	Pampanga	35.7

Note: Metro Manila: 39.8

Source: Statistical Annex 7

Inequality

As seen above, income disparities across provinces are great. However, disparities within provinces are likewise high. Statistical Annex 7 shows various measures of within-province inequality using per capita expenditure adjusted for cost-of-living difference and price changes over time.

Lanao del Norte has the most unequal distribution of income in the country with its richest decile having 17.0 more times the income of its poorest decile. On the other hand, Batanes has the most equitable distribution of income, with

the richest decile having only 3.0 times the share of consumption of its poorest decile. Batanes in fact is also characterized by low poverty incidence (rank 10) and high human development (rank 3). The same cannot be said of Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, however. While they record relatively low income inequality, they both score low in terms of poverty incidence and human development.

The Gini ratio is another measure of inequality. The higher the Gini ratio, the closer the province is to perfect inequality; the closer the ratio is to 0, the closer the province is to perfect equality. Table 4.19 shows the top and bottom provinces in terms of Gini ratio. Lanao del Norte has the highest inequality with a Gini ratio of 53.2 while Sulu has the least inequality with a ratio of 26.8.

For the country as a whole, inequality has been increasing from 1997 (42.7) to 2000 (42.9) to 2003 (43.8). From 2000 to 2003, the Gini ratio decreased in only 12 provinces including Metro Manila, compared to the 42 provinces between 1997 and 2000. Catanduanes recorded the largest decrease or the greatest improvement in equality **[Table 2.20].** On the other hand, the Gini ratio increased in 66 provinces, with Lanao del Sur registering the largest deterioration in equality.

Other indicators

■ Unemployment and underemployment

Statistical Annex 9 shows the provincial unemployment and underemployment rates from 1997 to 2003. These were estimated using NSO's definitions, which categorize as unemployed those people who, in the reference period (week preceding survey), (i) actively looked for work but did not find work, and (ii) those who had no work and who are not looking for work for any reason except schooling, housekeeping, young or old age, retirement, or permanent disability (since any of these would exclude them from the labor force). The unemployment rate is the fraction of the labor force that is unemployed. The underemployed are people already employed but who are looking for additional

Table 4.20 Most and least improved provinces based on Gini ratios (2003)

Provinces showing greater equality	Gini 2003 minus Gini 2000	Provinces showing greater inequality	Gini 2003 minus Gini 2000
Catanduanes	-10.4	Camarines Norte	8.2
Rizal	-7.0	Eastern Samar	8.3
Davao Oriental	-5.0	Surigao del Norte	8.5
Northern Samar	-3.8	Biliran	8.6
Bohol	-2.5	Quirino	9.1
Batanes	-1.8	Masbate	9.8
Maguindanao	-1.6	Antique	10.9
Siquijor	-1.4	Agusan del Sur	11.0
Leyte	-0.9	Zamboanga del Sur	11.0
Romblon	-0.8	Lanao del Sur	17.2

Note: Metro Manila: -5.2 Source: Statistical Annex 7

Table 4.21 Top and bottom provinces in unemployment rate (2000-2003)

Low Unemployment Provinces	Average Unemployment Rate (2001-2003)	High Unemployment Provinces	Average Unemployment Rate (2001-2003)
Batanes	2.2	Pangasinan	13.7
Camiguin	2.4	Zambales	13.8
Siquijor	2.9	Pampanga	13.9
Cagayan	3.0	Cebu	14.2
Apayao	3.4	South Cotabato	14.8
Sulu	3.7	Agusan del Norte	14.9
Mt. Province	3.8	Bataan	15.3
Tawi-Tawi	4.6	Aurora	15.3
Bukidnon	5.0	Laguna	15.4
North Cotabato	5.2	Cavite	15.8

Note: Metro Manila: 17.3 Source: Statistical Annex 9

Table 4.22 Provinces with highest and lowest underemployment (2001-2003)

Low Underemployment Provinces	Average Underemployment Rate (2001-2003)	High Underemployment Provinces	Average Underemployment Rate (2001-2003)
Sulu	3.2	Guimaras	34.5
Tawi-Tawi	3.3	Lanao del Norte	35.5
Lanao del Sur	4.2	Davao Oriental	36.1
Zambales	5.3	South Cotabato	36.9
Ilocos Sur	5.7	Zamboanga del Norte	37.2
Bulacan	7.2	Albay	39.6
Rizal	7.3	Bukidnon	43.2
Nueva Ecija	7.3	Nueva Vizcaya	43.5
Tarlac	7.4	Catanduanes	45.9
Sultan Kudarat	7.5	Eastern Samar	50.5

Note: Metro Manila: 10.1

Source: Statistical Annex 9

hours of work. The underemployment rate is the ratio of the underemployed to the total employed.

For 21 of the 77 provinces, unemployment rate was at or near double-digit figures for each year in the 2001-2003 periods. In contrast, the unemployment rate was consistently below 6 percent for each period for 10 provinces.

Table 4.20 shows the top and bottom provinces in terms of unemployment rate for years 2001-2003. Except for Tarlac, Surigao del Sur and Lanao del Norte, provinces with high unemployment rate for 1997-2000, still appear in the group for 2001-2003. On the other hand, Surigao del Norte and Ilocos Norte are no longer among the low-unemployment provinces in 2000-2003, having been replaced by Apayao and North Cotabato.

Both high- and low-unemployment provinces are a combination of poor and nonpoor, low and high human development provinces. Some of the lowest unemployment rates are also found in the poorest provinces (and with very low human development) such as Sulu, with the second lowest unemployment rate from 1997-2000 and sixth lowest from 2001-2003; and Tawi-Tawi, the seventh lowest from 1997-2000 and eight lowest from 2001-2003; where are employed as low-income agricultural workers. On the other hand, there is Agusan del Norte, with high poverty (above average) and also high unemployment (but decent human development). Kalinga has high employment, low poverty incidence (below average) but low human development.

Underemployment also varies across provinces. For 20 of the 77 provinces, the underemployment rate was never less than 25 percent for each year in the 2001-2003. For 12 provinces, the underemployment rate was at or near single digits for all the three years. In Table 4.31, the top and bottom provinces in terms of underemployment rates for 2001-2003 are presented.

Among the provinces belonging to the bottom 10 provinces in terms of HDI, income poverty and human poverty, Zamboanga del Norte again appears among the high-unemployment provinces. There is no straightforward relationship to be determined between underemployment, human development or poverty, however. Among those with the lowest underemployment rate are the relatively low-human development, high-income poverty provinces of

Table 4.23 Top and bottom provinces in terms of female economic activity rate as % of male rate (average 2001-2003)

Top Provinces	Female Economic Activity Rate (%)	As % of male rate	Bottom Provinces	Female Economic Activity Rate (%)	As % of male rate
Mt. Province	81.6	90.5	Tawi-Tawi	44.4	52.2
Batanes	80.8	81.4	Maguindanao	43.8	50.6
Bukidnon	76.7	82.0	Zamboanga del Sur	43.0	51.7
Camiguin	72.8	75.5	Nueva Ecija	42.5	50.4
Biliran	70.2	78.5	Pangasinan	41.6	52.5
Ifugao	68.1	82.2	Pampanga	41.1	51.4
Davao Oriental	65.8	71.6	Sultan Kudarat	38.5	46.7
Misamis Occidental	65.5	74.4	Basilan	29.0	35.6
Eastern Samar	64.9	71.7	Lanao del Sur	27.0	33.6
Nueva Vizcaya	64.5	76.2	Sulu	19.1	24.3

Note: Metro Manila: 53.0% (female economic activity rate); 67.8% (as % of male rate)

Source: Statistical Annex 10

Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Lanao del Sur, Sultan Kudarat and Basilan, alongside the relatively high-human development, low-income poverty provinces of Zambales and Ilocos Sur. At the same time, among those with the highest underemployment rates with high income poverty and low human development rank are Sarangani, Eastern Samar, Surigao del Sur, and Southern Leyte.

■ Gender inequality in economic activity

Statistical Annex 10 shows some measures of gender inequality in economic activity across provinces. In all provinces, the economic activity rate (defined as the sum of the employed and the unemployed over the total population, also called the labor participation rate) of women is lower than that of men. By custom, women undertake most of the housekeeping functions and when one does not look for work due to these functions, one is not considered to be a member of the labor force.

For the country as a whole, the difference in average economic activity rates between females and males has lessened. Over the 1997-2000 period, the economic activity rates were 49.7 percent for females and 83.5 percent for males; and from 2001-2003, they were 52.0 for females and 71.1 for males.

Among the top and bottom provinces in terms of relative economic activity, we find Sulu with the lowest female economic activity rate of 19.1 percent, or one-fourth the economic activity rate of women in Mountain Province. Other Mindanao provinces are also at the bottom for female economic activity such as Lanao del Sur, Basilan, Sultan Kudarat, Zamboanga del Sur, Maguindanao and Tawi-Tawi. Having a low female economic activity rate is not markedly different in Mindanao, however. Luzon provinces such as Pampanga, Pangasinan and Nueva Ecija also have low female economic activity rates. On the other hand, the top provinces are Mountain Province, Batanes, Bukidnon, Camiguin, Biliran, Ifugao, Davao Oriental, Misamis Occidental, Eastern Samar and Nueva Vizcaya. Half of the provinces in the top 10 have majority of their working females employed in the service sector. This marks a shift from 2000, where the major source of employment for females was agricultural.

TECHNICAL NOTES
(based on Human Development Report 2001 & 2004)

The human development index (HDI)

The HDI is a summary measure of human development. It measures the average achievement in a country in three basic dimensions of human development, namely, *Longevity*, as measured by life expectancy at birth; *Knowledge*, as measured by basic enrollment ratio (or enrolment ratio of children 7 to 16 years old), high-school graduate ratio and functional literacy rate; *Standard of living*, as measured by real income per capita (per capita income 1997 NCR in pesos and per capita income in PPP US$). For this report, there are two HDIs computed: HDI-1 for **interprovincial** comparisons and HDI-2 for **international comparisons**, that is, for comparing provinces with other countries.

Before the HDI itself is calculated, an index needs to be created for each of these dimensions. To calculate these dimension indices—the life expectancy, education, and income indices—minimum and maximum values (goalposts) are chosen for each underlying indicator. Goalposts are determined by the maximum and minimum values used in the recent Global HDI. Except for income indicator for HDI-1, the maximum and minimum values are not fixed exogenous values as in the Global HDI but are instead what are actually observed from the data. The reason for not using the Global HDI maximum (and by association the minimum) for income is that the maximum seems to represent too high a goalpost. Hence, deflating 2003 and 2000 per capita income figures to 1997 prices, maximum and minimum values for real per capita income (pesos) are utilized.

Performance in each dimension is expressed as a value between 0 and 1 by applying the following general formula:

$$\textbf{Dimension} = \frac{\text{actual value - minimum value}}{\text{maximum value - minimum value}}$$

The HDI is then calculated as a simple average of the dimension indices. We illustrate the calculation of the HDI for a sample province below.

Goalposts for calculating the HDI

Indicator	Maximum value	Minimum value
Life expectancy at birth (years)	85	25
Basic enrollment ratio (%)	100	0
High school graduate ratio (%) [for HDI-1]	100	0
Functional literacy rate [for HDI-2]	100	0
Real per capita income (Pesos) [for HDI-1]	46,837 (NCR per capita income 1997)	7,675 (Sulu per capita income 2000)
Real per capita income (PPP US$) [for HDI-2]	40,000	100

Calculating the HDI

The illustration of the calculation of the HDI uses data for Benguet.

1. Calculating the life expectancy index

The life expectancy index measures the relative achievement of a country in life expectancy at birth. To obtain the life expectancy figures for this report, a straight-line regression

was done using the gender-differentiated life expectancy figures for 1970, 1980, 1990, and 1995 obtained from Flieger and Cabigon (1994 and 1999), and this was projected to 1997, 2000 and 2003. The life expectancy in a province is assumed to be just the simple average of the male and the female life expectancies. For Benguet, with an estimated life expectancy of 70.1 in 2003, the life expectancy index is 0.751.

$$\textbf{Life expectancy index} = \frac{70.1 - 25}{85 - 25} = 0.751$$

2. Calculating the education index

The education index measures a country's relative achievement in education. For HDI-1, calculations of index for basic enrollment ratio and the high-school graduate ratio are done, giving a greater weight on the latter.

To get the index for the *Basic Enrollment Ratio*, two variables are created: elementary and high school variable, to represent the age (7-16 yrs old) and current grade attended (from grade 1-4th year secondary), respectively. The elementary and high school variable is divided by the total elementary and high school variable, respectively, to get the basic enrollment ratio. On the other hand, to get the index for the *High-School Graduate Ratio*, high school graduate variable (fourth year high school graduate ages 18 yrs old and above) is divided by the total population ages 18 yrs old and above.

For HDI-2, the functional literacy rate replaces the high-school graduate ratio, using the same above computation. For Benguet, with a basic enrollment rate of 94.8 percent, a high-school graduate ratio of 0.653, and functional literacy of 0.891, Education Index-1 (for HDI-1) is 0.751 and Education Index -2 (for HDI-2) is 0.910.

$$\textbf{Basic enrollment index} = \frac{94.8 - 0}{100 - 0} = 0.948$$

$$\textbf{High school graduate index} = \frac{65.3 - 0}{100 - 0} = 0.653$$

$$\textbf{Functional literacy index} = \frac{89.1 - 0}{100 - 0} = 0.891$$

Education Index -1 (High school graduate index) = 1/3 (Basic enrolment index) + 2/3 (High school graduate index)
= 1/3 (0.948) + 2/3 (0.653)
= 0.751

Education Index -2 (Functional literacy index) = 1/3 (Basic enrolment index) + 2/3
= 1/3 (0.948) + 2/3 (0.891)
= 0.910

3. Calculating the real per capita income index

The Income Index is calculated using adjusted per capita income figures obtained from the Family Income and Expenditures Survey. In the HDI, income serves as a surrogate for all the dimensions of human development not reflected in a long and healthy life and in knowledge.

To compute for Income Index-1 (for HDI-1), the per capita income figures are first deflated to 1997 prices using the National Statistics Office's regional consumer price indices to make them consistent over time, and then adjusted further using the provincial cost-of-living indices derived by Balisacan [2000] to make them consistent across space. Subsequently, the adjusted per capita income figure is subtracted from the highest adjusted per capita income from the years 1997, 2000 and 2003 and divided by the difference of highest adjusted per capita income and lowest adjusted per capita income from the years 1997, 2000 and 2003.

To compute for Income Index-2 (for HDI-2), the (unadjusted) per capita income figures are converted to purchasing power parity (PPP) US$ by multiplying the per capita income figures to the quotient of the exchange rate implicit in the 2004 *Human Development Report* and Peso GDP 2003. The Income Index-2 is based on a scale defined by a

minimum income of PPPUS$100 and a maximum of PPPUS$40,000. First, the gap between a province's PPPUS$ income and the minimum income of PPPUS$100 is computed as the difference between their logarithms. This difference is then taken as a proportion of the gap between the maximum income of PPPUS$, and the minimum income of PPPUS$100, again taken as the difference between their logarithms.

For Benguet, with a real per capita income in pesos of 35,530 (for provincial comparisons) and in PPPUS$ of 3,600 (for comparison with other countries), Income Index-1 is 0.711 and Income Index-2 is 0.598.

$$\textbf{Income index-1} = \frac{35{,}530 - 7{,}675}{46{,}837 - 7{,}675} = 0.711$$

$$\textbf{Income index-2} = \frac{\log(3{,}600) - \log(100)}{\log(40{,}000) - \log(100)} = 0.598$$

4. Calculating the HDI

Once the dimension indices have been calculated, determining the HDI is straightforward. It is the simple average of the three dimension indices.

HDI-1 =1/3 (life expectancy index) + 1/3 (education index-1) + 1/3 (income index-1)
=1/3 (0.751) + 1/3 (0.751) + 1/3 (0.711)
= 0.738

HDI-2 =1/3 (life expectancy index) + 1/3 (education index-2) + 1/3 (income index-2)
=1/3 (0.751) + 1/3 (0.910) + 1/3 (0.598)
= 0.753

The gender-related development index (GDI)

While the HDI measures average achievement, the GDI adjusts the average achievement to reflect the *inequalities* between men and women in the following dimensions as the HDI. Two GDI indices are computed in this report, GDI-1 and GDI-2, corresponding to HDI-1 and HDI-2.

The calculation of the GDI involves three steps. First, female and male indices in each dimension are calculated according to this general formula:

$$\textbf{Dimension} = \frac{\text{actual value - minimum value}}{\text{maximum value - minimum value}}$$

Second, the female and male indices in each dimension are combined in a way that penalizes differences in achievement between men and women. The resulting index, referred to as the equally distributed index, is calculated according to this general formula:

$$\textbf{Equally distributed index} = \{[\text{female population share}\ (\text{female index}^{1-\in})] + [\text{male population share}\ (\text{male index}^{1-\in})]\}^{1/1-\in}$$

$\in$ measures the aversion to inequality. In the GDI $\in = 2$. Thus the general equation becomes:

$$\textbf{Equally distributed index} = \{[\text{female population share}\ (\text{female index}^{-1})] + [\text{male population share}\ (\text{male index}^{-1})]\}^{-1}$$

which gives the harmonic mean of the female and male indices.

Third, the GDI is calculated by combining the three equally distributed indices in an unweighted average.

Goalposts for calculating the GDI

Indicator	Maximum value	Minimum value
Female life expectancy at birth (years)	87.5	27.5
Male life expectancy at birth (years)	82.5	22.5
Basic enrollment ratio (%)	100	0
High-school graduate ratio (%) for GDI-1	100	0
Functional literacy rate for GDI-2	100	0
Estimated earned income (Pesos) for GDI-1	55,778 (NCR male estimated earned income 1997)	4,000*
Estimated earned income (PPP US$) for GDI-2	40,000	100

**somewhat arbitrary and simply chosen so as to be less than value for minimum income province, to ensure that GDI-1 is defined for all provinces*

Calculating the GDI

The illustration of the calculation of the GDI uses data for Benguet.

1. Calculating the equally distributed life expectancy index

The first step is to calculate separate indices for female and male achievements in life expectancy, using the general formula for dimension indices.

FEMALE
Life expectancy: 73.1 years

Life expectancy = $\frac{73.1 - 27.5}{87.5 - 27.5} = 0.760$

MALE
Life expectancy: 67.0 years

Life expectancy = $\frac{67.0 - 22.5}{82.5 - 22.5} = 0.741$

Next, the female and male indices are combined to create the equally distributed life expectancy index, using the general formula for equally distributed indices. The male and female population shares are obtained from the 2003 Labor Force Surveys.

FEMALE
Population share: 0.511
Life expectancy index: 0.760

MALE
Population share: 0.489
Life expectancy index: 0.741

Equally distributed life expectancy index = $\{[0.511\ (0.760^{-1})] + [0.489\ (0.741^{-1})]\}^{-1}$ = **0.751**

2. Calculating the equally distributed education index

First, indices for the basic enrollment rate, the high-school graduate ratio, and the functional literacy rate are calculated separately for females and males. Calculating these indices is straightforward since the indicators used are already normalized between 0 and 100.

FEMALE
Basic enrollment rate: 92.0
Basic enrollment index: 0.920
High-school graduate ratio: 68.7
High-school graduate index: 0.687
Functional literacy rate: 91.2
Functional literacy index: 0.912

MALE
Basic enrollment rate: 98.2
Basic enrollment index: 0.982
High-school graduate ratio: 61.7
High-school graduate index: 0.617
Functional literacy rate: 87.0
Functional literacy index: 0.870

Second, the education indices are computed separately for females and males. Note that the the computation for female education index and male education index are the same with the HDI computation of indices.

Female education index-1 = 1/3 (0.920) + 2/3 (0.687) = 0.765

Male education index-1 = 1/3 (0.982) + 2/3 (0.617) = 0.739

Female education index-2 = 1/3 (0.920) + 2/3 (0.912) = 0.915

Male education index-2 = 1/3 (0.982) + 2/3 (0.870) = 0.907

Finally, the female and male education indices are combined to create the equally distributed education index:

FEMALE
Population share: 0.511
Education index-1: 0.765
Education index-2: 0.915

MALE
Population share: 0.489
Education index-1: 0.739
Education index-2: 0.907

Equally distributed education index-1 = $\{[0.511\ (0.765^{-1})] + [0.489\ (0.739^{-1})]\}^{-1}$ = **0.752**

Equally distributed education index-2 = $\{[0.511\ (0.915^{-1})] + [0.489\ (0.907^{-1})]\}^{-1}$ = **0.911**

3. Calculating the equally distributed income index

First, female and male earned incomes are estimated. This is done by getting the female and male shares in total income from the salary and wage variable of APIS 2002. Next, multiply these by the real per capita income figures in the HDI table. After getting the product, it should be divided by the female and male population [from Labor Force Survey 2003].

As there are two income figures (one for provincial and another for international comparisons), there are also two equally distributed income indices. The income indices are calculated for each gender.

FEMALE

$$\text{Income index-1} = \frac{18{,}091 - 4{,}000}{55{,}778 - 4{,}000} = 0.272$$

$$\text{Income index-2} = \frac{\log(2{,}076) - \log(100)}{\log(40{,}000) - \log(100)} = 0.506$$

MALE

$$\text{Income index-1} = \frac{45{,}734 - 4{,}000}{55{,}778 - 4{,}000} = 0.806$$

$$\text{Income index-2} = \frac{\log(5{,}249) - \log(100)}{\log(40{,}000) - \log(100)} = 0.661$$

Second, the female and male income indices are combined to create the equally distributed income index:

FEMALE	**MALE**
Population share: 0.511	Population share: 0.489
Income index-1: 0.272	Income index-1: 0.806
Income index-2: 0.506	Income index-2: 0.661

Equally distributed income index-1 = $\{[0.511\ (0.272^{-1})] + [0.489\ (0.806^{-1})]\}^{-1}$ = **0.403**

Equally distributed income index-2 = $\{[0.511\ (0.506^{-1})] + [0.489\ (0.661^{-1})]\}^{-1}$ = **0.572**

4. Calculating the GDIs

Calculating the GDI is straightforward. It is simply the unweighted average of the three component indices—the equally distributed life expectancy index, the equally distributed education index and the equally distributed income index.

GDI-1 =1/3 (life expectancy index) + 1/3 (education index-1) + 1/3 (income index-1)
=1/3 (0.751) + 1/3 (0.752) + 1/3 (0.403)
= 0.635

GDI-2 =1/3 (life expectancy index) + 1/3 (education index-2) + 1/3 (income index-2)
=1/3 (0.751) + 1/3 (0.911) + 1/3 (0.572)
= 0.745

The Human Poverty Index for developing countries (HPI)

While the HDI measures average achievement, the HPI measures *deprivation* in the three basic dimensions of human development captured in the HDI:

- **A long and healthy life**—vulnerability to death at a relatively early age, as measured by the probability at birth of not surviving to age 40. This was derived from the *1995 Gender-specific Life Tables for the Philippines, its Regions and Provinces* by Flieger and Cabigon.
- **Knowledge**—exclusion from the world of reading and communications, as measured by the percentage of did not graduate from high school. This was obtained from the 2003 Labor Force Survey.
- **A decent standard of living**—lack of access to overall economic provisioning, as measured by the percentage of the population not using improved water sources and the percentage of children under five who are underweight. These were obtained, respectively, from the 2003 FIES and the 2002 "Operation Timbang" of the National Nutrition Council.

Calculating the HPI

The illustration of the calculation of the HPI uses data for Benguet.

1. Measuring deprivation in a decent standard of living

An unweighted average of two indicators is used to measure deprivation in a decent standard of living.

$$\textbf{Unweighted average} = \tfrac{1}{2}\,(\text{population not using improved water sources}) + \tfrac{1}{2}\,(\text{underweight children under five})$$

For Benguet:

Population not using improved water sources (FIES 2003) = 28.0%

Unweighted children under five (Operation Timbang 2002) = 1.5%

$$\textbf{Unweighted average} = \tfrac{1}{2}\,(28.0) + \tfrac{1}{2}\,(1.5) = 14.7$$

2. Calculating the HPI

The formula for calculating the HPI is as follows

$$\textbf{HPI} = [1/3\ P_1^{\alpha} + P_2^{\alpha} + P_3^{\alpha}]^{1/\alpha}$$

Where:

P_1 = Probability at birth of not surviving to age 40 (multiplied by 100)

P_2 = Functional illiteracy rate

P_3 = Unweighted average of population not using improved water sources and underweight children under age five

$\alpha = 3$

For Benguet

P_1 = 15.4

P_2 = 10.9

P_3 = 14.7

$$\textbf{HPI} = [1/3\ (15.4^3 + 10.9^3 + 14.7^3)]^{1/3} = \mathbf{13.7}$$

Statistical annexes

Statistical Annex 1: Human Development Index 2003

HDI-1 Rank 2003	Province	Life expectancy at birth (years) 2003	%HS grad 2003 (18 and above)	Primary and high school enrollment rate (%) 2002	Per capita income (NCR 1997 pesos) 2003	Per capita income (PPP US$) 2003	Life expectancy index
	Metro Manila	70.0	75.7	92.8	39,639	4,686	0.749
1	Benguet	70.1	65.3	94.8	35,530	3,600	0.751
2	Laguna	67.8	63.8	91.8	35,309	3,684	0.713
3	Batanes	65.5	76.3	96.9	32,181	3,988	0.675
4	Rizal	71.0	67.6	92.8	30,981	3,756	0.767
5	Cavite	70.5	66.6	93.3	31,101	3,650	0.759
6	Nueva Vizcaya	65.3	50.9	93.5	36,485	2,876	0.672
7	Pampanga	72.2	57.4	92.0	30,355	2,948	0.787
8	Bataan	69.7	62.7	91.7	29,916	2,942	0.745
9	Bulacan	71.4	56.4	90.3	28,779	3,059	0.774
10	Ilocos Norte	70.0	54.0	93.6	29,427	2,244	0.749
11	Tarlac	69.6	55.3	89.3	29,473	2,490	0.743
12	La Union	70.6	55.7	89.5	28,392	2,342	0.760
13	Misamis Oriental	69.7	58.1	94.3	27,427	2,045	0.745
14	Pangasinan	69.8	62.0	92.5	25,380	2,042	0.747
15	Zambales	67.7	60.9	94.7	26,497	2,512	0.711
16	Batangas	71.8	55.4	92.8	25,261	2,823	0.780
17	South Cotabato	68.2	52.1	90.7	28,716	2,223	0.721
18	Davao del Sur	71.1	49.4	90.5	27,311	2,158	0.768
19	Iloilo	69.4	53.5	91.1	25,154	2,064	0.740
20	Cebu	72.6	46.5	91.1	24,359	2,341	0.794
21	Quirino	62.6	39.4	90.6	32,062	2,228	0.627
22	Abra	63.2	49.5	91.9	28,329	1,976	0.636
23	Capiz	65.3	41.0	91.4	29,045	2,056	0.671
24	Ifugao	63.0	40.0	93.9	29,435	2,097	0.633
25	Ilocos Sur	66.0	51.8	92.1	24,490	2,102	0.683
26	Negros Occidental	70.1	45.7	90.8	23,343	1,792	0.752
27	Camiguin	64.6	48.1	93.6	25,512	2,110	0.660
28	Bukidnon	68.6	34.8	88.3	25,912	1,647	0.727
29	Isabela	68.4	46.5	90.5	22,282	2,010	0.723
30	North Cotabato	69.6	41.3	92.8	22,142	1,647	0.743
31	Davao del Norte	66.1	41.1	90.1	24,640	1,710	0.685
32	Agusan del Norte	65.1	48.8	93.4	22,822	1,682	0.668
33	Nueva Ecija	71.2	50.1	90.1	18,465	2,143	0.769
34	Camarines Sur	71.3	42.4	87.5	20,477	1,692	0.772
35	Zamboanga del Sur	68.2	40.4	90.4	22,573	1,730	0.721
36	Lanao del Norte	64.7	45.8	91.1	23,351	1,798	0.661
37	Antique	62.6	43.0	92.8	24,825	1,797	0.627
38	Aurora	63.3	52.3	92.2	21,310	2,000	0.638

Education Index I	Education Index II	Income Index I	Income Index II	HDI (I) 2003	HDI (II) 2003	Per capita income rank minus HDI rank1
0.814	0.941	0.816	0.642	0.793	0.777	
0.751	0.910	0.711	0.598	0.738	0.753	1
0.731	0.927	0.706	0.602	0.717	0.747	1
0.832	0.976	0.626	0.615	0.711	0.755	1
0.760	0.916	0.595	0.605	0.708	0.763	3
0.755	0.914	0.598	0.600	0.704	0.758	1
0.651	0.885	0.736	0.561	0.686	0.706	-5
0.689	0.889	0.579	0.565	0.685	0.747	1
0.724	0.927	0.568	0.564	0.679	0.745	1
0.677	0.901	0.539	0.571	0.663	0.749	5
0.672	0.867	0.555	0.519	0.659	0.712	2
0.666	0.814	0.557	0.537	0.655	0.698	-1
0.670	0.883	0.529	0.526	0.653	0.723	4
0.702	0.903	0.504	0.504	0.650	0.717	5
0.722	0.917	0.452	0.503	0.640	0.723	10
0.722	0.931	0.481	0.538	0.638	0.727	5
0.679	0.913	0.449	0.558	0.636	0.750	9
0.650	0.852	0.537	0.518	0.636	0.697	-2
0.631	0.825	0.501	0.513	0.634	0.702	1
0.661	0.848	0.446	0.505	0.616	0.698	7
0.613	0.865	0.426	0.526	0.611	0.728	10
0.565	0.837	0.623	0.518	0.605	0.661	-16
0.636	0.918	0.527	0.498	0.600	0.684	-5
0.578	0.825	0.546	0.505	0.598	0.667	-10
0.580	0.797	0.556	0.508	0.589	0.646	-13
0.653	0.849	0.429	0.508	0.588	0.680	4
0.607	0.859	0.400	0.482	0.586	0.697	7
0.633	0.878	0.455	0.509	0.583	0.682	-5
0.527	0.782	0.466	0.468	0.573	0.659	-7
0.612	0.867	0.373	0.501	0.569	0.697	8
0.585	0.789	0.369	0.468	0.566	0.666	8
0.574	0.834	0.433	0.474	0.564	0.664	-3
0.637	0.874	0.387	0.471	0.564	0.671	3
0.634	0.859	0.276	0.512	0.560	0.713	26
0.574	0.836	0.327	0.472	0.558	0.693	9
0.571	0.813	0.380	0.476	0.557	0.670	1
0.609	0.876	0.400	0.482	0.557	0.673	-4
0.596	0.819	0.438	0.482	0.554	0.643	-10
0.656	0.835	0.348	0.500	0.547	0.658	1

Statistical Annex 1

HDI-1 Rank 2003	Province	Life expectancy at birth (years) 2003	%HS grad 2003 (18 and above)	Primary and high school enrollment rate (%) 2002	Per capita income (NCR 1997 pesos) 2003	Per capita income (PPP US$) 2003	Life expectancy index
39	Kalinga	62.5	42.3	94.1	24,038	1,608	0.626
40	Mt. Province	64.0	41.6	94.8	22,961	1,577	0.650
41	Bohol	70.0	36.5	89.9	20,966	1,581	0.750
42	Quezon	68.6	44.0	90.5	19,793	1,840	0.726
43	Apayao	62.4	37.5	90.4	25,485	1,727	0.624
44	Albay	69.0	47.6	91.7	18,129	1,846	0.733
45	Cagayan	66.5	42.6	92.8	20,705	1,895	0.692
46	Misamis Occidental	66.8	46.4	92.9	19,391	1,406	0.697
47	Aklan	63.4	49.7	93.7	20,401	1,668	0.639
48	Catanduanes	66.6	42.2	91.9	19,656	1,614	0.694
49	Sorsogon	69.1	40.5	90.7	18,393	1,613	0.735
50	Camarines Norte	65.0	41.4	92.8	20,376	1,773	0.667
51	Leyte	68.9	37.5	88.7	19,119	1,627	0.731
52	Oriental Mindoro	65.8	40.1	93.3	19,626	1,774	0.681
53	Surigao del Norte	67.3	37.9	91.0	18,865	1,494	0.705
54	Southern Leyte	65.4	36.2	93.6	19,587	1,651	0.673
55	Occidental Mindoro	63.7	36.5	89.9	20,875	1,625	0.644
56	Palawan	65.6	45.3	88.3	17,505	1,424	0.676
57	Guimaras	67.6	39.2	91.4	17,049	1,359	0.709
58	Davao Oriental	70.0	27.8	91.4	18,144	1,236	0.750
59	Sultan Kudarat	63.8	43.5	92.1	17,431	1,274	0.646
60	Siquijor	64.4	42.9	92.2	17,092	1,355	0.657
61	Agusan del Sur	63.6	32.1	91.2	19,876	1,295	0.643
62	Negros Oriental	65.7	32.1	76.9	20,292	1,442	0.678
63	Marinduque	65.8	39.9	92.9	15,939	1,476	0.681
64	Biliran	63.7	39.1	86.4	18,351	1,516	0.645
65	Surigao del Sur	63.7	41.3	90.4	17,076	1,268	0.644
66	Northern Samar	64.5	32.1	91.3	18,727	1,343	0.658
67	Romblon	64.7	37.4	92.6	16,712	1,497	0.661
68	Lanao del Sur	57.9	45.9	81.1	20,016	1,756	0.548
69	Eastern Samar	61.7	32.2	88.4	19,480	1,654	0.612
70	Western Samar	61.4	31.0	80.9	20,445	1,718	0.606
71	Sarangani	68.2	25.3	80.1	15,014	1,171	0.720
72	Zamboanga del Norte	63.7	33.9	90.1	14,218	1,079	0.646
73	Masbate	64.8	28.5	90.0	14,454	1,299	0.664
74	Basilan	60.6	31.6	83.9	13,265	1,314	0.593
75	Tawi-Tawi	51.2	40.9	91.4	10,780	1,347	0.436
76	Maguindanao	52.0	28.9	81.2	14,198	1,096	0.450
77	Sulu	52.8	21.1	83.8	8,430	1,287	0.463
	Philippines	69.8	52.1	90.6	27,442	2,609	0.747

[1]A positive figure indicates that the HDI rank is higher than the per capita income rank, a negative the opposite.
Sources: Flieger and Cabigon (1994 and 1999); 2002 APIS; 2003 LFS; 2003 FLEMMS; 2003 FIES

Education Index I	Education Index II	Income Index I	Income Index II	HDI (I) 2003	HDI (II) 2003	Per capita income rank minus HDI rank[1]
0.595	0.854	0.418	0.464	0.546	0.648	-8
0.593	0.839	0.390	0.460	0.545	0.650	-6
0.543	0.841	0.339	0.461	0.544	0.684	-1
0.595	0.872	0.309	0.486	0.544	0.695	8
0.551	0.878	0.455	0.476	0.543	0.659	-20
0.623	0.868	0.267	0.487	0.541	0.696	19
0.593	0.865	0.333	0.491	0.539	0.683	-3
0.619	0.900	0.299	0.441	0.538	0.680	9
0.644	0.858	0.325	0.470	0.536	0.656	-2
0.588	0.736	0.306	0.464	0.529	0.632	3
0.572	0.886	0.274	0.464	0.527	0.695	11
0.585	0.775	0.324	0.480	0.525	0.641	-4
0.546	0.820	0.292	0.466	0.523	0.672	5
0.578	0.897	0.305	0.480	0.521	0.686	0
0.556	0.866	0.286	0.451	0.515	0.674	4
0.554	0.836	0.304	0.468	0.510	0.659	-1
0.543	0.782	0.337	0.465	0.508	0.630	-14
0.597	0.822	0.251	0.443	0.508	0.647	8
0.566	0.784	0.239	0.435	0.505	0.643	11
0.490	0.748	0.267	0.420	0.503	0.639	4
0.597	0.878	0.249	0.425	0.497	0.650	6
0.593	0.754	0.240	0.435	0.497	0.615	6
0.518	0.801	0.312	0.427	0.491	0.624	-12
0.470	0.755	0.322	0.445	0.490	0.626	-15
0.576	0.897	0.211	0.449	0.489	0.676	7
0.549	0.867	0.273	0.454	0.489	0.655	-3
0.577	0.831	0.240	0.424	0.487	0.633	2
0.518	0.831	0.282	0.434	0.486	0.641	-8
0.558	0.879	0.231	0.452	0.483	0.664	2
0.576	0.777	0.315	0.478	0.480	0.601	-20
0.509	0.795	0.301	0.468	0.474	0.625	-15
0.476	0.710	0.326	0.475	0.469	0.597	-26
0.436	0.647	0.187	0.411	0.448	0.593	0
0.527	0.754	0.167	0.397	0.446	0.599	1
0.490	0.784	0.173	0.428	0.442	0.625	-1
0.490	0.711	0.143	0.430	0.409	0.578	1
0.577	0.684	0.079	0.434	0.364	0.518	1
0.463	0.644	0.167	0.400	0.360	0.498	-2
0.420	0.729	0.019	0.426	0.301	0.540	0
	0.863		0.544		0.721	

Statistical Annex 2: Human Development Index 2000

HDI-1 Rank 2000	HDI-1 Rank 2003	Province	Life expectancy at birth (years) 2000	%HS grad 2000	Functional literacy 1994	Primary and high school enrollment rate (%) 1999	Per capita income (NCR 1997 pesos) 2000
		Metro Manila	69.2	74.3	92.41	93.8	46,367
4	1	Benguet	68.7	64.7	83.89	94.8	31,658
6	2	Laguna	67.1	60.8	86.09	93.1	33,375
9	3	Batanes	64.8	60.7	92.68	98.0	29,693
1	4	Rizal	70.2	66.9	89.17	94.2	36,592
5	5	Cavite	69.7	64.3	92.80	95.6	30,866
15	6	Nueva Vizcaya	64.6	48.9	78.20	93.6	30,892
11	7	Pampanga	71.4	53.4	79.23	91.3	27,672
3	8	Bataan	68.8	62.2	88.74	94.4	33,178
7	9	Bulacan	70.7	52.1	90.59	90.0	31,696
2	10	Ilocos Norte	69.3	54.9	84.69	94.9	35,090
21	11	Tarlac	68.8	51.6	82.22	87.7	23,297
18	12	La Union	69.8	52.9	87.43	89.7	26,260
8	13	Misamis Oriental	68.4	55.2	84.54	92.1	30,602
16	14	Pangasinan	69.1	60.0	87.38	94.5	24,458
14	15	Zambales	66.7	60.2	81.71	94.8	26,632
17	16	Batangas	71.0	51.7	90.40	93.4	25,367
12	17	South Cotabato	67.2	50.2	73.63	89.8	30,303
13	18	Davao del Sur	69.9	49.4	68.78	85.3	29,181
10	19	Iloilo	68.8	51.5	83.59	92.2	29,860
25	20	Cebu	71.8	41.6	80.18	89.5	20,852
58	21	Quirino	62.3	39.6	80.14	86.6	21,220
19	22	Abra	62.6	50.8	90.11	92.6	30,321
41	23	Capiz	64.5	41.4	76.45	91.1	20,953
63	24	Ifugao	61.9	34.4	51.07	90.1	19,602
20	25	Ilocos Sur	65.6	52.9	83.29	93.3	25,899
35	26	Negros Occidental	69.0	38.0	78.30	90.2	20,737
49	27	Camiguin	63.6	46.2	85.90	94.9	18,392
30	28	Bukidnon	67.2	34.1	83.15	82.8	25,654
24	29	Isabela	67.3	47.1	89.45	88.4	22,497
39	30	North Cotabato	68.0	42.9	72.76	90.9	18,824
43	31	Davao del Norte	65.1	36.5	85.49	88.5	21,990
42	32	Agusan del Norte	63.8	46.7	88.16	87.6	20,378
26	33	Nueva Ecija	70.2	50.9	92.42	91.7	19,119
46	34	Camarines Sur	69.9	35.5	85.97	84.5	19,183
48	35	Zamboanga del Sur	66.9	37.7	77.23	85.7	19,850
23	36	Lanao del Norte	63.7	47.7	73.39	92.4	25,112
38	37	Antique	62.0	38.4	78.45	94.8	23,428
33	38	Aurora	63.0	50.1	84.16	93.3	21,163

Per capita income (PPP US$) 2000	Life Expectancy Index	Education Index I	Education Index II	Income Index I	Income Index II	HDI (I) 2000	HDI (II) 2000
4,750	0.737	0.808	0.931	0.988	0.644	0.844	0.771
2,885	0.729	0.747	0.893	0.612	0.561	0.696	0.728
3,109	0.702	0.716	0.896	0.656	0.574	0.691	0.724
3,166	0.663	0.731	0.953	0.562	0.577	0.652	0.731
3,902	0.754	0.760	0.917	0.738	0.612	0.751	0.761
3,204	0.746	0.747	0.942	0.592	0.579	0.695	0.755
2,160	0.661	0.638	0.859	0.593	0.513	0.631	0.678
2,456	0.774	0.660	0.853	0.511	0.534	0.648	0.720
2,909	0.731	0.729	0.916	0.651	0.563	0.704	0.736
3,082	0.761	0.647	0.903	0.613	0.572	0.674	0.745
2,412	0.739	0.682	0.898	0.700	0.531	0.707	0.723
1,792	0.730	0.636	0.850	0.399	0.482	0.588	0.687
1,998	0.747	0.652	0.886	0.475	0.500	0.624	0.711
2,000	0.724	0.675	0.883	0.585	0.500	0.662	0.702
1,805	0.734	0.715	0.909	0.429	0.483	0.626	0.709
2,264	0.695	0.717	0.883	0.484	0.521	0.632	0.700
2,489	0.767	0.656	0.919	0.452	0.537	0.625	0.741
2,095	0.703	0.634	0.817	0.578	0.508	0.638	0.676
2,066	0.748	0.614	0.770	0.549	0.505	0.637	0.674
2,210	0.729	0.651	0.879	0.567	0.517	0.649	0.708
1,757	0.779	0.576	0.849	0.336	0.478	0.564	0.702
1,463	0.621	0.553	0.834	0.346	0.448	0.507	0.634
1,902	0.627	0.648	0.914	0.578	0.492	0.618	0.678
1,496	0.659	0.579	0.838	0.339	0.452	0.526	0.649
1,238	0.616	0.529	0.706	0.305	0.420	0.483	0.581
2,001	0.676	0.663	0.883	0.465	0.500	0.602	0.686
1,444	0.733	0.554	0.842	0.334	0.446	0.540	0.674
1,333	0.643	0.625	0.904	0.274	0.432	0.514	0.660
1,434	0.704	0.503	0.830	0.459	0.444	0.555	0.659
1,912	0.704	0.609	0.889	0.378	0.492	0.564	0.695
1,260	0.717	0.589	0.818	0.285	0.423	0.530	0.653
1,375	0.668	0.538	0.870	0.366	0.438	0.524	0.658
1,397	0.647	0.603	0.879	0.324	0.440	0.525	0.655
2,028	0.753	0.645	0.921	0.292	0.502	0.563	0.725
1,421	0.748	0.519	0.852	0.294	0.443	0.520	0.681
1,367	0.699	0.537	0.815	0.311	0.437	0.515	0.650
1,639	0.646	0.626	0.829	0.445	0.467	0.572	0.647
1,533	0.617	0.572	0.866	0.402	0.456	0.531	0.646
1,809	0.633	0.645	0.887	0.344	0.483	0.541	0.668

Statistical Annex 2

HDI-1 Rank 2000	HDI-1 Rank 2003	Province	Life expectancy at birth (years) 2000	%HS grad 2000	Functional literacy 1994	Primary and high school enrollment rate (%) 1999	Per capita income (NCR 1997 pesos) 2000
31	39	Kalinga	61.8	38.7	70.35	93.8	26,356
22	40	Mt. Province	62.9	43.1	81.08	95.7	27,405
45	41	Bohol	69.0	33.1	84.86	92.3	19,459
27	42	Quezon	67.7	46.4	87.25	91.2	21,607
36	43	Apayao	61.6	31.3	70.35	94.1	26,752
40	44	Albay	67.9	46.0	82.31	91.0	18,103
57	45	Cagayan	65.6	37.8	86.72	89.2	19,281
44	46	Misamis Occidental	65.7	41.3	84.83	90.4	19,928
34	47	Aklan	62.9	50.3	83.01	94.6	20,972
52	48	Catanduanes	65.8	39.6	87.01	95.3	18,343
62	49	Sorsogon	67.8	37.4	79.38	92.3	15,203
59	50	Camarines Norte	64.0	42.9	90.01	86.6	18,420
32	51	Leyte	67.3	36.2	79.45	88.9	22,700
50	52	Oriental Mindoro	65.0	40.7	91.54	87.1	19,895
60	53	Surigao del Norte	66.0	35.3	81.64	91.7	18,426
47	54	Southern Leyte	64.6	37.6	86.35	89.6	21,107
56	55	Occidental Mindoro	63.0	33.2	83.12	92.4	21,781
28	56	Palawan	64.4	44.9	77.35	87.3	24,335
37	57	Guimaras	67.1	39.0	83.59	89.6	21,126
29	58	Davao Oriental	68.3	31.8	74.61	87.4	25,092
61	59	Sultan Kudarat	63.1	41.9	78.63	93.5	18,190
55	60	Siquijor	63.6	34.3	86.27	95.2	20,917
67	61	Agusan del Sur	62.4	33.2	71.84	88.0	17,877
51	62	Negros Oriental	65.0	33.1	73.82	79.7	22,607
66	63	Marinduque	64.8	33.7	91.25	92.1	15,936
65	64	Biliran	62.8	32.6	79.45	90.4	18,090
53	65	Surigao del Sur	62.7	40.2	82.43	85.8	21,272
64	66	Northern Samar	63.3	31.8	73.63	87.2	18,451
69	67	Romblon	63.8	38.7	85.92	90.2	14,633
72	68	Lanao del Sur	56.9	35.7	59.31	76.9	15,211
71	69	Eastern Samar	61.1	27.8	86.25	89.8	14,181
70	70	Western Samar	60.6	22.3	76.41	85.5	16,706
68	71	Sarangani	67.2	33.6	73.63	69.3	16,893
54	72	Zamboanga del Norte	63.1	37.8	74.49	90.5	20,999
73	73	Masbate	64.0	23.3	75.21	84.0	12,147
74	74	Basilan	60.2	28.6	48.08	82.1	13,026
76	75	Tawi-Tawi	50.8	34.2	52.67	90.9	11,121
75	76	Maguindanao	52.6	36.1	68.71	76.6	15,508
77	77	Sulu	52.3	18.1	57.73	77.7	7,675
		Philippines	69.3	49.4	83.8	88.5	26,881

Sources: Flieger and Cabigon (1994 and 1999); 2000 LFS; 1999 APIS; 1994 FLEMMS; 2000 FIES

*HDI-2 2000 is not comparable with HDI-2 2003 since the education index II for 2000 is computed with equal weights.

Per capita income (PPP US$) 2000	Life Expectancy Index	Education Index I	Education Index II	Income Index I	Income Index II	HDI (I) 2000	HDI (II) 2000
1,541	0.613	0.571	0.821	0.477	0.456	0.554	0.630
1,613	0.631	0.606	0.884	0.504	0.464	0.580	0.660
1,239	0.733	0.528	0.886	0.301	0.420	0.521	0.680
1,796	0.711	0.614	0.892	0.356	0.482	0.560	0.695
1,596	0.610	0.522	0.822	0.487	0.462	0.540	0.632
1,634	0.714	0.610	0.867	0.266	0.466	0.530	0.682
1,673	0.676	0.549	0.880	0.296	0.470	0.507	0.675
1,309	0.679	0.577	0.876	0.313	0.429	0.523	0.662
1,587	0.632	0.651	0.888	0.340	0.461	0.541	0.660
1,366	0.679	0.581	0.911	0.272	0.436	0.511	0.676
1,392	0.713	0.557	0.859	0.192	0.440	0.487	0.670
1,396	0.650	0.575	0.883	0.274	0.440	0.500	0.658
1,715	0.705	0.537	0.842	0.384	0.474	0.542	0.674
1,639	0.666	0.561	0.893	0.312	0.467	0.513	0.676
1,336	0.682	0.541	0.867	0.275	0.433	0.499	0.661
1,564	0.661	0.549	0.880	0.343	0.459	0.518	0.666
1,511	0.633	0.529	0.877	0.360	0.453	0.507	0.655
1,750	0.657	0.590	0.823	0.425	0.478	0.557	0.653
1,566	0.702	0.558	0.866	0.343	0.459	0.535	0.676
1,530	0.722	0.504	0.810	0.445	0.455	0.557	0.662
1,211	0.634	0.591	0.861	0.269	0.416	0.498	0.637
1,499	0.644	0.546	0.908	0.338	0.452	0.509	0.668
1,055	0.623	0.515	0.799	0.261	0.393	0.466	0.605
1,423	0.667	0.486	0.768	0.381	0.443	0.512	0.626
1,358	0.664	0.532	0.917	0.211	0.435	0.469	0.672
1,367	0.629	0.519	0.849	0.266	0.436	0.471	0.638
1,431	0.628	0.554	0.841	0.347	0.444	0.510	0.638
1,182	0.638	0.503	0.804	0.275	0.412	0.472	0.618
1,163	0.646	0.559	0.881	0.178	0.410	0.461	0.645
1,221	0.532	0.494	0.681	0.192	0.418	0.406	0.544
1,140	0.602	0.485	0.880	0.166	0.406	0.418	0.629
1,231	0.594	0.434	0.809	0.231	0.419	0.419	0.607
1,168	0.704	0.455	0.715	0.235	0.410	0.465	0.610
1,441	0.635	0.553	0.825	0.340	0.445	0.510	0.635
995	0.650	0.436	0.796	0.114	0.383	0.400	0.610
1,074	0.587	0.464	0.651	0.137	0.396	0.396	0.545
1,201	0.429	0.531	0.718	0.088	0.415	0.349	0.521
1,052	0.460	0.496	0.727	0.200	0.393	0.385	0.527
1,020	0.456	0.380	0.677	0.000	0.388	0.278	0.507
2,260	0.738		0.854		0.520		0.704

Statistical Annex 3: Human Development Index 1997

HDI-1 Rank 1997	HDI-1 Rank 2000	HDI-1 Rank 2003	Province	Life expectancy at birth (years) 1997	%HS grad 1997	Primary and high school enrollment rate (%) 1998
			Metro Manila	68.4	73.2	94.5
7	4	1	Benguet	67.4	60.9	94.1
6	6	2	Laguna	66.4	56.9	94.1
2	9	3	Batanes	64.0	58.3	96.6
1	1	4	Rizal	69.4	62.0	93.7
5	5	5	Cavite	68.9	60.2	93.5
19	15	6	Nueva Vizcaya	64.0	42.8	90.9
9	11	7	Pampanga	70.7	52.2	90.8
3	3	8	Bataan	68.0	58.2	91.4
12	7	9	Bulacan	69.9	50.6	90.4
8	2	10	Ilocos Norte	68.7	52.1	92.8
15	21	11	Tarlac	68.0	49.0	91.5
16	18	12	La Union	69.0	50.1	88.8
4	8	13	Misamis Oriental	67.2	54.5	92.4
14	16	14	Pangasinan	68.3	55.8	93.9
10	14	15	Zambales	65.8	59.4	93.9
11	17	16	Batangas	70.2	52.0	93.5
22	12	17	South Cotabato	66.1	47.4	88.9
13	13	18	Davao del Sur	68.6	44.6	87.1
17	10	19	Iloilo	68.1	49.5	92.2
20	25	20	Cebu	70.9	39.0	88.4
31	58	21	Quirino	61.9	37.2	89.4
25	19	22	Abra	62.1	50.3	93.8
29	41	23	Capiz	63.8	42.3	93.9
45	63	24	Ifugao	60.9	34.1	90.1
18	20	25	Ilocos Sur	65.1	48.3	94.6
33	35	26	Negros Occidental	67.9	37.8	84.4
43	49	27	Camiguin	62.6	46.8	94.9
28	30	28	Bukidnon	65.8	29.8	84.1
27	24	29	Isabela	66.1	41.7	88.5
48	39	30	North Cotabato	66.4	42.0	89.0
39	43	31	Davao del Norte	64.1	33.9	90.8
50	42	32	Agusan del Norte	62.6	41.8	91.2
26	26	33	Nueva Ecija	69.1	45.4	90.9
49	46	34	Camarines Sur	68.5	36.1	88.7
37	48	35	Zamboanga del Sur	65.6	34.7	84.2
24	23	36	Lanao del Norte	62.8	45.6	88.2
40	38	37	Antique	61.4	36.7	88.5
36	33	38	Aurora	62.6	43.8	95.8
21	31	39	Kalinga	61.1	41.7	89.9

Per capita income (NCR 1997 Pesos) 1997	Life expectancy index	Education index I	Income index I	HDI I 1997
46,837	0.724	0.803	1.000	0.842
31,107	0.707	0.719	0.598	0.675
34,288	0.691	0.693	0.680	0.688
38,995	0.651	0.710	0.800	0.720
35,769	0.740	0.725	0.717	0.728
32,214	0.732	0.713	0.627	0.691
28,654	0.650	0.588	0.536	0.591
30,452	0.761	0.651	0.582	0.665
34,760	0.716	0.693	0.692	0.700
29,006	0.749	0.639	0.545	0.644
32,330	0.729	0.656	0.630	0.671
27,866	0.717	0.632	0.516	0.621
26,614	0.733	0.630	0.484	0.616
36,006	0.703	0.671	0.723	0.699
25,613	0.721	0.685	0.458	0.621
29,946	0.680	0.709	0.569	0.653
28,415	0.754	0.659	0.530	0.647
24,768	0.685	0.612	0.436	0.578
30,820	0.727	0.588	0.591	0.635
25,517	0.718	0.637	0.456	0.604
24,710	0.764	0.555	0.435	0.585
26,057	0.616	0.546	0.469	0.544
24,141	0.618	0.648	0.420	0.562
23,105	0.647	0.595	0.394	0.545
24,146	0.599	0.527	0.421	0.515
27,391	0.669	0.637	0.503	0.603
22,555	0.715	0.533	0.380	0.543
19,971	0.627	0.628	0.314	0.523
26,450	0.680	0.479	0.479	0.546
22,853	0.685	0.573	0.388	0.549
18,446	0.691	0.577	0.275	0.514
23,580	0.651	0.528	0.406	0.528
20,624	0.626	0.583	0.331	0.513
19,856	0.736	0.606	0.311	0.551
18,688	0.725	0.536	0.281	0.514
24,471	0.676	0.512	0.429	0.539
25,755	0.631	0.598	0.462	0.564
24,631	0.607	0.540	0.433	0.527
22,516	0.627	0.612	0.379	0.539
29,930	0.601	0.578	0.568	0.582

Statistical Annex 3

HDI-1 Rank 1997	HDI-1 Rank 2000	HDI-1 Rank 2003	Province	Life expectancy at birth (years) 1997	%HS grad 1997	Primary and high school enrollment rate (%) 1998
51	22	40	Mt. Province	61.7	36.6	96.4
55	45	41	Bohol	68.0	31.1	88.0
23	27	42	Quezon	66.8	43.8	89.5
34	36	43	Apayao	60.8	31.2	91.5
44	40	44	Albay	66.8	42.2	90.4
61	57	45	Cagayan	64.6	32.0	91.5
41	44	46	Misamis Occidental	64.7	37.5	90.1
30	34	47	Aklan	62.4	44.6	96.2
38	52	48	Catanduanes	64.9	36.2	94.2
63	62	49	Sorsogon	66.5	37.2	92.8
56	59	50	Camarines Norte	63.0	38.3	86.6
60	32	51	Leyte	65.7	30.9	83.6
42	50	52	Oriental Mindoro	64.1	36.3	90.1
59	60	53	Surigao del Norte	64.6	32.6	90.2
65	47	54	Southern Leyte	63.9	29.0	89.3
52	56	55	Occidental Mindoro	62.3	33.2	89.1
35	28	56	Palawan	63.2	42.6	89.0
47	37	57	Guimaras	66.7	36.5	86.3
57	29	58	Davao Oriental	66.6	24.5	86.6
32	61	59	Sultan Kudarat	62.3	45.7	92.3
64	55	60	Siquijor	62.9	35.5	87.9
62	67	61	Agusan del Sur	61.2	31.7	83.5
46	51	62	Negros Oriental	64.4	28.8	88.1
54	66	63	Marinduque	63.8	35.8	91.2
66	65	64	Biliran	61.8	28.2	93.0
53	53	65	Surigao del Sur	61.8	38.6	91.1
68	64	66	Northern Samar	62.1	26.8	88.9
67	69	67	Romblon	62.8	32.4	92.6
73	72	68	Lanao del Sur	56.0	39.2	82.0
76	71	69	Eastern Samar	60.5	26.2	88.0
71	70	70	Western Samar	59.9	26.5	81.7
70	68	71	Sarangani	66.2	27.5	66.6
58	54	72	Zamboanga del Norte	62.4	32.5	88.3
74	73	73	Masbate	63.2	22.4	79.4
69	74	74	Basilan	59.8	30.1	81.3
75	76	75	Tawi-Tawi	50.4	32.9	87.6
72	75	76	Maguindanao	53.2	33.8	79.9
77	77	77	Sulu	51.9	22.4	81.3
			Philippines	68.0	46.8	87.9

Sources: Flieger and Cabigon (1994 and 1999); 1997 LFS; 1998 APIS; 1997 FIES

Per capita income (NCR 1997 Pesos) 1997	Life expectancy index	Education index I	Income index I	HDI I 1997
21,791	0.611	0.565	0.360	0.512
18,423	0.717	0.501	0.274	0.497
24,587	0.697	0.591	0.432	0.573
27,911	0.597	0.513	0.517	0.542
18,302	0.696	0.582	0.271	0.517
18,980	0.660	0.518	0.289	0.489
22,107	0.661	0.550	0.369	0.527
23,084	0.624	0.618	0.393	0.545
22,365	0.665	0.556	0.375	0.532
16,210	0.691	0.557	0.218	0.489
19,912	0.633	0.544	0.312	0.496
19,759	0.679	0.484	0.309	0.491
22,727	0.652	0.542	0.384	0.526
19,490	0.660	0.518	0.302	0.493
18,223	0.648	0.491	0.269	0.470
22,899	0.622	0.519	0.389	0.510
23,644	0.637	0.580	0.408	0.542
20,154	0.695	0.531	0.319	0.515
20,998	0.694	0.452	0.340	0.495
23,170	0.622	0.612	0.396	0.543
18,093	0.631	0.530	0.266	0.476
22,307	0.603	0.490	0.374	0.489
23,490	0.656	0.486	0.404	0.515
19,819	0.647	0.543	0.310	0.500
18,344	0.614	0.498	0.272	0.462
20,825	0.613	0.561	0.336	0.503
18,206	0.618	0.475	0.269	0.454
16,154	0.631	0.524	0.217	0.457
15,636	0.517	0.534	0.203	0.418
12,985	0.591	0.468	0.136	0.398
18,896	0.582	0.449	0.287	0.439
17,497	0.687	0.405	0.251	0.448
21,290	0.624	0.511	0.348	0.494
13,991	0.636	0.414	0.161	0.404
19,686	0.580	0.472	0.307	0.453
18,180	0.423	0.511	0.268	0.401
21,428	0.471	0.492	0.351	0.438
8,840	0.448	0.420	0.030	0.299
27,896	0.644			

Statistical Annex 4: Gender-related Development Index 2003

HDI-1 Rank 2003	Province	Gender-related development index (GDI)				Life expectancy at birth (years) 2003		% HS Graduate (18 and above) 2003	
		Rank 1	Value 1	Rank 2	Value 2	Female	Male	Female	Male
	Metro Manila		0.735		0.775	72.9	67.0	75.3	76.2
1	Benguet	4	0.635	5	0.745	73.1	67.0	68.7	61.7
2	Laguna	2	0.662	11	0.725	72.2	63.4	63.7	63.9
3	Batanes	5	0.625	6	0.744	66.9	64.0	74.0	78.5
4	Rizal	1	0.680	1	0.764	74.4	67.6	67.5	67.8
5	Cavite	3	0.642	2	0.756	76.0	65.1	66.3	67.1
6	Nueva Vizcaya	10	0.595	14	0.714	66.0	64.6	53.8	48.0
7	Pampanga	8	0.611	8	0.743	75.8	68.6	57.5	57.2
8	Bataan	7	0.619	4	0.746	72.8	66.6	62.2	63.2
9	Bulacan	11	0.593	7	0.743	74.8	68.0	55.6	57.3
10	Ilocos Norte	16	0.561	17	0.707	72.8	67.1	54.9	53.1
11	Tarlac	12	0.579	50	0.660	70.8	68.3	55.1	55.4
12	La Union	14	0.576	19	0.702	73.4	67.8	56.1	55.2
13	Misamis Oriental	21	0.541	24	0.691	73.1	66.3	60.4	55.7
14	Pangasinan	15	0.562	13	0.719	73.2	66.5	61.3	62.7
15	Zambales	6	0.624	9	0.730	69.6	65.7	58.4	63.3
16	Batangas	9	0.606	3	0.749	76.1	67.5	56.6	54.2
17	South Cotabato	13	0.577	30	0.685	70.5	66.0	55.5	48.8
18	Davao del Sur	22	0.536	27	0.688	72.7	69.5	51.6	47.1
19	Iloilo	20	0.551	18	0.703	71.6	67.2	56.3	50.7
20	Cebu	19	0.552	10	0.730	74.1	71.2	47.1	45.8
21	Quirino	41	0.490	41	0.668	62.7	62.5	41.2	37.7
22	Abra	29	0.513	26	0.689	66.2	60.2	50.9	48.0
23	Capiz	33	0.508	37	0.674	68.0	62.6	45.2	36.8
24	Ifugao	32	0.508	62	0.642	66.7	59.2	45.7	34.5
25	Ilocos Sur	23	0.534	33	0.681	70.4	61.5	52.0	51.7
26	Negros Occidental	27	0.523	25	0.691	73.4	66.8	48.6	42.8
27	Camiguin	49	0.478	29	0.685	67.1	62.0	51.6	44.5
28	Bukidnon	53	0.475	54	0.654	71.4	65.9	37.1	32.7
29	Isabela	25	0.530	20	0.702	70.8	66.0	47.2	45.9
30	North Cotabato	28	0.517	47	0.662	73.1	66.1	44.3	38.5
31	Davao del Norte	34	0.507	51	0.660	69.8	62.4	45.2	37.4
32	Agusan del Norte	52	0.476	42	0.667	67.5	62.6	51.3	46.4
33	Nueva Ecija	18	0.558	16	0.710	73.2	69.2	51.9	48.3
34	Camarines Sur	31	0.512	23	0.693	74.3	68.3	43.9	40.8
35	Zamboanga del Sur	36	0.501	39	0.671	70.8	65.7	41.9	38.9
36	Lanao del Norte	37	0.498	15	0.713	66.7	62.6	48.3	43.2
37	Antique	39	0.493	56	0.648	66.5	58.7	45.2	40.9
38	Aurora	17	0.560	53	0.657	65.6	61.0	51.4	53.2
39	Kalinga	61	0.455	46	0.663	65.8	59.3	45.3	39.5

Primary and high school enrollment rate (%) 2002		Estimated earned income (NCR 1997 pesos) 2000		Estimated earned income (PPP US$) 2003		HDI rank minus GDI-1 rank[1]
Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	
91.2	93.4	28,784	55,778	3,406	6,600	
92.1	98.2	18,091	45,735	2,076	5,249	-3
94.6	91.5	26,796	40,056	2,024	3,026	0
96.3	86.1	25,265	23,005	3,894	3,546	-2
99.5	92.2	23,690	43,265	2,758	5,037	3
93.0	94.1	20,892	33,383	2,900	4,633	2
94.6	93.8	23,796	34,702	2,761	4,027	-4
91.0	93.2	17,580	33,570	2,067	3,946	-1
95.8	91.4	19,455	32,160	2,292	3,788	1
91.5	87.1	16,439	32,257	2,103	4,126	-2
97.9	89.4	15,449	20,943	1,791	2,428	-6
93.0	86.3	16,431	31,300	965	1,838	-1
91.1	89.8	16,256	24,413	1,311	1,969	-2
93.0	97.5	9,963	22,935	900	2,072	-8
91.4	92.0	12,298	22,825	1,480	2,748	-1
95.0	100.7	24,228	29,134	2,294	2,758	9
95.8	88.2	20,130	26,617	2,490	3,292	7
88.3	96.5	18,962	28,358	1,444	2,160	4
94.8	86.2	11,653	23,665	1,252	2,543	-4
94.0	95.1	15,079	18,643	1,939	2,397	-1
94.0	94.1	13,155	23,926	1,739	3,162	1
97.2	89.3	15,242	23,592	2,013	3,115	-20
100.0	89.4	18,976	16,037	2,239	1,892	-7
91.9	94.1	16,327	20,078	2,036	2,503	-10
99.2	98.4	18,017	20,917	1,657	1,924	-8
90.8	90.8	15,234	23,029	1,819	2,750	2
92.3	93.6	11,539	21,454	1,160	2,156	-1
99.9	95.4	9,050	14,073	1,649	2,564	-22
86.9	82.0	11,201	18,346	1,312	2,149	-25
92.0	91.0	15,529	19,284	1,924	2,389	4
97.9	91.3	13,172	18,697	1,250	1,775	2
93.7	88.5	13,874	25,382	1,215	2,222	-3
94.3	96.4	8,059	16,883	1,112	2,330	-20
88.1	91.5	14,467	26,019	1,573	2,828	15
88.6	86.9	11,610	17,944	1,377	2,129	3
93.0	93.7	11,441	21,984	1,264	2,428	-1
93.3	91.8	12,304	22,833	2,704	5,017	-1
94.8	94.5	16,275	17,875	1,820	1,999	-2
93.3	92.4	20,477	29,329	1,657	2,374	21
97.5	90.4	10,444	12,947	1,882	2,333	-22

Statistical Annex 4

HDI-1 Rank 2003	Province	Gender-related development index (GDI)				Life expectancy at birth (years) 2003		% HS Graduate (18 and above) 2003	
		Rank 1	Value 1	Rank 2	Value 2	Female	Male	Female	Male
40	Mt. Province	44	0.485	40	0.671	66.9	61.1	44.8	38.3
41	Bohol	50	0.478	31	0.683	72.6	67.4	37.1	35.8
42	Quezon	24	0.531	22	0.697	72.2	64.9	46.6	41.6
43	Apayao	62	0.453	52	0.658	66.1	58.7	38.5	36.6
44	Albay	26	0.526	21	0.700	71.2	66.7	49.1	46.1
45	Cagayan	40	0.492	32	0.682	69.1	63.9	43.0	42.1
46	Misamis Occidental	51	0.477	35	0.676	70.4	63.2	49.7	43.0
47	Aklan	35	0.501	49	0.662	66.2	60.5	53.3	46.0
48	Catanduanes	30	0.512	60	0.644	69.1	64.2	40.4	44.0
49	Sorsogon	47	0.480	12	0.724	70.6	67.6	42.9	38.0
50	Camarines Norte	42	0.488	65	0.639	67.0	63.0	42.4	40.4
51	Leyte	43	0.488	36	0.675	71.8	66.0	40.9	34.1
52	Oriental Mindoro	38	0.496	28	0.688	68.4	63.2	44.0	36.4
53	Surigao del Norte	54	0.472	43	0.667	71.1	63.5	40.1	35.6
54	Southern Leyte	46	0.481	58	0.646	67.7	63.1	40.0	32.7
55	Occidental Mindoro	45	0.482	59	0.645	67.1	60.3	39.1	34.0
56	Palawan	56	0.470	55	0.649	67.4	63.7	48.0	42.9
57	Guimaras	55	0.471	61	0.643	69.7	65.4	40.9	37.7
58	Davao Oriental	59	0.458	34	0.676	73.6	66.4	31.4	24.6
59	Sultan Kudarat	57	0.461	57	0.647	66.4	61.2	47.6	39.7
60	Siquijor	66	0.440	67	0.619	65.7	63.1	46.4	39.5
61	Agusan del Sur	70	0.429	68	0.617	64.6	62.5	35.5	28.8
62	Negros Oriental	65	0.441	63	0.641	67.3	64.1	34.0	30.2
63	Marinduque	48	0.479	48	0.662	67.9	63.8	41.4	38.4
64	Biliran	69	0.438	44	0.665	65.3	62.0	43.1	35.1
65	Surigao del Sur	63	0.448	38	0.674	66.2	61.1	43.7	39.0
66	Northern Samar	64	0.445	64	0.641	67.2	61.8	33.4	30.8
67	Romblon	58	0.459	45	0.665	67.6	61.7	39.8	34.8
68	Lanao del Sur	67	0.439	71	0.597	59.6	56.1	47.2	44.5
69	Eastern Samar	68	0.439	69	0.615	64.4	59.0	36.2	28.2
70	Western Samar	60	0.457	73	0.585	62.6	60.1	34.2	28.2
71	Sarangani	72	0.425	72	0.591	70.4	66.0	26.7	24.0
72	Zamboanga del Norte	71	0.428	70	0.609	65.6	61.9	36.9	31.2
73	Masbate	73	0.408	66	0.630	67.7	62.0	28.2	28.9
74	Basilan	74	0.381	74	0.562	64.3	56.9	29.9	33.3
75	Tawi-Tawi	75	0.356	76	0.539	53.6	48.7	37.8	43.9
76	Maguindanao	76	0.314	77	0.536	52.8	51.2	28.6	29.2
77	Sulu	77	0.296	75	0.540	55.6	49.9	20.5	21.6
	Philippines					72.4	67.2	53.52	50.59

[1]A positive figure indicates that the GDI rank is higher than the HDI rank, a negative the opposite.

Sources: Flieger and Cabigon (1994 and 1999); 2003 LFS; 2002 APIS; 1994 FLEMMS; 2003 FIES

Primary and high school enrollment rate (%) 2002		Estimated earned income (NCR 1997 pesos) 2000		Estimated earned income (PPP US$) 2003		HDI rank minus GDI-1 rank[1]
Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	
100.0	97.6	13,667	15,003	2,047	2,247	-4
100.1	85.5	8,699	17,104	1,116	2,194	-9
90.9	90.4	16,075	20,907	1,681	2,187	18
87.5	91.4	13,680	13,574	1,734	1,721	-19
92.2	91.9	13,988	17,718	1,779	2,253	18
91.8	94.9	11,085	20,074	1,419	2,569	5
93.7	89.9	9,076	11,889	1,178	1,543	-5
96.4	97.7	13,820	16,338	1,586	1,875	12
96.0	92.5	12,868	27,767	1,379	2,976	18
92.9	91.8	8,462	17,056	1,953	3,937	2
89.2	94.9	12,764	19,600	1,420	2,180	8
87.6	91.7	10,996	19,086	1,317	2,286	8
92.2	94.0	16,233	15,465	1,877	1,789	14
95.0	90.6	10,050	14,956	1,062	1,580	-1
99.2	91.1	13,206	17,921	1,118	1,518	8
94.9	91.0	14,843	19,900	1,714	2,298	10
92.3	86.8	9,295	13,767	1,194	1,769	0
92.4	95.6	9,392	12,544	1,159	1,547	2
96.6	97.4	8,253	13,848	1,672	2,805	-1
89.5	93.0	9,652	15,022	1,017	1,582	2
94.7	81.1	7,460	10,791	1,415	2,046	-6
90.8	92.4	8,231	18,925	814	1,871	-9
83.6	74.2	11,080	15,887	1,543	2,213	-3
93.6	95.2	11,194	16,466	930	1,368	15
96.1	97.3	10,621	7,352	1,812	1,254	-5
93.9	90.9	9,983	10,217	2,503	2,562	2
94.3	93.0	9,686	17,012	996	1,749	2
92.9	93.2	12,283	11,890	1,540	1,490	9
82.4	72.1	13,665	16,208	1,738	2,061	1
95.0	88.7	13,875	13,255	1,307	1,249	1
93.7	74.3	16,626	21,507	1,173	1,517	10
78.9	83.7	8,222	14,117	869	1,492	-1
96.7	99.2	7,913	9,230	1,037	1,210	1
93.5	89.5	6,046	15,438	932	2,379	0
84.7	83.3	5,736	17,396	656	1,990	0
86.6	92.1	6,427	9,824	1,686	2,578	0
82.0	75.2	5,239	10,268	1,153	2,260	0
85.2	81.3	4,209	9,427	944	2,114	0
92.37	88.99	16,133	27,223	1,936	3,272	

Statistical Annex 5: Poverty Incidence, Depth, and Severity

HDI-1

Rank

2003		Incidence			Depth			Severity		
	PROVINCE	1997	2000	2003	1997	2000	2003	1997	2000	2003
	Metro Manila	3.5	5.6	4.3	0.6	0.9	0.6	0.17	0.24	0.13
1	Benguet	19.7	12.6	12.3	4.6	2.3	2.4	1.43	0.58	0.70
2	Laguna	8.2	7.7	5.7	1.4	1.4	1.2	0.33	0.37	0.33
3	Batanes	21.7	9.9	9.2	3.3	1.1	3.2	0.69	0.22	1.11
4	Rizal	12.3	10.5	7.9	2.2	2.4	1.2	0.59	0.78	0.32
5	Cavite	9.1	10.9	8.5	1.7	1.9	1.3	0.47	0.58	0.29
6	Nueva Vizcaya	10.8	9.3	3.8	2.5	1.4	0.6	0.77	0.37	0.13
7	Pampanga	5.8	8.8	6.0	0.6	1.2	0.6	0.12	0.25	0.11
8	Bataan	7.1	7.6	8.9	1.2	1.0	1.1	0.31	0.23	0.23
9	Bulacan	10.1	9.5	9.2	1.8	1.7	1.7	0.50	0.49	0.47
10	Ilocos Norte	8.3	6.2	6.7	1.2	0.6	0.7	0.36	0.09	0.11
11	Tarlac	15.4	20.2	9.7	3.0	5.1	1.8	0.89	1.91	0.45
12	La Union	22.6	19.4	17.2	5.8	4.4	3.3	1.91	1.45	0.86
13	Misamis Oriental	22.9	22.8	26.6	5.8	5.9	7.2	2.08	2.15	2.76
14	Pangasinan	25.2	24.3	18.6	4.7	5.1	3.5	1.27	1.53	0.96
15	Zambales	13.8	18.2	10.6	2.5	3.7	1.7	0.68	0.97	0.39
16	Batangas	17.4	16.3	24.4	4.2	3.0	5.8	1.44	0.84	1.95
17	South Cotabato	25.4	25.2	21.6	6.9	5.3	5.4	2.45	1.69	1.89
18	Davao del Sur	21.6	18.8	24.0	4.6	4.2	6.2	1.46	1.42	2.18
19	Iloilo	22.0	21.8	26.3	4.8	4.5	7.3	1.62	1.41	2.67
20	Cebu	31.9	35.7	34.8	9.8	11.1	10.5	4.19	4.62	4.34
21	Quirino	18.5	19.8	9.6	3.4	3.8	1.1	0.97	1.12	0.20
22	Abra	22.0	19.7	13.4	4.7	3.4	1.6	1.33	0.97	0.36
23	Capiz	26.0	36.1	23.6	4.7	8.4	4.4	1.23	2.56	1.25
24	Ifugao	31.3	40.9	10.9	4.4	8.2	1.0	0.87	2.36	0.16
25	Ilocos Sur	13.3	17.0	15.2	2.0	3.6	2.9	0.46	1.05	0.83
26	Negros Occidental	18.8	31.3	24.6	4.2	7.5	5.1	1.32	2.50	1.57
27	Camiguin	33.6	32.3	30.6	9.1	7.7	7.9	3.52	2.68	2.68
28	Bukidnon	23.1	24.7	28.3	4.9	5.8	7.2	1.53	1.91	2.48
29	Isabela	36.1	32.6	31.9	10.3	8.0	7.0	3.79	2.92	2.14
30	North Cotabato	42.7	34.8	23.7	13.4	8.8	5.8	5.45	2.93	2.04
31	Davao del Norte	26.2	27.3	24.9	6.4	7.1	6.1	2.16	2.43	2.20
32	Agusan del Norte	32.3	34.1	26.7	9.2	10.1	7.0	3.61	4.28	2.42
33	Nueva Ecija	26.8	31.8	31.4	6.1	6.0	6.6	1.94	1.79	1.97
34	Camarines Sur	35.1	44.1	39.4	8.5	11.9	10.9	2.94	4.39	4.06
35	Zamboanga del Sur	31.9	42.2	40.1	6.9	12.1	12.2	2.21	4.84	4.91
36	Lanao del Norte	32.9	46.0	46.1	9.4	14.0	13.7	3.68	5.82	5.56
37	Antique	23.5	25.1	28.1	5.0	4.5	6.1	1.52	1.35	1.82
38	Aurora	19.2	27.4	24.6	3.5	6.0	5.1	0.90	2.08	1.59
39	Kalinga	16.3	26.5	18.5	2.2	8.1	3.5	0.42	3.14	0.97
40	Mountain Province	31.4	25.1	33.1	5.9	5.1	8.0	1.71	1.47	2.59
41	Bohol	43.1	48.1	35.3	11.9	13.7	9.0	4.65	5.08	3.14
42	Quezon	30.3	29.3	30.0	7.4	7.9	6.9	2.33	2.93	2.38
43	Apayao	19.7	10.4	1.2	4.7	1.7	0.1	1.38	0.40	0.00
44	Albay	49.8	44.6	45.9	13.8	12.0	13.6	5.14	4.68	5.20
45	Cagayan	31.7	35.5	31.7	6.5	7.5	6.9	1.90	2.22	2.14

HDI-1 Rank 2003		Incidence			Depth			Severity		
	PROVINCE	1997	2000	2003	1997	2000	2003	1997	2000	2003
46	Misamis Occidental	37.1	43.2	43.1	10.9	13.1	10.1	4.41	5.24	3.46
47	Aklan	32.8	30.7	31.9	7.0	7.4	7.7	2.27	2.57	2.55
48	Catanduanes	29.6	43.2	21.9	6.7	10.7	4.9	2.21	3.56	1.50
49	Sorsogon	50.3	52.9	34.2	14.6	15.1	5.8	5.60	5.31	1.31
50	Camarines Norte	39.5	49.3	49.0	9.7	12.9	14.3	3.27	4.92	5.75
51	Leyte	41.9	44.3	47.0	13.2	14.3	13.5	5.45	6.23	5.08
52	Oriental Mindoro	32.8	42.0	40.6	7.7	13.0	10.4	2.41	5.24	3.81
53	Surigao del Norte	43.0	36.9	45.1	10.8	8.2	11.4	3.90	2.67	3.79
54	Southern Leyte	45.9	32.5	44.4	12.2	9.1	11.8	4.18	3.28	4.12
55	Occidental Mindoro	17.3	23.4	35.3	3.3	4.6	8.6	1.07	1.33	2.98
56	Palawan	26.1	25.4	50.5	5.6	6.6	13.5	1.75	2.44	4.96
57	Guimaras	17.6	16.5	48.8	3.7	3.3	10.1	1.05	0.81	2.99
58	Davao Oriental	40.2	28.3	41.7	12.4	7.5	9.9	4.74	2.68	3.45
59	Sultan Kudarat	21.6	35.3	34.1	3.2	5.8	6.0	0.71	1.40	1.48
60	Siquijor	57.5	51.1	51.9	18.2	15.6	13.7	7.96	6.17	4.36
61	Agusan del Sur	36.3	34.9	36.7	8.8	7.5	9.5	3.02	2.48	3.36
62	Negros Oriental	35.1	41.0	45.9	9.3	11.9	16.3	3.43	5.01	7.61
63	Marinduque	38.2	48.8	49.1	10.8	12.0	11.3	3.97	3.94	3.48
64	Biliran	57.0	47.1	48.5	15.4	13.5	12.1	5.81	5.07	3.69
65	Surigao del Sur	36.5	30.1	44.5	10.0	7.3	10.4	3.88	2.60	3.34
66	Northern Samar	55.0	48.0	39.6	19.5	14.6	8.5	9.00	6.10	2.64
67	Romblon	61.5	74.4	52.1	17.5	23.7	15.3	6.58	9.86	5.75
68	Lanao del Sur	40.8	48.1	38.8	10.4	9.7	11.7	3.75	2.71	4.81
69	Eastern Samar	70.9	61.7	44.5	25.1	18.7	13.6	10.87	7.48	5.31
70	Western Samar	55.2	51.3	46.5	15.6	14.4	11.8	5.88	5.07	4.09
71	Sarangani	38.1	43.5	46.5	10.4	14.4	13.3	3.69	6.41	5.03
72	Zamboanga del Norte	44.2	51.9	63.2	12.0	18.6	25.8	4.75	8.75	12.80
73	Masbate	64.9	70.8	60.8	20.6	24.2	21.8	8.47	10.46	10.00
74	Basilan	30.2	63.0	65.6	5.9	16.7	18.4	1.66	5.97	6.47
75	Tawi-tawi	52.1	75.3	69.9	13.4	25.8	23.9	4.91	11.14	10.06
76	Maguindanao	24.0	36.2	55.8	4.0	9.2	12.9	1.10	3.48	4.19
77	Sulu	87.5	92.0	88.8	33.1	37.3	37.2	14.53	17.04	17.80
	Philippines	25.1	27.5	25.7	6.4	7.2	6.7	2.31	2.71	2.47

Source: 1997, 2000 and 2003 FIES

Statistical Annex 6: Human Poverty Index

HDI-1 Rank 2003	PROVINCE	HPI Rank (2003)	HPI (2003)	HPI (2000)	Probability at birth of not surviving to age 40 (% of cohort) 1995	Popn not using improved water sources (%) 2003	Underweight children under age five (%) 2002	Income poverty rank minus HPI rank[1]
	Metro Manila	4	7.7	9.6	9.6	14.8	1.6	-1
1	Benguet	24	13.7	14.6	15.4	28.0	1.5	-8
2	Laguna	2	7.2	11.6	12.1	2.8	2.4	2
3	Batanes	1	6.5	12.3	17.3	0.0	0.5	9
4	Rizal	17	11.3	15.4	11.3	24.8	2.5	-10
5	Cavite	8	8.9	8.8	11.7	6.2	4.7	0
6	Nueva Vizcaya	35	15.1	17.9	16.4	27.4	2.7	-33
7	Pampanga	7	8.1	14.9	10.0	0.6	2.8	-2
8	Bataan	3	7.3	10.3	12.2	1.9	3.6	6
9	Bulacan	6	8.1	9.0	10.6	5.9	1.4	5
10	Ilocos Norte	34	15.1	15.3	12.4	27.0	4.8	-28
11	Tarlac	21	13.0	13.7	12.3	4.6	3.8	-8
12	La Union	11	10.3	14.3	12.5	8.4	3.9	8
13	Misamis Oriental	14	10.5	13.3	13.0	7.6	6.3	18
14	Pangasinan	9	9.3	11.5	13.0	7.6	4.9	12
15	Zambales	10	10.2	15.9	13.0	15.4	4.7	4
16	Batangas	5	7.9	9.2	10.8	3.7	3.3	22
17	South Cotabato	25	13.7	20.1	14.5	11.7	6.5	-3
18	Davao del Sur	41	16.0	22.7	12.8	20.8	6.5	-15
19	Iloilo	47	17.0	19.0	13.4	31.4	6.8	-16
20	Cebu	32	14.9	16.8	11.0	28.1	7.9	13
21	Quirino	31	14.9	16.8	18.0	13.0	0.9	-19
22	Abra	12	10.4	13.8	18.1	1.3	8.5	5
23	Capiz	64	20.6	24.4	16.9	39.1	6.8	-40
24	Ifugao	59	19.4	35.8	21.4	16.9	2.3	-44
25	Ilocos Sur	22	13.3	13.9	14.4	9.4	4.1	-4
26	Negros Occidental	44	16.6	19.6	14.1	31.9	6.6	-16
27	Camiguin	16	11.3	13.7	16.7	0.0	4.1	21
28	Bukidnon	63	20.5	18.9	16.0	32.7	4.5	-28
29	Isabela	15	10.6	11.6	14.2	2.5	2.7	25
30	North Cotabato	60	19.8	21.6	14.6	25.6	8.1	-35
31	Davao del Norte	52	18.2	21.1	16.7	31.5	4.3	-22
32	Agusan del Norte	28	14.2	13.8	16.3	16.3	5.3	5
33	Nueva Ecija	13	10.5	8.9	11.7	4.2	2.8	25
34	Camarines Sur	36	15.4	13.5	13.1	16.0	13.8	14
35	Zamboanga del Sur	62	20.0	21.0	15.9	35.1	6.5	-10
36	Lanao del Norte	37	15.5	20.2	16.6	23.1	8.2	25
37	Antique	56	19.0	18.7	18.7	22.5	7.4	-22
38	Aurora	26	13.9	14.8	17.8	0.0	6.1	3
39	Kalinga	43	16.2	24.2	24.8	5.5	4.5	-23
40	Mt. Province	42	16.2	17.2	20.3	11.1	2.3	0

HDI-1 Rank 2003	PROVINCE	HPI Rank (2003)	HPI (2003)	HPI (2000)	Probability at birth of not surviving to age 40 (% of cohort) 1995	Popn not using improved water sources (%) 2003	Underweight children under age five (%) 2002	Income poverty rank minus HPI rank[1]
41	Bohol	48	17.1	16.4	13.5	32.9	4.8	-2
42	Quezon	39	15.7	16.5	13.7	33.3	4.7	-3
43	Apayao	49	17.2	26.4	20.0	30.5	5.6	-48
44	Albay	19	12.7	14.7	14.2	12.3	4.3	42
45	Cagayan	45	16.8	17.3	16.0	33.0	2.5	-6
46	Misamis Occidental	33	15.0	14.6	16.2	28.6	6.2	22
47	Aklan	40	15.8	19.5	17.8	18.7	3.9	1
48	Catanduanes	61	20.0	13.6	17.1	3.3	11.4	-38
49	Sorsogon	29	14.7	18.3	15.6	24.7	7.2	15
50	Camarines Norte	72	25.7	22.7	18.0	50.4	7.5	-4
51	Leyte	57	19.1	17.4	15.6	32.9	7.6	8
52	Oriental Mindoro	23	13.6	11.8	15.4	21.8	5.1	30
53	Surigao del Norte	27	14.1	15.4	15.6	14.8	7.3	32
54	Southern Leyte	38	15.6	14.1	16.4	13.0	4.7	18
55	Occidental Mindoro	46	16.9	15.3	16.6	8.2	4.6	1
56	Palawan	65	21.0	20.8	18.1	42.9	4.8	5
57	Guimaras	73	27.7	24.8	15.7	72.3	6.2	-6
58	Davao Oriental	67	22.4	19.6	15.6	31.8	4.7	-13
59	Sultan Kudarat	51	17.8	17.7	16.0	37.1	8.9	-8
60	Siquijor	55	18.9	13.1	16.0	8.0	7.3	16
61	Agusan del Sur	66	21.9	23.1	19.3	34.8	6.9	-18
62	Negros Oriental	58	19.4	21.9	15.1	28.8	6.7	2
63	Marinduque	18	12.2	12.2	15.3	15.3	3.7	51
64	Biliran	20	12.8	17.2	18.1	5.0	9.2	46
65	Surigao del Sur	50	17.6	17.3	19.3	16.7	9.2	8
66	Northern Samar	54	18.8	22.4	19.2	20.4	11.9	-3
67	Romblon	30	14.8	15.7	17.0	21.6	4.6	42
68	Lanao del Sur	69	23.2	35.9	22.9	41.5	4.1	-20
69	Eastern Samar	53	18.7	15.9	19.8	12.2	10.4	4
70	Western Samar	68	22.8	21.9	20.4	15.4	12.7	-4
71	Sarangani	70	23.8	22.7	15.1	21.7	4.9	-7
72	Zamboanga del Norte	71	24.8	24.7	16.6	43.6	7.9	4
73	Masbate	74	28.0	29.9	17.4	72.0	6.2	0
74	Basilan	75	29.8	-	18.1	66.8	5.4	1
75	Tawi-Tawi	78	39.1	42.4	29.7	81.9	7.2	-1
76	Maguindanao	76	31.7	29.4	24.3	47.1	6.4	-3
77	Sulu	77	32.7	37.8	28.6	68.7	5.1	1
	Philippines		14.9	14.7	16.2	20.92	4.6	

[1] A positive figure indicates that HPI rank of the province is higher than its income poverty rank, a negative the opposite.

Source: 1. Flieger and Cabigon 1999; 2. FLEMMS 1994; 3. 2003 FIES; 4. NNC "Operation Timbang" (2002)

Statistical Annex 7: Inequality in Consumption, 2003

HDI-1 Rank 2003	PROVINCE	SHARE OF CONSUMPTION					INEQUALITY MEASURES			
		Poorest 10%	Poorest 20%	Richest 20%	Richest 10%	Richest 10% to poorest 10%	Richest 20% to poorest 20%	Gini index 2003	Gini index 2000	Gini index 1997
	Metro Manila	3.2	7.4	45.2	29.5	9.4	6.1	39.8	44.9	44.9
1	Benguet	2.8	6.5	45.0	27.8	10.1	6.9	40.6	34.2	37.6
2	Laguna	3.2	7.7	41.9	25.9	8.1	5.5	38.9	34.5	39.0
3	Batanes	6.0	12.2	37.8	17.7	3.0	3.1	34.0	35.8	33.8
4	Rizal	3.5	8.2	42.0	26.8	7.5	5.1	37.5	44.5	37.5
5	Cavite	3.4	7.8	41.3	25.4	7.4	5.3	36.6	33.9	36.4
6	Nueva Vizcaya	3.8	8.5	44.1	28.1	7.5	5.2	41.8	35.0	31.3
7	Pampanga	4.0	8.7	41.7	26.4	6.6	4.8	35.7	27.6	43.9
8	Bataan	3.4	7.9	41.4	26.0	7.6	5.2	36.6	35.0	31.1
9	Bulacan	3.6	8.5	41.2	25.7	7.1	4.8	33.5	31.8	31.2
10	Ilocos Norte	4.0	9.0	41.1	25.5	6.4	4.6	39.6	34.5	37.6
11	Tarlac	3.5	8.3	42.1	26.6	7.6	5.1	35.9	33.2	41.8
12	La Union	3.5	8.0	43.6	28.7	8.2	5.4	42.4	38.2	37.2
13	Misamis Oriental	2.6	6.2	47.6	30.5	11.9	7.7	44.4	40.1	47.2
14	Pangasinan	3.6	8.4	42.4	27.2	7.5	5.0	38.1	34.2	26.9
15	Zambales	4.0	9.1	41.3	25.6	6.4	4.5	35.4	34.8	34.3
16	Batangas	3.0	7.1	44.3	28.6	9.5	6.2	40.9	35.9	38.2
17	South Cotabato	2.7	6.4	47.3	30.6	11.5	7.4	45.7	41.3	37.1
18	Davao del Sur	2.6	6.2	47.1	30.8	11.8	7.6	43.1	38.4	37.6
19	Iloilo	2.8	6.5	48.1	31.9	11.6	7.4	44.9	42.8	38.5
20	Cebu	2.4	5.8	48.9	31.7	13.4	8.4	44.6	40.3	44.3
21	Quirino	4.5	8.8	42.7	26.5	5.9	4.9	43.2	34.0	41.8
22	Abra	3.6	7.9	43.9	27.5	7.7	5.5	43.2	41.1	38.6
23	Capiz	2.9	6.7	49.0	31.8	10.9	7.3	48.6	42.6	36.2
24	Ifugao	4.4	9.2	40.5	25.1	5.7	4.4	39.6	35.8	41.0
25	Ilocos Sur	3.5	8.3	41.6	26.2	7.4	5.0	39.5	35.8	34.0
26	Negros Occidental	3.1	7.4	46.2	29.8	9.5	6.3	41.7	40.5	42.6
27	Camiguin	3.1	7.7	48.0	27.9	8.9	6.3	45.5	37.6	42.6
28	Bukidnon	2.6	6.1	49.2	33.1	12.7	8.0	46.6	40.0	28.4
29	Isabela	3.6	8.0	44.4	29.2	8.1	5.5	40.9	39.9	43.3
30	North Cotabato	3.5	8.5	40.4	25.1	7.1	4.8	36.9	36.1	36.9
31	Davao del Norte	2.9	6.8	46.6	30.3	10.5	6.8	43.0	38.0	41.1
32	Agusan del Norte	3.0	6.9	44.1	27.6	9.1	6.4	41.1	40.5	30.4
33	Nueva Ecija	4.1	9.3	38.7	24.1	5.8	4.2	32.9	28.8	34.5
34	Camarines Sur	3.0	6.8	49.7	33.6	11.2	7.3	47.4	40.4	36.7
35	Zamboanga del Sur	2.7	6.4	49.6	33.1	12.4	7.8	49.0	38.0	37.9
36	Lanao del Norte	2.4	5.6	57.3	41.4	17.0	10.3	53.2	47.5	33.5
37	Antique	3.4	7.4	50.4	34.7	10.2	6.8	49.4	38.5	37.2
38	Aurora	3.8	8.9	40.8	25.3	6.7	4.6	39.1	35.3	41.4
39	Kalinga	3.8	8.5	39.0	23.9	6.3	4.6	41.1	36.7	37.3

HDI-1 Rank 2003	PROVINCE	SHARE OF CONSUMPTION					INEQUALITY MEASURES			
		Poorest 10%	Poorest 20%	Richest 20%	Richest 10%	Richest 10% to poorest 10%	Richest 20% to poorest 20%	Gini index 2003	Gini index 2000	Gini index 1997
40	Mt. Province	3.7	8.2	42.5	27.3	7.3	5.2	44.1	36.6	37.5
41	Bohol	3.4	7.7	45.3	30.1	9.0	5.9	41.2	43.8	42.7
42	Quezon	3.4	8.2	43.7	29.4	8.5	5.3	38.9	38.0	40.5
43	Apayao	5.0	11.3	34.1	19.2	3.8	3.0	28.3	25.9	28.4
44	Albay	3.3	7.4	47.2	31.0	9.5	6.4	43.9	40.4	42.1
45	Cagayan	3.8	8.6	42.7	27.4	7.2	5.0	38.9	31.1	40.5
46	Misamis Occidental	3.4	8.2	46.2	30.0	8.8	5.7	42.8	40.1	37.0
47	Aklan	3.7	8.3	44.3	29.3	8.0	5.3	43.1	37.5	39.9
48	Catanduanes	4.7	9.7	40.3	26.9	5.7	4.2	38.3	48.7	38.1
49	Sorsogon	4.8	9.7	43.1	27.3	5.7	4.4	36.4	36.1	32.3
50	Camarines Norte	2.9	6.2	53.2	39.3	13.5	8.7	50.7	42.5	34.5
51	Leyte	3.1	7.1	49.9	34.6	11.3	7.0	45.4	46.3	39.9
52	Oriental Mindoro	3.4	7.9	45.4	30.0	8.9	5.7	40.1	40.4	34.4
53	Surigao del Norte	3.9	8.4	45.7	28.9	7.5	5.4	43.3	34.9	38.7
54	Southern Leyte	3.7	7.8	46.7	32.0	8.6	6.0	43.2	36.9	42.7
55	Occidental Mindoro	3.2	7.6	46.0	31.5	9.7	6.1	43.6	36.9	36.1
56	Palawan	3.4	7.8	47.0	32.0	9.4	6.0	41.4	37.5	40.2
57	Guimaras	4.5	10.0	40.9	24.3	5.5	4.1	38.3	32.5	39.4
58	Davao Oriental	3.7	8.6	41.4	26.8	7.2	4.8	37.5	42.5	40.7
59	Sultan Kudarat	4.6	10.1	41.3	27.4	5.9	4.1	36.5	30.2	35.4
60	Siquijor	4.6	8.9	43.9	29.2	6.4	4.9	39.0	40.4	36.4
61	Agusan del Sur	3.4	7.8	45.3	30.1	8.9	5.8	42.8	31.8	40.9
62	Negros Oriental	2.3	5.4	54.2	37.3	16.3	10.1	49.0	43.9	37.2
63	Marinduque	4.1	9.3	45.6	32.2	7.8	4.9	40.1	35.3	36.6
64	Biliran	5.7	9.1	43.9	31.9	5.6	4.8	45.7	37.1	37.3
65	Surigao del Sur	3.8	8.5	45.4	30.2	7.9	5.3	39.8	38.6	30.3
66	Northern Samar	4.4	9.2	40.7	26.4	6.0	4.4	36.8	40.5	41.4
67	Romblon	3.8	8.4	44.5	29.2	7.6	5.3	38.0	38.8	46.9
68	Lanao del Sur	3.3	7.5	41.9	26.2	8.1	5.6	40.9	23.6	29.9
69	Eastern Samar	3.0	6.8	50.6	34.7	11.6	7.5	46.8	38.5	39.2
70	Western Samar	3.4	7.7	48.3	32.5	9.5	6.2	43.8	36.0	38.0
71	Sarangani	3.8	9.0	40.3	25.4	6.7	4.5	36.2	35.9	34.7
72	Zamboanga del Norte	2.8	6.3	52.3	36.2	13.0	8.2	50.9	47.6	44.4
73	Masbate	3.1	7.2	48.2	31.3	10.2	6.7	46.7	37.0	38.9
74	Basilan	5.1	11.1	38.6	23.2	4.5	3.5	32.4	27.1	28.5
75	Tawi-Tawi	5.0	10.9	34.3	20.0	4.0	3.2	28.9	27.6	30.5
76	Maguindanao	4.8	10.6	38.5	25.2	5.3	3.6	34.5	36.0	24.1
77	Sulu	5.1	11.8	33.0	19.6	3.9	2.8	26.8	19.2	22.8
Philippines		2.7	6.4	47.2	31.0	11.7	7.3	43.8	42.9	42.7

FIES 1997,2000 and 2003

Statistical Annex 8: Baseline Human Insecurity Indicators

HDI-1 2003 Rank	Province	Average number of armed encounters (1986-2004)	Disparity in access to convenient water source (2000)	% of population without access to electricity (2000)	% adult with less 6 years of schooling (2000)	% CARP accomplishments 1972-2004 (%hectares)	Minoritization: proportion of original settlers (%) 2000	Average per capita expenditure of the 3rd quintile (NCR 1997 prices) 2003
Majority								
	Metro Manila	1.37	..	7.3	4.5		71.3	29,013
44	Albay	1.53	..	42.4	13.9	55	97.8	13,454
8	Bataan	0.37	..	14.2	12.7	91	3.9	24,858
16	Batangas	0.32	..	11.8	15.3	50	96.4	18,391
41	Bohol	0.74	..	41.7	28.5	102	94.6	14,611
9	Bulacan	0.58	..	6.2	11.4	55	90.7	22,301
50	Camarines Norte	0.32	..	39.1	10.3	43	80.1	12,568
34	Camarines Sur	1.21	..	38.9	15.2	43	94.7	13,403
48	Catanduanes	0.00	..	42.6	16.9	95	98.5	19,459
20	Cebu	0.47	..	30.7	24.8	62	97.0	16,641
31	Davao del Norte	1.63	..	46.6	24.0	83	61.8	18,338
69	Eastern Samar	0.79	..	56.5	26.5	129	98.1	12,006
2	Laguna	0.47	..	8.3	9.8	70	90.5	26,177
51	Leyte	0.53	..	48.1	30.2	82	97.9	13,068
64	Biliran[1]			49.9	32.3	82	97.0	13,550
63	Marinduque	0.11	..	45.0	20.4	73	97.0	11,845
13	Misamis Oriental	0.53	..	29.4	15.2	103	81.7	18,293
26	Negros Occidental	0.89	..	42.7	25.5	49	79.9	18,280
62	Negros Oriental	0.47	..	63.3	38.7	63	94.8	12,061
33	Nueva Ecija	0.84	..	19.5	14.6	91	0.6	14,946
55	Occidental Mindoro	0.21	..	58.9	25.6	90	73.3	16,618
7	Pampanga	0.84	..	9.0	10.2	106	86.6	23,544
42	Quezon	2.42	..	31.9	17.2	76	92.7	14,462
4	Rizal	0.47	..	10.0	7.8	84	81.2	22,964
70	Western Samar	0.74	..	54.2	40.3	79	92.3	12,004
60	Siquijor	0.00	..	57.9	22.1	112	99.0	11,428
49	Sorsogon	0.63	..	36.3	15.9	55	97.5	12,237
54	Southern Leyte	0.11	..	47.5	26.1	118	80.9	13,652
11	Tarlac	0.53	..	17.9	13.1	110	84.6	22,218
38	Aurora	0.42	..	40.3	17.8	115	4.8	21,042
Minority								
47	Aklan	0.16	72.42	32.8	22.1	97	94.0	14,755
37	Antique	0.11	39.25	51.2	26.2	96	95.6	15,385
74	Basilan	0.58	29.45	62.7	39.7	97	68.4	10,298
3	Batanes	0.00	8.03	15.9	9.9	106	95.2	34,307
23	Capiz	0.26	77.31	48.4	26.6	67	89.5	17,770
76	Maguindanao	4.79	65.75	75.7	39.7	..	79.7	10,753
40	Mt. Province	0.16	28.07	45.1	28.2	129	80.4	15,761
67	Romblon	0.00	35.75	58.5	23.3	93	88.0	11,448
77	Sulu	0.32	34.72	82.7	39.1	..	95.4	6,720
75	Tawi-Tawi	0.00	72.93	82.8	24.9		26.0	8,193

Mixed								
22	Abra	0.21	12.76	35.2	18.6	268	89.7	21,994
32	Agusan del Norte	0.32	25.93	38.1	18.9	83	76.5	18,109
61	Agusan del Sur	0.74	37.43	59.4	31.7	104	66.5	14,404
1	Benguet	0.37	32.96	22.2	12.5	48	51.2	25,272
28	Bukidnon	0.95	66.31	57.5	32.3	107	73.6	17,067
45	Cagayan	1.32	32.47	42.8	24.3	104	94.6	14,935
27	Camiguin	0.00	3.58	45.3	13.9	109	36.4	16,779
5	Cavite	0.16	6.03	8.0	8.8	40	84.9	25,804
18	Davao del Sur	1.42	27.69	34.7	20.1	99	38.9	19,531
58	Davao Oriental	1.16	36.83	57.2	33.1	123	68.4	13,732
24	Ifugao	0.05	21.65	63.2	33.5	85	72.8	19,747
10	Ilocos Norte	0.58	24.92	11.0	14.9	74	96.9	22,450
25	Ilocos Sur	0.42	19.53	20.4	15.9	106	92.0	19,835
19	Iloilo	0.21	34.32	40.5	16.7	44	97.2	17,642
57	Guimaras[2]		49.08	58.6	19.1	56	94.0	14,831
29	Isabela	1.11	41.40	29.9	20.4	100	86.6	15,719
39	Kalinga	0.79	16.68	55.7	27.8	145	64.0	17,811
43	Apayao[3]		64.33	66.6	26.0	77	37.5	23,585
12	La Union	0.26	27.43	17.6	11.5	114	91.9	19,403
36	Lanao del Norte	1.95	50.77	39.9	24.8	70	62.1	13,354
68	Lanao del Sur	0.42	80.80	39.6	22.4	62	90.0	12,785
73	Masbate	0.53	66.16	77.6	33.4	72	91.2	10,222
46	Misamis Occidental	0.42	51.32	37.3	20.8	93	81.5	13,583
30	North Cotabato	3.58	62.40	63.8	26.8	85	7.1	15,533
66	Northern Samar	0.79	54.21	66.5	34.7	77	93.7	14,133
6	Nueva Vizcaya	0.05	29.38	41.7	21.4	111	87.9	24,400
52	Oriental Mindoro	0.63	38.31	56.4	24.5	54	85.8	13,647
56	Palawan	0.11	67.21	62.8	24.8	114	40.3	12,710
14	Pangasinan	0.37	41.30	23.8	9.9	83	93.9	18,247
21	Quirino	0.16	24.14	48.7	22.9	111	1.6	20,730
17	South Cotabato	1.05	38.17	31.8	18.8	108	11.8	19,323
71	Sarangani[4]		61.02	63.4	42.0	137	28.6	12,674
59	Sultan Kudarat	0.84	55.80	57.1	25.4	88	7.6	13,257
53	Surigao del Norte	0.32	10.65	43.2	23.4	89	15.2	12,278
65	Surigao del Sur	0.79	65.82	44.1	26.3	74	84.9	13,528
15	Zambales	0.53	19.76	17.5	9.9	115	41.3	19,013
72	Zamboanga del Norte	0.68	27.65	65.6	33.2	116	70.7	8,979
35	Zamboanga del Sur	1.47	53.00	52.4	28.8	112	55.4	13,767
PHILIPPINES		0.68	..	32.0	18.1	81	75.9	16,281

[1] part of Leyte using the 1985 provincial classification

[2] part of Iloilo using the 1985 provincial classification

[3] part of Kalinga using the 1985 provincial classification

[4] part of South Cotabato using the 1985 provincial classification

Sources: Edillon (2005); C.Bautista (2005); CPH 2000; FIES 2003

Statistical Annex 9: Open Unemployment and Underemployment Rates, 2001-2003

HDI-1 Rank 2003	Province	OPEN UNEMPLOYMENT RATE						
		1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
	Metro Manila	13.8	16.0	16.2	17.5	17.0	17.7	17.2
1	Benguet	7.6	7.7	8.5	10.2	11.3	11.2	12.3
2	Laguna	9.5	9.9	10.5	12.5	14.5	15.3	16.4
3	Batanes	2.3	2.5	4.0	4.4	1.6	1.1	4.0
4	Rizal	7.1	10.3	11.2	13.2	12.4	13.8	13.7
5	Cavite	10.1	10.2	10.2	15.4	15.9	15.5	16.0
6	Nueva Vizcaya	5.1	5.4	3.9	5.4	4.9	7.1	4.2
7	Pampanga	9.7	11.0	11.6	11.5	13.2	15.1	13.2
8	Bataan	13.0	14.0	14.9	14.2	15.1	16.5	14.3
9	Bulacan	7.5	9.3	8.6	8.3	8.8	10.0	11.0
10	Ilocos Norte	3.6	4.8	4.0	6.3	4.9	7.9	6.7
11	Tarlac	10.8	12.6	11.6	15.8	11.5	13.9	12.7
12	La Union	6.2	6.3	7.8	8.2	8.0	10.1	9.1
13	Misamis Oriental	8.4	9.4	9.6	10.0	8.2	9.0	9.5
14	Pangasinan	10.0	11.0	9.9	12.2	12.5	14.3	14.3
15	Zambales	20.1	13.3	12.6	14.0	13.4	13.3	14.7
16	Batangas	8.7	9.4	9.4	13.3	12.0	12.7	13.4
17	South Cotabato	9.6	11.8	9.7	11.1	13.2	16.3	14.9
18	Davao del Sur	7.4	10.1	9.2	10.9	10.5	11.2	10.1
19	Iloilo	11.2	13.2	10.8	10.0	11.9	12.1	11.3
20	Cebu	11.0	14.3	13.3	12.6	13.7	14.3	14.7
21	Quirino	3.5	5.6	6.0	8.6	5.7	7.5	8.0
22	Abra	5.7	5.4	6.7	8.4	5.7	7.7	7.9
23	Capiz	5.3	6.5	4.0	5.9	5.9	6.8	6.0
24	Ifugao	4.3	6.5	4.0	5.1	5.4	7.9	7.1
25	Ilocos Sur	8.0	7.5	6.9	9.7	9.0	9.3	8.2
26	Negros Occidental	8.5	10.0	8.5	13.4	10.0	9.1	9.2
27	Camiguin	3.0	3.5	2.2	2.3	4.0	3.2	0.0
28	Bukidnon	3.7	5.5	3.4	4.5	4.9	4.8	5.2
29	Isabela	5.4	8.7	5.9	7.1	5.6	8.7	9.1
30	North Cotabato	4.4	6.2	5.4	5.5	5.0	5.3	5.2
31	Davao del Norte	8.4	8.1	7.2	6.9	8.8	10.4	10.3
32	Agusan del Norte	13.7	16.3	12.2	13.8	14.1	15.1	15.5
33	Nueva Ecija	6.1	6.9	9.3	10.7	9.8	11.2	9.1
34	Camarines Sur	5.8	7.5	7.8	10.4	8.7	8.8	7.9
35	Zamboanga del Sur	5.4	6.2	6.0	7.6	6.7	7.4	7.1
36	Lanao del Norte	10.2	11.3	9.3	15.5	13.2	10.5	8.3
37	Antique	8.7	9.6	9.7	10.7	11.9	11.2	15.8
38	Aurora	12.4	14.5	15.4	18.9	15.1	14.6	16.2
39	Kalinga	6.6	7.2	4.7	4.3	4.1	9.5	8.6

UNDEREMPLOYMENT RATE

1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
15.2	15.5	15.8	14.3	11.1	9.7	9.6
9.9	10.6	7.5	19.1	10.8	6.8	10.2
23.1	19.9	17.6	19.8	17.9	16.6	13.2
0.3	0.7	0.1	4.8	2.6	9.0	11.8
17.4	12.5	12.6	8.8	8.2	7.6	6.0
9.3	15.6	15.3	14.6	17.0	15.0	17.0
45.0	44.8	36.8	35.6	43.9	48.6	38.1
16.0	14.5	18.4	12.8	8.9	11.2	8.7
13.1	10.8	11.5	17.9	16.0	22.8	19.9
10.6	14.1	20.1	13.0	7.0	6.8	7.8
22.7	23.1	20.3	27.0	23.2	29.5	22.0
10.0	7.4	12.9	6.4	5.6	8.5	8.2
17.5	16.2	20.5	21.9	13.0	16.1	24.2
23.6	28.5	36.2	25.6	14.5	18.2	19.7
17.6	18.2	16.8	18.8	11.2	13.0	10.4
5.5	7.3	4.3	7.1	7.9	3.7	4.2
21.6	21.6	22.7	23.2	16.2	15.6	10.2
50.6	50.8	50.8	45.6	40.6	35.9	34.1
31.3	30.4	27.9	28.8	19.2	16.4	18.6
38.9	36.0	43.9	41.5	28.5	26.6	31.1
8.9	9.8	10.7	13.3	10.0	0.0	10.5
15.3	15.2	9.4	24.3	12.8	15.3	28.6
14.3	11.7	8.8	10.4	10.6	9.3	9.1
14.1	14.7	22.1	24.0	21.6	22.6	22.7
8.3	8.4	13.0	21.2	19.3	27.0	26.6
8.1	5.4	8.0	16.3	5.7	4.4	7.0
16.4	19.1	15.8	20.3	14.2	17.6	18.4
5.2	4.1	1.2	17.7	5.2	13.7	6.3
62.9	51.9	48.1	38.9	46.9	44.6	38.1
14.2	19.5	16.4	24.4	19.4	20.2	17.5
46.9	38.8	33.3	32.4	21.2	16.5	14.9
34.6	36.0	31.5	29.9	14.5	14.6	18.1
34.9	35.2	42.2	38.1	26.9	28.1	26.6
7.8	10.1	8.1	6.8	5.3	8.4	8.3
52.2	52.7	58.1	48.9	28.6	28.7	34.8
24.6	21.4	22.6	14.4	12.6	10.1	13.4
35.9	41.6	37.8	45.9	33.1	32.8	40.7
23.8	13.0	14.5	22.1	18.1	16.4	20.8
27.7	36.2	41.1	42.1	35.2	31.8	33.4
31.5	37.8	28.0	31.0	12.0	12.8	12.1

Statistical Annex 9

HDI-1 Rank 2003	Province	OPEN UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
40	Mt. Province	3.3	3.1	3.5	4.7	3.8	4.5	3.0
41	Bohol	8.4	11.4	7.2	10.1	8.3	10.8	9.9
42	Quezon	7.8	8.1	6.9	8.0	7.0	6.8	8.4
43	Apayao	6.4	12.2	7.1	4.3	3.6	3.7	2.7
44	Albay	9.6	11.7	10.2	10.3	10.5	13.9	12.2
45	Cagayan	3.7	5.4	3.9	5.0	2.9	2.8	3.2
46	Misamis Occidental	9.2	11.2	11.8	10.7	8.2	9.0	8.9
47	Aklan	6.8	7.1	6.9	13.2	9.0	10.7	10.2
48	Catanduanes	6.1	8.3	7.8	10.4	9.7	6.8	7.1
49	Sorsogon	10.0	10.4	10.3	13.7	7.5	7.0	6.8
50	Camarines Norte	8.4	11.0	11.6	10.5	7.4	9.1	6.9
51	Leyte	7.8	8.9	7.2	11.6	10.0	8.2	9.1
52	Oriental Mindoro	5.5	7.9	6.9	8.6	8.0	7.6	6.0
53	Surigao del Norte	4.2	5.0	3.7	3.4	3.8	6.1	6.3
54	Southern Leyte	8.5	11.1	10.6	12.0	10.4	12.5	13.8
55	Occidental Mindoro	6.5	7.6	6.9	10.6	7.3	10.7	10.6
56	Palawan	5.5	7.6	8.9	7.8	9.0	9.4	11.3
57	Guimaras	8.9	8.0	8.0	7.7	7.1	10.6	10.4
58	Davao Oriental	6.5	7.0	8.0	8.8	6.0	8.2	5.9
59	Sultan Kudarat	3.7	4.9	5.3	7.5	5.8	4.6	5.3
60	Siquijor	5.5	4.4	2.4	3.3	5.0	3.7	0.0
61	Agusan del Sur	5.1	7.7	6.9	7.4	7.0	6.8	6.8
62	Negros Oriental	4.4	6.8	5.0	10.4	7.6	8.6	10.0
63	Marinduque	6.3	9.0	6.7	8.3	7.9	8.8	8.3
64	Biliran	5.3	6.9	7.4	10.3	8.8	6.5	7.7
65	Surigao del Sur	12.9	12.9	10.9	10.4	9.9	13.6	12.1
66	Northern Samar	9.1	8.9	7.7	11.6	9.1	8.6	8.0
67	Romblon	9.8	8.3	9.7	9.2	8.8	10.2	7.5
68	Lanao del Sur	5.7	5.5	4.4	8.3	6.5	7.0	9.6
69	Eastern Samar	11.4	8.2	8.3	13.1	9.9	11.4	8.3
70	Western Samar	8.6	8.2	6.8	8.0	6.4	7.8	6.5
71	Sarangani	4.9	5.8	6.0	8.2	8.4	12.1	11.1
72	Zamboanga del Norte	8.6	10.9	8.1	7.3	7.8	7.7	7.8
73	Masbate	4.1	5.7	5.7	6.2	5.1	6.1	5.7
74	Basilan	4.8	5.8	9.5	9.6	8.5	8.8	10.4
75	Tawi-Tawi	3.2	5.0	3.9	4.6	6.0	4.9	2.9
76	Maguindanao	4.4	6.6	5.5	5.5	8.0	8.6	7.7
77	Sulu	1.8	4.0	3.7	2.8	3.4	4.7	3.1
	Philipppines	8.6	10.1	9.4	11.1	10.6	11.4	11.2

Source: 1997 to 2003 LFS

UNDEREMPLOYMENT RATE

1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
16.8	16.6	21.1	28.7	20.8	12.9	9.0
10.8	10.7	8.9	10.6	5.8	9.7	8.6
17.5	14.1	15.1	17.1	13.2	16.3	14.7
38.0	43.8	45.0	48.6	27.1	42.1	27.1
43.3	46.8	50.7	41.4	38.7	44.5	35.7
11.5	12.7	9.9	12.0	13.9	10.1	9.7
15.6	12.1	12.7	13.7	21.3	20.8	26.8
14.0	13.0	15.0	12.1	8.9	10.5	16.6
27.1	48.4	49.1	49.7	49.2	49.1	39.6
23.4	26.7	28.4	25.9	16.1	19.2	17.5
33.6	27.4	30.6	27.4	25.6	23.5	28.4
21.3	17.3	15.4	20.0	22.2	20.3	22.4
18.9	17.3	22.0	34.7	15.8	10.0	12.3
9.8	6.8	11.2	8.7	9.6	7.5	8.1
28.6	25.4	27.1	27.1	22.7	29.0	24.
31.6	33.3	28.2	41.5	23.2	20.1	23.1
7.8	3.6	11.5	19.3	19.4	11.7	11.3
28.9	34.8	41.5	32.3	35.3	35.5	32.8
46.1	41.4	48.0	37.6	39.6	32.3	36.4
7.9	8.1	8.9	16.2	7.7	8.3	6.7
3.8	5.9	16.6	9.7	7.1	20.9	17.8
16.3	12.7	13.8	10.5	13.4	13.3	13.6
23.3	13.2	17.4	16.4	9.8	12.6	14.0
24.9	23.0	21.7	27.5	26.0	24.9	34.5
24.5	20.6	16.5	12.3	19.0	29.8	16.7
32.1	37.7	42.6	39.0	26.2	32.4	32.8
16.0	15.6	13.4	20.7	10.2	7.2	7.5
18.6	16.4	13.3	22.3	17.8	13.2	12.5
2.2	11.5	5.6	7.9	2.7	4.0	6.0
37.2	50.4	48.9	50.0	39.5	48.9	63.1
41.4	36.4	34.4	37.1	27.3	27.7	31.6
24.6	31.5	29.2	23.8	35.5	30.7	25.3
29.8	30.2	36.4	33.4	41.4	36.4	33.9
22.9	31.6	21.7	26.6	27.5	24.8	21.5
3.0	3.3	5.7	6.6	7.7	5.7	13.6
26.9	18.4	13.2	15.5	2.6	3.3	3.9
25.8	24.1	20.8	20.3	18.4	24.0	17.8
8.3	5.1	4.3	5.1	3.3	4.2	2.3
22.1	21.8	22.3	21.9	17.03	16.99	17.04

Statistical Annex 10: Gender inequality in economic activity, 2001-2003

HDI-1 Rank 2003	PROVINCE	Female economic activity rate (age 15 and above)		Employment by Economic Activity: Agriculture		Industry		Services		Contributing family Workers	
		rate % male rate	As % of male rate	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female (as % of total)	Male (as %of total)
	Metro Manila	53.0	67.8	0.4	1.6	16.0	29.2	83.6	69.2	61.8	38.2
1	Benguet	48.3	64.1	23.6	30.4	14.0	27.6	62.4	42.0	58.4	41.6
2	Laguna	54.5	68.1	4.1	19.2	30.0	31.9	65.9	48.9	60.6	39.4
3	Batanes	80.8	81.4	54.2	58.4	2.1	17.3	43.7	24.3	42.5	57.5
4	Rizal	49.8	64.8	1.6	8.3	25.4	36.6	73.0	55.2	63.8	36.2
5	Cavite	50.3	63.4	4.8	14.0	27.2	31.1	68.1	54.8	55.3	44.7
6	Nueva Vizcaya	64.6	76.2	46.3	63.2	3.1	12.7	50.6	24.2	59.7	40.3
7	Pampanga	41.1	51.4	3.4	19.8	21.1	31.1	75.4	49.1	38.6	61.4
8	Bataan	50.8	63.8	6.5	31.2	21.8	25.3	71.7	43.5	38.1	61.9
9	Bulacan	50.5	62.0	6.4	17.5	25.2	30.3	68.4	52.2	47.5	52.5
10	Ilocos Norte	57.1	69.1	51.9	61.8	4.8	10.5	43.3	27.8	48.1	51.9
11	Tarlac	49.0	57.0	27.9	47.6	13.2	19.1	58.8	33.3	45.8	54.2
12	La Union	57.1	68.7	37.7	56.7	4.4	14.1	57.9	29.2	51.2	48.8
13	Misamis Oriental	57.9	69.7	15.7	34.4	7.7	18.2	76.6	47.4	57.8	42.2
14	Pangasinan	41.6	52.5	15.2	44.7	9.6	18.9	75.2	36.4	45.4	54.6
15	Zambales	49.1	61.3	9.2	34.9	11.6	20.1	79.2	45.1	49.0	51.0
16	Batangas	51.8	62.1	16.2	41.3	24.7	21.4	59.1	37.3	39.2	60.8
17	South Cotabato	57.3	68.4	29.6	53.4	7.9	13.7	62.5	33.0	51.6	48.4
18	Davao del Sur	55.1	66.4	21.3	42.5	8.3	19.3	70.4	38.2	53.4	46.6
19	Iloilo	52.2	65.5	29.0	51.8	6.8	14.5	64.2	33.7	47.8	52.2
20	Cebu	53.0	67.4	18.2	32.2	21.0	26.7	60.8	41.1	55.4	44.6
21	Quirino	56.6	64.5	40.2	67.1	4.0	11.9	55.8	21.0	52.0	48.0
22	Abra	50.0	59.6	54.0	74.7	2.2	7.1	43.8	18.2	53.1	46.9
23	Capiz	62.8	75.5	42.6	57.5	4.3	10.9	53.1	31.6	62.3	37.7
24	Ifugao	68.1	82.2	70.5	68.1	4.6	13.7	24.9	18.3	71.5	28.5
25	Ilocos Sur	53.8	63.5	46.9	67.1	3.5	9.4	49.6	23.4	57.0	43.0
26	Negros Occidental	53.3	65.7	32.4	57.8	6.2	11.9	61.5	30.4	51.9	48.1
27	Camiguin	72.8	75.5	43.3	62.4	4.5	12.4	52.2	25.1	48.5	51.5
28	Bukidnon	76.7	82.0	62.8	75.4	1.8	6.7	35.4	17.9	56.8	43.2
29	Isabela	49.8	58.6	39.3	61.8	3.3	12.4	57.5	25.8	50.6	49.4
30	North Cotabato	58.9	67.5	50.0	69.6	3.9	8.7	46.1	21.7	45.8	54.2
31	Davao del Norte	49.4	59.3	37.7	64.0	4.9	16.1	57.4	19.9	45.9	54.1
32	Agusan del Norte	59.2	69.8	28.4	44.5	6.4	18.2	65.2	37.4	50.9	49.1
33	Nueva Ecija	42.5	50.4	26.4	53.3	9.2	14.7	64.4	31.9	40.9	59.1
34	Camarines Sur	56.5	66.7	40.0	61.7	5.2	12.0	54.8	26.3	50.6	49.4
35	Zamboanga del Sur	43.0	51.7	32.7	58.4	6.5	11.3	60.9	30.2	46.5	53.5
36	Lanao del Norte	57.3	68.2	29.0	51.3	4.6	14.4	66.4	34.4	53.6	46.4
37	Antique	49.7	61.8	30.5	68.6	9.0	7.9	60.5	23.5	41.5	58.5

38	Aurora	62.9	73.3	23.4	55.1	12.6	14.3	64.0	30.6	48.0	52.0
39	Kalinga	51.6	63.1	61.5	72.5	4.4	11.9	34.1	15.6	54.4	45.6
40	Mt. Province	81.6	90.5	76.6	77.6	1.6	8.8	21.8	13.7	64.4	35.6
41	Bohol	46.5	56.7	32.9	62.3	21.2	13.0	45.9	24.7	49.3	50.7
42	Quezon	49.7	58.8	20.2	48.2	10.4	16.7	69.4	35.1	50.7	49.3
43	Apayao	54.1	63.2	74.0	84.7	0.7	4.5	25.3	10.9	60.0	40.0
44	Albay	53.9	65.6	13.8	44.6	23.6	21.9	62.5	33.6	45.7	54.3
45	Cagayan	61.1	69.9	63.3	71.8	2.1	9.4	34.6	18.8	58.7	41.3
46	Misamis Occidental	65.5	74.4	43.7	59.6	5.0	11.2	51.3	29.2	58.1	41.9
47	Aklan	50.6	64.9	20.9	45.5	19.6	19.8	59.5	34.7	65.2	34.8
48	Catanduanes	51.0	59.4	31.3	65.1	5.1	12.1	63.6	22.8	45.2	54.8
49	Sorsogon	45.1	54.4	22.0	64.3	16.1	9.5	61.9	26.2	41.5	58.5
50	Camarines Norte	48.4	56.1	24.0	48.5	9.9	16.2	66.1	35.3	46.1	53.9
51	Leyte	57.4	67.6	29.6	55.5	9.6	14.1	60.8	30.4	56.8	43.2
52	Oriental Mindoro	58.2	64.0	38.5	66.1	6.7	13.5	54.9	20.5	43.6	56.4
53	Surigao del Norte	54.2	66.0	37.4	61.0	6.6	13.4	56.0	25.6	55.4	44.6
54	Southern Leyte	46.1	56.0	14.9	63.8	9.2	12.1	75.9	24.1	32.1	67.9
55	Occidental Mindoro	57.6	64.5	41.2	70.5	4.3	9.4	54.5	20.1	48.9	51.1
56	Palawan	51.1	61.2	28.7	61.3	7.0	13.6	64.4	25.1	40.3	59.7
57	Guimaras	49.8	59.4	39.8	67.9	5.5	12.8	54.7	19.3	37.5	62.5
58	Davao Oriental	65.8	71.6	35.2	70.4	6.0	6.8	58.9	22.8	50.0	50.0
59	Sultan Kudarat	38.5	46.7	37.7	71.4	3.5	8.0	58.7	20.6	35.6	64.4
60	Siquijor	56.7	69.7	53.4	67.5	4.6	11.7	42.1	20.8	57.0	43.0
61	Agusan del Sur	55.3	63.1	49.2	74.2	4.3	5.9	46.5	19.9	56.3	43.7
62	Negros Oriental	52.9	63.4	45.7	60.7	6.3	11.9	47.9	27.4	51.4	48.6
63	Marinduque	64.0	76.5	35.8	56.1	5.6	15.4	58.6	28.5	54.3	45.7
64	Biliran	70.2	78.5	38.4	67.6	6.8	8.4	54.8	24.0	59.8	40.2
65	Surigao del Sur	54.1	63.6	39.1	64.4	5.2	10.5	55.7	25.1	50.3	49.8
66	Northern Samar	49.2	56.0	39.6	65.4	5.4	9.7	54.9	24.8	46.5	53.5
67	Romblon	55.2	69.0	31.4	55.3	13.8	20.2	54.9	24.5	56.9	43.1
68	Lanao del Sur	27.0	33.6	19.1	59.5	6.7	4.5	74.2	36.0	46.3	53.7
69	Eastern Samar	64.9	71.7	53.9	73.5	4.8	6.7	41.3	19.7	51.1	48.9
70	Western Samar	61.1	67.9	45.0	66.3	6.0	6.7	48.9	27.0	51.6	48.4
71	Sarangani	60.3	66.6	47.4	75.0	4.9	8.2	47.7	16.8	57.8	42.2
72	Zamboanga del Norte	53.0	63.0	36.8	61.9	4.0	12.9	59.2	25.2	58.5	41.5
73	Masbate	54.9	62.7	42.7	70.0	6.9	10.0	50.4	20.0	52.7	47.3
74	Basilan	29.0	35.6	44.3	71.4	6.9	5.2	48.8	23.3	20.8	79.2
75	Tawi-Tawi	44.4	52.2	67.0	81.4	4.3	2.8	28.7	15.7	58.3	41.7
76	Maguindanao	43.8	50.6	53.9	69.7	3.7	4.6	42.4	25.6	50.5	49.5
77	Sulu	19.1	24.3	52.7	81.3	2.0	2.2	45.3	16.5	27.7	72.3
	Philipppines	52.0	63.1	24.9	45.8	12.0	17.7	63.1	36.6	51.8	48.2

Source: 2001 to 2003 LFS