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Thematic Guidance Note

3

By Marc-André Franche with Michi Ebata

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United Nations Development Programme
National Human Development Report Unit/HDRO
Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery

Conflict Prevention
NHDR Thematic Guidance Note*

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* By Marc-André Franche with contributions from Pablo Ruiz, Ana Cutter, Arkadi Toritsyn, Sarah Burd-Sharps Devanand Ramiah, Dirk Boberg, Michi Ebata, Céline Moyroud, Francesca Cook, Misaki Watanabe, Moncef Ghrib, Natasha Loayza and Sharmila Kurukulasuriya and Noha Aboueldahab

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Introduction:

War and violent conflict pose one of the most difficult challenges and impediments to human development. Of the 20 poorest countries in the world, most have recently or continually experienced violent conflict. According to the HDR 2002, in the 1990s more than 53 internal conflicts resulted in an estimated 3.6 millions deaths, the majority of whom were civilians. Frequently these wars accompany political, economic, and social transition, natural disasters, and profound pressures arising from globalization, which tends to make them intractable and protracted. War today is mostly internal, chronic, extending over long periods of time, often based on identity politics and benefiting from globalized forms of financing, which include among others: the drug trade, arms trade, the exploitation of natural resources and financial remittances[i]. Preventing the death and suffering of millions from violent conflict and building a sustainable peace is the most urgent challenge for human development today.

This extraordinary challenge places the National Human Development Reports (NHDRs) in a key position to address the complex issue of preventing violent conflict and building peace from the human development perspective. As UNDP's Corporate Policy on NHDRs underlines, the NHDRs are bottom-up policy instruments which place quality analysis tied to policy action within the framework of people-centered development at the forefront of national development agendas. They also provide policy options and strategic recommendations on pertinent themes to shape government policies and programs in order to bring about effective change. NHDRs are important advocacy tools, but they also play an important role in contributing to public dialogue and generating exchange of ideas on issues that impede development.

This guidance note is a reference tool that is aimed at NHDR teams wishing to prepare NHDRs on (violent) conflict prevention or to mainstream conflict prevention in NHDRs focusing on other themes. It will assist NHDR teams to apply a conflict prevention lens to development, while ensuring that the analysis of conflict is seen through a human development framework. The note offers guidance on how to prepare an analysis on the theme of conflict prevention enabling NHDR teams to develop and advocate policy changes that address violent conflict from the human development perspective.

The review draws on twenty[ii] country or regional NHDRs published from 1995 to 2001 dealing with violent conflicts ("organized" and sustained clashes based on the use of force) and on complementary literature on conflict prevention and human security. Moreover, this note's conceptual part and guidance on policy recommendations take advantage of Colombia's NHDR 2003 on violent conflict. It also benefits from extensive dialogue within the NHDR Unit at HDRO, with BCPR, and with their respective networks.

The note is a guide drawing on lessons learned and building upon best practices of NHDRs while at the same time, respecting the uniqueness of each country or regional situation. It is divided into three parts: the first part presents the conceptual framework linking conflict prevention and human development. The second part leads the reader through the guidance note explaining the basic steps and dimensions of dealing with conflict prevention as a theme in NHDRs. The third part presents possible indicators. Finally the review includes a

series of annexes where the reader will find a set of useful resources and comparative tables on key issues.

Part 1: Conceptual note

As the Corporate Policy on NHDRs argues, NHDRs must be about human development. This said, NHDRs are a unique tool and platform to analyze conflict and offer measures to prevent conflict before it becomes violent and/or to explore ways to end it or prevent further escalation. NHDRs have a comparative advantage and added value by viewing violent conflict from the human development perspective while underlining how the prevention of violent conflict increases human development. This first part will present the main concepts to be used. It begins with a discussion on conflict, violent conflict, and conflict prevention and offers a set of analytical tools to understand violent conflict. It then considers the use of the concept of human security to establish a link between prevention and development. Finally, this part of the review concludes with a framework for analyzing conflict and conflict prevention from the human development perspective.

D. Conflict and Conflict Prevention

What do we mean by conflict and conflict prevention?

Conflict exists where two or more actors are mobilized to obtain incompatible goals where the other party is perceived to stand in the way of these goals.[iii] The concept of conflict describes a type of relationship between two or more actors and refers to a situation between these actors, their behavior, and their attitudes and perceptions. Conflict must exhibit all of these components and must take place between identifiable actors otherwise applying the concept of conflict is misleading. A number of factors must be taken into account in order to analyze conflict including the conditions which create a favorable environment for conflict to emerge, the causes which precipitate conflict, the expression of conflict, the dynamics of conflict, and the consequences and legacies from conflict.

Conflict occurs in many different spheres, whether political, social, economic, between individuals, groups or states, and at different levels from the personal to the global. Conflict is not negative *per se*, on the contrary, when expressed through peaceful means, conflict can be constructive and a powerful source of change. Situations of conflict or rivalry actually promote human development – enlarge available options – as a competitive market, democratic elections or in the case of positive sum games. In fact, in many spheres, conflicts are mostly resolved by preventive or compensatory strategies rather than by violent confrontation. These methods may not be as "effective" (to attain immediate goals) as violence, but they are much less costly and entail a much lower risk of wasting life and livelihoods. Under certain circumstances, none of these options may be feasible and violence[iv] may be perceived as the most efficient means of influencing the outcome from conflict in favor of one group or individual over another. Although violent conflict should be avoided, all crises may also bring new sets of opportunities. Violent conflict and war can involve not just the breakdown of society but also the re-ordering of society. As

the Somalia NHDR demonstrates, this re-ordering may at times, for some groups and in some circumstances bring about new opportunities in terms of human development.

Violent conflict is a sustained, organized violence between two or more groups mobilized to use force for the purpose of attaining goals. Violent conflict is only one form of violence; many others exist in and outside the realm of violent conflict. This said, violent conflict often encompasses and feeds from other forms of violence including rape, crime, terrorism, suicide, and the cultural[v] or social reproduction of violence. This last phenomenon occur when violence is socially "learned", incorporated into "regular" social relations, as the only or the best way to socially interact.

The focus of this note is on the prevention of violent conflict, including war[vi], and not on the entire spectrum of violence and conflicts. This choice is based on three basic reasons. First, because of all the violence(s), violent conflict is the one affecting human development most directly and impact-fully. Second, because this focus avoids a conception of prevention that is restricted to any particular phase of conflict given that many conflicts today are never strictly latent or manifest, pre or post-conflict but define a situation that is neither peace nor war. Using conflict prevention allows us to cover the entire cycle of violent conflict. Third, as a rapid review of NHDRs show, violent conflict is a growing concern of NHDR teams, especially intrastate conflicts. Thus, the note does not deal with conflict in general nor violence at large, neither does it consider all forms of crisis. However, it cannot entirely exclude abuses or misuses of power by the state on its citizens where there is action by citizens to secure their rights; nor can it exclude chronic instability that is derived from structural transformations of society. These situations may not be violent conflict in a strict sense, but they share enough similar characteristics and present similar challenges that it is worthwhile to include them in this discussion.

Conflict prevention is the wide range of actions, interventions, programs, activities, mechanisms and procedures that address structural threats, prevent the escalations of tensions into violent conflict in addition of preventing the continuation or reoccurrence of violent conflict. This said however, conflict prevention is not synonymous with building order and stability regardless of other factors. Prevention must be anchored in international law and United Nations norms and standards. As the Somalia 2001 NHDR underlines: "The re-establishment of law and order cannot by itself be equated with the advancement of human rights and justice".

Three levels of conflict prevention – matching the three types of causes of conflict – are suggested in the policy discourse:

1. Systemic prevention: global conflict factors, including global inequity, the negative effects of globalization, arms trafficking, and international organized crime;
2. Structural prevention: weak, failing or predatory states, group identities, horizontal inequalities, inequity, insecurity and lack of justice;
3. Operational prevention: conflict accelerators and triggers, including, among others, resource scarcity, influx of small arms, public health emergencies, military decommissioning, sudden migration or population displacement, land redistribution, severe inflation, contentious elections, etc.

Understanding the context, causes, actors and dynamic is the basis for understanding and applying effectively conflict prevention. Ideally, conflict prevention measures should address symptoms, triggers and root causes of conflict, and should respond to conditions that generate conflict.

Conflict Analysis

For the purpose of understanding the complexity of violent conflicts, conflict analysis tools are useful tools. They aim at systematically study the profile, causes, actors and dynamics of conflicts. As described by a Resource Pack published in 2004 by a consortium of organizations leaded by Fewer, International Alert and Safeword conflict identifies four key elements of conflict analysis: profile, causes, actors and dynamics. Box 1.1 presents the key questions for each element.

Box 1. Basic structure of conflict analysis

Profile: Characterization of the context.

- Is there a history of conflict?
- What is the political, economic and socio-cultural context?
- What are emergent political, economic, and social issues?
- What conflict prone/affected areas can be situated within the context?

Causes: Potential and existing causes and factors contributing to peace. Three types of causes: Structural, proximate and triggers.

- What are the structural causes of conflict?
- What issues can be considered as proximate causes of conflict?
- What triggers could contribute to the outbreak/ further escalation of conflict?
- What new factors contribute to prolonging conflict dynamics?
- What factors can contribute to peace?

Actors: All those engaged in or being affected by conflict Actors will differ in terms of interests, goals, positions, capacities and relationships.

- Who are the main actors?
- What are their interests, goals, positions, capacities and relationships?
- What capacities for peace can be identified?
- What actors can be identified as spoilers? Why? Are they inadvertent or intentional spoilers?

Dynamics: Resulting interaction between the conflict profile, the actors, and the causes. This allows the identification of windows of opportunity and scenarios.

- What are current conflict trends?
- What are the windows of opportunity?
- What scenarios can be developed from the analysis of the conflict profile, causes and actors?

Source: Fewer Resource Pack 2004, Chapter 2.

On this basis a number of methodologies have been developed. They can also be found in Annex of the Resource Pack. The entire "tool box" often includes recommendations for complete process in which conflict analysis is only one step. Interestingly, the proposed process bares resemblance to the ones used by many NHDR teams in the preparation and dissemination of their NHDRs. Table 1.1. highlights three conflict analysis methodologies produced by different institutions. UNDP (see resources section) sis also working on a Conflict Development Analysis Guide which draws on the DFID framework.

Table 1. Sample of conflict analysis methodologies.

<table>
<tr><td colspan="4">DFID: Strategic Conflict Assessment: www.dfid.gov.uk</td></tr>
<tr><td>Structures</td><td>Actors</td><td>Dynamics</td><td>Main concepts</td></tr>
<tr><td>Analysis of long term factors underlying conflict:
• Security
• Political
• Economic
• Social</td><td>Analysis of conflict actors:
• Interests
• Relations
• Capacities
• Peace agendas
• Incentives</td><td>Analysis of:
• Long term trends
• Triggers for increased violence
• Capacities for managing conflict
• Likely future conflict scenarios</td><td>• Political economy approach focusing on interests and rationality of those engaged and those benefiting from conflict
• Greed and grievances
• Structure and actors and their interactions
• Different layers of conflict (international, regional, national and local)
• Dynamic character of conflict</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">World Bank: Conflict Analysis Framework: www.worldbank.org/conflict</td></tr>
<tr><td>Variables</td><td>Dimensions</td><td colspan="2">Main concepts</td></tr>
<tr><td>• Social and ethnic tensions
• Governance and political institutions
• Human Rights and security
• Economic Structure and performance
• Environment and natural resources
• External factors</td><td>• History/changes
• Dynamics /trends
• Public perceptions
• Politicization
• Organization
• Link to conflict and intensity
• Link to poverty</td><td colspan="2">• Starts by a screening process with 9 indicators to test whether a full analysis is needed
• Strengthening participatory and inclusive social processes
• Addressing factors related to conflict and their link with poverty, opportunities for groups to engage and consequences of conflict
• Factors that can be addressed through WB assisted strategies</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">UNSSC: Early Warning and Preventive Measures: www.unssc.org</td></tr>
<tr><td>Steps</td><td colspan="2">Content</td><td>Main concepts</td></tr>
<tr><td>Situation profile</td><td colspan="2">Shared understanding and broad picture of the context: geography, events, economy, etc.</td><td rowspan="2">Human security and human rights framework
HS distinguishes between violent threats and non violent threats.</td></tr>
<tr><td>Actors analysis matrix</td><td colspan="2">Identifies and assesses key actors through their characteristics, interests and</td></tr>
</table>

	underlying needs, resources they have or hope to obtain	
Survey of conflict causes	Causes of conflict divided between: potential threat to various aspects of human security and; between proximate and structural causes Considers human rights as a cross-cutting issue	
Composite Analysis	Interaction between the structural causes to assess dynamics and core issues	
Preventive measures matrix	Elements of preventive action to address core issues	
Scenario building	Builds a two track scenarios	

Source: Fewer Resource Pack 2004, Chapter 2, Annex1.

In conflict analysis literature, four terms are recurrent and overlap: causes, risks, threats and conditions. A cause of conflict describes a causal relationship between two phenomena, one leads to the other. As seen before, there may be different types of causes, namely structural, proximate and triggers. A threat or a risk describes a potential or probability of causing conflict. It is also related to the future in terms of factors that pose a danger. In contrast a cause is an antecedent. As the methodology of the UN Staff College shows threats are associated with triggers. Finally, a condition for conflict describes a permissive context or environment; action is often more complex. Conditions may also be understood as proximate causes.

Box 2. Causes and likelihood of violent conflict

Violent conflicts are not on the increase today. In fact, according to empirical evidence, they are decreasing. The evolution of such conflicts without outside intervention is more likely today and the most likely places for conflict to occur are places where conflict has already occurred in the recent past. The same corpus of research rejects the simple idea that ethnically mixed states are inherently more afflicted by internal wars that ethnically homogeneous states. The reality is more nuanced: very homogenous and very heterogeneous states are both less likely to experience war than states with a predominant ethnic groups and a second or third fairly large group. The role of external actors in such conflicts is declining as a result of an increased willingness of governments to negotiate rather than fight when faced with demands for recognition of group rights. In addition the increasing influence of economic power has been a likely factor in the overall decrease in military interventions.

One factor that can be correlated to the likelihood of war within a state is the type of political system. While democracies are least likely to experience wars, autocracies are not as likely to do so in comparison with "semi-democracies", i.e. system falling between democracy and autocracy. On the other hand, systems experiencing dramatic change have been identified as significantly at risk for both inter-state and intra-state war. Changes from autocratic to democratic rule have been found to be the most difficult.

The local history of peace and war has been found to be an important indicator for internal wars: the longer a community is at peace, the less likely that an internal war will start. The implication is that peaceful relations create mutual trust while war-like relations increase distrust and relapse becomes a real risk.

Source: UNDP: 2001

The need to integrate conflict prevention in development:

Understanding the links between conflict prevention and development is as complex as analyzing violent conflict. Conflict prevention and development share a number of overlapping fields of action, bridges and contradictions. The note explores the most crucial ones.

The most difficult challenge for conflict prevention is to effectively respond/impact on causes of violent conflict in order to prevent them from materializing or escalating. The difficult of the task is most evident when violent conflicts are well understood in both form and content, causes are proximate and escalation is apparent, the problem is not one of analysis but rather action. Where conflict is nothing more than a probability, it will often be difficult to generate the momentum and urgency for an effective response. This happens if those capable of generating responses cannot be convinced of its necessity they may prefer to sit and wait or do nothing. Given the inherent difficulties in generating early action to prevent violent conflict, it is more effective to mainstream prevention in regular development programs rather than devising isolated conflict prevention actions that often act too late.

When mainstreaming conflict prevention into development strategies, prevention that aims at structural causes of violent conflict is the area of choice. Causes such as group inequalities, poverty and exclusion of certain groups or widespread insecurity are regular picks for mainstreaming. But choosing those structural causes blurs the difference between development and conflict prevention. Moreover, conflict prevention is now seen as a long-term and on-going process that requires early warning and early action. Examining the process whereby conflicts are transformed into violence could start from any point in the process and focus on any issue implying that prevention could encompass all development strategies. To target conflict NHDR teams must attempt to distinguish between development strategies at large and assistance that targets the specific causes (structural, proximate and triggers) of conflict. This is a key issue. Clear links on how development affects violent conflict is crucial because not all development positively affects violent conflict. To the contrary, assistance might also encourage conflict and may therefore wait valuable efforts and resources. For example, significant investments – which should theoretically promote economic development – towards the exploitation of natural resources in a region prone to conflict, might instigate further conflict by injecting fresh funds up for grabs by regional actors.

Development assistance creates incentives and disincentives for peace and for violent conflict. Development strategies in countries in conflict or vulnerable to it should systematically incorporate concerns – ask how those strategies relate to violent conflict - for their impact on violent conflict or in promoting tensions that could lead to violence.

According to the Secretary-General in his report on the prevention of armed conflict, conflict prevention in development strategies "needs to focus on decreasing the key structural risk factors that fuel violent conflict, such as inequity – by addressing disparities between identity groups; inequality – by addressing policies and practices that institutionalize discrimination; justice – by promoting the rule of law, effective and fair law enforcement and administration of justice, and, as appropriate, equitable representation in the institutions that serve the rules of law, and insecurity – by strengthening accountable and transparent governance and human security."

A good case in favor of mainstreaming can be made by analyzing perverse effects of otherwise well-intentioned policies. Positive policies for human development may have the opposite impact in a situation on violent conflict. For example, a decentralization program that does not account for the violent conflict in its design may divide civil society, promote division and hand in power and resources to armed gangs instead of legitimate state institutions. It may also contribute in destabilizing and reducing the legitimacy of the local state by opening the door to increased corruption and abuse of force. Policies in such areas as healthcare, education and other well intended measures turn against people if they do not consider the violent conflict in which they are implemented.

At the very least, development strategies should assure they do no harm. In this way, preventive actions mainstreamed into development assistance can be targeted towards the causes of potential and actual violent conflict. Mainstreaming conflict prevention in development has a greater chance of reducing or mitigating the extraordinarily high human, political, social and economic cost of violent conflict; it can preserve stability and peace where it does exist; it can advance human, regional and international security and thus secure the foundation for prosperous development and trade. This focus is even more important when faced with evidence that violence is often an outcome or a reaction to deep rooted problems. As the Bosnia and Herzegovina 1998 report explains "In the context of human development, the country's problems did not arise with war. They existed already, were increasingly evident, and the war intensified them."

All in all, the relation between development and violent conflict is complex and synergistic; development without peace is not sustainable, and peace without development is not durable.

E. Human Security:

The concept of human security has circulated in development and conflict prevention circles for a number of years. The HDR 1994 gave the concept great impetus by giving it a wider and more inclusive meaning from security of territory to security of people in their daily lives. Human security was thus viewed as universal, interdependent, less costly and effective if preventive and people-centered. The human security concept is potentially useful for linking violent conflict and human development. It allows an analysis of conflict to prioritize causes and threats because human security objectives are more "urgent" that those of human development. It also provides the analysis with more immediate parameters to evaluate the effect of conflict on people.

Box 3. Human Security in the HDR 1998

The safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression and; Protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily lives, whether in homes, jobs or communities. Human security is moreover about people being able to exercise these choices safely and freely.

The Millennium Report of the Secretary-General similarly advocates the need for a more human-centered approach to security. The objective is to create conditions for people to live free from want and free from fear. On the basis of the Millennium Report and the Millennium Summit a UN sponsored independent global Commission on Human Security (CHS) was established in 2001.

The CHS has proposed the following working definition of human security: The objective of human security is to safeguard the vital core of all human lives form critical pervasive threats, in a way that is consistent with long-term human fulfillment. It underlines the importance of safeguarding the vital core, human life, which includes survival, livelihood and basic dignity. To safeguard the vital core implies protecting people and communities against events that threaten them (critical and pervasive threats) beyond their control: such as financial crisis, diseases, crime, terrorism, human rights violations, hunger, unemployment, violent conflicts, investment cuts in health or education, etc. They could also be considered as basic sets of capabilities, human rights or absolute poverties. It can be argued that without these it is impossible to think of human development: that is enlarging people's choices by expanding their capabilities to lead long and healthy lives, to be knowledgeable, to have decent standard of living and to participate actively in community life. It is through these capabilities that human security contributes to human development.

Human security is people-centered, including all people, regardless of gender, race, religion, ethnicity, citizenship, or other distinguishing characteristics. Human security is not concerned with all threats, but with critical and pervasive threats – meaning large scale and recurrent. Some threaten life directly, such as armed conflicts, genocide and soil degradation, while others do so indirectly and over a longer period of time such as underinvestment in education and overinvestment in the military. Safeguarding human lives involves not only those institutions that directly promote human security, but also institutions that unintentionally undermine it. The concept aims to prevent threats from materializing, mitigate the harmful effects when they occur and help victims cope after they occur. Human security requires that actors ensure that their actions do not intentionally or unintentionally threaten the human security of others.

If human development is concerned with the enlargement of people's options, human security allows people to exercise these options safely and freely. As the HDR 1991 underlines, people not only need positive options – to attain goals as being well educated, well nourished or be respected – but also negative options – that nobody prevents them from exercising their legitimate options. Therefore, human security is a condition to exercise the basic options of human development. Thus, human security must be geared, be consistent with people's human development goals.[vii] (See Table 2. and Annex B for a comparative table of conflict prevention and human security concepts)

Table 2. Comparative table of Human Security and Human Development

Human Security	Human Development
Protection	Fulfillment
Threats	Options
Basic Rights	Entire range of options
Negative liberties	Positive liberties

The human security concept is useful to NHDR teams in four ways ways. First, it allows those analyzing conflict to distinguish between the effects of violent conflict on human security and those that affect human development and to prioritize them. Arguably, those that affect the core of human life, including life itself, livelihood and basic dignity should go to the forefront. Second, it allows the analysis to consider security beyond state security (especially in a world increasingly concerned with security) and assure people's security is centrally regarded. Third, it may help them underline the consequences that causes and threats have on people and conversely how investment in human security or human development might affect the different threats and causes of violent conflict.

Nevertheless, there are weaknesses in the concept of human security which suggest the need for caution when adopting and applying it. First, the concept remains vague and open-ended, how for example, can the core of human life be objectively and universally defined, what limits the core as opposed to non-essential aspects of life? Second, there are contradictions in the concept. The concept of security in relation to the state was conceived as a relationship between entities, there must be another actor or object against which security is necessary. Human security does not consider this object because it does not focus on agency, that is, actors responsible for causing insecurity, it focuses mainly on threats and on the object that is under threat. Similarly, while there are many types of threats to human security including personal and group security, the concept does not anticipate that there may be contradictions between individual and group security, and that the security of the group is indeed one of the fundamental causes of conflict. Third and in consequence of the previous points, NHDR teams should avoid devoting their analysis solely to human security without considering the wider realm of human development fulfillment needed in violent conflict contexts.

F. Key elements of a conceptual fra mework for NHDRs on conflict a nd conflict prevention

Box 4. Kofi Annan on conflict prevention and human development

> For the United Nations, there is no larger goal, no deeper commitment and no greater ambition than preventing armed conflict. The prevention of conflict begins and ends with the protection of human life and the promotion of human development. Ensuring human security is, in the broadest sense, the United Nations cardinal mission. Genuine and lasting prevention is the means to achieve that mission."[viii]

On the basis of the review of the concepts of conflict prevention and human security, which conceptual element must be at the heart of an NHDR on conflict prevention? The answer explores both ways of the relation violent conflict (VC) – human development (HD).

1. The impact of violent conflict on human development (VC → HD)

Conceptually, the relation from violent conflict to human development is rather straightforward. If human development is the enlargement of people's options and human security what allows people to fulfill them safely, violent conflict limits severely the fulfillment and protection to fulfill these options. Although the range of human development options is broad, the point can be illustrated by underlining how conflict affects the four basic components of human development. Thus, violent conflict:

1. **Kills:** denying the possibility to live a long and healthy life

To state the obvious, war kills people, increasingly civilians rather than combatants. Armed groups may specifically target individuals or particular groups to eliminate them. Additionally, the most vulnerable in society are usually the ones who suffer the most from violence, particularly women, minorities, the rural population and the poor. They are usually the most ill-prepared to face violent attack and the consequences of conflict, that is by getting access to health and education services or paying for security. Even when the conflict is over, certain people remain at risk, for example demobilized guerrillas.

2. **Replaces reason by force**: denies the option for knowledge

In war, armed groups interact with society and state on the basis of the use of force. Knowledge and education have little relative value. Youth and certain disadvantaged groups may easily be convinced of this. They will prefer a riffle as a sign of status rather than going/staying in school. In addition to status, guns are a much more efficient way to secure resources of all sorts. This has devastating intermediate to long- term effects on society. Not only is knowledge devalued but it becomes a threat to armed groups. Educated elites (teachers, writers, artists, journalists, political leaders, etc.) are assassinated or flee the country as they are symbolic targets. Those who remain may turn their backs on conflict, contributing little to the analysis and resolution of the ongoing conflict. The void may thus be filled by extremist views, further exacerbating the conflict. In pre or post conflict situations, denial of knowledge might materialize in certain groups being denied access to school because of their involvement in war or on the failure to integrate other into the system following a demobilization agreement. The tensions involved in the road towards conflict might also divert resources from the social system towards military spending.

3. **Destroys accumulated wealth**: denies the option for a decent life

It is difficult to compute the total damage produced by violent conflict. How much productivity loss can be attributed to the numerous permanently traumatized people? How much has been lost (and how much would have been gained) by the falling international "image" in terms of foreign investment, international aid, tourism, etc? Poor or negative reputations take years to fade away. Equally significant, violent conflict easily destroys in a short time what takes generations to build: roads, schools,

factories, territorial unity, etc. All in all, violent conflicts have a tremendous effect on both the availability and the productivity of factors: by destroying infrastructure, scarifying human capital and scaring away investment. At the individual level it affects confidence, trust, leadership and entrepreneurship. At the end of the day, violent conflicts affects negatively every sort of capital. Tensions leading to conflict in pre conflict settings might also scare investment, divert productive investment from governments, lead to the flight of educated professionals, etc.

4. **Prohibits dialogue**: denies the option to participate in collective matters

People can rarely vote freely and elections are often biased in favor of the proprietors of force who bring the promise of ending violence. When force rules, participation and dialogue in public affairs is not only dangerous but has also poor legitimacy. Then, As the NHDRs in ex-socialist states show, the transition to democracy poses serious challenges to human security and development, as rapid institutional change destabilizes state and society. The resulting instability endangers the creation and/or consolidation of new democratic institutions. Fragmented social societies are even more vulnerable to violent conflict when participation is concerned. Violent conflict is fueled by this fragmentation. Fear and mistrust in pre/post conflict environments for example might also challenge participation and democracy.

Obviously NHDR teams will need to go beyond these basic components according to country specificity. As the note will underline further on, NHDR teams will want to deal with the wider set of options, ordering the impact of the conflict on human security and human development. In addition, this impact assessment will need to specify how violent conflict (or pre conflict tensions) impact on vulnerable groups and how it affects different regions.

2. The enlargement of people's choices as a conflict prevention and violence reduction strategy (HD → VC)

At the heart of any NHDR dealing with violent conflict there is the argument that human development is, after all, the solution to violent conflict. The enlargement of people's choices, especially of violent actors, victims and affected communities, will allow for constructive solutions to mitigate and resolve violent conflict. To actually have an impact on conflict, specific policy areas must be explored. These policy areas must be directly and specifically linked to a thorough understanding of conflict and its impact on human development. For example, youths from households with history of family violence in poor rural areas with few educational or productive options are particularly vulnerable to recruitment, thus increasing violence. Then, the NDHR must suggest ways to increase options, in a number of areas, for these youth to reduce their vulnerability to recruitment. Or again, the inefficiency, corruption and focus of the criminal justice system promotes impunity, ill protects victims, and offers justice to a few. On this basis, armed irregular actors justify their existence and fill in the void by providing their own justice "system" and acting as the state in many regions. In this case, the NHDR must suggest ways to reform and refocus the efforts of the system to fill in the void specifically where armed groups may provide such "services".

In this way, solutions proposed by NHDRs would stem from the human development perspective. How can options of violent actors, victims and communities be enlarged? Who is responsible? Who should be involved and what are the foreseeable scenarios? The process must look for synergies between policy areas which may catalyze the choice enlargement process.

This said however, for the same reasons as those explored above in the discussion between conflict prevention and development strategies, this relation is less straightforward than the one from violent conflict to human development. This side of the equation requires a precise linkage between denials of people's options which affect or has the potential (in pre/post settings) to impact violent conflict. As in the discussion on conflict prevention mainstreaming, not all denials of options will promote violent conflict. Some options will receive greater priority in relation to the analysis given to the context, causes, actors and dynamic of conflict.

Part 2: Guidance note for NHDRs on conflict and conflict prevention

On the basis of the links between the concepts presented above, Part 2 is meant as a practical guide for NHDR teams. First it provides criteria for teams to select conflict as a theme. It strongly emphasizes the importance of an inclusive and participatory process in line with the recommendations of the NHDR Corporate Policy. Secondly, it provides NHDR teams with a step-by-step guide to produce an NHDR on conflict and conflict prevention.

A. Selecting conflict and conflict prevention as a theme

What should determine the selection of conflict and conflict prevention as a theme? In many countries in conflict or vulnerable to it, leaders and development actors, including the international community, implement development strategies while ignoring violent conflict. As a result, poverty reduction, decentralization, public sector reforms, political reforms or social services provision programs are executed while ignoring the dynamics of conflict. This constitutes a double tragedy as it wastes resources in times of great need and has the potential to promote conflict. In some cases conflict may continue unabated and even intensify even while there are good human development results. The opposite is, apart from a few exceptions, always true: violent conflict erodes human development.

UNDP and NHDR teams may therefore select conflict and conflict prevention as a theme when violent conflict or latent tensions clearly endanger human development. NHDRs could also address this theme when a specific conflict prevention issue as demobilization, judiciary reforms or local governance for peace is a national priority. The question should be: is violent conflict the most, or a significant, challenge to human development in your country? The more difficult test arises when violent conflict is not imminent but conditions for its escalation may be present. In this case, the NHDR's advocacy and awareness raising potential might be an ally in the process of facing those latent tensions.

In the same way, the degree of attention given to violent conflict must depend on the conflict's dynamics. Thus, in some instances, if violence is restricted to a particular region and not affecting the entire country, the NHDR could focus on another issue or be used to raise awareness on those often "forgotten" conflicts. Another option is to draw attention to a regional conflict when focusing on other themes such as decentralization. In addition to location, conflict may be a subset in relation to a broader theme, for example an NHDR on gender could include a section on the impact of conflict on women or women's role in conflict, prevention and peace-building. There is no specific formula, nor should there be, it is up to country teams to decide the balance between an exclusive or limited focus on conflict or prevention.

A key challenge in selecting conflict prevention as a theme is the perception of conflict by governments and in consequence the actions of UNDP vis-à-vis its position. Governments may be reluctant to acknowledge conflict or dismiss the importance of mounting tensions or regionally confined conflicts. In other instances, they may downplay the severity of violent conflict or dismiss it altogether. Some governments will also be reticent in using the word violent conflict or conflict and may give them other denominations as crisis, tensions, disturbances or terrorism. Behind such position lay fears of showing breaches in their control or negative image of their administration. Some have also use denial as a way to cover up State abuses or State sanctioned violations. In these cases, selecting conflict as a theme is accompanied by added difficulties. Because NHDRs are participatory processes including governmental instances, the government might use its involvement to prevent the selection of conflict as a theme. In other instances it might be other groups – the private sector, NGOs, religious authorities – taking part in the process which might be reluctant to address this theme. In this sense, the NHDR itself might be a source of conflict and may contribute to increased tensions. NHDR teams must proceed with caution and assure their process does not instigate more conflict.

There are ways to support and facilitate such processes. The selection of the theme should be approved through the participatory instances of the process and avoid giving a veto to any of the parties. The NHDR might choose a related theme and deal with conflict through it or use different language. In the case of government reluctance the NHDR process might choose to work with some parts of government, governments are rarely monolithic structures. Such situations will require NHDR teams to plan lengthy and sustained awareness raising efforts prior to "officially" selecting the theme which might include bilateral visits, dialogues, forums, public presentations, etc.

A crucial issue in these cases is the posture and role of UNDP. Although NHDR teams are independent to UNDP, the support and sponsoring of theses report might raise tension in its own relations with government or other actors. Therefore, NHDR teams should establish a clear strategy with UNDP Representations and with UN Country teams when needed. Depending on the political sensitivity of violent conflict, other UN instances could be informed and/or involved, such as the Secretariat's Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peace Keeping Operations.

The role of UNDP is crucial. UNDP should at the very least be actively involved in the process albeit not in the content. UNDP should convene and facilitate dialogue between

actors sitting on the NHDR's participatory instances. It should also keep the final decision on theme selection, as NHDR is a UNDP flagship. UNDP has a key role in spearing the efforts of dialogue on the selection of the theme with different actors. To this purpose the choice of an independent and highly respected coordinator and teams is an asset. By no means does this mean UNDP should agree with all recommendations and positions or take the task of implementing them in its program. In the end, UNDP should concentrate in its role as "political" convener and coordinator. This means it will assure the process respects the basic principles contained in the Corporate Policy, namely independence of analysis, inclusion of numerous viewpoints, open process, quality of analysis.

B. The importance of an inclusive and participatory process

NHDRs are not merely books. As UNDP's Corporate Policy stresses, NHDRs must be participatory, bottom-up processes involving stakeholders in all phases of the drafting and dissemination processes. This is even more relevant in conflict prone countries as participatory processes in these situations have the potential to reinforce the implementation of policy recommendations. This will be true only if the process itself is also conflict sensitive and works to diminish tensions leading to violence. Knowledge of the different dimensions of violent conflicts is essential for a better understanding of the issues at stake. As the NHDRs show, violence can "stick" differently depending of the region, the composition of the population, its closeness with other states, the way globalization and democratic transitions are managed, the availability of institutions, etc. The process should be adapted to such circumstances by setting up regional consultative groups for example in addition to a national promoting committee. Participatory processes can also be a useful mechanism for collecting information, data and experiences when no other formal study, collection method or data exist.

This said, participatory processes pose serious difficulties in conflict prone countries. Many of the main stakeholders are either unavailable or poorly organized. Others cannot simply be interviewed or invited for security or political reasons. In other cases, violence makes travel to remote regions difficult or the absence of formal government or social organizations complicates the construction of participatory processes. Annex C presents a few mechanisms used by NHDRs teams.

Taking into account these difficulties, a review of NHDRs shows that violent conflict does not generate chaos, at least not in the medium or long term. Communities replace the absence of formal institutions by other practices, usually based on local customs, sometimes forming alliances with armed groups, to regulate life and provide a degree of security during or after the war. These demonstrates that even in the deadliest of wars, some civil society organizations, makeshift administrations, politicians, teachers, etc., have the capacity to serve the needs of society and are important social resources that can provide useful input for the NHDR. In Somalia for example, the NHDR team used human rights workshops in Somaliland and a draft of the report was critically reviewed by reading circles in four regions. These reading circles brought together staff of regional administrations, civil society organizations and business communities. The draft was also reviewed by UN Agency staff. This process allowed the report, in the absence of a central

state, to identify problems and threats and allow for a wide –ranging dialogue on possible solutions. The use of national and international NGOs present in the field is also quite important as they can provide up-to-date data and information, which can be used accordingly in the NHDR.

Other instruments can also be used, such as consultations with expatriate groups abroad, systematic interviews with IDPs, refugees, political leaders of particular groups, etc. These and other means of acquiring information and conducting analysis will allow for more objective and deep-rooted analysis and policy recommendations. This form of participatory process is also important as a platform to disseminate the ideas of change behind the report.

As in the case of theme selection, the role played by UNDP is important. When initiating participatory processes, UNDP should play an important proactive role in convening stakeholders and brokering agreements on the essentials of the process. i.e. elaboration process structure, political commitments, etc. Strong group and status identity is evident in many violent conflicts. In conflict environments, UNDP's reputation, image, neutrality and capacity to bring together a variety of actors, especially governmental, is an important advantage for the elaboration and dissemination process.

Finally, within the overall organization of the process, NHDR teams must remember the significance of respecting national priorities. The use of steering committees should serve this purpose in addition to promoting ownership of the process and its produce. The NHDR must be approached in a manner that recognizes and respects national priorities and existing national institutions. Priorities should be set by government or called for by civic actors. There may not necessarily be consensus on these issues, but a report that aims to be relevant and strategic must address these concerns. This does not mean conflict or prevention should be ignored if local actors fail to acknowledge them but that an NHDR concerned with these issues should be placed in the context of the national agenda and ask why they are being neglected. It is also important to work with the national agenda if policy recommendations are to have any welcome reception and impact. Once again, these objectives may be attained through participatory and consultative mechanisms.

C. Essential steps to elaborate an NHDR on conflict prevention:

1. Identify and analyze the conflict according to its "human" weight

NHDRs should first focus their energies on precisely identifying the conflict at hand and understand it in the most comprehensive way possible. Analysis should at the very least with the four basic elements of conflicts: context, causes, actors and dynamic. Is there one or many different violent conflicts? Is it an ongoing or latent conflict? When did it start? Who are the main actors? Is it a civil war, a regional conflict for resources, power, recognition, etc.? Box 1 and Table 1 on conflict analysis provide a general guide to identify and characterize conflicts. In most cases various conflicts evolve in parallel and/or are intertwined within a larger theatre of war. For example, particular groups seeking power might also be actors in social conflicts, resources (petroleum, diamonds, drugs, etc) seekers or terrorists. For the NHDR team, each and every one of these "conflicts", or layers of a wider one, should be assessed according to its weight on human security and human

development. Conflicts with bearing on human development should be considered over others. Other conflicts may be important but for other processes than an NHDR. For instance some low intensity protracted conflicts may persist and have relatively little bearing on human development as in Colombia from the 60's to the beginning of the 90's. Arguably, every violent conflict has some effect on somebody's human development. Nonetheless, the NHDR must justify the selection of a violent conflict on the collectiveness or on particularly affected vulnerable groups.

With the exception of wars, precise identification of conflict(s), especially if latent, is a complicated task, even more so because of the cyclical nature of violent conflict. Violent conflicts are more likely where a violent conflict has already happened before. The consequences from one conflict might become cause of another. The identification of conflict(s) must underline such issues clearly and show the importance of the violent conflict on human development at all stages. It should also explain the stages of the conflict and its evolution over time.

The case of transition countries is typical of these obstacles. For example, the Albanian report shows how the transition process coupled with particular cultural and institution set-ups helped bring anarchy and violence. Should the entire violent conflict "system" be considered or only one sub set? Should crime or a particular conflict, or both be considered? Another difficulty in transition countries is recognizing which actors are involved. It is most difficult in countries such as Albania where the conflict involves large "unstructured" groups of individuals. Some reports, as Somalia's, show how groups of expatriates may influence the continuation of the conflict, sometimes because of outdated knowledge on the true situation of the country.

In countries with civil wars, the difficulty rests in explaining and analyzing the different forms of violent behavior and their relation with the conflict object of the analysis. For example the NHDR 1996 for Tajikistan illustrates this point. The remaining political factions continue operating in the Karetegin Valley, but the report is unable to establish if acts of terrorism and violent crime are part of the same conflict or are isolated types of violence. For their part, the Somalia and Sierra Leone reports have underlined that armed conflict is not necessarily responsible for all violence but create an environment where such violent behavior goes unpunished. This is an important point because it highlights the need for NHDR teams to identify the causes and dynamics of violent conflict as precisely as possible. Where violence is not directly related to the main conflict, addressing the causes and mitigating the threats might not end the violence. This point is especially clear in the Colombian NHDR: a peace agreement will not end violence, as some of the products of the armed violent conflict will remain, as drug trafficking, networks of criminals, availability or arms, etc.

2. Establish the impact of violent conflict on human security and human development

NHDRs must highlight the effects of violent conflict on people. How is violent conflict affecting life, survival, access to health, education, sustained livelihood, participation, empowerment, equality, etc? How is this reflected in different regions, groups, in time,

etc? Is the violent conflict affecting/or has a potential to affect some particularly vulnerable groups in society? All these questions will enable the analysis to identify and prioritize threats and causes in terms of human development.

In the circumstances of troubled transitions and wars, it may be difficult to assess the impact of the conflict on people. NHDRs on conflict in countries in transition often cannot differentiate between the effects of the transition and the effects of the war on the health of people for example. NHDR teams should strive to divide these effects as precisely as possible. For example effects of war on health may be presented by describing the damage to infrastructure or on war related illnesses as post-war traumas.

A severe problem for NHDRs is obtaining the data and information for this type of analysis. As the Tajikistan 1995 Report points out, there is an urgent need to reinforce governmental and non-governmental information systems for the elaboration of the NHDR and decision making at large. In some cases, the availability of various contradictory sources and the lack of coordination obstruct data collection efforts. This problem is particularly difficult in the midst of a conflict. The Sri Lanka report underlines how the limited availability of data for the North-Eastern Province poses problems for the assessment and comparability of the human development situation. As a result, all districts in the conflict zone had to be excluded from the analysis of the report. This is in itself a negative impact of violent conflicts because of its effect on informed decision-making. The NHDRs were particularly at odds with the construction of sub-national Human Development Indexes (HDI), HDIs that may reflect the evolution of the index before, during and after the war, and HDIs for particular groups of vulnerable people.

Notwithstanding the data problem, NHDR teams should address the following questions over time (before, during and after conflict): How did the conflict affect survival, livelihood, basic dignity, education and healthcare provision, institutions, participation, governance, poverty, economic and political insertion in the world system, economic growth, equality, between people, groups, gender, age and specific regions? Which groups are most vulnerable? Who are the victims? Did some groups benefit from violent conflict? How did the HDI react to violent conflict? The proposed dichotomy between human security and development impacts may be a challenge in some contexts. As the CHS underlined[ix], the task of prioritizing among rights and capabilities that fit into the vital core to be safeguarded is a value judgment and a difficult one. One way of resolving this is to divide between positive or negative liberties. Each report team will need to draw the line between choices which constitute the vital core and those who belong to human development.

There is no doubt that violent conflicts or tensions leading to them have an extraordinarily devastating impact on people's security and development. Violent conflicts not only constrain human development and security but also reverse whatever achievements had been made before. In some very particular cases they may also present new opportunities for human development. So as to provide a few examples of the specific impact of violent conflict on human development, categories and types of impact are proposed in the following list. The list is the result of a survey of some twenty NHDRs on conflict. Each issue may be analyzed by regions (conflictive vs. peaceful), groups, gender, age or periods.

Only some categories may be "monetized" to assess costs of violent conflict. It should offer NHDR teams an array of possible consequences to explore, depending on country situations. These categories may be artificial at times because many impacts are intertwined or are transversal to many categories; for example displacement to the cities may heighten pressure for social services and employment.

i. Human security:

Survival

- Death as reflected in homicide rates
- Disappearances
- Torture
- Massacres
- Dependence on humanitarian aid for survival
- Food insecurity
- Proliferation of mine fields, which kills, injures severely, limits displacement but also affects agriculture and forest land plots
- Effect on birth rates and death rates

Livelihood

- Flows of refugees and/or internally displaced persons as a result of confrontation, territorial control, terror tactics, ethnic cleansing, etc.
- Rapid urbanization: caused by displacement, breakdown of the agricultural sector during the conflict, increased insecurity in war zones, land invasions, etc.
- Direct threats to individual or communities by armed actors
- Population in zones of armed confrontation
- Kidnappings
- Land occupation, seizure and/or destruction of other essential productive assets
- Weakening rural economy, affecting agricultural production
- Environmental damage (increased deforestation and poaching, unregulated fishing and deforestation, military actions disturb marine and forest environments, land mines, and uncontrolled waste disposal, damaged caused by production of illicit drugs, etc.)
- Increased arm trade
- Number of active combatants, recruitment into armed groups
- Increased crime, including money laundering, drug trafficking, etc.
- Depletion of natural resources by armed groups

Basic dignity

- Prostitution of women
- Breakdown of social structures, status and identity
- Violations of International Humanitarian Law

ii. Other components of human development:

Education

- Targeting of teachers, shortages of teachers in conflict zones
- Destruction and looting of schools
- Diminishing enrollment rates
- Increased desertion rates
- Total collapse of the system
- Lost capacity of the system
- Serious disparities in coverage and quality, especially for victims
- Diversion of resources to military spending

Health

- Increase in drug use, alcohol abuse
- Post-war traumas, especially on children
- Destruction of hospitals
- Falling coverage and quality of services
- Increased incidence of sexually transmitted diseases, including AIDS
- Fall in health indicators, as mortality rates or life expectancy, especially for vulnerable groups and/or population in conflict zone
- Diversion of resources to military spending

Economic growth

Figure 1. Impact of violent conflict on economic growth



	Destruction (stock)	**Accumulation (influx)**
Physical capital	Destruction	- Uncertainty causing falling investment - Capital flight - Increased unproductive spending
Human capital	Deaths	- Brain drain - Diminishing education indicators (ex. desertion rates)

Source: PNUD (2003: 111)

Equality

- Restructuring of society's class stratification towards extremes
- Access to public services, particularly justice and security
- Distribution of the cost of war (who pays, who benefits?) and the burden of war (who fights the war?)

Participation, institutions and governance

- Hostility or decreasing trust and legitimacy towards state institutions
- Collapse or appropriation by armed groups of political and social institutions
- Fragmentation of territorial sovereignty
- Re-localization of political authority at the community, district and regional levels
- Limited access to information and declining transparency of state institutions
- The media's work may exacerbate conflict
- Growing role of NGOs and CSOs in conflict zones in response to the vacuum created by the state. Although they may be the only organization structure left in conflict zones, they can also play an active role in exacerbating conflict
- Territorial control by local war lords, mafias or both instead of legitimate state institutions
- Public goods offered by illegitimate armed actors
- Decreasing access to justice, rise of impunity
- Establishment of ad hoc judicial systems or services
- Replacement of indigenous institutions by international organization administration

- Lost of sovereignty through foreign intervention
- Increased dependence on foreign aid to wage war and/or maintain state services and obligations
- Imposition of electoral candidates by force
- Tempering of electoral processes or results
- Loss of civil and political rights

Other important impacts

- Militarization of social conflicts for land, jobs, resources, etc.
- Destruction of confidence, social fabric and identities
- Loss of ethnic diversity
- Social "learning" of violence ("violence works")
- Failed insertion into the international system and changing international relations
- Changing role of CSOs

Poverty

As the list shows, it is clear that violent conflict causes poverty. The impact of violent conflict on poverty levels can be difficult to assess due to the difficulty of isolating the deprivation specifically caused by conflict. This said, when counting on the appropriate data, NHDR might want to compare poverty levels between peaceful and conflictive regions and through time using the Human Poverty Index or other poverty measurements.

iii. Human Development Index:

Two main reasons explain the low sensitivity of the HDI to violent conflict and its consequent un-usefulness in showing the impact of violent conflict on human development: 1) The HDI is composed of stock variables so it does not capture short-term changes in human development and; 2) The difficulty to isolate the specific effects of violent conflict on the HDI's components. For example, to calculate life expectancy, data will be needed on ages and gender of deaths caused specifically by violent conflict. Or again, school enrollment affected specifically by violent conflict. This last point is especially true when conflicts are very dynamic, both in time and space.

Nonetheless, in some cases, when the data is available and a country lives through a prolonged and widespread conflict it might be possible to measure its effect on the HDI, by comparing regions[x]. This was the case in the Somalia and Sierra Leone Report. This said, much more can be accomplished by considering each component individually.

Another option for NHDR teams may be to "correct" the HDI by adding the homicide rate into the index to compare the intensity of conflict between country and regions. It is of course a mere approximation as homicides are not all caused by armed conflict.[xi]

iv. Vulnerable groups:

Analyzing the plight of the most vulnerable groups or victims is fundamental for an NHDR. Additionally, attention must be given on how certain vulnerable groups may constitute a threat for the conflict's launch or relapse in post/pre conflict situations. This section presents the three main types of victims and/or vulnerable groups according to the NHDR reviewed. Others may include political opponents and dissidents, human rights activists, the poor, local leaders, journalists, intellectuals, artists, ethnic groups and the elderly. Of course, these groups are not mutually exclusive as for example IDPs tend to come from poor households.

Refugees and IDPs: Refugees and IDPs are often the most direct and numerous victims of violent conflicts. They are the worst off in society, the most insecure, presenting the worst human rights situation and the less likely to attain their human development goals. NHDR may want to extend their analysis beyond the number of refugees and IDPs to consider loses in livelihood caused by displacement and the reasons for displacement. Additionally, NHDR will want to precise their analysis by including the problems caused in areas where large populations leave or arrive. For example, what effect does the arrival of IDPs have on the educational system or the use of land?

Youth: Youth and children are a particularly vulnerable group in conflict. Their options may be seriously limited by conflict as educational systems collapse, families displace, parents die, revenues fall, etc. They are also vulnerable to recruitment into armed groups, to sexual exploitation, etc. As the elderly they have few alternate strategies to respond to conflict.

Women: In violent conflicts women bare a particularly heavy load: they sustain families while men are at war, or when their husbands die during war, and face more hardship than them. They are more vulnerable to sexual abuse, prostitution and displacement. As they are usually poorer then men, their vulnerability may increase during conflict. In some cases, armed groups may also focus threats and violence towards particularly active social organizations of women.

3. Prioritize and analyze threats and causes of conflict according to their "human" weight

Guided by the previous assessment, threats to peace and causes of conflict can be identified according to their "human" weight. NHDR teams will need to order causes and threats between structural, operational or systemic (see Annex E). Then, it may be possible to divide between those affecting human security and those who impact human development more widely. First, threats that may affect survival, livelihood and basic dignity should be addressed – human security threats. Then, other causes must be considered according to their effect on the enlargement of people's choices. Generally, structural causes will be associated to human development goals while operational and systemic causes to human security objectives.

Each of those threats and causes may be analyzed separately by establishing how each of them affects human security and development using the impact assessment. In which way is this cause of conflict an obstacle to human development? How does it limit or deny the

expansion of options and for whom specifically? Or conversely, how is the human development situation shaping the threat or cause? Which investments in human development would overcome or mitigate the threat and address the cause? Will this investment affect the causes of violent conflict and in what way? Which policies are in place and maintain those causes and threats? Who are the actors and the responsible institutions? In other words, threats and causes must be understood from the language of human development, from the perspective of human options, human liberties. The identification of causes in this way allows NHDRs to focus their analysis on causes of violent conflicts that have the most bearing for human security and human development. The objective of such an analysis is not to discard a threat or cause (those with little bearing on human development) but rather to prioritize between them and understand how they might constitute an obstacle to fulfill human development goals and how human development strategies and investments might be geared towards them.

The human development approach is useful in this step because it allows NHDRs to understand conflict in a multidimensional way. As development does not depend exclusively of economic growth, a conflict's cause does not depend exclusively on availability of resources for armed groups, or identity politics, for example, but of a combination of causes. This emphasis also means the analysis will contemplate root causes, as exclusion of a group from the decision making process or stagnation of the rural economy, and more immediate "catalyzers", as revenues from the drug trade or hate discourse of the media. What is important is to understand as specifically as possible how those many causes fuel, and move the conflict while underling how these have an impact on human development. An illustration of this relation can be found in the Sierra Leone NHDR: underinvestment in social services has led to an increase in distrust and diminishing options for certain groups in certain regions which increased the recruitment of rebel groups. It also underlines how gross inequalities within the army created violence through distrust.

The complex relation between poverty and conflict deserve a short mention here as poverty eradication is crucial for human development. Although most conflict-prone societies are low-income with minimal capacity, even before the conflict, the linkage between poverty and conflict is certainly not automatic. Poverty can be a good breeding ground for violence but is not necessarily a direct cause. Empirical evidence suggests that in many cases, surpluses can be central causes of violent conflict. Violent conflicts are often financed by these, mostly illegal, sources of funds. Conflict creates and deepens poverty, but the contrary is not necessarily true, as many very poor societies are steadily peaceful. Horizontal inequalities, institutional collapse and other structural factors more than poverty, may be more likely sources of violent conflict. In any case the invitation to NHDR teams is to carefully underline the precise links between poverty and violent conflict. For example, how poor households may be more vulnerable to displacement.

4. Draft policy recommendations

Policy recommendations determine the report's impact and strategic presence in the public policy debate. To guide teams, three essential requirements are suggested: the overall focus of recommendations, the drafting process and key issues and actors.

i. Focus of policy recommendations

It is not enough to consider that development activities be analyzed or "evaluated" through a conflict prevention lens. The lenses must also consider human development. NHDRs must recommend particular sets of development policies in favor of human development while ensuring their actions prevent violent conflict. For example, a rural employment program might provide for additional livelihood in general, but will reduce violent conflict if especially targeted towards young men, who would normally be joining irregular armed forces. An NHDR must strive to prevent and end conflict through the protection of the vital core of human life and the enlargement of people's choices.

A human development framework requires a multidimensional approach. Responses should always be people-centered. The questions are built around people and their communities. These must also be universal, for all people, and non-discriminatory. This focus goes well beyond saving lives; it involves deconstructing the complex system that creates violence. It stresses the need to think within a multidimensional and comprehensive focus, including the social, political, security, humanitarian, economic, cultural and psychological aspects that produce violent conflicts. This involves understanding the complex interconnections between various insecurities and their multi-sector responsibilities. Looking towards human development finally means all policy recommendations must clearly enlarge options of populations, victims and combatants (or violent actors).

ii. The policy recommendation process

In conflict prone countries the process of developing policy recommendations is equally if not more important than the policies themselves. The NHDR team's main task is to offer an organized framework for developing policies to address violent conflict. The purpose of an NHDR is not only to generate enlightened ideas, but also to increase the critical mass of supporters for these ideas so they are effectively implemented. The NHDR's independent status, and the position of UNDP in the process, may provide for the ideal forum to propose and organize a plural and open dialogue. Annex F shows some few examples of policy recommendation processes.

From the start of the process, teams should be as inclusive as possible and include groups and representatives in their interview and focal groups. They should pay particular attention to the identification of successful experiences that have potential to be replicated at a bigger scale or in other parts of the country. At the end of the process, the teams should distribute extensively drafts of policy recommendations. On this basis, seminars with academics, government, NGOs, international cooperation organizations, and other social groups should be organized. The objective is to give these groups the opportunity to express their view points. NHDRs teams may also wish to strengthen this process by organizing special dialogues with particularly important groups, as political wings of armed groups, politicians, the media, etc.

iii. Key issues

On the basis of a proper identification and analysis of violent conflict, an analysis of the impact of the violent conflict on human development and how causes and threats shape human development and vice versa, NHDR teams may select and develop areas for action.

As mentioned above, policy recommendations must act on people's range of options and be as straightforward as possible. Depending on the conflict, the NHDR team may want to differentiate between short, medium or long-term policy recommendations. They may also divide their recommendations according to actors. For example, they could recommend some changes to the international organizations, while others to national and/or regional government or actors. Not only should policy recommendations be concrete, but they should pay particular attention to the actors' rationale and act on them by changing existing incentive in favor of conflict prevention.

The complexity of conflict and the specificity of cases offer a wide range of options to NHDRs. Nonetheless, from the human development perspective three basic general issues may be underlined.

Local dynamics of violent conflicts

A common characteristic of many reviewed NHDRs is the importance of understanding the local dynamics of a violent conflict. In many cases, a violent conflict is especially virulent in specific regions. Even where conflict is a reality for many regions, its characteristics are often quite different form region to region. For these reasons, it is central for policy recommendations to be sensible to these regional disparities. Cultural, historical factors along with disparate economic and social structures have great influence on the way the conflict is understood and resolved. For example, some communities may have a great deal of social capital and solidarity that allows them to organize in such a way they protect themselves from divisions and scare-off violence. In other cases productive arrangements associated with a particular product as sugarcane may provide for closer interdependency and act as a way of protecting against conflict. In other regions the contrary may be the norm, productive arrangements or social structures that facilitate division, feuding and violence.

Timing

There is a need to differentiate between long-term and short-term conflict prevention. Any activity that advances human security, alleviates poverty and the environment, increases respect for human rights, or fosters good and stable governance, contributes in one way or another to long-term, stabilization and the prevention of breakdown and violence. For example, one way is ensuring that stabilization or structural adjustment programs do not contribute to the disintegration of the political and economic bases of people's very existence. In almost all cases, assessing and responding to the underlying root causes of conflicts involves short-term human security and longer-term human development activities. A strategic balance must be reached between short-term needs and longer-term strategic human development goals. The balance is key in order to avoid out of context development and/or conflict prevention activities, ensuring that these improve the security

of people in their daily lives, which proves a solid base to fulfill their human development goals.

New opportunities opened by conflicts:

The devastation and suffering brought about by conflict is accompanied in some cases and in particular circumstances by consequences that may offer new opportunities for human development. It is an important issue for an NHDR's policy recommendations. For example, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the cessation of industrial production during the war allowed for an environmental recovery of ecosystems. In Tajikistan, the civil war allowed: the insertion of the country in the international arena through participation and ratification of international agreements; increased international assistance; environmental recuperation because of the slowdown in use of fertilizers and chemicals in agriculture; the diminished pressure on natural reserves and; the promotion of reconciliation through exchanges and preservation of cultural traditions, new reconciliation programs in schools and inter-ethnic reconstruction.

iv. Policy areas for recommendations:

The following section presents a series of policy areas with key questions to inspire teams in drafting policy recommendations in favor of conflict prevention. Obviously these policy areas may overlap.

Governance: As underlined by conflict prevention, human security and development literature and practice, governance, which is preoccupied with building and strengthening conflict management institutions, is central to the objectives of conflict prevention in line with human development goals. The objective is to create and reinforce national capacity to manage conflicts peacefully. Eventually, democratic conflict management is the best guarantee for peace. This is a fertile area for policy recommendations.

Briefly, three types of institutions will be of particular interest to NHDR teams: macro democratic institutions, micro democratic institutions and; ad hoc conflict management institutions. The first include constitutions and constitutional changes, political and administrative arrangements (federative or unitary state, scope of decentralization, relations and responsibilities between levels, etc.), electoral systems, party systems and legislative decision making processes,. The second, aimed at fostering a culture of peace and resolving social conflicts, may include the resolution of common resources conflicts (land distribution and management institutes, labor tribunals, etc.) but also education, families, religion and social networks. The third type includes peace negotiations, democratic dialogues and forums to reach humanitarian agreements.

Key questions for policy recommendation have to do with the actors involved, participation mechanisms, internal rules, jurisdictions or agendas and implementation of agreements. Additionally, two types of relations will be of interest. First, the relations between the State and society. For example, how municipalities strengthen social links in their communities to resists threats against armed groups. Second, the relations between these three types of

institutions. For example, how a democratic dialogue process may shape or determine constitutional changes, electoral systems, demobilization and land distribution.

Protect vulnerable groups and attend the needs of victims: What is fair compensation for victims? How can they be protected from further harm? Is society expressing solidarity with the victims? Is the protection of vulnerable groups a priority in terms of funding and implementation of special programs? Which options (employment, education, productive assets, etc.) should be offered to individuals vulnerable to recruitment or of getting directly involved in war? Some vulnerable groups or people may also be key motors for peace as women or youth groups.

Security: How can the state improve and assure the safety of civilians? What resources, including personnel and equipment, are needed to support security schemes? Is the sector efficiently organized, what should be the work divisions between police, army and other institutions? Is civilian control of the security sector guaranteed? Is there a need for early warning systems?

Justice: Is the state resolving grievances before they turn violent or people resort to private means? How can the state assure justice as a public good? Can other institutions as NGOs or international organizations play an important role in the provision of justice? Is there any conflict resolution mechanism in place? Can alternative and informal mechanisms be implemented, especially at the local level? How can efficiency of the justice system be improved? Is the justice system effectively punishing offenders, especially the worse ones? Are there incentives to respect the law? Is the justice system geared towards the conflict, is it prioritizing its work to save and protect lives?

Arms and landmines: Which programs should be implemented to prevent the inflow of arms and mines? Are institutions in place to control the sale and distribution of arms? What mechanism should be implemented to track mines? Should disarmament mechanisms be implemented, through which incentives?

Demobilization: What are the conditions for collective and individual demobilizations? Is enough being done to promote the demobilization of combatants? Are incentives balanced with the aspirations of possible demobilized combatants? Which institutions should be in charge of demobilization, military or civilian institutions? What type of mechanisms should be put in place to demobilize combatants? How can the process be fair and efficient? What are the possible costs and sources of financing for demobilization? Who should be involved? Which mechanisms will allow for reintegration to civilian life of combatants? Which benefits are best to facilitate reintegration? What type of truth and pardon arrangements be implemented with demobilizations?

Resources: Which mechanisms should be implemented to avoid the exploitation of legitimate resources (as petroleum, diamonds, gold, etc.) by armed groups? How may the government intervene to protect those resources? What is the role of the international community, the buyers and traders? Are private companies given incentives to stay out of the war business? How can the traffic of drugs and other illegal resources be reduced or eliminated? Otherwise, how, can the financing of armed groups through these resources be

reduced? How can law enforcement efforts de geared against those illegal rents so they reduce violent conflict?

International involvement: As development, conflict prevention is not the sole responsibility of the international community it is the primary responsibility of governments and their societies. In his report, the Secretary General, made the point that the main role for the United Nations and the international community is to support national efforts for conflict prevention and assist in building national capacity in this field. Thus, conflict prevention mainstreaming should focus first and foremost on national mechanisms and institutions to manage conflict in society in a peaceful manner. How does foreign involvement which promotes conflict be discouraged? Which and how can other countries or international institutions contribute to peace? Are donors mainstreaming conflict prevention into their strategies? Should they be involved in peace negotiations or democratic dialogues for conflict prevention? Other resources for recommendations in this area include some conflict analysis tools as the one developed by DFID showed in Table 1 and guidelines for donors prepared by institutions such as the OECD.

National overall strategies: Is national policy prioritizing conflict prevention? Is it comprehensive and coordinated? Are governments and other actors mainstreaming conflict prevention into their strategies? What changes should be applied to existing policies to avoid perverse effects or prevent them causing harm? How can the government and other actors' budgetary priorities be directed towards conflict prevention? How can investment be more specifically geared towards operational, systemic and structural causes? What should be the correct distribution?

Respect for International Humanitarian Law: What can be done to increase knowledge and respect of IHL? Can communication and dissemination programs be implemented? Who should be targeted?

The private sector: how can the private sector contribute to conflict prevention, in terms of job creation, economic growth, financing of peace, etc? How can industries benefiting from conflict be given incentives against it to favor conflict prevention? What alliances can be established between the private and public sector to promote peace?

The Media, NGOs and CSOs: How can those actors play a decisive and proactive role in favor of conflict prevention? What programs and incentives can be implemented to deepen their commitment? What role should international NGOs and the organizations that finance them have?

Globalization: How may globalization be a force for peace? Can the influence of the influx of arms, money-laundering networks and drug trafficking on violent conflict be curbed? What can financial institutions do to help? What can arms producing countries do to help?

5. Ensure a vigorous communications and dissemination strategy

Lastly but not least, NHDR team should devote energy and resources in disseminating, communicating and raising the awareness of specific constituencies on policy proposals. As

the NHDR Corporate Policy underlines the report does not end with its publication. On the contrary, the impact of the NHDR will be dependent on the participatory process and the dissemination strategy. In each and every country innovative ways may be designed to disseminate the report. It is important to remember that in conflict prone countries, some issues might need private dissemination mechanisms rather than public events.

Successful experiences include: workshops with international organizations and national NGOs working in conflict zones, workshops in foreign capitals of involved countries, weekly radio program, journalistic summaries, policy specific workshops with top national and international decision makers, creation of network of practitioners specialized in conflict in the country and region, electronic bulletin boards and publication of regional studies, organization of training sessions with key organizations and partners, and production of training materials including guides to proposals, summaries and videos.

Part 3: Conflict and Conflict prevention indicators for NHDRs:

In spite of the existing literature very few indicators of violent conflict have been used by NHDRs. Some indicators of human security have been developed in countries were there was no violent conflict. A good deal of work has been devoted as well to the development of conflict indicators which relate to the four basic elements of conflict analysis (See resources section) The challenge for NHDRs is not to copy one of the many conflict indicators but to determine which ones can be used in conjunction with the HDI and other human development indicators, and/or which conflict indicators are sensible to or incorporate human development components.

In addition to common indicators used to illustrate the intensity of violence and its impact on human development as homicide rates, conflict related deaths, population uprooted by conflict, crime levels, death and birth rates, cost of war to GDP, effect of violence on life expectancy, massacres, and specific social indicators for IDPs, some new indicators have also been developed.

The Armenian report presents a social tension and change table that includes suicides, prisoners, drug related crimes, premeditates homicides and divorces. The Georgian report uses vulnerability indicators to access which groups are the most vulnerable in society. They then elaborate a vulnerability and capacity matrix.

The Colombian report uses homicide rates to adjust the human development index for a set of 65 countries and for Colombia's regions. It also develops an index of non degradation of conflict which measures the weight of homicides in combat on the total of politically motivated homicides to asses if conflict is more or less degraded. It also develops an index to measure the intensity of internal displacement, by dividing the total of displaced persons in a region on total population of that region; and an index of displacement pressure, which divides total displaced people, form any region, on the population of a region. This allows the NHDR to illustrate the "amount" of displacement and the pressure of displacement on each region.

An interesting area to explore is how to use existing conflict indicators in combination with human development indicators. Should only some components of the HDI be used? The experience with Peace and Conflict Impact Assessments (PCIA) could be used. Could composite indicators be elaborated? What is the best way to use the HDI in this context?

Annex A: List of NHDRs reviewed:

Country	Year	Theme/Title	Available online
Albania	1998	Albanian Human Development Report	http://undp.org.al/download/pdf/hdr98.pdf
Armenia	2000	Human Rights and Action for Progress Human Development	http://www.undp.am/archive/Nhdr/nhdr00/
Azerbaijan	2000	Human Development Report	http://www.un-az.org/undp/doc/Eng2000.pdf
Azerbaijan	1996	General Human Development Report	http://www.un-az.org/undp/doc/Eng1996.pdf
Azerbaijan	1995	Impact of the Transition	http://www.un-az.org/undp/doc/Eng1995.pdf
Bosnia – Herzegovina	1998	Human Development after war	N/A
Colombia	1999	Human Development Report	http://www.pnud.org.co/Informes/IDH-COL-1999.pdf
Colombia	2003	Armed conflict	http://www.pnud.org.co/indh2003
Eastern and Central Europe and the CIS	1999	Human Development Report	N/A
Estonia	1999	Human Development and Conflict in simultaneously occurring processes of modernization and post-modernization	http://www.undp.ee/nhdr99/
Georgia	1996	General Human Development Report	http://www.undp.org/rbec/nhdr/1996/georgia/
Kazakstan	1995	Human Development Report	http://www.undp.org/rbec/nhdr/kazakstan/
Kazakstan	1996	Human Development Report	N/A
Latvia	1995	Human Development Report	http://ano.deac.lv/html_e/index_09_01.htm
Lithuania	1998	Human Development Report	http://www.un.lt/HDR/1998/default.htm
SADC	1998		N/A
Sierra Leone	1998	From civil Conflict to Human Security	N/A
Somalia	2001	Human Development Report	N/A
Sri Lanka	1998	Regional Dimensions of Human Dev.	http://www.undp.org/rbap/NHDR/Srilanka98.PDF
Tajikistan	1995	Human Development Report	http://www.undp.org/rbec/nhdr/tajikistan/
Tajikistan	1996	Human Development Report	http://www.undp.org/rbec/nhdr/1996/tajikistan/

Other NHDRs on conflict and human security not reviewed in the note:

Chile	1998	**Paradoxes of Modernity: Human Security**	http://www.undp.org/rbec/pubs/nhdr97/summary/yugoslavia.htm

Yugoslavia	1996	Human Development Report	http://home.birzeit.edu/dsp/DSPNEW/hdr/PHDR2002/pdf/chapter1.pdf
Palestine	2002	Human Development Report	http://home.birzeit.edu/dsp/phdr/2002/

Annex B: Comparative table of conflict prevention and human security

	Conflict Prevention	Human Security
Relation between violent conflict and development	Mainstreaming of conflict prevention in development activities, especially in regards to structural threats. Coordination of development and humanitarian actors.	Symbiotic relation in line with long-term human fulfillment Joint focus on poverty and violence
Importance of governance	Conflict Management Institutions Hopefully locally-based with empowerment of stakeholders	Governance makes sure that human security actions are in line with long term human fulfillment
Foremost objective	Preventing Violent conflict	Protecting the vital core of human life, survival, livelihood and basic dignity
Acts upon	Systemic, structural and operational *threats and causes*, with particular emphasis on the structural (underlying roots causes)	Critical and pervasive *threats* to the vital core of human life
Type of actions	Preventive actions in conflict prone; preventing continuation of conflict, and preventing the reoccurrence of violence in post-conflict situations	Preventive (including mitigation, and response to the victims) and; Respect: no actors should threaten human security "Safeguard"
Time frame	Short and long terms	Shorter term

Annex C: Examples of participatory instruments for drafting NHDRs on conflict and conflict prevention.

NHDR	Participatory Instruments
Armenia 2000	Interviews to groups, especially from NGOs dedicated to conflict resolution and human rights groups Reviewed and supported by the HD Expert's Club
Albania 1998	Interviews with prominent personalities
Azerbaijan 1996	Consultations with ministries of economy, health, education and social security. Meetings with state committees for refugees and IDPs as well as for environment Consultation meetings with International community and NGOs
Tajikistan 1996	Interviews with UN system staff, academics, and government ministries
Latvia 1995	Each chapter is drafted by a different policy maker, journalist or academic and then critiqued by a well-known commentator. The draft are also presented to the National Steering Committee, including government representatives
Colombia 2003	National Consultative Committee, 14 Regional Consultative Committees, network of regional journalist and academics, academic committee of experts on Colombia's conflict, workshops with UN agencies, workshops in regions with mayors and social actors, policy area workshops with experts and interviews, workshops with journalist form all over the country.
Somalia 2001	Regional Reading circles for comments and input to the report. Consultation meetings with UN agencies and other NGO groups.

Annex D: Violent conflicts in NHDRs

NHDR	Violent conflict	Main Actors	Status
Somalia 2001	Civil war after state collapse Clan and irregular army clashes in particular in the south of the country Political violence	Clans – Over 30 factions and political movements – Forces of the Republic of Somaliland Puntland State of Somalia – Rahanweyn Resistance Army - Transitional National Government	Ongoing in the south, potential in all other areas
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1998	Civil war on ethnical group bases Returnees may clash whit settled communities, again on ethnic grounds	Armed groups of civilians – Police and army troops	Potential in all regions
Georgia 1996	Clashes provoked by Ossetians sovereignist aspirations (Tskhinvali region War in Abkhazia Political clashes	Armed militias of Tskhinvali and Abkhazia regions – Russian Army - Georgian Army War lords, Paramilitary formations – Government troops	Both are described as "suspended" conflicts, although "hostilities periodically flare up" in the Abkhazia region Potential
Estonia 1999	Ethnic separation Rising crime	Mainly Estonians, Russians and Ukrainians Organized crime groups – police	Potential Ongoing
Lithuania 1998	Rising crime	Organized crime groups – police	Ongoing
Latvia 1995	Rising crime	Organized crime groups – police	Ongoing
Eastern Europe and CIS 1999	Civil wars in Ex Yugoslavia, Georgia, Tajikistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia (Chechnya) Growing human insecurity Rising crime	States Organized crime groups – police	Ongoing and Potential Potential Ongoing
Albania 1998	Political and social conflict since 1997, rising crime	State –Organized Crime – Armed citizens	Ongoing
Kazakhstan 1995	Rising crime	Organized crime groups – police	Ongoing
Armenia 2000	Conflict with Azerbaijan in Nagorno Karabagh	Troops of Armenia, Azerbaijan and the Republic of Nagorno Karabagh	Post conflict/potential "the cease-fire is violated form time to time"
Sri Lanka 1998	Secessionist conflict in the North Eastern Provinces	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam – National Army	Ongoing
Colombia 2003	Internal conflict involving the state, civil society, two left wing guerillas and a number of right wing paramilitary groups	The government and its agencies, AUC paramilitary group, other paramilitary group, FARC, ELN, CSOs, the Media, International community.	Ongoing
Colombia	Irregular war between	National Army – FARC and	Ongoing

1998	different insurgent groups	ELN guerrilla groups – Paramilitaries	
Azerbaijan 1996	Conflict with Armenia since 1988	Troops of Armenia, Azerbaijan and the Republic of Nagorno Karabagh	Potential
Azerbaijan 2000	Conflict with Armenia since 1988	Troops of Armenia, Azerbaijan and the Republic of Nagorno Karabagh	Potential
Tajikistan 1995	Civil war of 1992-1993 Armed conflict and political unrest, especially in the south Political and economic reforms	Armed political factions (oppositionists) – Self-defense groups criminal groups – government troops	Reconciliation Ongoing Potential
Tajikistan 1996	Civil war of 1992-1993 Presence of an armed and militant opposition in the Karetegin Valley with related rising crime Terrorism Political unrest	Armed political factions (oppositionists) – Self-defense groups criminal groups – government troops	Reconciliation Ongoing Ongoing Potential
Sierra Leone 1998	Civil war	Rebel factions – government troops	Ongoing

Annex E.: Causes and threats of violent conflict according to NHDRs:

NHDR	Structural	Systemic/ proximate	Operational/ accelerators and triggers
Somalia 2001	- Crisis in development: collapse of social services, erosion of property rights, disruption of livelihoods, forced displacement, stagnation of the economy, in particular rural. - Application of alien systems of governance - State Collapse	- Globalization - Terms of trade, in particular for livestock - Presence of global crime syndicates	- Clan based society - Religious extremism - Climatic stress - Unsettlement of post-war justice* - Privatization of social services* - Presence of large amounts if arms - Unsettlement of IDPs*
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1998	- Inadecuate institutional set-up given the ethnic structure - Incomplete and still dysfunctional institutions - Deep dependency on international actors* -Limitations to the exercise of full citizenship for all - No implementation of human rights instruments	- Economic and political transition	- Refugees and IDPs movements* - Integration of returnees* - Decentralization may lead to disintegration* - Police inaction - Nationalistic discourses in relations with the media and territorial aspirations*
Georgia 1996	- Weakness of economic and political institutions - Lack of collective responsibility - Ethnic tensions and inequalities - Environmental degradation - Vulnerability of large parts of society (because of low income, unemployment, displacement, nutrition, housing, participation, social services)	- Economic and political transition	- Revival of military actions in one of the conflict zones* - Mined fields - Natural disasters* - Unsettlement of IDPs*
Estonia 1999	- Un-preparedness of institutions to cope with change - Structural weakness of the security sector - Unemployment, inequality and corruption - Citizen's deficit and postponed definition of identity	- Networks of international organized crime	- Fast transition to market economics and democracy - Increasingly repressive security sector
Lithuania 1998	- Un-preparedness of institutions to cope with change - Structural weakness of the security sector - Unemployment, inequality and corruption	- Networks of international organized crime	- Fast transition to market economics and democracy - Increasingly repressive security sector
Latvia 1995	- Un-preparedness of institutions to cope with change - Structural weakness of the security sector - Unemployment, inequality and corruption	- Networks of international organized crime	- Fast transition to market economics and democracy
Eastern Europe	- Un-preparedness of institutions	- Networks of	-Fast transition to market

and CIS 1999	to cope with change - Structural weakness of the security sector - Unemployment, inequality and corruption	international organized crime	economics and democracy
Albania 1998	- "Kanun" code - Tradition of vendetta - Low levels of education - Low valorization of community life and solidarity - Absence of institutions, particularly for justice	- Globalization; networks of international organized crime - Transition from communism to a form of salvage capitalism	-Collapse of pyramidal saving schemes in 1997 - Large influx of arms
Kazakhstan 1995	- Traditional political confrontations - Difficulty to adapt to the market "mentality" - Unemployment and inequalities, particularly for the youth -Regional inequalities Institutional incapacity to regulate	- Globalization poses a challenge to economic management combined with political and economic transition - Networks of international organized crime - Arms trafficking	- Hyperinflation and economic crisis (due to collapse of production) around 1994
Armenia 2000	- Complex ethnic composition and the perceived inequalities - USSR's policies regarding ethnic settlements	-Implicitly the transitions to democracy and market economics	- Azerbaijan's occupation of Nagorno Karabagh - Unsettlement of IDPs*
Sri Lanka 1998	- Historical claims of tamil ethnic groups and their perceived ethnic inequalities	N/A	- Attacks of Tamil Tigers since 1983
Colombia 1998	- Inequalities in access to goods and services to which the populations has rights to. - Access to the new sources of wealth - No access of large groups in society to political rights and institutions.	- Pressures for macroeconomic stability	- Presence of large amounts of resources (legal and illegal) - Drug trafficking
Colombia 2003	- Armed actors, including the state are simultaneously and in different degrees: a political project, a military apparatus, an actor in local social conflicts, a rent seeker, a way of life, a territorial power, an author of degraded violence, and an obstacle to human development. - Individual rationalities respond to local signals given by the environment to favor violent behavior	- Involvement of the international community, especially the USA in its war on drugs - Week insertion into the international system	- Degradation of conflict, including terrorism, - Drug trafficking
Azerbaijan 1996	- Inadequate institutions for economic management - Environmental crisis*	- Transition to market economics and democracy	-Increase in IDPs and their nutritional insecurity*

	- Institutional failure in health, education and provision of food	- Pressures for macroeconomic stability - Globalization	- Increase in criminal activities - Increase in infectious diseases
Azerbaijan 2000	- Ethnic differences and historical claims to territory - Institutional set-up to manage the refugee and IDP situation; environmental degradation and unemployment, in particular for IDPs and refugees*	- Dependency on international oil prices	N/A
Tajikistan 1995	- Economic and political transition creating institutional instability and fragility, in particular in the economic sphere - Ethnic diversity - Regional inequalities - Permanent tension between centralization and decentralization	- Economic and political transition coupled with globalization	- Unsettlement of IDPs*
Tajikistan 1996	- Non-existent or fragile state institutions to deal with transition and bring about a universal sense of national pride and identity - Ethnical diversity - Opposing views of the future: religious exclusivism vs. secular pluralism	- Economic and political transition coupled with globalization	- Economic crisis, including collapse of industrial and agricultural production, high inflation. - Natural disasters as mud slides and floods*
Sierra Leone 1998	- Political misrule and lack of a strong development mission leading to deteriorating social and economical conditions. - Centralization of power and twenty years of dictatorship - Poverty and lack of equitable access to economic resources and opportunities. - Social injustice stemming from disparities in income, limited or no access to education for the majority, neglect of the rural sector and an obsolete and inefficient judicial system	- Spill over from the conflict in Liberia - Financial support from Libya	- Ndogborwusu conflict in Southern Sierra Leone - Unfavorable socioeconomic situation - Maltreatment of children of less favored wives, forcing children to join rebel movements to seek revenge - Extravagant lifestyle of high ranking officials in the Army - NGOs providing help and ammunitions to rebels - Opportunistic politicians, exploiting ethnic and regional differences. - Unsettlement of IDPs*

* Specifically mentioned as a threat rather than a cause.

Annex F: Policy recommendations on conflict in NHDRs:

NHDR	Governance	Vulnerable groups	Other
Somalia 2001	Reconstruction of a hybrid judicial system combining modern and traditional codes	Elaboration of a system of governance that is responsive to people's needs, protects their rights, and reconciles an inherently democratic political culture with modern democratic ideals.	Formulation of combined human development and humanitarian strategies, because of the interdependence of both objectives
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1998	Social Reconstruction Reinforcement of local self rule and NGOs as civil society builders Strengthening of capacity building Harmonization of process in all entities Institution building with equal rights for all	Social reconstruction with especial focus on refugees and IDPs	
Estonia 1999 **Lithuania 1998** **Latvia 1995**	Institutional building and state reform. Conduct criminology research Reorganization and reform of the judicial system Police decentralization	Improvement of living conditions for inmates (Latvia)	
Eastern Europe and CIS 1999	Statehood strengthening Strengthening of criminal judicial systems, including police, criminal justice and prisons.		
Albania 1998	Increase mechanisms to create solidarity and transform values away from traditional violent codes		
Kazakhstan 1995	Institutional building in tune with the market		
Armenia 2000	Make institutions promoters of a culture of peace	Protection of Human Rights of IDPs. Solve the Human Rights Problem that persist in the Army	Assure that national security is understood with human security
Sri Lanka 1998	Building of a national wide consensus in favor of a political solution to the conflict Continue the rehabilitation and reconstruction effort		
Colombia 1998			Attack poverty and inequality through focalization
Colombia 2003	-Reform of politics	-Mechanisms to favor	-Reorient the efforts of

	-Reform of the security and justice system -Mechanisms to resolve local social conflicts -Promote peace negotiations -Reorient the role of municipalities in favor of peace -Promote collective actions against violence -Reorient the efforts of the educational sector	the respect of International Humanitarian Law -Give options to vulnerable youth -Reform the system which attends the needs of victims	CSO, the media and the international community in favor of peace -The role of Colombian diplomacy -Demobilize combatants individually and collectively -Reduction of drug trafficking and its impact on the conflict -Protection of legitimate resources so they do not finance armed groups
Azerbaijan 1996		Rehabilitation of war victims, as refugees and IDPs through a contributive social security system Urges policy makers to consider all aspects (social, economical, sociological) for the reintegration of combatants and the settlement of IDPs and refugee Special program for women and girl IDPs	Reform of agriculture and property regime for land
Azerbaijan 2000	Implementation of local level institutions	Stabilization program for IDPs	Need to offer solutions to the environmental problem so as to prevent further conflicts
Tajikistan 1995	Territorial and agrarian reform	Planning of return for IDPs	Employment program Reconciliation program independently of the peace process Need to strengthen external aid and presence
Sierra Leone 1998	Provide firm, decisive leadership in parallel with decentralized democratic governance Increase external resource mobilization and effective donor coordination.		Priority on concluding the rebel war. Assure higher levels of poverty-reducing economic growth, with traditional and non-traditional activities, promotion of the private sector. Increased allocations for human resources development and social sector development Development human resources and capabilities.

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[i] See Kaldor (2001)
[ii] The list of NHDRs reviewed can be found in Annex A.
[iii] Mitchell, Chris (XXXX) , *The Structure of International Conflict, …*
[iv] For Riches (1986: 8) , violence is the assertion of power, an act of physical hurt deemed legitimate by the performer and by (some) witnesses.
[v] See Galtung (1990) for a full discussion on cultural violence and cultural peace.
[vi] War is a state of confrontation in which the possibility of violence is always present and deemed legitimate by the perpetrating party, and in which actual violent encounters occur on a regular basis. It also means a relationship of political collectivities above the family level, ranging from bands or segmentary lineage to states. The decision to go to war is made by those who hold power in society. War occurs when those who make the decision to fight estimate that it is in their material interests to do so.
(Ferguson, 1990:30)
[vii] See PNUD (2003: 99-115), for an analysis and application of these concepts in the Colombian context.
[viii] From the address of the Secretary-General upon presentation of the Final Repot of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, New York, 5 February 1998.
[ix] Alkire, (2002)
[x] See UNDP (2003), Human Development Report 2003, Oxford University Press, New York, p. 48.
[xi] See PNUD (2003: 102), for an example between 65 countries and for Colombia's departments.